McInturff, C.J.
Benjamin Ford appeals the trial judge's determination of a partial revocation of a community property agreement and the denial of an award in lieu of homestead.
Neoma D. Ford was married to Benjamin Ford on May 2, 1968. As a married couple, they executed a statutory community property agreement on July 28, 1969. The pertinent clauses of the agreement stated:
[138]*138I.
That all property of whatsoever nature or description whether real, personal or mixed and wheresoever situated now owned or hereafter acquired by them or either of them shall be considered and is hereby declared to be community property.
II.
That upon the death of either . . . title to all community property as herein defined shall immediately vest in fee simple in the survivor of them.
On October 2, 1972, Mrs. Ford executed a will which left all of her assets to her four children from a previous marriage. Three years later, on October 10,1975, Mr. Ford executed a quitclaim deed to Mrs. Ford for two parcels of real estate.1 The deed conveyed the property to Mrs. Ford "as her sole and separate property . . . including any interest therein which grantor may hereafter acquire."
Mrs. Ford passed away March 12, 1977. Her will, together with the unrecorded deed, was found in her safety deposit box. The trial judge ruled that the two parcels of land deeded to Mrs. Ford were excluded from the community property agreement and passed to her estate as separate property. The trial judge also denied Mr. Ford's petition for an award in lieu of homestead on the property.
The initial issue is whether the inter vivos conveyance of a quitclaim deed from one spouse to another constitutes a partial revocation of a community property agreement regarding the deeded property. Mr. Ford contends the quitclaim deed was invalidated at the death of Mrs. Ford unless there can be found a mutuality of purpose to terminate the agreement.
Community property agreements are governed by RCW 26.16.120 which states:
Nothing contained in any of the provisions of this chapter or in any law of this state, shall prevent the husband and wife from jointly entering into any agreement [139]*139concerning the status or disposition of the whole or any portion of the community property, then owned by them or afterwards to be acquired, to take effect upon the death of either. But such agreement may be made at any time by the husband and wife by the execution of an instrument in writing under their hands and seals, and to be witnessed, acknowledged and certified in the same manner as deeds to real estate are required to be, under the laws of the state, and the same may at any time thereafter be altered or amended in the same manner:
An agreement to rescind a community property agreement must itself be a valid agreement. All parties to the contract must assent to its rescission; there must be a meeting of the minds. In re Estate of Wittman, 58 Wn.2d 841, 844, 365 P.2d 17 (1961). As in the case of any contract, the parties may, by mutually manifesting a clear intention to do so, abandon the community property agreement. Uncommunicated, subjective intention to abandon is not enough. In re Estate of Lyman, 7 Wn. App. 945, 948, 503 P.2d 1127 (1972), aff'd, 82 Wn.2d 693, 512 P.2d 1093 (1973). Here, the court concluded there was insufficient evidence to revoke the entire community property agreement. Mrs. Ford manifested her intent to rescind the entire agreement by making an inconsistent will; however, there was no evidence of Mr. Ford's intention to rescind the entire agreement. Thus, the court properly ruled there was no mutual rescission of the entire community property agreement.
Whether a community property agreement may be partially revoked concerns the ability of Mr. Ford to convey his community property interest in the parcels of land to his wife as her separate property subsequent to execution of a valid community property agreement. When one spouse deeds a community interest in the property to the other, the property becomes the separate property of the grantee spouse unless there is clear and convincing evidence that such was not the intention of the parties. In re Estate of Monighan, 198 Wash. 253, 88 P.2d 403 (1939). The language used by Mr. Ford in his quitclaim deed is clear. With [140]*140knowledge of the prior community property agreement,* 2 he deeded to Mrs. Ford his undivided one-half of the community property interest in the two parcels of land. In Hesseltine v. First Methodist Church, 23 Wn.2d 315, 322, 161 P.2d 157 (1945), the court noted:
Appellants contend that such an agreement [community property agreement] restricts the alienation of any real property of which the community may be seized at the time it is executed. In other words, the only way real property may be alienated after such an agreement is entered into is by modification of the agreement itself. . . .
