In Re Term of Parental Rights as to S.M.

Opinion

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.M.

No. 1 CA-JV 26-0019

FILED 08-28-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. JD41336

The Honorable Michael Rassas, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Barreda Law, PLLC, Gilbert By Bonnie Platter Counsel for Appellants

Robert D. Rosanelli, Phoenix Counsel for Appellees/Intervenors

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix By Autumn Spritzer Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Andrew J. Becke and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

Decision of the Court

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 Phil and his stepmother, Ann,1 unsuccessfully moved to intervene in this termination of parental rights proceeding. They appeal from the order denying their motion for permissive intervention. Because they have shown no abuse of discretion, the order is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 S.M. was born in May 2020 to Mother. Days later, Mother and C.M. signed an acknowledgement of paternity (AOP), stating C.M. was the child’s father. The AOP was then used to obtain a birth certificate for S.M., also listing C.M. as the child’s father. The AOP was filed with the Arizona Department of Economic Security, giving it “the same force and effect as a superior court judgment.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) § 25-812(D)(2026).2 The AOP was never set aside, making C.M. was the legal father of the child until C.M.’s paternal rights were terminated.

¶3 At some point, Phil lived with Mother and the child. In September 2021, Phil stabbed Mother more than a dozen times in front of the child. When a neighbor found the 14-month-old child covered in blood and crying, the Department of Child Safety (DCS) took custody of the child and filed a dependency petition in October 2021. The court found the child dependent as to C.M. in December 2021, and as to Mother in March 2022. Although the record is unclear, Phil apparently was found guilty of stabbing Mother, and was in prison until sometime in 2024.

¶4 At the time the dependency petition was filed, C.M. was unwilling to parent, claiming he was not the child’s father.3 Mother claimed that Phil was the child’s biological father.

1 Given confidentiality concerns, the court uses pseudonyms throughout. 2 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated. 3 The dependency petition alleged that C.M. had taken “an at home

paternity test and found out that he was the biological father of the child in September 2021.” Although the superior court found C.M. was the child’s father, on appeal, Phil alleges this allegation was a typographical error.

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¶5 Initially, the court ordered DCS to facilitate paternity testing and authorized an amended dependency petition to add Phil as a potential father. Those orders were either rescinded or stayed because the six-month period for C.M. to challenge the AOP had expired and C.M. failed to provide any facts showing the AOP was fraudulent. C.M. took no action to disestablish paternity, even though ordered to do so by the court.

¶6 In September 2024, finding C.M.’s paternity had been established, the court terminated his parental rights in an order that was not appealed. In April 2025, the court terminated Mother’s parental rights, a ruling affirmed on appeal in November 2025. Neither C.M. nor Mother are parties to this appeal.

¶7 When considering possible placements for the child, the superior court directed DCS to evaluate Ann. After a home study, in February 2022, DCS rejected Ann as a placement, given that her significant other had been convicted of reckless homicide.

¶8 In August 2024, after the dependency had been pending for nearly three years, Phil moved to intervene, claiming he was the child’s biological father and was “eager to establish paternity,” adding that he had been released from prison earlier in 2024. When terminating C.M.’s parental rights in September 2024, the court denied Phil’s motion to intervene. Phil did not appeal from that ruling.

¶9 In November 2024, Ann moved to intervene. The court denied that motion in February 2025. In May 2025, Ann moved to reconsider that February 2025 denial, which the court denied in June 2025. Ann did not appeal from either of those rulings.

¶10 From the record presented, Phil never filed a notice of claim of paternity expressing a willingness and intent to support the child and never sought to comply with the requirements of the putative fathers registry. See A.R.S. § 8-106.01; see also A.R.S. § 8-106.01(F) (“Lack of knowledge of the pregnancy is not an acceptable reason for failure to file.”). Sometime in 2023, Phil filed a family court case. In August 2025, Phil obtained family court orders for paternity testing and for the placement to cooperate with that testing. In September 2025, Phil lodged those orders in this juvenile court matter. Because juvenile court orders “take precedence over any order of any other court of this state,” A.R.S. § 8-202(F), the juvenile court found the family court orders were not valid, and the family court proceeding apparently was dismissed.

