In Re the Estate of Schafer

113 P.2d 41, 8 Wash. 2d 517
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedMay 2, 1941
DocketNo. 28266.
StatusPublished
Cited by43 cases

This text of 113 P.2d 41 (In Re the Estate of Schafer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re the Estate of Schafer, 113 P.2d 41, 8 Wash. 2d 517 (Wash. 1941).

Opinions

Jeffers, J.

This is a will contest instituted by Nancy W. King, niece of Anna Schafer, deceased. Mrs. King was the principal beneficiary in two former wills made by Anna Schafer, and is also assignee of all the rights of her mother, Mary Winter, sister of deceased, who claims she would be the sole heir of the Anna Schafer estate if there were no will. The will being contested was executed on January 13, 1940, one D. W. Schloeman being named executor, and the principal beneficiary being Melvin A. Moe. This instrument was drawn by Lewis L. Stedman, who, with one M. N. Olsen, witnessed the execution of the will.

The petition alleges that the execution of the will was obtained through undue influence of Melvin A. Moe and others, at a time when the deceased was greatly weakened by disease in mind and body, and advanced in age.

The executor filed an answer to the petition, denying the allegations of undue influence, and alleging affirmatively that, on January 13, 1940, when Mrs. Schafer made the will in question, she was of sound and disposing mind and memory, knew the extent of her property and the natural beneficiaries of her bounty, and was capable of transacting business of any character. Melvin A. Moe also answered the petition, admitting *519 the death of Anna Schafer, January 16,1940, and denying the other allegations of the petition.

A hearing was held on June 17, 1940, at which time oral testimony of many witnesses was received, and the depositions of Nancy W. King and her mother, Mary Winter, theretofore taken, were admitted and read into the record. The trial court, after filing a very exhaustive memorandum opinion, on July 23, 1940, made and entered a decree denying the petition of Nancy W. King and upholding the instrument executed by Anna Schafer on January 13, 1940, as her last will and testament. Mrs. King has appealed from the decree entered.

Appellant claims the court erred: (1) In failing to hold that the purported last will and testament of Anna Schafer was the result of fraud and undue influence on the part of Melvin A. Moe; and (2) in failing to hold that the evidence regarding Mr. Moe’s conduct was so suspicious as to raise a presumption of fraud and undue influence, which presumption Mr. Moe failed to overcome.

While it is not specifically contended by appellant that Mrs. Schafer did not have the mental capacity to make a will on January 13, 1940, there was considerable testimony introduced relative to the effect on her mind caused by her sickness and the opiates given to her during such sickness, so that Mrs. Schafer’s mental condition, especially in view of her age, is a factor which may properly be considered along with the other facts, in determining the question of undue influence.

In considering the testimony in this case, it may be well to have in mind certain well-established principles. The right to dispose of one’s property by will is not only a valuable right, but one assured by law. In re Phillip’s Estate, 193 Wash. 194, 74 P. (2d) *520 1015; Dean v. Jordan, 194 Wash. 661, 79 P. (2d) 331. The rule in regard to testamentary capacity is that the testator must have sufficient mind and memory to intelligently understand the nature of the business in which he is engaged, to comprehend generally the nature and extent of the property which constitutes his estate and which he intends to dispose of, and to recollect the objects of his bounty. In re Larsen’s Estate, 191 Wash. 257, 71 P. (2d) 47; Dean v. Jordan, supra.

Where a will, rational on its face, is shown to have been executed in legal form, the law presumes testamentary capacity in the testator, and that the will speaks his wishes. In re Hanson’s Estate, 87 Wash. 113, 151 Pac. 264; In re Riley’s Estate, 163 Wash. 119, 300 Pac. 159. In order to overcome a will, the evidence must be cogent and convincing. In re Johanson’s Estate, 178 Wash. 628, 35 P. (2d) 52.

In order to vitiate a will, there must be something more than mere influence. There must have been undue influence at the time of the testamentary act, which interfered with the free will of the testator and prevented the exercise of judgment and choice. Dean v. Jordan, supra, and cases therein cited.

In Dean v. Jordan, supra, this court, while recognizing the rule that fraud or undue influence must be established by evidence that is clear, cogent, and convincing, stated that, nevertheless, certain facts and circumstances bearing upon the execution of a will may be of such nature and force as to raise a suspicion, varying in its strength, against the validity of the testamentary instrument, the most important of such facts being: (1) That the beneficiary occupied a fiduciary or. confidential relation to the testator; (2) that the beneficiary actively participated in the preparation or procurement of the will; and (3) that the beneficiary received an unusually or unnaturally large part of the *521 estate. Added to these may be other considerations, such as the age or condition of health and mental vigor of the testator, the nature or degree of relationship between the testator and the beneficiary, the opportunity for exerting undue influence, and the naturalness or unnaturalness of the will.

In Foster v. Brady, 198 Wash. 13, 86 P. (2d) 760, we reaffirmed the rule that opportunity to exert undue influence is not sufficient to support a finding of undue influence, even though the circumstances under which a will was executed might arouse suspicion. We also stated, in the cited case, that ordinarily undue influence can be established only by circumstantial evidence, and that the circumstances surrounding the execution of a will may be so suspicious and suggestive as to raise a presumption of undue influence, which may be overcome only by clear and satisfactory evidence that no such influence was exerted. The cited case seems to rely upon the cases of Dean v. Jordan, supra, and In re Beck’s Estate, 79 Wash. 331, 140 Pac. 340, to sustain the statement that, where the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will are so suspicious as to create a presumption, that presumption can be overcome only by clear and satisfactory evidence'. We seriously doubt if either of the cited cases goes as far as above stated. The Jordan case states:

“The combination of facts shown by the evidence in a particular case may be of such suspicious nature as to raise a presumption of fraud or undue influence and, in the absence of rebuttal evidence, may even be sufficient to overthrow the will,” (Italics ours.)

citing In re Beck’s Estate, 79 Wash. 331, 140 Pac. 340, to sustain the above statement.

On this point we quote from In re Patterson’s Estate, 68 Wash. 377, 123 Pac. 515, which has been cited in *522 many of our cases, up to and including the Jordan case, supra:

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Bluebook (online)
113 P.2d 41, 8 Wash. 2d 517, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-estate-of-schafer-wash-1941.