FILED APRIL 26, 2016 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division Ill
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
In the Matter of the Detention of ) ) No. 32882-1-111 ) ) JAMES EDWARD JONES, ) ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) )
FEARING, C.J. -James Jones assigns three errors to his involuntary commitment
as a sexually violent predator. First, he argues the trial court violated his due process
rights by failing to review all pleadings the parties submitted for a Frye hearing. Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013, 34 A.L.R. 145 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Second, he contends the
trial court erred when allowing the State's expert witness to testify to his chance of
recidivism based on the Structured Risk Assessment-Forensic Version (SRA-FV)
actuarial instrument. He maintains the SRA-FV is a novel risk assessment that fails the
Frye test. Finally, he argues the State failed to plead and prove that he committed a No. 32882-1-111 In re Det. ofJones
recent overt act, a necessary element to his commitment since he was no longer in total
confinement for a sexually violent act but incarcerated for a drug-related community
custody violation. We reject Jones's first two contentions. We agree with his third
argument and remand for a new trial.
FACTS
In 1997, a jury convicted James Jones of two counts of second degree rape and
one count of unlawful imprisonment. The trial court sentenced him to sixteen years and
six months' incarceration and three years' community custody. The Department of
Corrections (DOC) released him to community custody on December 9, 2010.
DOC sanctioned James Jones for various substance abuse violations during his
community custody. On March 4, 2011, Jones' urine tested positive for marijuana, and
the DOC hearing officer sentenced him to seventeen days in jail. On August 3, 2011,
Jones' urine tested positive for methamphetamine, and the hearing officer sentenced him
to thirty days in jail. On September 5, 2011, Jones smoked marijuana.
Before any hearing for his September 5 community custody breach and on
September 6, 2011, James Jones engaged in "rough sex" with a female at his home.
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 1187. We know none of the details of the sexual activity. When
police questioned him about bruises, abrasions, and scars suffered by his purported
victim, Jones characterized the sex as "rough." CP at 1187. The police arrested Jones,
2 No. 32882-1-111 In re Det. ofJones
and the State charged him with first degree rape and unlawful imprisonment. At the
Yakima County jail, a community corrections officer collected Jones's urine, which
tested positive for marijuana.
On September 21, 2011, DOC conducted a third community placement hearing for
James Jones at the Yakima County jail. At the hearing, Jones conceded marijuana use on
September 5. The DOC hearing officer ordered Jones returned to total confinement to .
serve the remainder of his prison sentence for the 1997 convictions. The officer noted
Jones' earlier community custody violations, his failure to seek help, and his risk to the
community when he uses drugs.
On November 14, 2012, James Jones pied guilty to third degree assault for the
Septemb.er 6, 2011 incident, and the State dismissed the first degree rape count. The trial
court sentenced Jones to one year of incarceration with a year's credit for time served.
Therefore, Jones did not thereafter serve time for the 2011 assault, but he remained
imprisoned for the 1997 convictions.
PROCEDURE
On February 12, 2013, while James Jones remained in incarceration, the State of
Washington filed this petition to commit Jones as a sexually violent person. Prior to trial
on the petition, the trial court conducted a Frye hearing to determine whether the State
could admit as evidence use of the SRA-FV, a dynamic risk assessment tool for sex
3 No. 32882-1-111 In re Det. ofJones
offenders, t.o establish that Jones would likely reoffend if released into the community. In
advance of the hearing, the parties filed hundreds of pages of declarations, briefs, articles,
and studies. The Frye hearing lasted two days. The State called Dr. Amy Phenix and Dr.
Harry Haberman as its experts, and Jones called Dr. Brian Abbott as his expert.
At the conclusion of the Frye hearing, the trial court stated that the court
actually had an opportunity to go through all of the mounds of paperwork that the attorneys had given me on this issue. So I was able to finally get through all of it. I have read the briefs, some of the cases, but I didn't go through all of the attachments and the declarations.
