In Re Sweet

428 B.R. 917, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1500, 2010 WL 1781897
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Georgia
DecidedApril 30, 2010
Docket19-50188
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 428 B.R. 917 (In Re Sweet) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Sweet, 428 B.R. 917, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1500, 2010 WL 1781897 (Ga. 2010).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JAMES P. SMITH, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the Chapter 13 Trustee’s Amended Objection to Confirmation of the Debtors’ amended Chapter 13 Plan. At the hearing on the objection, the parties stipulated to certain facts and agreed that the Court could take judicial notice of the contents of the various filings by the Debtors in this case. Upon considering that evidence and the arguments of counsel, the Court now publishes this memorandum opinion.

FACTS

Debtors Michael W. Sweet and Barbara Sweet filed their Chapter 13 case on November 5, 2009. Debtors own a home in Walton County, Georgia, which they value at $290,000 on their Amended Schedule A. The home is subject to a first priority mortgage held by Chase Home Finance of $323,000, and a second priority mortgage also held by Chase in the amount of $110,000. Thus, Debtors have no equity in the home. Debtors purchased their home in 2007 for $435,000. At that time, Mr. *919 Sweet was making $260,000 per year. However, he subsequently lost his job and is now self-employed and makes approximately $7,200 per month. Debtors and their two children, ages 10 and 15, live in the home.

In their bankruptcy schedules, Debtors listed personal property having a value of $10,600, all of which is claimed as exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3). None of their personal property appears to be extravagant.

According to the stipulated facts, Debtors did not incur any new debt after Mr. Sweet lost his job. Rather, Debtors went through their savings until they were forced to file this bankruptcy case. This is the first bankruptcy case that Debtors have ever filed.

Pursuant to their amended Chapter 13 plan, Debtors will pay $1,635 per month to Trustee for a period of 60 months. 1 From this amount, Trustee will receive her fee for administration of the case and will pay attorney’s fees of $3,500, a secured IRS lien of $10,600, and an arrearage of $4,700 owed to Chase Home Finance on the first mortgage. Priority claims are to be paid in full and unsecured creditors are to receive a total of $25,000 which will yield a dividend of slightly less than 8 percent. 2 Debtors are to make the monthly payments of $2,333 on the first priority mortgage to Chase “outside the plan.” Debtors propose to surrender a 2006 car and to retain two older vehicles which are “paid for,” a 1999 car and a 2004 truck.

Trustee acknowledges that Debtors have proposed a “bare bones” budget and that Debtors “are trying.” Trustee also acknowledges that Debtors are under the applicable “median income” and that they were probably eligible to file a Chapter 7 case instead of a Chapter 13 case. The deadline for creditors to object to the dis-chargeability of claims has passed without any objection being filed. Debtors have no unusual or special circumstances or inordinate medical needs.

The amended plan hinges on Debtors being able to successfully strip off the second mortgage on their home held by Chase. Debtors have filed an adversary proceeding contending that the second mortgage is wholly unsecured and can be avoided. As of the publishing of this opinion, Chase had not filed a response to this complaint.

Trustee objects to confirmation of Debtors’ amended plan contending that the plan has not been proposed in good faith because Debtors are proposing to keep a large home while paying a low-percentage dividend to unsecured creditors. 3 The monthly mortgage payment of $2,333 represents approximately 32 percent of the Debtors’ gross monthly income.

Trustee acknowledges that the projected plan payments meet the disposable income test as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b). Nevertheless, Trustee contends that Debtors are proposing to pay an unreasonable amount of their income in order to retain a home in which they have no equity while at the same time paying a low dividend to their unsecured creditors. Trustee argues *920 that Debtors should surrender their home, find a less expensive home to either buy or rent, and pay the savings to the unsecured creditors, thus increasing their dividend. Trustee argues that if Debtors rented a home for $1,500 per month, that the payments to unsecured creditors could be increased by approximately $45,000 over the term of the plan.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Section 1325(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a court shall confirm a Chapter 13 plan if, inter alia, “the plan has been proposed in good faith....” 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3). The debtor has the ultimate burden of proving that the plan is confirmable. In re Pearson, 398 B.R. 97, 102 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.2008). The term “good faith” is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that in determining whether a plan is proposed in good faith, a bankruptcy court must consider the following non-exclusive factors:

(1) the amount of the debtor’s income from all sources; (2) the living expenses of the debtor and his dependents; (3) the amount of attorney’s fees; (4) the probable or expected duration of the debtor’s Chapter 13 plan; (5) the motivations of the debtor and his sincerity in seeking relief under the provisions of Chapter 13; (6) the debtor’s degree of effort; (7) the debtor’s ability to earn and the likelihood of the fluctuation of his earnings; (8) special circumstances such as inordinate medical expense; (9) the frequency with which the debtor has sought relief under the Bankruptcy Reform Act and its predecessors; (10) the circumstances under which the debtor has contracted his debts and his demonstrated bona Aides, or lack of same, in dealing with his creditors; (11) the burden which the plan’s administration would place on the trustee.

Kitchens v. Georgia R.R. Bank and Trust Co. (In re Kitchens), 702 F.2d 885, 888-89 (11th Cir.1983).

Other factors include the extent to which claims are modified, the extent of preferential treatment among classes of creditors, the substantiality of repayment to unsecured creditors, whether a debt would be nondischargeable under Chapter 7, and the accuracy of the plan’s statements of debts and expenses. Id. at 889. The Eleventh Circuit also stated, “we do wish to note that other factors or exceptional circumstances may support a finding of good faith, even though a debtor has proposed no or only nominal payment to unsecured creditors.” Id.

Good faith is a finding of fact. Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Saylors (In re Saylors), 869 F.2d 1434, 1438 (11th Cir.1989).

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
428 B.R. 917, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1500, 2010 WL 1781897, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-sweet-gamb-2010.