In Re Tamarack Trail Co.

23 B.R. 3, 1982 Bankr. LEXIS 4228
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedApril 29, 1982
DocketBankruptcy 1-81-00526
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 23 B.R. 3 (In Re Tamarack Trail Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Tamarack Trail Co., 23 B.R. 3, 1982 Bankr. LEXIS 4228 (Ohio 1982).

Opinion

DECISION ON CONFIRMATION

BURTON PERLMAN, Bankruptcy Judge.

Debtor in this Chapter 11 case is a corporation engaged in the business of developing land and building condominiums on it for resale. The stock in the corporate debt- or is owned fifty percent each by Messrs. Gilmore and Diem. A disclosure statement was filed on behalf of debtor and one was also filed on behalf of a creditor, Kilday. Both were approved by the court, and separate and competing plans were submitted to creditors by debtors and by Kilday together with the respective disclosure statements. The matter came on for hearing on confirmation. It was then determined that the outcome of balloting by creditors was that neither plan was completely accepted by all classes. The vote against debtor’s plan decisively rejected it.

As to the Kilday plan, a mortgagee of certain real estate, Dreyfus, comprising Class 7, rejected the plan, as did the equity security holders Gilmore and Diem, constituting Class 11. At the request of creditor Kilday we continued the confirmation hearing for consideration of confirmation pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) notwithstanding these rejections. At the time of the continued hearing we were informed that Dreyfus had withdrawn its rejection. That left to be dealt with only the question of whether the plan of Kilday could be confirmed despite the objection of Class 11 equity security holders. Hearing on this issue proceeded. Testimony on behalf of Kilday and of the opposing equity security holders was taken. Certain changes not here relevant have in the interim been approved, and the subject now before us is Kilday Second Amended Plan. The following reflects our findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon the evidence elicited at the hearing.

Debtor began business in August 19,1978 having for its purpose the developing and building of a condominium project. In furtherance of this object, debtor acquired a tract of land in Union Township, Clermont County, Ohio comprising approximately 49 acres. It proceeded to develop a portion of the tract consisting of 6.074 acres. The remainder of the tract, which has always been and is today in an undeveloped state, consists of 42.391 acres. Debtor planned to erect eleven (11) buildings, each containing six condominium units on the six acre tract. At the present time the eleven buildings are in various stages of construction, ranging from completed to not even begun. The eleven buildings are identified by number on a plat introduced into evidence at the hearing, Kilday Exhibit 1. Three of the buildings, buildings 1, 4, and 5, are not even begun, though the ground has been prepared for the commencement of construction. Water and sewer lines if not in place at the immediate site of each of these three locations, are sufficiently close that extending such lines to the location would require minimal effort and expense. Buildings 2 and 3 are under construction, with some dry wall in place. These buildings are approximately 70% complete. Building 6 is com-plet with the exception that one unit requires carpeting. Building 7 is framed with some dry wall in place and is 40% complete. Buildings 8 and 9 are complete. Building 10 is complete to the point that one unit is occupied, and is 90% complete. Building 11 is complete with three units occupied, there otherwise being serious fire damage in the building which requires some corrective work. Conflicting evidence was presented as to the cost of carrying out that corrective work.

Building 9 has already been sold by debt- or in its entirety. Two units in building 6 have been sold. Five units in building 8 have been rented.

The construction lender for buildings 2 and 3 was Central Savings, while the lender for the remaining buildings was Eagle Savings.

The task presented to us against this background is the valuation of the land and buildings, for valuation will determine the *5 outcome of the objection to confirmation on the part of Class 11. That is, the Kilday plan before us provides for the cancellation of the stock of objecting equity security holders Gilmore and Diem. It would be inequitable to confirm the plan with such a provision if this were to deprive these equity security holders of a valuable asset without compensation. If there were to be a remaining equity after creditors were dealt with as proposed in the plan, this would be the situation and we would be unable to confirm the plan. If, on the other hand, there were no remaining equity, and the stock was valueless, then it would not violate concepts of equity for the plan to be confirmed as it stands. That such an outcome was contemplated by the Congress in enacting 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(C) is clear from the following:

“. .. If the interests are ‘under water’ then they will be valueless and the plan may be confirmed notwithstanding the dissent of that class of interests even if the plan provides that the holders of such interests will not receive any property on account of such interests.
Alternatively, under clause (ii), the court must confirm the plan notwithstanding the dissent of a class of interests if the plan provides that holders of any interests junior to the dissenting class of interests will not receive or retain any property on account of such junior interests. Clearly, if there are no junior interests junior to the class of dissenting interests, then the condition of clause (ii) is satisfied. The safeguards that no claim or interest receive more than 100 percent of the allowed amount of such claim or interest and that no class be discriminated against unfairly will insure that the plan is fair and equitable with respect to the dissenting class of interests.” 124 Cong.Rec. H 11,103 (Sept. 28, 1978); S 17,420 (Oct. 6, 1978).

See also In re Muskegon Motor Specialties, 366 F.2d 522, 525 (6th Cir., 1966).

The determination of whether or not there is a remaining equity is assisted by the stipulation of the parties that the total claims against the debtor amount to $2,165,-000.00. Whether the stock has value will depend upon whether the value of debtor’s assets exceeds or is below this amount.

As stated by Robert J. Herking, called as an expert appraiser by debtor, three appraisal techniques are available to appraisers in arriving at fair market value. The first is the market approach which depends upon evidence of comparable sales. The second is the cost approach which is based upon the actual costs of construction and other costs. The third is the capitalization of income approach. Authorities support this statement. See Thompson on Real Property, vol. 5A, sec. 2582, 1981 Supp. p. 25. We agree with the suggestion of Herk-ing that the capitalization of income approach would be inappropriate in this case because we are not dealing with income producing property.

1. The Six Acres. This is the portion of the entire tract where debtor has developed the land and erected buildings to the extent above described. Each building comprises or is to comprise six (6) condominium units. It is reasonable to value a building based upon the fair market value of the condominium units therein.

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Bluebook (online)
23 B.R. 3, 1982 Bankr. LEXIS 4228, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-tamarack-trail-co-ohsb-1982.