2 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (May 29, 2014) at 266-67. The trial court
found the SRA-FY to be generally accepted in the scientific community and that
generally accepted methods of applying the test exist that can produce reliable results.
James Jones did not object to the trial court rendering a ruling without reviewing all
declarations and attachments.
At the beginning of the trial on the sexually violent person petition, James Jones
filed a Marshall motion, seeking a trial court determination as a matter of law whether his
drug-related community custody violations and assault conviction qualified as recent
overt acts under chapter RCW 71.09.020(12). In re Det. ofMarshall, 156 Wn.2d 150,
125 P.3d 111 (2005). Jones requested that the trial court oblige the State to plead and
prove a recent overt act. He argued that his recent incarceration resulted from
community custody violations, that those violations involved no sexual activity, and that 4 No. 32882-1-111 In re Det. ofJones
the violations did not qualify as recent overt acts under the statute.
The trial court denied James Jones' motion. The court found that Jones'
incarceration at the time the State filed its petition was pursuant to his 1997 sexually
violent offense, not for community custody violations. The trial court therefore
concluded that the State need not plead or prove that Jones committed a recent overt act.
The trial court declined to decide whether Jones' September 2011 assault qualified as a
recent overt act.
During trial, the State called Dr. Harry Hoberman to establish James Jones' level
of dynamic risk for reoffending under the SRA-FV. Hoberman concluded that Jones
scaled in the "very high" category to reoffend and that his likelihood of reoffending was
thirty-six percent over ten years. 4 VRP (Oct. 9, 2014) at 563. Psychologist Brian
Abbott testified and opined that Jones did not meet the criteria for involuntary
commitment. The jury found Jones to be a sexually violent predator, and the trial court
committed Jones to the State of Washington Department of Social and Health Services.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Trial Court Review of Pleadings
On appeal, James Jones first argues that the trial court's failure to review some
pleadings during the Frye hearing violated his due process rights. We decline to address
this claimed error because Jones did not preserve the assignment of error for appeal.
5 No. 32882-1-111 In re Det. ofJones
When the trial court announced the court had not read all of the declarations and
attachments, Jones never demanded that the court review all pleadings or objected to the
court issuing a ruling without this additional review.
RAP 2.5 formalizes a fundamental principle of appellate review. The first
sentence of the rule reads:
(a) Errors Raised for First Time on Review. The appellate court may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court.
No procedural principle is more familiar than that a constitutional right, or a right of any
other sort, may be forfeited in criminal cases by the failure to make timely assertion of
the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it. United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 731, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1993); Yakus v. United States, 321
U.S. 414, 444, 64 S. Ct. 660, 88 L. Ed. 834 (1944).
Good sense lies behind the requirement that arguments be first asserted at trial.
There is great potential for abuse when a party does not raise an issue below because a
party so situated could simply lie back, not allowing the trial court to avoid the potential
prejudice, gamble on the verdict, and then seek a new trial on appeal. State v. Weber, 159
Wn.2d 252, 271-72, 149 P.3d 646 (2006); State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741, 762, 278 P.3d
653 (2012). The theory of preservation by timely objection also addresses several other
concerns. The rule serves the goal of judicial economy by enabling trial courts to correct
6 No. 32882-1-111 In re Det. ofJones
mistakes and thereby obviate the needless expense of appellate review and further trials,
facilitates appellate review by ensuring that a complete record of the issues will be
available, and prevents adversarial unfairness by ensuring that the prevailing party is not
deprived of victory by claimed errors that he had no opportunity to address. State v.
Strine, 176 Wn.2d 742, 749-50, 293 P.3d 1177 (2013); State v. Scott, 110 Wn.2d 682,
685-88, 757 P.2d 492 (1988).
