In Re the Commitment of Gregory Scott Alldredge v. the State of Texas

Opinion

In the

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-26-00067-CV

IN RE THE COMMITMENT OF GREGORY SCOTT ALLDREDGE

On Appeal from the 124th District Court Gregg County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2024-1434-B

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Gregory Scott Alldredge, appeals from a judgment decreeing that he is a sexually violent predator and ordering his supervision and treatment pursuant to the provisions of chapter 841 of the Texas Health and Safety Code. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 841.081–.085. The matter was tried to a jury, which came to a unanimous verdict. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.062(b) (Supp.). In one issue on appeal, Alldredge argues that the trial court erred in “admitting evidence of unsubstantiated and unadjudicated allegations of non-sexual offenses.” Because we find that Alldredge did not preserve this issue for appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. I. Applicable Law “In 1999, the [Texas] Legislature enacted the Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act (‘SVP Act’ or ‘Act’), codified at Texas Health and Safety Code chapter 841.” In re Commitment of Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d 665, 669 (Tex. 2020). “[T]he Act provides ‘a civil- commitment procedure for the long-term supervision and treatment of sexually violent predators.’” Id. (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.001). “A ‘sexually violent predator’ is a ‘repeat sexually violent offender’1 who ‘suffers from a behavioral abnormality[2]

1 “As relevant here, a person is a ‘repeat sexually violent offender’ if he ‘is convicted of more than one sexually violent offense and a sentence is imposed for at least one of the offenses.’ TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE [ANN.] § 841.003(b) [(Supp.)]. ‘Sexually violent offense’ is defined in the Act to include certain enumerated offenses under the Penal Code, as well as offenses with substantially similar elements under prior state law or the law of other jurisdictions. Id. § 841.002(8) [(Supp.)].” In re Commitment of Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d at 669 n.1. 2 “‘Behavioral abnormality’ is defined as ‘a congenital or acquired condition that, by affecting a person’s emotional or volitional capacity, predisposes the person to commit a sexually violent offense, to the extent that the person becomes a menace to the health and safety of another person.’” [TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.] § 841.002(2) [(Supp.)].” In re Commitment of Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d at 669 n.2.

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that makes the person likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.003(a)).

“The commitment procedure begins when the Texas Department of Criminal Justice notifies an established multidisciplinary team of the anticipated release date of a person who is serving a sentence for a sexually violent offense and ‘may be a repeat sexually violent offender.’” Id. (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.021(a)). “The team must timely assess whether the person is a repeat sexually violent offender and is likely to commit a sexually violent offense after release, notify the Department of the assessment, and make a recommendation regarding whether to evaluate the person for a behavioral abnormality.” Id. (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.022(c)). “Upon receipt of a recommendation to do so, the Department must timely conduct the behavioral-abnormality assessment by utilizing an expert to examine the person and ‘make a clinical assessment based on testing for psychopathy, a clinical interview, and other appropriate . . . techniques.’” Id. (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.023(a)). “If as a result of that assessment the Department ‘believes that the person suffers from a behavioral abnormality,’ the Department must timely provide notice and corresponding documentation to the appropriate attorney representing the [S]tate.” Id. (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.023(b)).

“[T]he [S]tate’s attorney ‘may [then] file . . . a petition alleging that the person is a sexually violent predator and stating facts sufficient to support the allegation.’” Id. at 670 (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.041). At trial, which may be to a jury or judge, “the factfinder ‘shall determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the person is a

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sexually violent predator.’” Id. (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.062(a)). Upon such a finding, “‘the judge shall commit the person for treatment and supervision’ . . . [through] the Texas Civil Commitment Office.” Id. (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 841.007, .081(a)). II. Relevant Facts In December 2023, Alldredge pled guilty to three offenses of indecency with a child by sexual contact. The convictions involved Alldredge’s touching his three stepdaughters on the vagina, breasts, and buttocks, and placing one of their hands on his penis, when the girls were between the ages of seven and thirteen in the years 2010 through 2016. Alldredge was sentenced to five years in prison for each indecency conviction, to be served concurrently.

Before Alldredge was to be released from imprisonment for the indecency convictions, the State petitioned that he be civilly committed as a sexually violent predator. The matter was tried to a jury, and the State called two witnesses, Dr. Christine Reed and Alldredge.