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¶11 In December 2025, Phil and Ann filed a joint motion seeking permissive intervention. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 113(a)(2). Phil claimed that he had a right to establish paternity, stating that Mother and Phil had “completed a home paternity test” confirming Phil was S.M.’s biological father. The motion, however, did not attach any paternity test results. Citing A.R.S. § 25-812(E) and Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure 85(b), Phil claimed he was an interested party who could challenge the AOP at any time by showing fraud on the court. After citing cases applying those provisions, Phil discussed Juvenile Court Rule 113(b), listing factors applicable to determining whether permissive intervention “would be in the child’s best interests.” The motion then argued, from Ann’s perspective, why she believed those same best interests factors should allow her to permissively intervene. DCS filed a response and objection to the motion to intervene. In January 2026, the superior court denied the joint motion for permissive intervention. Phil and Ann appealed from that January 2026 denial. In February 2026, S.M. was adopted and the dependency was dismissed.

DISCUSSION

I. Appellate Jurisdiction.

¶12 DCS argues that appellate jurisdiction is lacking because the superior court denied the previous motions to intervene. Absent good cause, juvenile appeals must be filed within 15 days after the entry of the final order being appealed. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 603(a)(1)(A), (5)(A). Phil and Ann timely appealed from the January 2026 denial of their December 2025 motion to intervene. Accordingly, although this court lacks appellate jurisdiction over the previous denials of their motions to intervene, this court has appellate jurisdiction over their appeal from the January 2026 denial pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A) and 12-2101(A) and Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 601-03.

II. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying the December 2025 Motion to Intervene.

¶13 Phil and Ann cite no legal authority supporting their arguments that the superior court erred in denying their December 2025 motion to intervene. That December 2025 motion cited Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 113(b) allowing for permissive intervention and applied the enumerated factors. But their appellate briefing fails to cite Rule 113, apply the permissive intervention factors. or argue how the superior court erred in denying their motion. That failure constitutes a waiver. See MacMillan v.

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Schwartz, 226 Ariz. 584, 591 ¶ 33 (App. 2011); ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A). Waiver notwithstanding, they have shown no error in the superior court denying their December 2025 motion to intervene.

¶14 This court reviews the denial of a motion for permissive intervention for an abuse of discretion. See Bechtel v. Rose, 150 Ariz. 68, 72 (1986) (juvenile court case applying Ariz. R. Civ. P. 24(b), the civil permissive intervention counterpart to Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 113(a)(2) & (b)); Allen v. Chon-Lopez, 214 Ariz. 361, 364 ¶ 9 (App. 2007) (citing Bechtel). Whether to grant permissive intervention requires the court to “determine whether intervention would be in the child’s best interests,” based on eight enumerated factors. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 113(b). On the record presented, Appellants have shown no abuse of discretion.

A. Phil Has Shown No Abuse of Discretion in the Denial of His Request for Permissive Intervention.

¶15 Starting with Phil, relevant factors include the nature and extent of his interest and whether his interest or position would be adequately represented by the existing parties; whether he is the child’s relative, member of the child’s extended family or a person with a significant relationship with the child; and whether his intervention will significantly contribute to the full development of the underlying issues and the just and equitable resolution of the proceeding. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 113(b)(1), (2) & (7). Although Phil claimed to be S.M.’s biological father, he had years to support that claim with objective evidence and failed to do so. He never provided or disclosed purported paternity test results. Nor did he support his intervention motion with evidence supporting any claim that the AOP constituted fraud on the court. Although there were no other parties remaining in the proceeding adequately representing his position by December 2025, Phil failed to show that he had any cognizable interest in the proceedings. Moreover, after stabbing S.M.’s Mother in September 2021, there is no indication that Phil had any significant relationship before filing the December 2025 motion.

¶16 Nor do “the timeliness of the motion” and “whether intervention will unduly prolong or delay the case” show error. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 113(b)(5) & (6). By the time of the December 2025 motion to intervene: (1) the dependency had been pending for more than four years; (2) S.M. had been in the same foster placement for nearly four years; (3) Phil’s prior motion to intervene filed more than a year earlier had been denied without seeking appellate review; (4) the parental rights of C.M. and Mother had been terminated; (5) Phil’s family court order for paternity

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testing was invalidated given the ongoing juvenile case; and (6) S.M.’s adoption was scheduled for February 2026. Allowing Phil to intervene at that time to try to show the AOP was fraudulent and prove his own paternity and then proceed with the dependency would have prolonged the case, perhaps for perhaps years. And Phil’s motion to intervene acknowledged that he had known of the paternity issue “for years” and that intervention “will delay an adoption.” Phil asserted – without regard to the best interests of S.M. – that he was “an innocent party,” not constrained by time limits. Notwithstanding that approach, the superior court was not required to excuse the delay in Phil seeking to intervene and the delay granting intervention would have caused.