Countervailing policies support allowing an argument to be raised for the first time
on appeal. For this reason, RAP 2.5(a) contains a number of exceptions. RAP 2.5(a)(3)
allows an appellant to raise for the first time "manifest error affecting a constitutional
right," an exception on which a criminal appellant commonly relies. Constitutional errors
are treated specially under RAP 2.5(a) because they often result in serious injustice to the
accused and may adversely affect public perceptions of the fairness and integrity of
judicial proceedings. State v. Scott, 110 Wn.2d at 686-87. James Jones does not claim
the trial court's failure to review all pleadings constitutes manifest constitutional error.
This appeal fulfills the rationale behind the waiver of error by failing to object
below. The trial court was inundated with pleadings concerning the SRA-FV. The trial
court noted the "mounds of paperwork" examined. 2 VRP (May 29, 2014) at 266. Jones
could have asked the trial court which pages he did not review, but Jones did not raise
this question. Because Jones did not object below, we do not know which of the 1,500
7 No. 32882-1-111 In re Det. ofJones
pages of pleadings the trial court did not review. We have no way to adjudge the
importance of the declarations and attachments not reviewed. We do not know to what
pleadings the attachments were affixed. For all we know, the unreviewed pleadings were
cumulative of other pleadings or testimony of the experts during the two-day trial. Jones
could have insisted that the trial court read all pleadings, at which time the trial court
could have delivered a reasoned explanation for omitting the review.
Frye Test
James Jones next assigns error to the trial court's ruling that the SRA-FY tool
satisfies Frye. Washington applies the Frye test to gauge whether expert testimony
premised on scientific evidence may be admissible. State v. Copeland, 130 Wn.2d 244,
261, 922 P.2d 1304 (1996). Frye requires that expert testimony be based on principles
generally accepted in the scientific community. State v. Canaday, 90 Wn.2d 808, 812,
585 P.2d 1185 (1978). The Frye test is two prong: (1) whether the underlying theory is
generally accepted in the scientific community, and (2) whether there are techniques
utilizing the theory that are capable of producing reliable results. State v. Riker, 123
Wn.2d 351, 359, 869 P.2d 43 (1994). The purpose of the Frye test is to exclude, from a
trial, novel scientific evidence not accepted in the scientific community. State v.
Copeland, 130 Wn.2d at 256. Disputes concerning scientific validity should be resolved
by the relevant scientific community. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44
8 No. 32882-1-III In re Det. ofJones
(D.C. Cir. 1974); State v. Vandebogart, 136 N.H. 365, 616 A.2d 483, 489 (1992). Only
after the technique has been scrutinized and tested successfully in the scientific
community will the technique receive judicial recognition. State v. Copeland, 130 Wn.2d
at 256-57.
Even before Washington adopted the community protection act of 1990, chapter
71.09 RCW, which includes provisions for the commitment of sexually violent predators,
forensic psychiatrists began formulating tools and protocols for predicting the likelihood
of a sexually violent offender to repeat similar criminal behavior. Psychiatrists and
psychologists refer to the tools as actuarial instruments, which, when widely accepted by
the professions, become validated actuarial instruments. Dr. David Thornton, Research
Director of the Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center in Wisconsin, developed the first
validated actuarial instrument, labeled Static-99, in 1999. The term "static" derives from
the static factors, concerning an offender's history, reviewed through the instrument.
Other validated actuarial instruments constructed by Thornton or other psychologists
include Static-99 Revised, Static-2000, Static-2002 Revised, and Stable-2007. These
later versions introduced dynamic factors such as the aptitudes, interests, traits, and
thought patterns of the defendant. This case involves the acceptability of the latest
actuarial instrument, Structured Risk Assessment-Forensic Version (SRA-FY) developed
by David Thornton in 2010.
9 No. 32882-1-111 In re Det. ofJones
This court on two occasions has affirmed other trial court findings that the SRA-
FY instrument satisfies the Frye test. In re Det. ofRitter, No. 30845-6-111, 2016 WL
503128, *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2016); In re Det. of Pettis, 188 Wn. App. 198, 211,
352 P.3d 841, review denied, 184 Wn.2d 1025, 361 P.3d 748 (2015). Dr. Amy Phenix
provided similar testimony before the trial courts in both cases. James Jones raises
legitimate arguments concerning the legitimacy of the SRA-FY tool. He emphasizes the
low inter-rater reliability of the SRA-FY. One administrator of the test may arrive at a
different result than another administrator. Still, both Ritter and Pettis ruled against these
concerns.
