In Re The Guardianship Of: Kristen Jean Bernoski

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: June 8, 2026
• Docket: 87971-5
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF: No. 87971-5-I

KRISTEN JEAN BERNOSKI. DIVISION ONE

NANCY BRUSH, UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Respondent,

v.

JANET BERNOSKI,

Appellant.

COBURN, J. — Representing herself below and on appeal, Janet Bernoski

challenges the trial court commissioner’s order 1 removing her as guardian and claimed

conservator for her adult sister Kristen Bernoski and appointing Nancy Brush as

temporary full successor guardian and conservator for Kristen. 2 Because Janet’s appeal

is untimely under RAP 5.2 and she otherwise fails to support her arguments with

citations to the record or authority as required under RAP 10.3(a)(6), we dismiss her

1 Janet’s notice of appeal does not designate an order as required under RAP 5.3, and instead designates an order dated March 24, 2025, of which none exists in the record. Brush asks this court to dismiss Janet’s appeal on this basis. Because we dismiss the appeal under RAP 5.2 and RAP 10.3(a)(6), we need not address RAP 5.3 and exercise our discretion to characterize Janet’s appeal to the best we can discern from her briefing. See RAP 1.2(a). 2 For clarity, we use first names for individuals that share the same surname. 87971-5-I/2

appeal.

FACTS 3

In August 2016 Janet was appointed as full guardian for her sister Kristen. In

May 2024 Kristen received a Notice of Termination of Service requiring her to vacate

the Greenwood Home residential facility, where she had lived for more than 15 years.

Greenwood Home terminated Kristen’s residence on the basis that Janet’s behaviors

compromised the level of care of the facility’s residents. During Kristen’s residence at

the Greenwood Home, Janet mispresented conversations she had with the facility,

questioned staff on the performance of managers that undermined the administration

and created divisiveness amongst staff, threatened lawsuits and reports to state

agencies, and acted in a disruptive manner to the detriment of Kristen and other

residents.

Nancy Brush, who is also a sister to Kristen, subsequently filed a petition to

remove Janet as Kristen’s guardian and conservator and to appoint a successor

guardian and conservator. 4 Brush noted her petition as an “[e]mergency [m]otion[ ]” on

the commissioner’s ex parte calendar. A hearing was held on July 22, 2024, at which

Bernoski was present and represented herself pro se. After hearing argument from both

3 The facts are largely derived from the findings underlying the commissioner’s August 23, 2024, order removing Janet as guardian and appointing Bruch as successor guardian and conservator. Janet does not assign error to the commissioner’s findings, thereby making them verities on appeal. In re Marriage of Drlik, 121 Wn. App. 269, 275, 87 P.3d 1192 (2004); see RAP 10.3(g) (“A separate assignment of error for each finding of fact a party contends was improperly made must be included with reference to the finding by number. The appellate court will only review a claimed error which is included in an assignment of error or clearly disclosed in the associated issue pertaining thereto.”). 4 The clerk’s papers do not include the petition that initiated the commissioner’s order that Janet challenges on appeal. The omission of the petition in the appellate record violates RAP 9.6(c)(1)(C). 2 87971-5-I/3

parties, the commissioner decided he needed more information before making a

decision and appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) to investigate and provide a report

and recommendations as to whether “the actions [Janet] has taken as Guardian and

Conservator, or Guardian of Person and Estate, amount to breaches of her fiduciary

duty or have so significantly impacted [Kristen’s] circumstances that it would be

otherwise appropriate that she be removed as Guardian and Conservator or Guardian

of Person and Estate.”

A subsequent hearing on the petition was held on August 22, at which Bernoski

again appeared and represented herself. At the hearing, the GAL provided a summary

of her findings and recommendations, and the commissioner heard additional argument

from both parties. Brush’s counsel argued that Janet was not Kristen’s conservator and

did not have authority to access her financial information. The following day, on August

23, the commissioner entered an order wherein it concluded that Janet “was appointed

and has served only as full guardian of” Kristen and Janet was neither the full guardian

of Kristen’s estate nor the conservator for Kristen. The commissioner determined that

