AMUNDSON, Justice.
This is a disciplinary proceeding against Respondent Lawrence R. Bihlmeyer (Bihl-meyer), a member of the State Bar of South Dakota. The Disciplinary Board of the State Bar (Board) and a referee have recommended public censure.
[237]*237FACTS
In 1972, Bihlmeyer completed his legal education and was admitted to practice law in the State of South Dakota. He started practicing as a Deputy State’s Attorney in Pennington County and as a Deputy City Attorney in Rapid City, South Dakota. Approximately three years later, he began practicing law as a sole practitioner in Rapid City, concentrating in worker’s compensation, bankruptcy, and domestic relations with some minor involvement in personal injury and criminal work. Bihlmeyer has and does advertise in the yellow pages, holding himself out to be knowledgeable in the area of worker’s compensation.
Sally Ann Powell (Powell) of Box Elder, South Dakota, employed Bihlmeyer to handle her husband’s probate and her worker’s compensation claim for benefits from the death of her husband in Iowa. Bihlmeyer had Powell sign three separate employment agreements. All of these agreements established a contingent fee to be paid Bihlmeyer in the event of recovery.
In May of 1989, Bihlmeyer and Powell appeared before the Industrial Commissioner of Iowa seeking payment of the worker’s compensation benefits. They were requesting a full or partial payment in lieu of monthly payments for the rest of Powell’s life. The Commissioner rejected both the total and partial payment plans but allowed Powell to receive approximately $12,000.00 in a retroactive payment. Bihlmeyer received 25% of this payment pursuant to the retainer agreement with Powell. Bihlmeyer and Powell later agreed that the fee percentage for future recovery would be reduced from 25% to 20%.
Next, Bihlmeyer, with the consent of Powell, mailed another application to the Commissioner for a partial lump-sum payment. This application claimed Powell needed to buy a house, pay medical expenses, and obtain a vehicle. The application requested approximately $61,000.00 in partial lump-sum payment and also $1,237.80 a month for the next eight years as full payment for worker’s compensation. Under this proposal, Powell would receive $31,000.00 and Bihlmeyer would be paid approximately $30,000.00 for his attorney fees. It was represented that this would be the total fee charged. The Commissioner approved this proposal and fee as required by Iowa law.
Bihlmeyer received a $59,000.00 check representing the partial lump-sum payment from the Iowa Industrial Commissioner. Powell had received a $2,000.00 advanced payment. At his office, Bihlmeyer presented a $19,000.00 check to Powell for her share of the payment with no explanation as to how it was calculated. Upon receiving her cheek, Powell inquired about the difference in this payment and the amount she was to receive under the second proposal presented to the Iowa Commissioner. After letting Bihlmeyer know of her displeasure with the proposed division, Bihlmeyer asked her how much she thought she deserved. Bihlmeyer then agreed to pay her an additional $5,000.00. Powell, although upset, accepted and cashed the check for $24,000.00. Powell had always understood that she should receive approximately $31,000.00 for a house, medical expenses and vehicle as proposed.
Bihlmeyer later represented that he calculated his fee based on the contingent fee agreement rather than the settlement proposal prepared and submitted on behalf of his client to the Iowa Industrial Commissioner. In calculating his 20% fee on the future installment benefits, Bihlmeyer failed to reduce these payments to present value.
Powell, feeling she had not received a proper division of the partial lump-sum payment, filed a complaint with the State Bar Disciplinary Board. After this filing, Bihl-meyer offered to pay for an attorney chosen by Powell to represent her and advise her in settlement of this fee dispute. Powell retained Richard L. Bode (Bode) and an agreement was made with Bihlmeyer to pay Powell the remainder of the $31,000.00 which was due her. Bihlmeyer paid the additional $5,000.00 plus interest prior to the hearings held in this matter.
