In Re the Bible Speaks, Debtor. Elizabeth Dovydenas v. The Bible Speaks

869 F.2d 628, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 2895, 1989 WL 19358
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedMarch 9, 1989
Docket88-1254
StatusPublished
Cited by35 cases

This text of 869 F.2d 628 (In Re the Bible Speaks, Debtor. Elizabeth Dovydenas v. The Bible Speaks) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re the Bible Speaks, Debtor. Elizabeth Dovydenas v. The Bible Speaks, 869 F.2d 628, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 2895, 1989 WL 19358 (1st Cir. 1989).

Opinion

BOWNES, Circuit Judge.

In this undue influence case, the defendant church, the Bible Speaks (TBS), appeals the district court’s affirmance of the bankruptcy court’s finding of liability. See The Bible Speaks v. Dovydenas, 81 B.R. 750 (D.Mass.1988) (TBS II); In re The Bible Speaks, 73 B.R. 848 (Bankr.D.Mass. 1987) (TBS I). The unique procedural history of the case was detailed by the district court.

TBS brought suit in Berkshire Superi- or Court [Massachusetts] against Elizabeth Dovydenas on April 14, 1986 seeking a declaratory judgment that it did not owe her any debt or liability and that it did not have to return funds transferred by her. This suit was dismissed on June 13, 1986. The Massachusetts Appeals Court dismissal was affirmed on April 8, 1987.
Elizabeth Dovydenas then brought suit on June 19, 1986 in Berkshire Superior Court against TBS. She sought rescission of gifts made by her between December 1984 and December 1985 because of undue influence and fraud. After its motion to dismiss was denied on July 15, 1986, TBS sought protection of the bankruptcy court filing for Chapter 11 reorganization on July 29, 1986. Its petition, which stayed the state court action, stated that Elizabeth Dovydenas’ claim against it was a core proceeding. Elizabeth Dovydenas then filed a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court on October 31, 1986. The three-week trial on the merits began on March 30, 1987 and ended on April 16, 1987. The bankruptcy court issued its final order on May 19, 1987. By assuming jurisdiction of TBS over the claimant’s objection, the bankruptcy court entered into the process of administering TBS’ estate while it reorganized under Chapter 11.

81 B.R. at 753-54.

Plaintiff’s claim in the bankruptcy court was for the return of gifts made to TBS, allegedly because of undue influence. The bankruptcy court found that the gifts were the result of undue influence and awarded her $6,581,356.25, which was the total of three large gifts and a number of smaller ones. After reviewing the record, the district court accepted and adopted in full the bankruptcy court’s findings of facts. Both courts rejected the first amendment — free exercise claim of TBS.

We affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

The bankruptcy court made extensive findings of facts. See TBS I, 73 B.R. at 849-57. Credibility was a key factor in determining the facts. Id. at 857. We review the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. Bankr.R. 8013; 1 Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a).

In Briden v. Foley, 776 F.2d 379, 381 (1st Cir.1985), we held, in a bankruptcy case, that the clearly erroneous standard was especially appropriate where credibility was at issue, stating: “Indeed, the clear,ly erroneous standard was designed to insulate just such findings — ones that are based, inter alia, on weighing the credibili *630 ty of witnesses.” Id. at 382. See also In re Pearson Bros., 787 F.2d 1157, 1161 (7th Cir.1986). The clearly erroneous standard has been explained by the Supreme Court as follows:

Although the meaning of the phrase “clearly erroneous” is not immediately apparent, certain general principles governing the exercise of the appellate court’s power to overturn findings of a district court may be derived from our cases. The foremost of these principles, as the Fourth Circuit itself recognized, is that “[a] finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 [68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746] (1948). This standard plainly does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because it is convinced that it would have decided the case differently. The reviewing court oversteps the bounds of its duty under Rule 52(a) if it undertakes to duplicate the role of the lower court. “In applying the clearly erroneous standard to the findings of a district court sitting without a jury, appellate courts must constantly have in mind that their function is not to decide factual issues de novo." Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 [89 S.Ct. 1562, 1576, 23 L.Ed.2d 129] (1969). If the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 342 [70 S.Ct. 177, 179, 94 L.Ed. 150] (1949); see also Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844 [102 S.Ct. 2182, 72 L.Ed.2d 606] (1982).
When findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, Rule 52(a) demands even greater deference to the trial court’s findings; for only the trial judge can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener’s understanding of and belief in what is said. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 [105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841] (1985).

Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74, 575, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 1512, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985).

We have reviewed the entire record carefully and conclude that the bankruptcy court’s findings, including its credibility determinations, are not clearly erroneous. The bankruptcy court found the testimony of plaintiff and her husband “forthright and credible” and the testimony of defendant’s witnesses “evasive and lacking in credibility.” TBS I, 73 B.R. at 857. All credibility conflicts were resolved in favor of the plaintiff.

Because of our decision, infra, that the first amendment is not implicated in this case, we do not reach TBS’ argument that its first amendment claim requires that we independently review the facts. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 104 S.Ct.

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869 F.2d 628, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 2895, 1989 WL 19358, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-bible-speaks-debtor-elizabeth-dovydenas-v-the-bible-speaks-ca1-1989.