In re Strahilevitz

668 F.2d 1229, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 561, 1982 CCPA LEXIS 192
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedJanuary 15, 1982
DocketAppeal No. 81-563
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 668 F.2d 1229 (In re Strahilevitz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Strahilevitz, 668 F.2d 1229, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 561, 1982 CCPA LEXIS 192 (ccpa 1982).

Opinion

MILLER, Judge.

The decision of the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) Board of Appeals (“board”) sustaining the rejection of claims 36-48 1 as unsupported by an adequate disclosure required by 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, is reversed.

[1230]*1230BACKGROUND

Invention

Appellant’s invention relates to methods and devices for removing a hapten, antigen, or antibody from the blood of a living mammal.

A hapten is a small molecule which does not by itself produce antibodies but which, when conjugated to a carrier protein or other macro-molecular carrier, induces in a recipient animal or human the production of antibodies that are specific to the small molecule. For example, certain psychoactive drugs, such as LSD, heroin, and tetrahydrocannabinol, can function as haptens. When an antibody (a relatively large immunoprotein) contacts the hapten or antigen to which it is specific, it tightly binds the hapten or antigen. It is this specific binding property of antibodies which is used by appellant to remove haptens, antibodies, or antigens from blood. Claim 44, the broadest appealed claim, from which claims 45 and 46 depend, reads:

An immunological method for removing from a living mammal a hapten in the blood of said mammal, comprising connecting in the blood circulatory system of said mammal a hapten-removing device, said device comprising passage means for said blood; an antibody to said hapten in said device; and exposure means in said device for exposing said hapten to said antibody and for preventing said antibody from entering said circulatory system.

Appealed method claims 36-39 involve linking to a matrix an antibody to a hapten and passing blood over the matrix. The antibody removes the hapten from the blood by binding the hapten.2 Claim 40 is directed to a method for removing an antibody from the blood of a living mammal which is passed over an antigen linked to a matrix; claim 41 involves an antibody linked to a matrix to remove an antigen from blood.

Claims 42 and 43 involve a method for removing a hapten or an antigen from blood through an immunodialysis process.3 A semipermeable membrane, permeable to haptens or antigens and impermeable to antibodies, separates a patient’s blood from a solution containing antibodies to the target molecules. Because the antibodies specifically bind target molecules that diffuse from the patient’s blood through the semipermeable membrane, a gradient across the membrane is present for the molecule, which continues to diffuse from the blood to the dialysis solution as long as the solution contains antibodies which are free to bind the target molecules. Claims 47 and [1231]*123148 are essentially directed to devices for practicing claims 42 and 43.

Proceedings Below

The examiner rejected the claims as based upon an insufficient disclosure under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, stating:

The disclosure is essentially an invitation to experiment. No specific examples are given. No human treatment (in fact no animal treatment) is described. The specification is replete with statements as to what may be done. No dialysis or adsorption data [have] been presented.
. .. [A]ppellant urges “nearly universal applicability” for selectively removing chemical species. If there is in fact universal applicability, with selectivity, appellant should have inserted numerous (50 to 100 for instance) examples into the specification.
Appellant urges that no working example is required and that instructions to a technician are not required. But it has already been pointed out that appellant believes his device has universal applications (and the claims are just about that broad). Admittedly, one skilled in the art is a Ph.D., but even with such a high level of skill, such a person would need detailed guidance to practice the claimed alleged universal invention.

The board took a somewhat different approach:

[A]ppellant admits .. . the disclosure contains no “operative example”. While we recognize that specific examples are not necessary to meet the requirements of Section 112, In re Gay, 50 CCPA 725, 309 F.2d 769, 135 USPQ 311 (1962), when present, they do provide good evidence that the disclosure is enabling and that the invention may be performed without undue experimentation. In our view, the material most descriptive of the claimed methods and apparatus, is that presented in examples 12 and 13, wherein systems are defined for the removal of haptens, antigens and antibodies from the circulatory system. At best, the descriptive material is a generalized explanation of figures 6 and 7 in the drawings, and except for the regeneration step, provides no specific or even general guidelines for the treatment. The claimed methods ... involve a complicated and complex series of reaction conditions that apparently require specifically related haptens, antigens and antibodies to operate effectively. We fail to find in the disclosure adequate instruction as to how these selections are to be made and in our view such selections would not be readily apparent or obvious to those of ordinary skill in the related art. Also required in various claims is the use of a matrix for use in binding the antibodies; however, we see no disclosure adequate to define such production or even the materials that are compatible in use. The specification also fails to teach or even suggest the antibodies or antigens that may be used with the appropriate haptens and we see no disclosure that would lead to or suggest a proper means of selecting the appropriate membranes for use in the removal devices. In short, it appears that the appellant has developed a concept of how a variety of prior art procedures may possibly be combined in a single method . . . and then retreated to leave those in the art with the task of experimentation to see if the method can be made to operate as set forth. . .. Here, appellant has presented no descriptive material that in our view is sufficient to provide a proper instruction in the manner of either developing the apparatus as claimed or the method of using same. The wide variety of variables that are inherent in the process, and for which the disclosure provides no basis for evaluation, leads us to the conclusion that operation of the method as claimed would involve an undue amount of experimentation and we will therefore sustain the rejection.

Thus, the board questioned whether the specification enabled selection and preparation of haptens, antigens, and antibodies; preparation of the matrix; selection of the dialysis membranes; and selection of parameters of the- dialysis process.

[1232]*1232OPINION

Burden of Proof

A threshold issue is whether the PTO met its burden of proof in calling into question the enablement of appellant’s disclosure. This burden required that the PTO advance acceptable reasoning inconsistent with enablement. Thereupon, the burden would shift to

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Bluebook (online)
668 F.2d 1229, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 561, 1982 CCPA LEXIS 192, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-strahilevitz-ccpa-1982.