Janet’s “aggressive and confrontational” advocacy was detrimental to Kristen’s best

interest, Janet failed in her duties and obligations as Kristen’s full guardian and “in her

assumed role” as full guardian of Kristen’s estate, and Janet’s removal was in Kristen’s

best interest. The commissioner removed Janet as Kristen’s full guardian and “alleged”

conservator, revoked all letters of guardianship to Janet, and appointed Brush as

temporary full successor guardian and conservator for Kristen under RCW 11.130.350

and RCW 11.130.565 of the Uniform Guardianship, Conservatorship, and other

3 87971-5-I/4

Protective Arrangements Act. 5

On February 24, 2025, the commissioner entered a judgment, ordering that Janet

pay attorney fees and costs to the Kristen Bernoski Special Needs Trust with post-

judgment interest. That same day the commissioner entered an order granting attorney

fees to Brush under RCW 11.96A.150. On February 28 the commissioner ordered that

Janet pay attorney fees and costs with post-judgment interest to Brush as conservator

for Kristen’s estate.

Janet appeals.

DISCUSSION

As a preliminary matter, we observe that Janet represents herself on appeal.

Though we acknowledge the inherent difficulties of self-representation, we hold pro se

litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and expect them to follow the

Rules of Appellate Procedure (RAPs). In re Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 626,

850 P.2d 527 (1993); In re Est. of Little, 9 Wn. App. 2d 262, 274 n.4, 444 P.3d 23

(2019). “The scope of a given appeal is determined by the notice of appeal, the

assignments of error, and the substantive argumentation of the parties.” Clark County v.

W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Rev. Bd., 177 Wn.2d 136, 144, 298 P.3d 704 (2013)

(citing RAP 5.3(a); RAP 10.3(a), (g); RAP 12.1)). The RAPs “govern proceedings in the

Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for review of a trial court decision.” RAP

1.1(a). We liberally interpret these rules to promote justice and facilitate the decision of

cases on the merits. RAP 1.2(a). However, a litigant’s failure to comply with appellate

procedure rules may preclude our review. See State v. Marintorres, 93 Wn. App. 442,

5 Ch. 11.130 RCW. 4 87971-5-I/5

452, 969 P.2d 501 (1999); Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801,

809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).

Timeliness

Janet contends that she was improperly removed as Kristen’s guardian and

conservator. Her appeal of the commissioner’s August 23, 2024, order removing her as

guardian and claimed conservator and appointing Brush as temporary full successor

guardian and conservator is untimely.

Whether an appellant seeks to challenge a trial court’s final decision or seeks

discretionary review of an interlocutory order, the appellant must generally file a notice

of appeal or notice for discretionary review within 30 days of entry of the trial court’s

order. RAP 5.2(a), (b). Here, Janet filed her notice of appeal on March 25, 2025, more

than seven months after the commissioner entered the order removing her as guardian

and claimed conservator. Janet has not asked us to enlarge the time to file her appeal

and consider its merits. See RAP 18.8(b) (“The appellate court will only in extraordinary

circumstances and to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice extend the time within

which a party must file a notice of appeal … [or] notice for discretionary review.”).

Therefore, Janet’s appeal of the August 23, 2024, order is untimely under RAP 5.2.

It is not apparent from Janet’s briefing whether she challenges any of the

commissioner’s subsequent orders designated on appeal. Janet’s notice of appeal was

not filed within 30 days of any of these subsequent orders except for the

commissioner’s February 28, 2025, judgment ordering Janet to pay attorney fees and

costs to Brush as conservator for Kristen’s estate. However, even if we could say that

Janet seeks review of the February 28 judgment, her briefing is insufficient under RAP

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10.3(a)(6).

Insufficient Briefing

RAP 10.3 states the general requirements for the appellant’s brief. RAP

10.3(a)(5) explains that the appellant’s brief must include a “fair statement of the facts

and procedure relevant to the issues presented for review, without argument. Reference

to the record must be included for each factual statement.” (Emphasis added.) RAP

10.3(a)(6) requires that the brief contain “argument in support of the issues presented

for review, together with citations to legal authority and references to relevant parts of

the record. … The court ordinarily encourages a concise statement of the standard of

review as to each issue.” (Emphasis added.) We need not consider arguments that are

not supported by relevant references to the record, meaningful analysis, or citation to

pertinent authority. Norcon Builders, LLC v. GMP Homes VG, LLC, 161 Wn. App. 474,

486, 254 P.3d 835 (2011); Cowiche, 118 Wn.2d at 809. “‘Passing treatment of an issue

or lack of reasoned argument is insufficient to merit judicial consideration.’” Little, 9 Wn.