The Frye test addresses the admissibility of scientific evidence. One might
question whether the SRA-FY must pass the Frye test, since the SRA-FY is not strictly
scientific, and then, assuming the Frye test applies, question whether the instrument is
sufficiently scientific to pass muster. Nevertheless, other courts have applied the Frye
test to and admitted expert testimony from the soft sciences, such as economics and
psychology. Andrade Garcia v. Columbia Med. Ctr. of Sherman, 996 F. Supp. 617 (E.D.
Tex. 1998); United States v. Hall, 974 F. Supp. 1198 (C.D. Ill. 1997), aff'd, 165 F.3d
1095 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Scholl, 959 F. Supp. 1189 (D. Ariz. 1997), aff'd,
166 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 1999); John Doe 76 C v. Archdiocese ofSt. Paul & Minneapolis,
10 No. 32882-1-III In re Det. ofJones
817 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 2012); Commonwealth v. Sliech-Brodeur, 457 Mass. 300, 930
N.E.2d 91 (2010); Nations v. State, 944 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. App. 1997).
Recent Overt Act
We arrive at James Jones' last assignment of error. Jones contends the trial court
mistakenly ordered his commitment, after the jury trial, without insisting that the State
prove a recent sexually violent act, known under the sexually violent predator law as a
"recent overt act." We agree.
To protect the public, the State may constitutionally confine dangerous individuals
who suffer from mental illnesses or disorders even if the mental condition is untreatable.
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 366, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501 (1997); In re
Det. of Gaff, 90 Wn. App. 834, 845, 954 P.2d 943 (1998). Therefore, RCW 71.09.060
authorizes the State of Washington to involuntarily commit a person determined to be a
"sexually violent predator" after he or she serves a sentence for a crime. The State may
file a petition alleging an individual is a sexually violent predator when "it appears that
. . . [a] person who at any time previously has been convicted of a sexually violent
offense is about to be released from total confinement." RCW 71.09.030(1). The State
may also wait until after release from incarceration to file the petition.
A "sexually violent predator" is someone "convicted of or charged with a crime of
sexual violence and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which
11 No. 32882-1-111 In re Det. ofJones
makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence." RCW
71.09.020(18). RCW 71.09.020(8) defines "[m]ental abnormality" which "is tied directly
to present dangerousness." In re Det. ofHenrickson, 140 Wn.2d 686, 692, 2 P.3d 473
(2000). This tie to present dangerousness is constitutionally required, as recognized in In
re Personal Restraint of Young, 122 Wn.2d 1, 27, 857 P.2d 989 (1993), because due
process requires that an individual must be both mentally ill and presently dangerous
before he or she may be indefinitely committed. In re Det. of Marshall, 156 Wn.2d at
157 (2005).
Proof of current dangerousness is constitutionally required to confine an offender.
In re Det. ofAlbrecht, 147 Wn.2d 1, 10, 51 P.3d 73 (2002). Therefore, the Washington
sexually violent predator statute is premised on a finding of the present dangerousness of
the committee. In re Det. of Henrickson, 140 Wn.2d at 692. Proof of a recent overt act
may be required to establish current dangerousness. In re Det. of Marshall, l 56 Wn.2d at
157. A "[r]ecent overt act" is:
any act or threat, or combination thereof that has either caused harm of a sexually violent nature or creates a reasonable apprehension of such harm in the mind of an objective person who knows of the history and mental condition of the person engaging in the act.
