In re Taylor's will

1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 375
CourtNew York Circuit Court
DecidedJanuary 15, 1847
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 375 (In re Taylor's will) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Circuit Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Taylor's will, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 375 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1847).

Opinion

The Circuit Judge:

In July and September, 1841, Taylor was declared by the courts of Hew York and Connecticut, to be insane, and the management of his property was taken from Mm. On the 23d January, 1845, he died insane.

In March and April, 1843, he made a will and codicil, giving the bulk of his property to the children with whom he lived, and cutting off, in a measure, one of his cMldren by his first wife, and all the children by her who is claimed to have been Ms second wife.

It is admitted, on all hands, that he was insane in 1841, and at the time of Ms death in 1845; that he was about 83 years of age, and very infirm and feeble at the time of making his will, and the question is whether he was at that time capable of making a will.

The first tMn'g that strikes me, is that tMs is an attempt, never regarded with favor, of a parent to bastardize his own offspring. For years he allowed the appellants to regard themselves as Ms legitimate children, and to bear his name. He allowed their mother to bear his name, to be regarded as Ms wife, to bring up the cMldren of his first wife, and until the close of Ms life seems to have bestowed upon her and her children the same care and attention that he had given to his other children, and to their mother, and it is only after he had been thus declared insane by two courts, and after the children of his first wife had got entire possession of him, that he makes tMs ungracious attempt of fixing the stain of illegitimacy upon those who are confessedly Ms children.

He had a right to do tMs, undoubtedly, if he was in possession of a mind competent to judge of the act he was doing. [377]*377But the inquiry naturally suggests itself, why this sudden change in his mode of treating these children and their mother thus, at the close of his life? Was it the product of a sound mind, reasoning clearly from cause to effect, and properly appreciating the misfortune he was bringing upon, his acknowledged children, or was it one of those freaks to which the insane are peculiarly liable, or was it the yielding of a feeble and prostrated mind to the influences of younger and more energetic understandings?

The surrogate was right in saying that neither the proceedings in the Court of Chancery here, nor in the court of probates in Connecticut, were an adjudication upon the question of sanity, at the time of making this will. But a different conclusion from that entertained by him forces itself from this fact upon my mind, and I feel myself called upon to examine minutely the testimony, and determine the question of sanity from that, as a new question, not controlled or disposed of by those proceedings.

It seems, from the evidence, that from about 1837 till he died, in 1845, the testator lived with his three daughters and his son-in-law, Hammond, in Hew Haven—his five other children and his wife living in Hew York.

In 1841, Hammond and the daughters in Hew Haven attempted to get possession of his property. They succeeded in Connecticut; Hammond was appointed the conservator, giving one of his sisters-in-law as one of his sureties. They made the same attempt in Hew York in regard to the property here, but in that they were defeated. The insanity was made out here, chiefly on the testimony of Hammond and the daughter who had been his surety in Connecticut, but the custody of the property was given to the Hew York branch of the family.

In their testimony here, Hammond and his sister-in-law stated that the insanity had endured from February, 1841; and from that time until one of the sureties of Hammond, in Connecticut, petitioned for his removal, and he resigned, Hammond and the daughters in Connecticut treated the testa[378]*378tor as unsound. But directly after that resignation — after Hammond, by his defeat here, and his removal in Connecticut, had lost all control over the property, the attempt was made to establish his sanity and to remove the disability which they had themselves established. And in December, 1842, a decree establishing his sanity went by default in Connecticut, as the decree establishing insanity had gone by default in the same court in July, 1841.

An attempt was then made to remove the disability in New York. The testator was brought to New York, and they who had him in their custody, had no longer any thing to gain, but much to lose, by having his insanity established. And it is worthy of remark that he who in September, 1841, had testified that the difficulty with this old man of fourscore, was that “ there appeared to be a breaking up of his mental faculties,” and that he was as “ easily controlled as a child,” was now, in May, 1843, when the testator had grown older and more infirm, attempting to show that his mental faculties had not broken down, and he was not as easily controlled as a child. If he was restored to his mental powers—if the two years which had been added to the long life of this feeble old man had brought vigor of intellect with bodily decrepitude, it is certainly ground of suspicion, if not of surprise, that while here, he should so carefully be secluded from his wife and children in New York, and that he and Ms advisers should so abruptly reject the very reasonable test proposed by the chancellor.

At that time he had made tMs will, and they who had him in their charge had every inducement to submit him to such an examination, unless perchance there was danger that that examination might establish insanity too plainly, and at an inconvement period.

It may be, however, that tMs behavior in New York grew entirely out of the volition of the testator. Yet I cannot avoid looking upon the whole proceedings with suspicion.

For three or four years before his death the testator was kept very much secluded by H. and Ms family; access to him [379]*379was denied by them to his children and his old Mends; and when control over his property was obtained, H. misapplied it; appropriated it to the payment of his own debts; suffered the testator to be rendered liable for large sums of his debts; avowed his intention to get the property away from the children in Hew York; and when his surety, becoming alarmed, charged him with mismanagement, he quietly submitted to the charge, resigned his post, and rendered an account of his trust, which was unquestionably false.

It was he who selected the person to draw the will. It was he who furnished the writer with the directions as to what it should contain. It was he who introduced into the house the witnesses by whom it was to be established, and it was he and his that were most to be benefited by it, if it should be established.

These circumstances have surrounded this paper with suspicion and doubt, which it is my duty carefully and heediully to regard.

1. The evidence in support of the will:—

1.1 remark as somewhat singular, that the witnesses were all persons who had only occasionally seen the testator. Ho one was produced who, during the lapse of two or three years, had seen him daily, and at all hours of the day, and in all moods of his mind. Only when permitted by the family, and, for aught we know, at most favorable moments.

2. Almost all the witnesses were recent acquaintances, none of them possessing the power to compare him, in his decrepitude, with what he had been, when he unquestionably possessed the mens sema in corpore semo.

3.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 375, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-taylors-will-nycirct-1847.