Reed, a clinical and forensic psychologist, testified that, consistent with the methodology followed by experts in her field, she evaluated Alldredge by reviewing records and interviewing him. Reed testified that she reviewed Alldredge’s criminal, sexual offense, medical, and mental health histories, along with his prison records. Reed then interviewed Alldredge and gathered information to assess Alldredge’s risk factors for re-offending. Reed testified that her interview with Alldredge was done in accordance with her training as a psychologist and the accepted standard in the field of forensic psychology.

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Reed testified that she relied on a previous psychologist’s report regarding Alldredge, which, she explained, is standard practice. When Reed was asked what the prior psychologist’s opinion was regarding whether Alldredge has a behavioral abnormality, Alldredge objected based on hearsay. The trial court overruled Alldredge’s hearsay objection, and Alldredge asked that the jury be given a limiting instruction on hearsay and that he be allowed a running objection. The trial court granted Alldredge’s running objection and allowed Alldredge to give the jury the following instruction:

Ladies and gentlemen, hearsay is a statement that, one, the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or a hearing; and, two, a party offers evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. Hearsay is normally not admissible in this case. Certain hearsay information contained in the records by an expert or experts will be admitted before you through that expert testimony. Such hearsay is admitted only for the purpose of showing the basis of the expert’s opinion and cannot be considered as the evidence of proof of the truth of the matter asserted.

You may not consider the hearsay information for any other purpose including whether the facts alleged in the records are true.

Reed then testified that the other psychologist opined that Alldredge has a behavioral abnormality. Reed testified that she also formed an opinion that Alldredge has a behavioral abnormality.

Reed continued testifying regarding Alldredge’s risk factors for re-offending, including, in particular, sexual deviance and an antisocial orientation. Reed explained that Alldredge’s sexual deviance arose due to his pedophilic disorder. Reed diagnosed Alldredge with pedophilic disorder, a diagnosis related to sexual deviance that involves urges, behaviors, and thoughts of a sexual nature involving prepubescent children.

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Reed detailed Alldredge’s three sexually violent offenses, the three indecency with a child by sexual-contact convictions referenced above. Reed testified that the records contained allegations of physical abuse in addition to the sexual abuse. Reed testified that the girls reported that Alldredge would push, hit, kick, spit at, choke, and make sexual comments to them. She reported that he made the girls dig their own graves. She also testified that the girls stated Alldredge “threw gasoline [on] them and threatened to light them on fire.” Reed stated that the girls also witnessed Alldredge be physically abusive toward their mother. Reed testified that the girls stated that Alldredge harmed a dog that was a family pet and may have killed another pet. Reed stated that these allegations of abuse did not result in a child abuse conviction. However, the physical abuse, neglect, and cruelty that the girls described informed Reed’s conclusion about antisocial orientation.

Reed also discussed Alldredge’s nonsexual-criminal history, which included driving under the influence, drug possession, criminal mischief, evading arrest, and at least three assault bodily-injury cases. Reed testified that the records showed additional offenses for which it was unclear whether they resulted in conviction, including theft, unlawful carrying of a weapon, assault family violence, obstruction and retaliation against officers, public intoxication, endangerment of a child, driving without a valid license or insurance—“more than [twenty] total,” Reed said.

Reed testified that Alldredge had not received any disciplinary or sexual-misconduct write-ups in the two years that he had been in prison. Reed said that did not change her opinion

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because prison is “a highly structured environment that’s meant to provide structure to individuals with an antisocial orientation.”

Reed also explained that she diagnosed Alldredge “with an unspecified personality disorder with antisocial features,” a personality disorder involving a long-standing pattern of behaviors that impair a person’s ability to properly view themselves and others and to interact with others. Reed testified that the personality disorder contributed to Alldredge’s sexual offending and to his continued risk to re-offend.