RCW 71.09.020(12). Nevertheless, the State must prove an individual committed a
recent overt act only if, on the day the State files the petition, the individual lived in the
community after release from custody. In re Det. of Marshall 156 Wn.2d at 157. 12 No. 32882-1-111 In re Det. ofJones
RCW 71.09.030(1) reads in relevant part:
A petition may be filed alleging that a person is a sexually violent predator and stating sufficient facts to support such allegation when it appears that: (a) A person who at any time previously has been convicted of a sexually violent offense is about to be released from total confinement; .. . or (e) a person who at any time previously has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and has since been released from total confinement and has committed a recent overt act.
(Emphasis added.) RCW 9.94A.030(51) defines "total confinement" as:
"Total confinement" means confinement inside the physical boundaries of a facility or institution operated or utilized under contract by the state or any other unit of government for twenty-four hours a day, or pursuant to RCW 72.64.050 and 72.64.060.
In tum, the second paragraph ofRCW 71.09.060 partially declares
(1) . . . If, on the date that the petition is filed, the person was living in the community after release from custody, the state must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person had committed a recent overt act.
(Emphasis added.)
When an individual remains incarcerated at the time the State files its petition for
commitment, no evidence of a recent overt act is required because such a requirement
would create a standard that would be impossible to meet. In re Pers. Restraint of Young,
122 Wn.2d at 41 (1993). This rationale assumes that the offender cannot engage in
sexually violent acts in prison. The law presumes that prisoners have no opportunity to
commit a recent overt act while incarcerated. In re Det. ofAlbrecht, 14 7 Wn.2d at 8-9
13 No. 32882-1-111 In re Det. ofJones
(2002). The rationale does not apply when the State released the offender into the
community even with supervision. In re Det. ofAlbrecht, 147 Wn.2d at 9. The
supervision does not extend round the clock. The offender in community custody
possesses an opportunity to engage in sexually violent acts and thus the State does not
face the impossibility of showing current dangerousness.
In this appeal, we must decide whether the State must prove a recent overt act.
DOC released James Jones to community custody on December 9, 2010. Thereafter, he
thrice returned to jail for community custody violations of substance abuse. When, on
February 12, 2013, the State filed the petition for commitment as a sexually violent
predator, Jones remained in prison. One could characterize the reason for his
imprisonment, in February 2013, as the result of a community custody violation or the
result of returning to prison for the 1997 second degree rape conviction. The community
custody violations were not sexually violent in nature and thus do not qualify as "recent
overt acts." The 1997 rapes qualify as an "overt act" for purposes of committing the
offender as a sexually violent person, but the question remains whether this court should
consider the rapes "recent overt acts" when James Jones spent time in the community
after his imprisonment for the rapes.
Whether the State must plead and prove a recent overt act in order to commit a
person as a sexually violent person is a question of law and reviewed de novo. In re Det.
14 No. 32882-1-III In re Det. ofJones
of Hovinga, 132 Wn. App. 16, 20, 130 P.3d 830 (2006). Based on In re Detention of
Albrecht, 147 Wn.2d at 51 (2002), In re Detention ofBroten, 115 Wn. App. 252, 62 P.3d
514 (2003), and In re Detention ofDavis, 109 Wn. App. 734, 37 P.3d 325 (2002), we rule
that the State needed to plead and prove a recent overt act.
In re Detention ofAlbrecht controls this appeal. Our state high court framed its
issue: whether the State must allege a recent overt act in order to commit an offender as a
sexually violent predator when the offender has been released from total confinement into
the community and then returned to total confinement. The Supreme Court concluded
that "after a person has been released into the community, due process would be
subverted by failing to require proof of a recent overt act." 14 7 Wn.2d at 4.
After Robin Albrecht served his four-year sentence for child molestation, the State
released Albrecht into community placement in accordance with his sentence. A
condition of community placement was no direct or indirect contact with minor children.
