In re Supreme Court Special Committee for Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures to Amend Integration Rule, Article II & Article XI

373 So. 2d 1, 1979 Fla. LEXIS 4787
Supreme Court of Florida·Decided May 24, 1979·No. No. 53942·Published·Cited by 4 cases

Opinions

PER CURIAM.

This matter is before us to consider major revisions to The Florida Bar Integration Rule, article XI, and amendment to The Florida Bar Integration Rule, article II, section 5(a), which have been proposed by the Supreme Court Special Committee for Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures.* Several major policy decisions were made by the committee which are reflected throughout the recommended changes to article XI. The committee recommends that lay persons should be included in the disciplinary process at the grievance committee level; that, for more expeditious handling of cases, a speedy trial rule should be instituted; that the Board of Governors should be taken out of the adjudicatory phase of the disciplinary process and should be involved only as prosecutor; that there should be absolute immunity for complainants in Bar disciplinary proceedings; that confidentiality should be eliminated after probable cause has been determined to exist; that spot audits by in-house auditors should be instituted; that there should be qualification proceedings to deal with incompetent lawyers; and that circuit judges should serve as referees. We approve the committee’s recommendation as they relate to inclusion of lay persons in the disciplinary process, taking the Board of Governors out of the adjudicatory phase of the disciplinary process, use of trial judges as referees, and elimination of confidentiality after probable cause has been determined to exist.

Although we approve a major portion of the committee’s recommendations, we reject the following proposals which are adequately covered by the present rules. We reject proposed rule 11.02(4)(d),1 dealing with unearned fees and lawyer retainers, providing that money paid to a lawyer for services rendered in the future should not be used until the services are rendered and the fee earned and enumerating exceptions to this rule. Not only do we feel that the situation dealt with by this proposed rule is adequately covered by the present rules, which make it unethical for a lawyer to accept a fee and then fail to do the promised work, but we are also of the opinion that the proposed rule is unworkable. Mechanical application of such a rule seems unfeasible due to the varying circumstances and stages under which a fee is “earned.”

[2] We reject proposed rule 11.02(4)(e),2 entitled “Staff Auditors and Random Audits,” which provides that The Florida Bar shall retain staff auditors to conduct random audits. We have recently revised the rules with respect to trust accounting so as to require standard procedures and reporting requirements on the part of members of the Bar. See Fla.Bar Integr.Rule, art. XI, rule 11.02(4)(c). Until these new procedures are tested and determined to be wanting, we decline to assume the need for the substantially more restrictive measures proposed by the committee.

We reject the proposed major revision of rule 11.04(3),3 which eliminates, at the grievance committee level, the accused attorney’s right to confrontation, to cross-examination, to be present during the hearing, and to present evidence although the accused, under the proposed rule, would still have the opportunity to make a statement to the grievance committee in refutation or explanation of the charges. This proposed change was previously rejected by this Court in In the Matter of The Florida Bar, 338 So.2d 205, 207 (Fla.1976), wherein we said:

We do not feel the rights afforded the accused attorney by Rule 11.04(3) should be sacrificed for the mere purpose of expediency in the processing of his charges.

Our ruling upon the proposal to eliminate confidentiality at certain stages of the grievance procedure makes retention of the present safeguards even more essential.

We reject proposed rule 11.10(9),4 which relates to the employment of suspended or [3] disbarred lawyers and which has the effect of overruling this Court’s holding in The Florida Bar v. Thomson, 310 So.2d 300 (Fla. 1975), granting permission to suspended, disbarred, resigned, or inactive lawyers to be employed by a law firm or professional association to perform services which ethically could be performed by other lay persons. This proposal has been before the Court on several occasions since the Thomson case was decided, and limitations upon such employment have been imposed. See Fla.Bar Integr.Rule, art. XI, rule 11.10(7). No additional information has been supplied to the Court in connection with this proposal which would justify further reconsideration of such a thoroughly considered matter.

Proposed rule 11.12(6)(a), (b), and (c)5 is likewise rejected as unnecessary. Subsections (a) and (b) give absolute immunity to the complainants and to the disciplinary agents. We deem that participants in a disciplinary proceeding have the same privileges that a person has in a judicial proceeding and that creation of a new status which departs from a well-established body of law is inadvisable. Subsection (c) deals with the granting of immunity from prosecution. This subject is dealt with by our decision in Ciravolo v. The Florida Bar, 361 So.2d 121 (Fla.1978). Further amplification of that decision by rule does not appear to be necessary or advisable.

Proposed rule 11.13(1)6 establishes a speedy trial rule in disciplinary proceedings. [4] We find that such a speedy trial rule is not necessary at this time since the revisions to article XI, which we approve, are expected to expedite disciplinary matters. Furthermore, it is not clear that application of the speedy trial concept embodied in the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure to disciplinary proceedings is in the best public interest.

We reject the special committee’s suggestion that rule 11.14, relating to disciplinary proceedings in circuit courts, be eliminated in its entirety. This rule provides a means to discipline attorneys exclusively within the judicial process, totally removed from the organized bar, and should remain in effect.

Finally, we reject in its entirety proposed rule 11.14,7 which establishes procedures for [5] conducting qualification proceedings against an attorney incapable of practicing law generally or in a particular area of law because of lack of expertise or qualifications or inability to render legal services in a prompt and competent manner. We find present rule 11.01(4) to be adequate for these purposes, particularly in view of the fact that no instances of deficiencies in operating under the existing rule have been brought to our attention.

Having rejected, in their totality, the foregoing proposed changes, we now proceed to those proposed rules which we approve but with some modification.

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In re Supreme Court Special Committee for Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures to Amend Integration Rule, Article II & Article XI, 373 So. 2d 1, 1979 Fla. LEXIS 4787 (Fla. 1979).

373 So. 2d 1 (In re Supreme Court Special Committee for Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures to Amend Integration Rule, Article II & Article XI) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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