In re the Estate of Gavin

41 Misc. 3d 232
CourtNew York Surrogate's Court
DecidedJuly 26, 2013
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 41 Misc. 3d 232 (In re the Estate of Gavin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Surrogate's Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re the Estate of Gavin, 41 Misc. 3d 232 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2013).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Barbara Howe, J.

Decedent Nora T. Gavin died on March 16, 2008. Her last will and testament, dated March 8, 2006, and codicil, dated May 21, 2007, were admitted to probate by this court on April 16, 2009, and letters testamentary were issued to the named executor and residuary beneficiary of the estate, Nora’s attorney, William N. Naples.1 Nora’s purported parents, Anthony and Sarah Gavin, predeceased her, she was never married, and she had no issue. At the time of her death, her heirs were unknown, and a guardian ad litem was appointed by this court to represent those unknown heirs.

Subsequently, Marian A. Geisler was identified as a possible maternal first cousin, although the paternal side of the family remained unknown. Geisler filed a petition for advice and direc[234]*234tian in May 2009, seeking a determination that she is Nora’s only distributee.

At the direction of this court, a kinship hearing was held before the Chief Attorney of this court, designated by me to hear and report with respect to the issues which I must now decide. At the hearing, counsel for all parties consented to the appointment of the referee, waived the filing of a written referee report, and consented that I might determine the issues based on the testimony and documentary evidence adduced (see SCPA 506 [6] [c]).

The first day of the hearing took place on April 22, 2010, at which Geisler presented two witnesses. The hearing was then adjourned for further testimony. No further testimony was ever produced by Geisler, but on February 13, 2013, the hearing resumed solely so that certain documents could be placed into evidence. Proof was finally closed on March 22, 2013, with the submission by Geisler of a last document.2

A briefing schedule was then set. All parties have had the opportunity to set forth their positions, and the matter has been finally submitted.

I now find and decide as follows.

(A)

A claimant has the burden of proving kinship (see e.g. Matter of Flavin, 15 Misc 3d 1104[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50479[U] [2007]; Matter of Morris, 277 App Div 211 [1950]), and she must establish that she is Nora’s closest surviving blood relative as defined in EPTL 4-1.1 (see Matter of Dinzey, NYLJ, June 9, 2003 at 33, col 4). This burden is met by a preponderance of evidence (Matter of Whelan, 93 AD2d 891 [1983]). For kinship to be established to the satisfaction of the court, the claimant must make an evidentiary showing (1) how she is related to decedent, and (2) that no other persons of the same or a nearer degree of relationship survived decedent. Upon proof that no heirs other than those before the court exist, the class of heirs may be “closed” (see e.g. Matter of Alao, NYLJ, Mar. 19, 2002 at 18, col 6).

“[I]n all cases involving pedigree and the distribution of intestate property, it is first necessary to establish the identity of the common ancestor and from that point to construct the [235]*235true family tree, to which all claimants must attach themselves to be successful” (Matter of Whalen, 146 Misc 176, 180 [1932]; see also Matter of Lelito, 20 Misc 3d 1120[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51479[U] [2008]).

“When persons of the nearest degree of relationship establish [their] standing, those more remote are excluded (Matter of Henesey, 3 Misc 2d 660, 662 [1956], affd 3 AD2d 834 [1957]). One who seeks to establish an interest in a decedent’s estate as a collateral relative must show that all lines of descent which would precede his or her claim as a distributee are exhausted” (Matter of Dinzey).

The proof required in kinship proceedings has been well-established over the years (2 Harris, New York Estates: Probate, Administration and Litigation § 21:19 [5th ed]). Evidence of pedigree takes the form of oral testimony, preferably by a disinterested person such as a professional genealogist, with documentary evidence required to corroborate it (see Matter of Kuberka, 22 Misc 3d 1104[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52599[U] [2008], citing 6 Warren’s Heaton, Surrogate’s Court Practice § 74:17 [2] [b] [iii] at 74-57 [7th ed]; Matter of Logue, NYLJ, June 19, 1998 at 30, col 3; Matter of Layh, 55 Misc 2d 92 [1967]; Matter of Pacosz, 22 Misc 3d 1105[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52600[U] [2008]). “[Claimants who fail to offer evidence to exclude the possible existence of persons who would have an equal right to share in the estate, fail to establish their rights as distributees (Matter of Hasser, 187 Misc 368 [Sur Ct, Bronx County 1946])” (Matter of Darienzo, NYLJ, July 23, 2010 at 36, col 5).

(B)

I find, for the reasons which follow, that Geisler has failed to meet her burden of proof that she is a distributee of decedent and also that there are no other maternal or paternal heirs who have an equal or prior right to share in this estate.

(i)

Two witnesses testified at the kinship hearing, executor William Naples and Albert T. Garner, Jr., a possible maternal second cousin of Nora’s. I find their testimony to be substantially credible, and, based on their testimony, I find that Nora died without a spouse or issue.

However, as set forth in the guardian ad litem report of Roger Simon, Esq., the testimony of Naples offered “very little if [236]*236anything about [decedent’s] ancestry,” and Garner’s testimony “was of limited value.” Furthermore, Simon states (and I concur) that “the documentary evidence that was produced in this matter is very limited . . . there is a paucity of other documents evidencing the death of potential distributees, and certainly nothing that documents whether or not they had children, etc.” In fact no proof at all was presented at the hearing regarding the paternal side of decedent’s family.

According to her death certificate, Nora was born on October 26, 1917, in Lorain, Ohio, and her parents were stated to be Anthony F. Gavin and Sarah Darney.3 Although Naples was listed as the informant on the death certificate, he testified that Nora actually gave that information to “the cremation person, prior to her death.”

Naples testified that he had been told that, in August of 1930, when he was three weeks old, his mother was in the waiting room of Lafayette General Hospital in Buffalo, New York, where she observed a young girl crying and sobbing. When his mother asked the girl what was wrong, she stated that her mother had just died. That little girl, Naples learned in later years, was decedent, Nora Gavin.

Naples’s testimony is corroborated by the death certificate of Sarah Gavin, which states that she died on August 23, 1930 at Lafayette General Hospital. It also states that Sarah was married to Anthony Gavin, who was the informant on the death certificate. Sarah’s death certificate lists her parents as James Garner and Mary Mohan, both of whom were born in Ireland.

Naples testified that he first remembered meeting Nora in 1937, when he was approximately seven years old, and that she lived one block away from his family. He would see Nora at least once a week during her lifetime, and he eventually became not only her friend but also her lawyer.

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