Thirty days after his release from incarceration, Albrecht offered two boys fifty cents to
follow him. As a result, the court modified Albrecht's community supervision and
imposed one hundred twenty days in jail. While Albrecht resided in jail, the State filed a
petition for a civil commitment as a sexually violent predator. After defense counsel
deposed the two young boys, counsel warned the State that the boys' testimony did not
support a finding of a recent overt act. The State then moved to amend the petition to
15 No. 32882-1-111 In re Det. ofJones
allege it need not prove a recent overt act because Albrecht remained in prison, at the
time of the petition's filing, for child molestation. The trial court permitted the
amendment, but the Supreme Court reversed.
In Albrecht, the state high court held that the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt a recent overt act when the State files a sexual predator petition on an
offender ( 1) who has been released from confinement, (2) but is incarcerated the day the
petition is filed, (3) on a charge that does not constitute a recent overt act. In re Det. of
Albrecht, 14 7 Wn.2d at 11 n.11. The court observed that another person on community
placement release may be found in violation of his. release for something as minor as
consuming alcohol or failing to report to his community corrections officer. The
Supreme Court remanded the case for the State to show a recent overt act at trial.
More reason exists to require a recent overt act in this appeal than in Albrecht.
James Jones returned to prison because of use of a controlled substance, not because of
any sexual act. Robin Albrecht returned to prison for accosting young boys.
In In re Detention of Broten, 115 Wn. App. 252 (2003), this court followed the
Supreme Court's lead in Albrecht. We reversed a civil commitment because the trial
court did not require the State to prove a recent overt act. The State incarcerated Richard
Broten for rape of his infant daughter. Broten gained release into community placement
with supervision. While on release, the State returned Broten to prison for violation of
16 No. 32882-1-111 In re Det. ofJones
conditions of his community placement by cruising malls and parks, encountering a
prostitute, possessing pornography, masturbating to fantasies of children, and pursuing a
relationship with a mother of a small child. We reasoned that equating incarceration for
community custody violations with imprisonment for a sexually violent offense violates
due process. One in community placement may be returned to prison if a violation
hearings judge determines the offender violated a community placement condition by a
preponderance of the evidence. The sexually violent predator statute requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Broten's release into the community afforded him the
opportunity to overtly act. Thus, the State no longer faced an impossible burden to show
a recent overt act.
In re Detention ofDavis, 109 Wn. App. 734, 37 P.3d 325 (2002) repeats the
outcomes in Albrecht and Broten. Dale Davis violated a community placement term
prohibiting him from contact with minors under the age of eighteen. This court
remanded the case for a trial on the question of whether Davis' violation of conditions of
community custody sufficed as a sexually violent recent overt act.
The Supreme Court in In re Detention of Marshall, 156 Wn.2d 150 (2005),
impliedly confirmed the holding in In re Detention ofAlbrecht. The Marshall court
excused the State from establishing a recent overt act, but distinguished its facts from the
Albrecht facts on the basis that Marshall was jailed for a sexually violent act on the date
17 No. 32882-1-III In re Det. ofJones
that the State filed the petition for confinement. In Albrecht, the offender had been
released into the community following total confinement for the sexually violent act and
was incarcerated again for a violation of community placement conditions.
The State relies on In re Detention of Kelley, 133 Wn. App. 289, 135 P.3d 554
(2006). Timothy Kelley was convicted in 1972 of raping a twelve-year-old girl. He was
convicted in 1980 of statutory rape of a nine-year-old girl. The 1980 conviction led to a
twenty-year sentence. Nevertheless, the trial court suspended the sentence and sent
Kelley to Western State Hospital to undergo sexual psychopathy treatment. While on
outpatient status, Kelley assaulted his girlfriend. The court revoked his suspended
sentence and sent him to jail to serve his twenty-year sentence. He remained in jail at the
time the State filed its sexually violent predator commitment petition. We affirmed the
commitment and ruled that the State did not need to show a recent overt act, despite the
outpatient release. We characterized Albrecht, Davis and Broten as carving a narrow
exception to the rule that the State need not prove a recent overt act when the offender is
totally confined. We distinguished the suspended sentence from the community
placement releases in Albrecht, Davis, and Broten. We reasoned that Kelley's
confinement at the time the State filed its petition was the result of the 1980 rape, not the
assault of his girlfriend while on outpatient release.