We think the position of appellants is untenable. The statute is not designed to vest a separate estate in community property in either spouse before the death of the other. That may be accomplished by deed or gift.
There is nothing to prevent a spouse from transferring, via inter vivos deed, the property to which he or she is entitled under the terms of the community property agreement. Mr. Ford expressed his intent to modify the prior community property agreement by the execution of the quitclaim deed which granted Mrs. Ford the two parcels of property as her separate estate "including any interest therein which grantor may hereafter acquire." (Italics ours.) Mrs. Ford's intent to modify the same community property agreement was manifested by her acceptance of the deed3 and its [141]*141retention in her safety deposit box. Thus, we find Mr. Ford, by execution of the later quitclaim deed to Mrs. Ford, waived any interest he may have held under their community property agreement—to the extent of the property deeded.
Next, Mr. Ford contends the court abused its discretion by denying his petition for an award in lieu of homestead. We note initially there is no abuse of discretion if a reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. State v. Huelett, 92 Wn.2d 967, 969, 603 P.2d 1258 (1979).
The award in lieu of homestead provisions are set forth in RCW 11.52.010 which provides in part:
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McInturff, C.J.
Benjamin Ford appeals the trial judge's determination of a partial revocation of a community property agreement and the denial of an award in lieu of homestead.
Neoma D. Ford was married to Benjamin Ford on May 2, 1968. As a married couple, they executed a statutory community property agreement on July 28, 1969. The pertinent clauses of the agreement stated:
[138]*138I.
That all property of whatsoever nature or description whether real, personal or mixed and wheresoever situated now owned or hereafter acquired by them or either of them shall be considered and is hereby declared to be community property.
II.
That upon the death of either . . . title to all community property as herein defined shall immediately vest in fee simple in the survivor of them.
On October 2, 1972, Mrs. Ford executed a will which left all of her assets to her four children from a previous marriage. Three years later, on October 10,1975, Mr. Ford executed a quitclaim deed to Mrs. Ford for two parcels of real estate.1 The deed conveyed the property to Mrs. Ford "as her sole and separate property . . . including any interest therein which grantor may hereafter acquire."
Mrs. Ford passed away March 12, 1977. Her will, together with the unrecorded deed, was found in her safety deposit box. The trial judge ruled that the two parcels of land deeded to Mrs. Ford were excluded from the community property agreement and passed to her estate as separate property. The trial judge also denied Mr. Ford's petition for an award in lieu of homestead on the property.
The initial issue is whether the inter vivos conveyance of a quitclaim deed from one spouse to another constitutes a partial revocation of a community property agreement regarding the deeded property. Mr. Ford contends the quitclaim deed was invalidated at the death of Mrs. Ford unless there can be found a mutuality of purpose to terminate the agreement.
Community property agreements are governed by RCW 26.16.120 which states:
Nothing contained in any of the provisions of this chapter or in any law of this state, shall prevent the husband and wife from jointly entering into any agreement [139]*139concerning the status or disposition of the whole or any portion of the community property, then owned by them or afterwards to be acquired, to take effect upon the death of either. But such agreement may be made at any time by the husband and wife by the execution of an instrument in writing under their hands and seals, and to be witnessed, acknowledged and certified in the same manner as deeds to real estate are required to be, under the laws of the state, and the same may at any time thereafter be altered or amended in the same manner:
An agreement to rescind a community property agreement must itself be a valid agreement. All parties to the contract must assent to its rescission; there must be a meeting of the minds. In re Estate of Wittman, 58 Wn.2d 841, 844, 365 P.2d 17 (1961). As in the case of any contract, the parties may, by mutually manifesting a clear intention to do so, abandon the community property agreement. Uncommunicated, subjective intention to abandon is not enough. In re Estate of Lyman, 7 Wn. App. 945, 948, 503 P.2d 1127 (1972), aff'd, 82 Wn.2d 693, 512 P.2d 1093 (1973). Here, the court concluded there was insufficient evidence to revoke the entire community property agreement. Mrs. Ford manifested her intent to rescind the entire agreement by making an inconsistent will; however, there was no evidence of Mr. Ford's intention to rescind the entire agreement. Thus, the court properly ruled there was no mutual rescission of the entire community property agreement.
