In Re TESLA, INC.

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
DecidedFebruary 27, 2026
Docket26-116
StatusUnpublished

This text of In Re TESLA, INC. (In Re TESLA, INC.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re TESLA, INC., (Fed. Cir. 2026).

Opinion

Case: 26-116 Document: 31 Page: 1 Filed: 02/27/2026

NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________

In Re TESLA, INC., Petitioner ______________________

2026-116 ______________________

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States Patent and Trademark Office in Nos. IPR2025-00943, IPR2025-00944, IPR2025-01034 and IPR2025-01035. ______________________

ON PETITION AND MOTION ______________________

Before TARANTO, MAYER, and STARK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM. ORDER In response to Granite Vehicle Ventures LLC filing suit alleging patent infringement, Tesla, Inc. petitioned the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) for in- ter partes review (“IPR”) of the asserted patents. The Di- rector of the PTO, through his delegee, the Deputy Director, denied Tesla’s petitions. In particular, the Direc- tor reasoned “it is unlikely that a final written decision in [these] proceeding[s] will issue before the district court trial occurs,” and such review would result “in significant duplication of effort, additional expense for the parties, and Case: 26-116 Document: 31 Page: 2 Filed: 02/27/2026

2 IN RE TESLA, INC.

a risk of inconsistent decisions.” Appx2, Appx6. Tesla now petitions this court for a writ of mandamus directing the PTO to vacate the non-institution decisions and reconsider without relying on time-to-trial as a criterion. ECF No. 2- 1 at 11. Granite and the Director oppose. Mandamus is a “drastic and extraordinary remedy re- served for really extraordinary causes.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004). A petitioner must ordinarily show, among other things, a clear and in- disputable right to relief. Id. at 380–81. Given Congress committed institution decisions to the Director’s discretion, even when the statutory pre-conditions are present, SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 366 (2018); Apple Inc. v. Squires, ___ F.4th ___, 2026 WL 406495 at *1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 13, 2026), and protected the exercise of that discretion from review by making such determinations “final and nonappealable,” 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), we have recognized that, in the absence of a colorable constitutional claim, mandamus is ordinarily unavailable for review of institu- tion decisions. Mylan Lab’ys Ltd. v. Janssen Pharmaceu- tica, N.V., 989 F.3d 1375, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2021); Apple Inc. v. Vidal, 63 F.4th 1, 12 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2023). We see no reason to grant such relief here. Tesla pri- marily argues that the Director exceeded his statutory au- thority in denying IPR review.1 But the Director here merely concluded that instituting IPR would not be an

1 Tesla casts its ultra vires arguments, regarding the Director’s use of the time-to-trial factor, also as a constitu- tional separation of powers challenge. But the Supreme Court has noted that “claims simply alleging that the Pres- ident has exceeded his statutory authority are not ‘consti- tutional’ claims,” Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 473–74 (1994), and we agree with the PTO that this challenge pre- sents no colorable constitutional claim. Case: 26-116 Document: 31 Page: 3 Filed: 02/27/2026

IN RE TESLA, INC. 3

efficient use of agency resources given the progress of the civil litigation between the parties at the time. In circum- stances like these, we have not exercised mandamus au- thority to disturb a denial of institution decision and see no basis to do so here either. See Mylan, 989 F.3d at 1382 (holding a petitioner has no right to mandamus relief when a non-constitutional challenge is to “the Director’s exercise of his discretion to deny institution”). Nor has Tesla shown any clear and indisputable right to disturb the non-institu- tion decisions based on its contention that the Director failed to conduct proper notice-and-comment rulemaking. See Apple, 2026 WL 406495, at *1 (holding that the PTO’s “general statement[s] of policy” are exempted from notice- and-comment rulemaking procedures). Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT: (1) The petition is denied. (2) The unopposed motions at ECF Nos. 12, 16, 20, and 25 for leave to file amici curiae briefs are granted and the corresponding briefs are accepted for filing. FOR THE COURT

February 27, 2026 Date

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Related

Dalton v. Specter
511 U.S. 462 (Supreme Court, 1994)
SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu
584 U.S. 357 (Supreme Court, 2018)
Mylan Laboratories Ltd. v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V.
989 F.3d 1375 (Federal Circuit, 2021)
Apple Inc. v. Vidal
63 F.4th 1 (Federal Circuit, 2023)

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In Re TESLA, INC., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-tesla-inc-cafc-2026.