This ruling in Kelley should be probed. Regardless of benefiting from a suspended
18 No. 32882-1-111 In re Det. ofJones
sentence and being on community placement, Timothy Kelley gained the opportunity to
commit a recent overt act. The opportunity to commit another violent sexual act
generates the requirement that the State prove a recent overt act. The constitution allows
a civil commitment only if the offender is currently dangerous.
In re Detention of Kelley followed In re Detention ofHovinga, 132 Wn. App. 16
(2006). In Hovinga, this court also held that the State need not allege and prove a recent
overt act. The State imprisoned Dery le Hovinga in 1981 for statutory rape of a nine-year-
old girl. In 1988, Hovinga was released into the community on parole. The State
returned Hovinga to prison in 1992 because of parole violations. He remained in prison
for another eleven years, and, before his release, the State filed a petition for
commitment. The parole violations included following young girls in a Bon Marche,
while being videotaped. He masturbated as he trailed the minors. He admitted at least
six occasions of similar behavior.
Hovinga may have alternative rulings. This court distinguished Albrecht on the
basis that Hovinga was released on parole in lieu of serving his full sentence, as opposed
to receiving community placement. This first ruling should be questioned as the Kelley
ruling was doubted.
The Hovinga court also affirmed the commitment of Dery le Hovinga on the
ground that the parole violation constituted a sexually violent act. Since Hovinga
19 No. 32882-1-111 In re Det. ofJones
returned to prison and remained in prison at the time of the filing of the petition, the State
did not need to prove another recent overt act.
We cannot reconcile Kelley and Hovinga with Albrecht, Davis, and Broten. The
distinction between release from parole and an outpatient release, on the one hand, and
community custody on the other hand has no legitimate difference. Nor does the
difference between community placement, the predecessor of community custody, and
community custody establish a reason to distinguish the facts in Albrecht, Davis, and
Broten from the circumstances of James Jones. Regardless of the label given the release
into the community, the offender no longer sits in total confinement. The offender
possesses the ability and freedom to commit another sexually violent crime. The
offender has the opportunity to commit a recent overt act.
We need not reconcile this court's various opinions. Albrecht, as a Supreme Court
decision, controls our appeal. Under Albrecht, the State must show a recent overt act in
order to commit James Jones.
The State also argues that the "rough sex" incident on September 6, 2011, for
which James Jones pied guilty to assault qualifies as a recent overt act or frees it from
showing a recent overt act because Jones returned to total confinement as a result of the
assault. We disagree. We only have sketchy facts and lack any testimony under oath.
We cannot judge whether the incident involved an act of violent sexual predation. We
20 No. 32882-1-111 In re Det. ofJones
would take from James Jones his right to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable
doubt whether the September 6 incident qualifies as a recent overt act.
The State also forwarded a similar argument in In re Detention ofDavis, 109 Wn.
App. 734 (2002). The Davis court rejected the argument. The court noted that the facts
in the record of Davis' unauthorized contact with the 15-year-old boy did not
conclusively prove that Davis' conduct was of a sexually violent nature or created a
reasonable apprehension of such harm.
We do not wish someone with the current propensity of sexual violence to be free
to prey on other victims. We note, however, that the State, if it deemed James Jones to be
a sexually violent person as a result of the 1997 rapes, could have filed a petition before
Jones' release to community custody on December 9, 2010. The State, on remand,
remains free to confine James Jones as a sexually violent predator if it proves beyond a
reasonable doubt the "rough sex" on September 6, 2011 to be a recent overt act.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court's judgment referring James Jones for civil commitment
as a sexually violent predator. We remand for a trial on whether James Jones committed
a recent overt act sufficient to commit him as a sexually violent person.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
21 No. 32882-1-III In re Det. ofJones
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
~~ Feari~ 1 I WE CONCUR:
5-;~w~-~- siddoway,1.