In re Syntax-Brillian Corp.

551 B.R. 156, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 2010, 62 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 162, 2016 WL 2865095
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Delaware
DecidedMay 11, 2016
DocketCase No. 08-11407 (BLS)
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 551 B.R. 156 (In re Syntax-Brillian Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Syntax-Brillian Corp., 551 B.R. 156, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 2010, 62 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 162, 2016 WL 2865095 (Del. 2016).

Opinion

OPINION2

Brendan Linehan Shannon, Chief United States Bankruptcy Judge

Before the Court is the motion (the “Motion”) of Alan Levine, appearing pro se, (the “Movant” or “Mr. Levine”) for relief from the order accepting into evidence the Rayburn Declaration.3 The SB Liquidation Trust (the “Trust”) opposes the Motion,4 and numerous shareholders have filed motions to intervene (the “Join-der Parties”) in support of the Motion. While the Motion seeks various forms of relief,5 at the hearing on the Motion on April 13, 2016 Mr. Levine clarified that he has two requests: first, that this Court vacate or reverse its ruling that admitted into evidence the Declaration of Gregory F. Rayburn in Support of the Debtors’ Chapter 11 Petitions and Requests for First Day Relief (the “First Day Affidavit”); 6 and second, that this Court direct the Trust to allow the Debtors’ books and records be subject to review upon request. For the reasons stated below, the Motion will be denied in its entirety.

I. INTRODUCTION

Companies sometimes fail. Failure can occur for a host of reasons, including mismanagement, changing tastes or technology, insuperable competition, even natural disasters. And companies can and do fail when they are victims of fraud. The failure of a corporation can bring loss and suffering to employees and management, vendors, customers and investors, all of whom hope at least for some recovery from the failed enterprise. Congress has decreed that shareholders in a bankrupt company cannot receive anything on account of their investment until all secured, priority and unsecured creditors are paid in full. This principle applies even when [158]*158the company — and by extension, the shareholders — is a victim of fraud.

In July 2008, Syntax-Brillian Corporation filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The company tried and failed to sell itself in the first few- months of the case, and promptly shut down operations. Its chapter 11 Plan7 — confirmed in July 2009, nearly seven years ago — provided for the creation of a liquidation trust, charged with administering claims against the estate, liquidating assets (including prosecuting causes of action) and making distributions to holders of allowed claims. The Plan provided that shareholders could potentially receive a distribution on account of their stock holdings in Syntax, but both the Plan and federal law expressly provide that no distributions to shareholders can be made until all claims are paid in full. The Court is advised that creditors holding allowed unsecured claims have to date received less than 25% on account of their claims.

Syntax was the victim of a fraud, apparently perpetrated by certain members of its management team as well as its suppliers in the Far East. The Court is acutely aware of the suffering endured by Syntax’s shareholders on account of the collapse of the company. The Court’s sympathy, however, does not change the economic reality and legal principles in play.. Under the Plan, there is not presently a return for Syntax’s shareholders, and there is not likely to be a return in the future.

Regrettably, shareholders of companies that file for bankruptcy relief often (and perhaps typically) see their interests wiped out. This is the case even where the shareholders purchased their shares in reliance upon fraudulent or misleading information: Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code specifically provides that claims arising from the purchase or sale of stock in a debtor are subordinated to all other claims.

Consequently, the result in this case is neither unusual nor inconsistent with well-settled legal principles. What is unusual about this case is the amount of time and resources that shareholders have spent pursuing a recovery. As noted, the Plan was confirmed nearly seven years ago, and the Disclosure Statement accompanying the Plan specifically stated that recovery for shareholders was unlikely.8

Certain shareholders continued to persist in post-confirmation litigation, to the point that the Trustee deemed it necessary in 2013 to enter into a confidential cash settlement with these several shareholders. While the settlement was not presented to the Court for approval (as it was a post-confirmation settlement within the authority of the Trustee) or disclosed to other shareholders, the Trustee has advised the Court that the confidential settlement was entered into for the purpose of [159]*159bringing peace for the Trust and stopping the burn of legal fees associated with dealing with these litigants.

At the hearing on the matter presently sub judice, the Court was distressed to learn that Mr. Ahmed Amr, one of the shareholders who enjoyed a substantial cash payment under the above-described confidential settlement, is actively engaging in or supporting litigation against the Trust.9 Even worse, however, was the disclosure during the hearing that Mr. Amr has been dunning other unfortunate Syntax shareholders (who have not received the cash payments Mr. Amr has enjoyed) for contributions to subsidize his costs associated with continuing his fight against the Trust.10

The bottom line is this: the decision to invest in Syntax turned out to be a bad idea, and the investment was effectively lost in 2008. While deeply unfortunate, this circumstance is neither remarkable nor fixable by this Court. But it appears that the shareholders’ suffering has been compounded by litigants — and specifically Mr. Amr — who have dragged out this process for so many years and kept false hopes alive for a substantial return out of this bankruptcy case. While it is not the Court’s prerogative to give advice to litigants before it, the simple fact is that shareholders who traveled from Pennsylvania, New York, Washington State, Georgia and elsewhere to attend the recent hearing are throwing good money after bad in pursuit of an investment that went bust eight years ago.

II. BACKGROUND

The Court assumes familiarity with the history of the Debtors’ bankruptcy case. The factual background of this ease is set forth in two opinions by this Court, see SB Liquidation Trust v. Preferred Bank (In re Syntax-Brillian Corp.), No. 08-11407, 2011 WL 3101809 (Bankr.D.Del. July 25, 2011); SB Liquidation Trust v. Preferred Bank (In re Syntax-Brillian Corp.), No. 08-11407, 2013 WL 153831 (Bankr.D.Del. Jan. 15, 2013), and also in an opinion by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, see SB Liquidation Trust v. Preferred Bank (In re Syntax-Brillian Corp.), 573 Fed.Appx. 154 (3d Cir.2014). The following background is only a summary of the facts relevant to the instant matter.

On July 8, 2008, the above-captioned debtors (the “Debtors”) filed for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The next day, the Court held a “first day” hearing and admitted into evidence the First Day Affidavit. On March 12, 2009, the Court approved the Debtors’ Second Amended Disclosure Statement (the “Disclosure Statement”).11 The Disclosure Statement included fulsome disclosure regarding pre-petition and post-petition investigations and claims of the Debtors against a variety of parties, including prior management and trading partners.

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Related

In re Energy Future Holdings Corp.
575 B.R. 616 (D. Delaware, 2017)
In re Syntax-Brillian Corp.
554 B.R. 323 (D. Delaware, 2016)

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Bluebook (online)
551 B.R. 156, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 2010, 62 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 162, 2016 WL 2865095, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-syntax-brillian-corp-deb-2016.