The Disciplinary Board found that Bihl-meyer had violated Rules of Professional [238]*238Conduct 1.41, 1.5(a), and 1.5(c)2 requiring that the attorney communicate with his client to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions, that attorney fees shall be reasonable and that contingent fee agreements set forth the method used for computation. The Board also found that Bihlmeyer’s conduct was dishonest and prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rules 8.4(c) and 8.4(d)3 because he paid himself a fee that was more beneficial to himself than his client under circumstances which prejudiced the client. The Board recommended public censure.
This matter was then referred for a hearing by a referee. The referee found that Bihlmeyer had made a misrepresentation to the Iowa Industrial Commissioner about attorney fees and distribution of payment. The referee found “[ujnder Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.5 entitled Fees, (a) a lawyer’s fees should be reasonable. The [referee] finds that Mr. Bihlmeyer attempted to apply 20% of attorney’s fees based on future payments without being reduced to present value. This would violate the spirit of Rule 1.5.” The referee also found a failure to comply with Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3, Candor Towards the Tribunal. The referee recommended public censure.
ANALYSIS
This court need not defer to a recommended discipline of the Board or referee, because the ultimate decision for discipline of members of the State Bar rests with this court. Matter of Discipline of Stanton, 446 N.W.2d 33 (S.D.1989).
Bihlmeyer personally appeared before this court, admitted misrepresenting the fee agreement to the Iowa Industrial Commission, admitted charging a fee in excess of that approved by that Commission, and acknowledged that he was negligent in not having reduced the recovery to present value when calculating his fee. He apologized for the embarrassment he has caused the profession and candidly admitted that public censure would be an appropriate discipline. Therefore, Bihlmeyer having admitted to violating the Code of Professional Conduct, this court need only determine the appropriate discipline to be imposed.
In arriving at its recommendation, the Board considered eleven complaints previously filed against Bihlmeyer since 1981, some of which were dismissed and others resulting in an admonishment or caution from the Board. “The prior record of an attorney may be considered in determining the appropriate discipline.” In re Goodrich, 88 S.D. 146, 216 N.W.2d 557, 559 (1974) (citing Simmons v. State Bar of California, 2 Cal.3d 719, 87 Cal.Rptr. 368, 470 P.2d 352 (1970)).
Bihlmeyer admitted his conduct constitutes a violation of South Dakota Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3, Candor Towards the Tribunal. Rule 3.3 states: “(a) lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of [239]
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AMUNDSON, Justice.
This is a disciplinary proceeding against Respondent Lawrence R. Bihlmeyer (Bihl-meyer), a member of the State Bar of South Dakota. The Disciplinary Board of the State Bar (Board) and a referee have recommended public censure.
[237]*237FACTS
In 1972, Bihlmeyer completed his legal education and was admitted to practice law in the State of South Dakota. He started practicing as a Deputy State’s Attorney in Pennington County and as a Deputy City Attorney in Rapid City, South Dakota. Approximately three years later, he began practicing law as a sole practitioner in Rapid City, concentrating in worker’s compensation, bankruptcy, and domestic relations with some minor involvement in personal injury and criminal work. Bihlmeyer has and does advertise in the yellow pages, holding himself out to be knowledgeable in the area of worker’s compensation.
Sally Ann Powell (Powell) of Box Elder, South Dakota, employed Bihlmeyer to handle her husband’s probate and her worker’s compensation claim for benefits from the death of her husband in Iowa. Bihlmeyer had Powell sign three separate employment agreements. All of these agreements established a contingent fee to be paid Bihlmeyer in the event of recovery.
In May of 1989, Bihlmeyer and Powell appeared before the Industrial Commissioner of Iowa seeking payment of the worker’s compensation benefits. They were requesting a full or partial payment in lieu of monthly payments for the rest of Powell’s life. The Commissioner rejected both the total and partial payment plans but allowed Powell to receive approximately $12,000.00 in a retroactive payment. Bihlmeyer received 25% of this payment pursuant to the retainer agreement with Powell. Bihlmeyer and Powell later agreed that the fee percentage for future recovery would be reduced from 25% to 20%.