Reed also testified regarding a number of testing instruments and measures she employed in arriving at her opinions. Reed testified that she did not consider any of those factors and measures in isolation, but she took them all into consideration within the context. Reed agreed that a mixture of sexual deviance, antisocial orientation, substance abuse history, and all the other risk factors substantially raise a person’s risk for re-offending. Reed said Alldredge’s conviction history indicates that his emotional or volitional capacity had been affected and was still affected. She believed him likely to be a menace to the health and safety of another person. Reed concluded that Alldredge’s risk of sexually re-offending was “high.” III. Analysis On appeal, Alldredge argues that the trial court erred in admitting Reed’s testimony regarding “unsubstantiated allegations of physical abuse and neglect.” Yet, the only objection Alldredge made to Reed’s testimony was at the point when Reed began to testify as to another psychologist’s diagnosis of Alldredge. Alldredge’s objection was merely, “[o]bjection. Hearsay.” The State responded that “under [Rule] 705 [of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure],

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this expert is able to rely upon hearsay and testify as to that.” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 705. Alldredge did not address the State’s reference to Rule 705. The trial court overruled Alldredge’s objection but granted Alldredge a running objection to hearsay and allowed him to immediately read to the jury a limiting instruction regarding hearsay.3 Alldredge now claims that his hearsay objection preserved error as to any and all hearsay evidence offered through Reed. Alldredge also asserts that the hearsay objection preserved error as to his appellate argument that the hearsay evidence should not have been admitted because “the probative value of [the] information [wa]s outweighed by its prejudicial effect.”

Our sister court has addressed preservation of error regarding hearsay testimony by an expert testifying in the commitment of a sexually violent predator. See In re Commitment of Winkle, 434 S.W.3d 300, 315 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. denied) (citing TEX. R. EVID. 705(a)). The Beaumont court observed, “Rule 705 allows a trial court to admit the underlying facts or data on which an expert has based his opinions.” Id. (citing TEX. R. EVID. 705(a); In re Commitment of Tesson, 413 S.W.3d 514, 520 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, pet. denied)).

When the underlying facts or data would be inadmissible in evidence, the court shall exclude the underlying facts or data if the danger that they will be used for a purpose other than as explanation or support for the expert’s opinion outweighs their value as explanation or support or are unfairly prejudicial. If otherwise inadmissible facts or data are disclosed before the jury, a limiting instruction by the court shall be given upon request.

Id. (quoting TEX. R. EVID. 705(d)).

Even if we assumed that Alldredge’s sole hearsay objection preserved error as to the admission of the “non-sexual,” “unsubstantiated allegations of physical abuse and neglect” of

3 The trial court also included a hearsay limiting instruction in the jury charge.

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which Alldredge now complains, the record indicates that Alldredge failed to request the trial court to balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect. “To place the trial court on notice regarding his desire for the court to balance the danger of the jury’s use of the hearsay . . . , [Alldredge] should have requested the trial court to perform a balancing test when [Reed] disclosed the [offensive evidence].” Id. at 316 (citing TEX. R. EVID. 705(d)). “Without such a request, [Alldredge] failed to give the trial court an opportunity to decide whether the danger of admitting the opinions outweighed their probative value.” Id. “We conclude that this part of [Alldredge’s] argument was not properly preserved for our review on appeal.” Id. (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)).

Further, if we found any error in admitting Reed’s hearsay testimony regarding the girls’

allegations of physical abuse, that error was cured when Alldredge questioned Reed about those allegations himself. “The erroneous admission of evidence ‘will not result in reversal when other such evidence was received without objection, either before or after the complained-of ruling. This rule applies whether the other evidence was introduced by the defendant or the State.’” Cook v. State, 665 S.W.3d 595, 600 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (quoting Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)).

Alldredge argues that “there was no other source of information to support the physical[-

]abuse allegations other than Dr. Reed’s testimony about the hearsay records,” but at least a portion of that evidence came through his own questioning. Alldredge asked Reed whether she read the records, and then proceeded to question her about them; whether Alldredge was ever charged with the physical abuse of his stepdaughters; whether Reed knew that the police were

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called to the Alldredges’ home on multiple occasions; whether the stepdaughters were interviewed separately, referring to a police report; whether the stepdaughters ever claimed that there was physical abuse by Alldredge; and whether Reed ever read anything that indicated that the police arrested Alldredge for physical abuse of the girls. This line of questioning by Alldredge cured any error in the admission of physical-abuse evidence through Reed.

For these reasons, we conclude Alldredge is not entitled to the relief he has requested.

We overrule his sole issue. IV. Conclusion We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Jeff Rambin

Justice

Date Submitted: August 19, 2026 Date Decided: August 31, 2026