In re the Estate of Thompson

126 Misc. 91, 213 N.Y.S. 426, 1925 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1047
New York Surrogate's Court·Decided November 23, 1925·Published·Cited by 5 cases

Opinion

Foley, S.

This is a proceeding for the construction of the will, and particularly paragraph 8 thereof. That paragraph reads as follows: I give and bequeath to each of my faithful servants Lena Anderson and Weldon Kershaw, if in my employment at the time of my death, the sum of Fifteen thousand dollars, and to each person not named above, who shall have been in my service ten years or more immediately preceding my decease the sum of Ten thousand dollars, and to each person who has been in my service for five years immediately preceding my decease the sum of Five thousand dollars.”

The decedent left an estate of $10,000,000. The residue is ultimately to go to certain charitable and educational corporations and institutions. The terms of the will and the extrinsic testimony evince the great interest of the testatrix in the many employees of her household and upon her estates.

Various persons claiming to be in the service of the testatrix and entitled to the legacies under the terms of the will were cited in the proceeding. With the acquiescence of all the parties, a referee was appointed to take testimony as to the identity of the legatees, the nature of the services rendered by these persons, the period of such service, and to report to the surrogate the evidence and his opinion thereon. This report is now before the court for confirmation. The executors or their attorneys, in their own interpretation of the will, restricted the class of beneficiaries and paid the legacies to four servants, only, employed in the household of the testatrix in the following capacities: Butler, second man, houseman and the personal maid of Mrs. Thompson. The referee in his report held that this restriction was erroneous, that the testatrix intended the objects of her. bounty to include not only the servants in the house, but her chauffeur and those employed upon the grounds of her various residences as.superintendents, gardeners, farm workers and as laborers. His conclusion on this phase must be confirmed. He has found that seventeen employees are entitled to a legacy of $10,000 each, and six employees are entitled to a legacy of $5,000 each. He has excluded from participation in the benefits of the will seven persons.

In testamentary provisions of this class, the language of the will must be examined to ascertain the intention of the testator. Necessarily the beneficiaries vary as the terms of the will vary. Here the intent of the testatrix to include all persons in her service for the requisite periods is reasonably clear. It is not necessary to go beyond a strict and literal interpretation of the language used by [93]*93her. She intended that the legacies be paid to all her servants in her service for the requisite periods of time fixed by her. She might have confined her bounty to the narrower class of domestic servants employed in her household by appropriate words of description. Such was the tenor of the will of Oliver H. Payne in Lafrinz v. Whitney (233 N. Y. 107) where the gift was to “ each person * * * who at the time of my death shall be in my service and shall then be customarily employed as part of my household in my house in New York City or in my country house.” It was there held that the class was limited to those employed as part of the household, and particularly in the house. In Mrs. Thompson’s will she used the word servants ” in the broader sense of employees, for it is important to note that in paragraph 8 she first bequeathed the sum of $15,000 to each “ of my faithful servants,, Lena Anderson and Weldon Kershaw.” Lena Anderson was a maid and caretaker. Weldon Kershaw, on the other hand, was the superintendent of the greenhouse on her country estate. He resided in a separate house provided by her. While he performed certain minor duties about the household, really within the scope of his work as superintendent, it is clear from the evidence that he was not a member of her household staff, but was an outside employee. The mention of his name and the nature of his services are conclusive as to the class of servants in the mind of the testatrix because the paragraph then proceeds to give to each person not named above, who shall have been in my service ten years or more, immediately preceding my decease the sum of Ten thousand dollars.” Thus the testatrix, by specifically mentioning an outdoor' servant included as beneficiaries all of the employees similarly employed on her various estates. Support for this conclusion is also found in the fact that’ she had “ named above,” in the 7th paragraph, persons other than servants in the house, to wit, John J. Handrahan, the landscape superintendent and architect, and Addison P. Wilber, the general superintendent of her estate at Canandaigua, N. Y. These persons were given legacies of $15,000 each. In his opinion the referee pointed out that the courts of Virginia and Rhode Island have construed wills, somewhat similar in form, by extending the word “ servant ” to a class of employees beyond mere household servants. (Ginter v. Shelton, 102 Va. 185; Industrial Trust Company v. Alves, - R. I.-; 124 Atl. 260.) I hold, therefore, that the referee correctly found that all persons in the service of the testatrix, whether indoor or outdoor, whether purely household servants or employees in other capacities, who had served the necessary period of time are entitled to take the respective amounts as legatees.

(2) It is claimed by the executors and certain other parties [94]*94adverse to the claimants, that the testatrix intended to limit her gifts to employees paid monthly rather than to persons employed as day laborers upon her various estates. The situation is further complicated by the fact that many of these employees were paid part of their time as per diem employees and at other times were placed upon the monthly payroll. The referee’s finding on this phase of the case must be sustained. The words “ in my service ” under the special circumstances of this case show no intention to exclude day laborers from the benefits mentioned in the will. The extrinsic testimony shows that these persons whom the referee has found to be legatees were employed exclusively by Mrs. Thompson. One of them, Ernest Standen, a groom, was employed for a. period of over five years with a perfect record of fidelity and without the loss of a single day’s work. Another, Patrick McKenna, foreman of laborers, was employed continuously, prior to the death of Mrs. Thompson, for ten years with only one day’s absence. Others were employed exclusively by her but were laid off from time to time when the weather prevented outdoor work, or when their services as farm laborers or in other capacities were not required. Accurate records were kept of each workman’s time and pay and these are in evidence. The will here is different from that in Matter of Altman (89 Misc. 697; affd., sub. nom. Matter of Friedsam, 171 App. Div. 903; affd., 217 N. Y. 680), where piece-workers were specifically excluded as objects of bounty. It appears from the evidence that these day laborers were treated as regular employees of Mrs. Thompson, that it was their custom to report regularly for duty to the various superintendents and other persons in charge of the different departments. They were not independent contractors, such as the piece-workers in the Altman will, since they were under the control and direction of their superiors employed by the testatrix. (Matter of Rheinwald v. Builders’, etc., Company, 168 App. Div. 425.)

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In re the Estate of Thompson, 126 Misc. 91, 213 N.Y.S. 426, 1925 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1047 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1925).

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