¶17 Turning to the remaining factors, there is no indication that Phil asked that DCS consider him as placement or that he sought to file a motion for change of physical custody. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 113(b)(3) & (4). And Phil cited no “other factors” that the court should find appropriate in addressing intervention request. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 113(b)(8). On this record, Phil has failed to show that the superior court abused its discretion in applying the Rule 113(b) factors to conclude that granting his request would not be in the child’s best interests. See Allen, 214 Ariz. at 364 ¶ 9 (citing cases). Nor do his other arguments on appeal show error.

¶18 Phil argues that he should be allowed to establish paternity and to challenge the AOP. Nothing prevented Phil from pressing such challenges during the several years the dependency was pending. Yet he failed to do so. The AOP establishes paternity, A.R.S. § 25-812(A)(1); see also Alvarado v. Thomson, 240 Ariz. 12, 15 ¶ 12 (App. 2016) (similar), and “is presumed valid and binding until proven otherwise,” Andrew R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 453, 457 ¶ 17 (App. 2010) (citation omitted). None of the signers to the AOP timely challenged it, and the time for such a challenge has passed. See Alvarado, 240 Ariz. at 15 ¶ 13; A.R.S. § 25-812(H). Nor has Phil initiated a challenge to the AOP, or even provided admissible evidence (as opposed to unverified argument) supporting such a challenge. See Johnson v. Edelstein, 252 Ariz. 230, 233 ¶ 14 (App. 2021); Garcia v. Ison, 260 Ariz. 429, 433 ¶ 14-15 (App. 2025).

¶19 Citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), Phil argues his due process rights were violated because he was unable to “assert[] his paternal rights.” As noted above, however, Phil never filed a proceeding challenging the AOP. Nor has he proffered any evidence supporting his paternity claim during the years of the pendency proceeding, which started when he repeatedly stabbed the child’s Mother. See In re Appeal in Pima Cnty. Juv. Severance Action No. S-114487, 179 Ariz. 86, 93-94 (1994)

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(“Although parents with an existing parental relationship, either in fact or law, are entitled to the highest constitutional protection, an unwed father must first take steps to establish a parent-child relationship before he may attain the same protection.”); Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t. of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 251 ¶ 25 (2000 (noting the “burden to act as a parent rests with the parent, who should assert his legal rights at the first and every opportunity”).

¶20 On this record, Phil has shown no abuse of discretion in the superior court denying his December 2025 motion for permissive intervention.

B. Ann Has Shown No Abuse of Discretion in the Denial of Her Request for Permissive Intervention.

¶21 Ann argues the superior court erred in denying her motion to intervene, adding DCS never complied with an order to evaluate her as a placement. As noted above, however, DCS considered her as a placement, but rejected that possibility. Moreover, Ann has not shown the superior court erred in denying her request to be a placement, given her partner who lived in her home was convicted of committing a violent crime, thereby precluding her as placement. See A.R.S. §§ 41-1758.07(B)(3); 8-509(C). Although Ann did seek to be placement and to have physical custody of the child, and her intervention might not have delayed the proceedings as much as Phil’s would have, see Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 113(b)(3), (4) & (6), those differences did not require the court to grant her motion to intervene.

¶22 Ann provides no authority supporting her argument that the superior court was required to make specific findings of fact in denying her motion to intervene. Such a ruling is not made as a finder of fact, like the cases upon which Ann relies. See Logan B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 532, 537-38 ¶¶ 13-15 (App. 2018) (requiring specific factual findings supporting termination of parental rights); Elliott v. Elliott, 165 Ariz. 128, 132-33 (App. 1990) (requiring specific factual findings supporting child support and spousal maintenance awards in family court). Nor does Ann’s reliance on Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 317(a)(2), which describes the basis for moving to amend a final order in juvenile court, support her argument.

¶23 On this record, Ann has shown no abuse of discretion in the superior court denying her December 2025 motion for permissive intervention.

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CONCLUSION

¶24 The order is affirmed.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR