In Re Term of Parental Rights as to Ij and Aj

CourtCourt of Appeals of Arizona
DecidedJuly 22, 2025
Docket1 CA-JV 24-0115
StatusUnpublished

This text of In Re Term of Parental Rights as to Ij and Aj (In Re Term of Parental Rights as to Ij and Aj) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Term of Parental Rights as to Ij and Aj, (Ark. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO I.J. AND A.J.

No. 1 CA-JV 24-0115 FILED 07-22-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County No. S8015JD202200126 The Honorable Aaron Michael Demke, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Alice B., Colorado City Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson By Autumn Spritzer Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Mohave County Legal Advocate, Kingman By Bobbi Shin Counsel for Children IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO I.J. AND A.J. Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Vice Chief Judge:

¶1 Alice B. (“Mother”) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to two daughters. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 We view and recount the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the juvenile court’s order, Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 2, ¶ 2 (2016), and use pseudonyms to protect the daughters’ identities, see Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(i).

¶3 Mother is the natural parent of Sarah, born in May 2007, and Nellie, born in August 2010.1 Mother lives in Colorado City and is a member of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter–Day Saints (FLDS), a fringe polygamous sect.

¶4 Samuel Bateman was anointed the sect’s prophet and wielded great power over its members who were told to believe Bateman spoke for God and must be obeyed. Bateman used women and underage girls as currency to control the community, awarding child brides to devoted followers and rescinding them for punishment. He referred to many women and underage girls in the community as his “wives” and engaged in sexual conduct with them.

¶5 Mother gave Bateman her daughters for a “spiritual marriage.” Sarah was 13 years old; Nellie was 10. Mother later testified she knew sexual activity “was part of a marriage relationship” and her daughters routinely slept in Bateman’s bed. When asked if she approved of Bateman’s sexual relations with her daughters, she asserted her right against self-incrimination. The daughters later reported that Bateman groped them in public, forced them to strip naked and watch other people

1 The court also terminated the father’s parental rights, but he is not a party to this appeal.

2 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO I.J. AND A.J. Decision of the Court

have sex, and later raped them in isolated areas. Bateman first raped Nellie when she was 11 years old. Sarah was 13. When Sarah said she did not want to have sex with Bateman, he told her “God was displeased” with her.

¶6 Bateman was arrested on I-40 in fall 2022, driving a pickup truck and towing a box-trailer of female minors between the ages of eleven and fourteen. The trailer had no air vents or cooling system and it contained a five-gallon bucket to serve as a makeshift bathroom. Police officers saw “children’s small fingers moving in the gap of the rear trailer door.”

¶7 The FBI later executed a search warrant on Mother’s home and found evidence she willingly gave her daughters to Bateman, was aware of Bateman’s abuse and took no action to prevent Bateman’s access to her daughters. The Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) removed both daughters.

¶8 With the daughters in DCS’s custody, DCS offered Mother reunification services, including a psychological evaluation, counseling, family therapy, supervised visits and transportation. Mother did not cooperate. She refused the psychological evaluation and any individual counseling. She participated in two sessions of family therapy. Although Mother participated in supervised visits at first, DCS suspended the visits after Mother brought photos of Bateman and told the daughters not to testify against him. To date, Mother remains loyal to Bateman.

¶9 DCS moved to terminate Mother’s parental rights on willful- abuse and fifteen-month time-in-care grounds under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2) and (B)(8)(c). The juvenile court held a two-day trial, during which DCS introduced, among other evidence, forensic interviews and journal entries from the child brides, along with a news article documenting Bateman’s abuse. The court terminated Mother’s parental rights under both grounds, finding termination was in the daughters’ best interests. Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1) and - 2101(A)(1).

PROCEDURAL ERROR

¶10 Mother has waived her arguments on appeal because she offered no record citations or supporting legal authorities in her brief. See ARCAP 13(a) (requiring that briefs contain “citations of legal authorities and appropriate references to the portions of the record on which the appellant relies”); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 607(b) (applying ARCAP 13 to juvenile appeals); Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 305, ¶ 62 (App. 2009) (noting

3 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO I.J. AND A.J. Decision of the Court

failure to comply with ARCAP 13 “can constitute abandonment and waiver” of a claim). But we exercise our discretion to address Mother’s arguments because a child’s best interests hangs in the balance. DeLong v. Merrill, 233 Ariz. 163, 166, ¶ 9 (App. 2013); Nold v. Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, 273, ¶ 10 (App. 2013) (the best interests of a child trumps the discretionary doctrine of waiver).

DISCUSSION

¶11 Parents have a fundamental but not absolute interest in the care and custody of their children. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 248–49, ¶¶ 11–12 (2000). The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds clear and convincing evidence of statutory grounds for termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B), and termination is in the child’s best interests by a preponderance of the evidence. Valerie M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 219 Ariz. 331, 334, ¶ 9 (2009).

¶12 Mother does not contest the grounds for termination or best interests. She instead argues the juvenile court erred by considering “inconsistent” forensic interviews and hearsay. We review the juvenile court’s evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice. Lohmeier v. Hammer, 214 Ariz. 57, 61, ¶ 7 (App. 2006) (citation omitted). The juvenile court does not abuse its discretion if its decisions are “supported by any reasonable evidence.” Id. at 62, ¶ 7 (citation omitted).

¶13 We discern no abuse of discretion. The Arizona Rules of Evidence do not preclude trial courts from considering “inconsistent” evidence. See Ariz. R. Evid. (no rule barring admissibility for being inconsistent). The interviews were admissible. What is more, the juvenile court was in the best position to weigh evidence and assess credibility. See Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 3, ¶ 9.

¶14 Even assuming the evidence was inadmissible hearsay, its admission was harmless. See Alice M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 70, 73, ¶ 12 (App. 2015). The record catalogues Bateman’s abuse with overwhelming evidence, including the forensic interviews and Mother’s own testimony. See State v. Williams, 133 Ariz. 220, 226 (1982) (admission of cumulative evidence constitutes harmless error).

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Related

In Re the Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Severance Action No. S-113432
872 P.2d 1240 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 1993)
Michael J. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security
995 P.2d 682 (Arizona Supreme Court, 2000)
State v. Williams
650 P.2d 1202 (Arizona Supreme Court, 1982)
Valerie M. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security
198 P.3d 1203 (Arizona Supreme Court, 2009)
Lohmeier v. Hammer
148 P.3d 101 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 2006)
State v. Ramsey
124 P.3d 756 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 2005)
Ritchie v. Krasner
211 P.3d 1272 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 2009)
Delong v. Merrill
310 P.3d 39 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 2013)
State of Arizona v. Crispin Granados
332 P.3d 68 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 2014)
Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F./d.L.
365 P.3d 353 (Arizona Supreme Court, 2016)
Nold v. Nold
304 P.3d 1093 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 2013)
Alice M. v. Department of Child Safety
345 P.3d 125 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 2015)

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In Re Term of Parental Rights as to Ij and Aj, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-term-of-parental-rights-as-to-ij-and-aj-arizctapp-2025.