Whether a community property agreement may be partially revoked concerns the ability of Mr. Ford to convey his community property interest in the parcels of land to his wife as her separate property subsequent to execution of a valid community property agreement. When one spouse deeds a community interest in the property to the other, the property becomes the separate property of the grantee spouse unless there is clear and convincing evidence that such was not the intention of the parties. In re Estate of Monighan, 198 Wash. 253, 88 P.2d 403 (1939). The language used by Mr. Ford in his quitclaim deed is clear. With [140]*140knowledge of the prior community property agreement,* 2 he deeded to Mrs. Ford his undivided one-half of the community property interest in the two parcels of land. In Hesseltine v. First Methodist Church, 23 Wn.2d 315, 322, 161 P.2d 157 (1945), the court noted:
Appellants contend that such an agreement [community property agreement] restricts the alienation of any real property of which the community may be seized at the time it is executed. In other words, the only way real property may be alienated after such an agreement is entered into is by modification of the agreement itself. . . .
We think the position of appellants is untenable. The statute is not designed to vest a separate estate in community property in either spouse before the death of the other. That may be accomplished by deed or gift.
There is nothing to prevent a spouse from transferring, via inter vivos deed, the property to which he or she is entitled under the terms of the community property agreement. Mr. Ford expressed his intent to modify the prior community property agreement by the execution of the quitclaim deed which granted Mrs. Ford the two parcels of property as her separate estate "including any interest therein which grantor may hereafter acquire." (Italics ours.) Mrs. Ford's intent to modify the same community property agreement was manifested by her acceptance of the deed3 and its [141]*141retention in her safety deposit box. Thus, we find Mr. Ford, by execution of the later quitclaim deed to Mrs. Ford, waived any interest he may have held under their community property agreement—to the extent of the property deeded.
Next, Mr. Ford contends the court abused its discretion by denying his petition for an award in lieu of homestead. We note initially there is no abuse of discretion if a reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. State v. Huelett, 92 Wn.2d 967, 969, 603 P.2d 1258 (1979).
The award in lieu of homestead provisions are set forth in RCW 11.52.010 which provides in part:
If it is made to appear to the satisfaction of the court that no homestead has been claimed in the manner provided by law, either prior or subsequent to the death of the person whose estate is being administered, then the court, after hearing and upon being satisfied that the funeral expenses, expenses of last sickness and of administration have been paid or provided for, and upon petition for that purpose, shall award and set off to the surviving spouse, if any, property of the estate, either community or separate, not exceeding the value of [$20,000.00] . . .
(Italics ours.) Although granting of the award is generally mandatory, RCW 11.52.012 enunciates several conditions under which the award may be denied or reduced:
That if it shall appear to the court, either (1) that there are children of the deceased by a former marriage . . . then the award in lieu of homestead and exemptions shall lie in the discretion of the court, . . .* **[4]
[142]*142(Italics ours.)
The statute specifically allows the trial judge discretion in denying the award if there are children, albeit adults, of the deceased spouse by a former marriage. The record indicates Mrs. Ford was survived by four children of a former marriage.
The trial judge's rationale and considerations were set forth in unchallenged conclusion of law No. 7:
Considering the relatively short duration of the marriage of these parties, their age and past marriages and considering the contribution made by the decedent to the family living expenses and the contribution made by petitioner and considering the fact that there are children of decedent by a former marriage and petitioner Benjamin N. Ford has property of his own, the court is of the opinion that equity and justice demand that the Petition for Award in Lieu of Homestead be denied in its entirety.
(Italics ours.) The denial of the petition for an award in lieu of homestead was not an abuse of discretion by the trial judge.
Judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.
Munson, J., concurs.