Next, Bihlmeyer, with the consent of Powell, mailed another application to the Commissioner for a partial lump-sum payment. This application claimed Powell needed to buy a house, pay medical expenses, and obtain a vehicle. The application requested approximately $61,000.00 in partial lump-sum payment and also $1,237.80 a month for the next eight years as full payment for worker’s compensation. Under this proposal, Powell would receive $31,000.00 and Bihlmeyer would be paid approximately $30,000.00 for his attorney fees. It was represented that this would be the total fee charged. The Commissioner approved this proposal and fee as required by Iowa law.
Bihlmeyer received a $59,000.00 check representing the partial lump-sum payment from the Iowa Industrial Commissioner. Powell had received a $2,000.00 advanced payment. At his office, Bihlmeyer presented a $19,000.00 check to Powell for her share of the payment with no explanation as to how it was calculated. Upon receiving her cheek, Powell inquired about the difference in this payment and the amount she was to receive under the second proposal presented to the Iowa Commissioner. After letting Bihlmeyer know of her displeasure with the proposed division, Bihlmeyer asked her how much she thought she deserved. Bihlmeyer then agreed to pay her an additional $5,000.00. Powell, although upset, accepted and cashed the check for $24,000.00. Powell had always understood that she should receive approximately $31,000.00 for a house, medical expenses and vehicle as proposed.
Bihlmeyer later represented that he calculated his fee based on the contingent fee agreement rather than the settlement proposal prepared and submitted on behalf of his client to the Iowa Industrial Commissioner. In calculating his 20% fee on the future installment benefits, Bihlmeyer failed to reduce these payments to present value.
Powell, feeling she had not received a proper division of the partial lump-sum payment, filed a complaint with the State Bar Disciplinary Board. After this filing, Bihl-meyer offered to pay for an attorney chosen by Powell to represent her and advise her in settlement of this fee dispute. Powell retained Richard L. Bode (Bode) and an agreement was made with Bihlmeyer to pay Powell the remainder of the $31,000.00 which was due her. Bihlmeyer paid the additional $5,000.00 plus interest prior to the hearings held in this matter.
The Disciplinary Board found that Bihl-meyer had violated Rules of Professional [238]*238Conduct 1.41, 1.5(a), and 1.5(c)2 requiring that the attorney communicate with his client to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions, that attorney fees shall be reasonable and that contingent fee agreements set forth the method used for computation. The Board also found that Bihlmeyer’s conduct was dishonest and prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rules 8.4(c) and 8.4(d)3 because he paid himself a fee that was more beneficial to himself than his client under circumstances which prejudiced the client. The Board recommended public censure.
This matter was then referred for a hearing by a referee. The referee found that Bihlmeyer had made a misrepresentation to the Iowa Industrial Commissioner about attorney fees and distribution of payment. The referee found “[ujnder Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.5 entitled Fees, (a) a lawyer’s fees should be reasonable. The [referee] finds that Mr. Bihlmeyer attempted to apply 20% of attorney’s fees based on future payments without being reduced to present value. This would violate the spirit of Rule 1.5.” The referee also found a failure to comply with Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3, Candor Towards the Tribunal. The referee recommended public censure.
ANALYSIS
This court need not defer to a recommended discipline of the Board or referee, because the ultimate decision for discipline of members of the State Bar rests with this court. Matter of Discipline of Stanton, 446 N.W.2d 33 (S.D.1989).
Bihlmeyer personally appeared before this court, admitted misrepresenting the fee agreement to the Iowa Industrial Commission, admitted charging a fee in excess of that approved by that Commission, and acknowledged that he was negligent in not having reduced the recovery to present value when calculating his fee. He apologized for the embarrassment he has caused the profession and candidly admitted that public censure would be an appropriate discipline. Therefore, Bihlmeyer having admitted to violating the Code of Professional Conduct, this court need only determine the appropriate discipline to be imposed.
