In Re Stoiber

160 B.R. 307, 29 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1184, 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 1633, 1993 WL 464540
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedJuly 13, 1993
Docket19-40226
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 160 B.R. 307 (In Re Stoiber) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Stoiber, 160 B.R. 307, 29 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1184, 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 1633, 1993 WL 464540 (Ohio 1993).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

JAMES H. WILLIAMS, Chief Judge.

At issue in this case is the ability of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to amend a proof of claim filed on its behalf by the debtors pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 501(c) and Fed.R.Bankr.P. 3004 1 ; a second, and larger, issue is whether, regardless of the debtors’ filing of such a proof of claim, there is a basis for disallowing the subsequent offering by the IRS.

Following a hearing on the debtors’ objection to the IRS’s proofs of claim 2 , the parties were offered the opportunity to submit points of authority to supplement the objection, response and reply. They have chosen not to do so.

The court has jurisdiction in this matter by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) and General Order No. 84 entered in this district on July 16,1984. This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B). This Memorandum of Decision constitutes the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7052.

FACTS

1. The debtors filed a joint petition for relief under Chapter 13 of Title 11 of the United States Code on July 20, 1990.

2. IRS was shown on the schedule of debts as being owed $5,000.00 in so-called Form 941 taxes. A post office box address for IRS was included. The court’s file reflects that a Notice of Meeting of Creditors was sent to IRS at that address. The notice provides that the last day to file a claim was November 27, 1990.

3. No proof of claim was filed by IRS by this filing deadline. IRS makes no claim that it did not receive the Notice of Meeting of Creditors.

4. The debtors moved for leave to file a proof of claim on IRS’s behalf. Leave was granted and, on May 26, 1992, the filing was made. One day later, the court notified IRS of the filing.

5. The first of IRS’s “amendments” to the proof of claim filed on its behalf was presented five months later, on October 27, 1992. The debtors^objected and the second “amendment” was filed on March 18, 1993. Again, the debtors objected on the basis that the IRS filing was “not timely, and it should be disallowed to the extent that it exceeds the amount set forth in the proof of claim originally filed by the debtors herein.”

DISCUSSION

A

The IRS first urges the court to use its equitable powers to allow its amended proofs of claim to relate back to the original proof of claim filed on its behalf by the debtors. This is on the entirely reasonable sounding premise that “[i]f this Court permitted the filing of the original Proof of Claim, then any amendments to this claim by the creditor should also be permitted.” (Response to Debtors’ Objection to Claim, p. 4) Support for the IRS’s position is found in In re Kolstad, 928 F.2d 171 (5th Cir.1991), reh’g en banc denied, U.S. v. Kolstad, 936 F.2d 571 (5th Cir.1991).

*309 A careful reading of Kolstad, however, reveals it to be less than solid support for IRS’s position. Judge Jones carefully reviews the claims amendment-objection process and concludes “that the bankruptcy court had discretion to authorize IRS to amend Kolstad’s proof of claim for federal taxes.” (emphasis added). Id. at 175. Furthermore, said the court, under the facts and circumstances there present, the bankruptcy judge in Kolstad did not abuse that discretion in permitting IRS to amend the claim the debtor filed in its behalf.

Assuming, without further analysis, that this court may indeed permit an amendment such as that tendered by IRS, it chooses not to do so for several reasons. First, IRS had not one but two notices from the court to file its proof of claim, if it intended to participate in the debtors’ Chapter 13 plan. The first, the Notice of the Meeting of Creditors and the last day to file proofs of claim, it utterly ignored; the second, the notice, sent 22 months after the case was filed, that a claim had been filed on its behalf, drew no response for five more months. Second, in the interim, the debtors’ plan was confirmed and well along the road to completion by the time the IRS sought to amend the claim filed in its behalf. Third, no evidence was offered on the possible effect of allowing IRS’s asserted claim at this late date and it is not the court’s role to ferret out that information. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to predict that, given the priority status of Section 507 claims, if allowed, whether timely or not, U.S. v. Cardinal Mine Supply, Inc., 916 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir.1990), some disruption of the debtors’ plan to the detriment of them and their other creditors would likely flow from this court’s exercise of its discretion in the IRS’s favor.

Kolstad expressed a concern about mischief on the part of debtors who might improperly seek to control the amount of a claim if amendments to their filing pursuant to Fed.R.Bankr.P. 3004 are not permitted. “If a Rule 3004 proof of claim permitted a debtor to fix beyond challenge the amount of the involuntary participant’s claim, the debt- or would also control that creditor’s share of the distribution from his estate. Such an interpretation of Rule 3004 carries a serious potential for abuse, because it would foster the deliberate filing of a very low claim on behalf of a creditor.” Id. 928 F.2d at 174. This fear seems rebutted by the Supreme Court’s statement in Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1644, 118 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992): “Debtors and their attorneys face penalties under various provisions for engaging in improper conduct in bankruptcy proceedings.... These provisions may limit bad-faith claims ... by debtors. To the extent that they do not, Congress may enact comparable provisions to address the difficulties that ... [may] follow our decision.” Id. — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 1648-49, 118 L.Ed.2d at 288.

Therefore, the court declines to accept the proofs of claim filed by the IRS as amendments to the proof of claim filed in the IRS’s name by the debtors.

B

The IRS argues in the alternative that its proofs of claim should stand despite their untimely filing on the basis that 11 U.S.C. § 502

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Bluebook (online)
160 B.R. 307, 29 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1184, 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 1633, 1993 WL 464540, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-stoiber-ohnb-1993.