In re the Estate of Lecuyer

50 V.I. 156, 2008 WL 5211643, 2008 V.I. LEXIS 17
CourtSuperior Court of The Virgin Islands
DecidedDecember 12, 2008
DocketProbate No. ST-05-PB-09
StatusPublished

This text of 50 V.I. 156 (In re the Estate of Lecuyer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of The Virgin Islands primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re the Estate of Lecuyer, 50 V.I. 156, 2008 WL 5211643, 2008 V.I. LEXIS 17 (visuper 2008).

Opinion

THOMAS, Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(December 12, 2008)

This Matter came on for a hearing on October 17, 2005, on the Declaration of Contest filed by Kristin Anne Morse (“Contestant”), pursuant to Rule 193 of the Rules of the Superior Court — Will [C]ontests. The Contestant, while not present, was represented by Paula D. Norkaitis, Esq. of Tom Bolt & Associates, P.C., and the estate of Mari (Mary) Louise LeCuyer (“Testatrix”), as well as the Petitioner, Francis J. LeCuyer (“Petitioner”), was represented by Ronald W. Belfon, Esq.

FACTS

The Contestant is the adopted daughter of the Testatrix. The Petitioner is the husband of the Testatrix and is named as the Executor of the estate in a document purported to be the Last Will and Testament of the Testatrix (“2004 Will”).

On January 24, 2005, the Petitioner filed a Petition for Admission of Will to Probate and for Letters Testamentary along with supporting documents, including Affidavits of Discovery, a Declaration of Notary Public, a Death Certificate, and three (3) Affidavits of Attesting Witnesses.

The Contestant filed a Declaration of Will Contest on August 5, 2005, and a Declaration of Will Contest Supplement on June 8, 2006, challenging the 2004 Will on the grounds that (1) the 2004 Will was altered and signed three months after the death of the Testatrix; (2) the Petitioner has not overcome the presumption that the Testatrix destroyed the 2004 Will for the reason that he is unable to produce the original 2004 Will;1 and (3) the Petitioner has not adequately proven that the Original 2004 Will was delivered to him by the Testatrix.

[159]*159According to the Contestant, the 2004 Will should not be admitted to probate; instead, a previous Will prepared by the Testatrix in 1984 should be declared the Testatrix’ Last Will and Testament. The 1984 Will and the 2004 Will contained substantially different dispositions:

The 1984 Will
The 1984Will is nine (9) pages in length with nine (9) sections. All real and personal property is bequeathed to Kristin Anne Morse, then a minor, with the exception of the Fiesta Ware Collection that is to be given to the Testatrix’ sister, Cynthia A. Norten. If Kristin Anne Morse is still a minor at the time of distribution, then Donald L. Morse2 becomes the guardian. Donald L. Morse is appointed executor of the estate, and Cynthia A. Norten was chosen as alternate executor of the estate.
The 2004 Will
The 2004 Will is three (3) pages in length with four (4) sections. All real and personal property is bequeathed to Francis J. LeCuyer, the Testatrix’s husband, with the exception of the Fiesta Ware Collection that is to be given to the Testatrix’ sister, Cynthia A. Norten. In addition, there is a Disinheritance Clause that expressly disinherits Kristin Anne Morse and any other person not specifically named in the Will. Francis J. LeCuyer is named executor of the estate, with Cynthia A. Norten as an alternate executor.

ISSUES

The Court must now determine (1) whether the original 2004 Will was seen after the death of the Testatrix and (2) whether the 2004 Will meets the requirements of acknowledgment and attestation set forth in sections 13 and 14 of Title 15 of the Virgin Islands Code.

ANALYSIS

I. Original Will Seen After Death of Testatrix

The Contestant contends that because the Petitioner has not produced the original 2004 Will, a rebuttable presumption arises that the [160]*160Testatrix destroyed and thereby revoked that Will. In support of this argument the Contestant cites the well settled principle articulated in Duvergee v. Sprauve, 7 V.I. 248, 413 F.2d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1969), which provides:

[I]f a will or codicil known to have been in existence during the testator’s lifetime, and in his custody, or in a place where he had ready access to it, cannot be found at his death, a presumption arises that the will was destroyed by the testator in his lifetime with the intention of revoking it, and in the absence of rebutting evidence, this presumption is sufficient to justify a finding that the will was revoked. In order to rebut this presumption, the burden is on the proponent of the will to establish by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that there is no possibility that the will was destroyed by the testator.3

Although the Contestant correctly states the rule, she ignores its temporal element and fails to distinguish the facts of Duvergee from the facts of this case. In Duvergee, a copy of the decedent’s Will was offered for probate because the original Will was not found after the death of the decedent. The proponent of that Will never alleged that the original was seen after the decedent’s death. Accordingly, the Duvergee court applied the presumption that the decedent had revoked his Will, shifting the burden of proof to the proponent. Because the proponent failed to prove by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that there was no possibility that the Will was destroyed by the decedent, the court held that the copy offered by the proponent “was not entitled to probate.” Id. Thus, the proper threshold inquiry is whether the original purported Will was seen by anyone after the death of the decedent.

In the instant action, the Petitioner has proven by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that there is no possibility that the Will was destroyed by the Testatrix. Unlike Duvergee, the Petitioner alleges that an original 2004 Will was seen after the death of the Testatrix. In his Affidavit of Discovery he avers that he received the 2004 Will from the Testatrix. The Petitioner has also submitted affidavits of two attesting Witnesses- declaring that the Petitioner delivered the original 2004 Will to [161]*161them to be notarized. (Garry Pierce Aff. ¶ 2; Elizabeth Bimey Pierce Aff. ¶ 2.)4 Additionally, the Witnesses stated that they took the original 2004 Will to the Notary, Elizabeth Allred Hickey. (Garry Pierce Aff. ¶ 2, Elizabeth Bimey Pierce Aff. ¶ 2.) The Notary confirmed her handwriting on pages two and three of the 2004 Will submitted to the Court. (Decl. of N.P. Jan. 22, 2005, Hickey Dep. 12:4-8.) Moreover, the Notary stated in her Declaration that the Witnesses asked her to notarize their signatures on an “original” Will. (Decl. of N.P. Jan. 22, 2005.) The Court therefore finds (1) that the original 2004 Will was seen by the attesting witnesses and the Notary subsequent to the death of the Testatrix, and (2) that the Petitioner, as the proponent of the 2004 Will, has rebutted the presumption of revocation.

Once it has been established that the original Will was seen after the decedent’s death, the proponent may proceed as if proving a lost Will. As the Duvergee court acknowledged,

[I]n a proceeding for the probate of a lost will, when the will has been placed in the custody and control of a third person and it cannot be found among the effects of that person, no presumption of revocation by the testator arises from the failure to find it.

413 F.2d at 123.

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Related

Duvergee v. Sprauve
413 F.2d 120 (Third Circuit, 1969)
In re the Estate of Richards
45 V.I. 287 (Supreme Court of The Virgin Islands, 2003)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
50 V.I. 156, 2008 WL 5211643, 2008 V.I. LEXIS 17, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-estate-of-lecuyer-visuper-2008.