In arriving at its recommendation, the Board considered eleven complaints previously filed against Bihlmeyer since 1981, some of which were dismissed and others resulting in an admonishment or caution from the Board. “The prior record of an attorney may be considered in determining the appropriate discipline.” In re Goodrich, 88 S.D. 146, 216 N.W.2d 557, 559 (1974) (citing Simmons v. State Bar of California, 2 Cal.3d 719, 87 Cal.Rptr. 368, 470 P.2d 352 (1970)).
Bihlmeyer admitted his conduct constitutes a violation of South Dakota Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3, Candor Towards the Tribunal. Rule 3.3 states: “(a) lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of [239]*239material fact or law to a tribunal; ... (b) the duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of [a] proceeding.”
This rule was violated when Bihlmeyer attempted to collect a 20% fee through his retainer agreement with Powell which exceeded the fee presented in the proposal to the Iowa Industrial Commissioner. Under Iowa law “all fees ... for legal ... services rendered ... are subject to the approval of the Industrial Commissioner.” Iowa Code Ann., § 86.39 (West 1993). By presenting the settlement proposal to the Iowa Industrial Commission, Bihlmeyer committed himself to only those fees approved by the Commission. His attempt to charge a retainer of $10,000.00 over and above the approved fee agreement is clearly a violation of Rule 3.3.
This court has previously imposed public censure for misrepresentations to the court. Matter of Discipline of Schmidt, 491 N.W.2d 754 (S.D.1992); Matter of Discipline of Rensch, 333 N.W.2d 713 (S.D.1983).
We cannot overemphasize the importance of attorneys in this state being absolutely fair with the court. Every court ... has the right to rely upon an attorney to assist it in ascertaining the truth of the case before it. Therefore, candor and fairness should characterize the conduct of an attorney at the beginning, during, and at the close of litigation.
Schmidt, 491 N.W.2d at 755 (citing H. Drinker, Legal Ethics 74 (1953)) (emphasis supplied).
Rule 1.4 requires an attorney to explain matters, including the division of settlement proceeds, to the chent so that the chent is able to make an informed decision regarding the representation. Since candor and fairness are required for representations to a tribunal, it only seems logical that such candor and fairness should be extended to the chent, especially when you are dividing up the Ghent’s money. Such open and fair disclosure can only ensure the maintenance of an appropriate lawyer/chent relationship. Since Bihlmeyer did not provide Powell with a breakdown of the method employed by him in assessing his fee, it is obvious why his attorney/client relationship with Powell deteriorated to the point where the complaint was filed.
Powell was not able to make an informed decision because she was not provided with a written statement explaining the outcome of this matter. “Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the chent with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter ... showing the remittance to the chent and the method of its determination.” Rule 1.5(c).
Bihlmeyer’s admitted conduct constitutes a violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, 1.4 Communication, 1.5 Fees, 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal, and 8.4 Misconduct. This attempted overcharge certainly is not an example of professionahsm and was prejudicial to the administration of justice. Rules 8.4(c) and (d).
In determining an appropriate discipline, this court reviews the totahty of the attorney/chent relationship to determine if any mitigating factors warrant consideration. Matter of Walker, 254 N.W.2d 452 (S.D.1977). The referee for this case found, “[t]o Mr. Bihlmeyer’s credit, he has made every effort to rectify the mistakes that he made and has fully compensated Ms. Powell.” Although this does not absolve Bihlmeyer from diseiphne, it certainly constitutes conduct on his part to correct his error.
This court concludes that the appropriate discipline in this ease is public censure with the condition that Bihlmeyer maintain and provide Board with proof of legal malpractice insurance or other appropriate security to protect his clients. See Matter of Discipline of Martin, 506 N.W.2d 101, 106 (S.D.1993); SDCL 16-19-35(4). Further, judgment is rendered against Bihlmeyer for all necessary costs which are taxable by the clerk as set forth in SDCL 16-19-70.
MILLER, C.J., and WUEST and SABERS, JJ., concur.
HENDERSON, J., concurs in result.