App. 2d at 274 n.4 (quoting Holland v. City of Tacoma, 90 Wn. App. 533, 538, 954 P.2d

290 (1998)).

Janet does not provide any legal authorities in the statement of authorities

section of her opening brief. 6 At the end of this section, Janet appears to summarize the

designated record, providing a list of broad citations to transcript volumes and clerk’s

papers. Her brief is otherwise completely devoid of cites to the trial court record to

support her various factual assertions and allegations. Without references to the record,

we are unable to determine if any of her statements are supported by, or even based

6 Janet did not submit a reply brief. 6 87971-5-I/7

on, the record and issues before us. 7 “[W]e will not comb the record to find support for

an appellant’s argument.” Fishburn v. Pierce County Planning & Land Services Dep’t,

161 Wn. App. 452, 468, 250 P.3d 146 (2011).

Though Janet asserts that the commissioner abused its discretion in “critical

rulings” and improperly “prevented evidence” she does not cite legal authority to support

these bald claims. Her various broad and conclusory assertions, such as that the trial

court violated her constitutional rights, lack reference to any controlling legal authority

and are inadequate for this court’s review. See West v. Thurston County, 168 Wn. App.

162, 187, 275 P.3d 1200 (2012); see also Seven Gables Corp. v. MGM/UA Ent. Co.,

106 Wn.2d 1, 14, 721 P.2d 1 (1986) (“‘[N]aked castings into the constitutional sea are

not sufficient to command judicial consideration and discussion.’”) (quoting United

States v. Phillips, 433 F.2d 1364, 1366 (8th Cir. 1970)). Much of Janet’s brief seems to

refer to separate matters, including claims that various individuals “will be prosecuted,”

and is unintelligible to the matter that she appears to appeal. Janet’s failure to comply

with the RAPs by providing citations to the record and reasoned argument with

controlling legal authority makes it impossible to reach the merits of her appeal. 8

Because Janet’s appeal of the commissioner’s August 23, 2024, removal order is

untimely and her briefing violations preclude this court’s review, we dismiss her appeal. 9

7 Janet also asks this court to subpoena medical records as well as staff records from the Greenwood Home. An appellant is limited to the record on appeal. See RAP 9.1(a) (stating that record on review consists of clerk’s papers, a report of proceedings, and exhibits). Appellate courts do not issue subpoenas. The party seeking review has the burden of producing a record that provides the appellate court with all the relevant evidence necessary to decide the issues on appeal. Bulzomi v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 72 Wn. App. 522, 525, 864 P.2d 996 (1994); Starczewsky v. Uniguard Ins. Grp., 61 Wn. App. 267, 276, 810 P.2d 58 (1991). 8 For this same reason, we do not consider Janet’s bald request for attorney fees. 9 Because we dismiss Janet’s appeal for untimeliness and insufficient briefing, we need not consider Brush’s argument that the removal order is not appealable under RAP 2.2(a). 7 87971-5-I/8

Brush’s Request for Appellate Attorney Fees

Brush requests attorney fees and costs under RAP 18.1(a) and RCW 11.96A.150

or, alternatively, under RAP 18.9(a). RAP 18.1(a) permits this court to award reasonable

attorney fees to a party entitled to recover such fees under applicable law. RCW

11.96A.150(1) authorizes an appellate court the discretion to award costs, including

attorney fees, in guardianship litigation “in such amount and in such manner as the

court determines to be equitable.” See In re Guardianship of Decker, 188 Wn. App. 429,

451-52, 353 P.3d 669 (2015); In re Guardianship of Mesler, 21 Wn. App. 2d 682, 719-

20, 507 P.3d 864 (2022). The statute further provides that “[i]n exercising its discretion

under this section, the court may consider any and all factors that it deems to be

relevant and appropriate, which factors may but need not include whether the litigation

benefits the estate or trust involved.” RCW 11.96A.150(1). Janet has not filed a reply

brief opposing Brush’s request for fees. Because Janet’s opening brief fails to meet

appellate procedural requirements and does not provide any reasoned argument to

support her appeal, we exercise our discretion under RCW 11.96A.150(1) to award

reasonable appellate attorney fees and costs to Brush. We therefore need not reach her

alternative request under RAP 18.9(a).

CONCLUSION

We dismiss Janet’s appeal under RAP 5.2 and RAP 10.3(a)(6) and award Brush

8 87971-5-I/9

reasonable attorney fees and costs subject to her compliance with RAP 18.1(d).

WE CONCUR: