In Re Gullatt

164 B.R. 279, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 187, 1994 WL 58273
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Tennessee
DecidedFebruary 23, 1994
DocketBankruptcy 93-01083-GP3-13
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 164 B.R. 279 (In Re Gullatt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Gullatt, 164 B.R. 279, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 187, 1994 WL 58273 (Tenn. 1994).

Opinion

*280 MEMORANDUM

KEITH M. LUNDIN, Bankruptcy Judge.

The question presented is whether a tardy claim is allowable in a Chapter 13 case. Late filing does not require disallowance. The following are findings of fact and conclusions of law. Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7052.

I

Connie and Sandra Gullatt filed Chapter 13 on February 11, 1993. Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c), 1 timely proofs of claim were due before June 16, 1993. On August 16, 1993, the Veterans’ Administration filed proof of an unsecured claim for $13,966.95. The debtors objected to allowance of the V.A.’s claim on the ground it was untimely.

II

Chief Judge George C. Paine II of this District recently held that a claim in a Chapter 13 case was not disallowed solely because proof was filed after the deadline fixed by Rule 3002(c). In re Sullins, 161 B.R. 957 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn.1993). This conclusion was based on the reasoning of In re Hausladen, 146 B.R. 557 (Bankr.D.Minn. 1992). 2 These debtors and the standing Chapter 13 trustees in this district urge departure from Sidlins based on the reasoning of In re Zimmerman, 156 B.R. 192, 197 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1993), In re Bailey, 151 B.R. 28, 32 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1993), and other decisions contrary to Hausladen. 3

At least five arguments from statutory interpretation support the outcome in Sullins:

1. No provision of the Bankruptcy Code disallows an untimely claim. Section 57n of the former Bankruptcy Act specifically disallowed late claims. 4 Section 502 of the Code mandates that “the court ... shall alloiu ... claim[s]” (emphasis added) unless an enumerated ground for disallowance applies. Late filing is not enumerated. The deletion of § 57n and the enactment of a different statutory scheme in § 502(b) signalled a change in the treatment of late-filed claims in bankruptcy cases under the Code. 5
2. Sections 501(b) and (c) have vitality only if untimely filed claims are allowable. 11 U.S.C. § 501(a) states (permissibly) that “a creditor ... may file a proof of claim.” (emphasis added). Section 501(b) and (c) permit the debtor, the trustee or a co-debtor to file a proof of claim on behalf of a creditor, “if a creditor does not timely file a proof of such creditor’s claim.” This power of the debtor, the trustee or a co-debtor to file an “untimely” proof of claim *281 is meaningless if all such claims are disallowed.
3. Section 506(d) makes sense only if disallowance is not the consequence of untimeliness. Section 506(d) voids liens that secure claims that are not “allowed secured claims.” Section 506(d)(2) states an exception where a claim is not an allowed secured claim “due only to the failure of any entity to file a proof of such claim under § 501 of this title.”
The failure of any entity to file a proof of claim under § 501 results in disallowance because the filing of a proof of claim is the predicate for allowance of all claims under §§ 501 and 502(a). If disallowance is also the consequence of untimely filing, then untimely filing is omitted as an exception to the voiding power in § 506(d) and a lien holder with no filed proof of claim is better off than a lien holder with a tardy proof of claim. It is not lightly to be inferred that Congress intended to allow a debtor or trustee to file an untimely proof of claim on behalf of a creditor, object to that untimely claim, then void the creditor’s lien under § 506(d). More reasonably, untimeliness is not listed as an additional exception to the voiding power in § 506(d) .because the untimely filing of a proof of claim does not disallow the claim.
4. Sections 726(a)(2)(C) and (3) have meaning only if a tardily-filed claim is allowed. The filing and allowance of claims in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases are controlled by the same provisions of the Code and Rules — §§ 501 and 502 of the Code and Bankruptcy Rule 3002. If the consequence of tardy filing is disallowance in a Chapter 13 case, then the same consequence applies in a Chapter 7 case. There is no provision of the Code or Rules to overcome this result.
In a Chapter 7 case, a tardily-filed claim has special distribution rights under §§ 726(a)(2) and (3). Section 726(a)(2)(C) provides “any allowed unsecured claim ... proof of which is tardily filed” will be paid together with timely filed claims if the creditor did not receive notice of the case in time to timely file and “proof of such claim is filed in time to permit payment of such claim.” Section 726(a)(3) then provides a lower priority of distribution for claims which are tardily filed for any other reason. If a tardily-filed claim is disallowed, the priority for distribution to “allowed” tardily-filed claims in §§ 726(a)(2)(C) and (3) is a nonsense. 6 This destructive reading of the Code is avoided by a changed premise: tardily-filed claims are allowable in cases under all chapters of the Code; however, differences in treatment are appropriate based on § 726(a) in Chapter 7 cases and based on the provisions of confirmed plans in Chapter 13 cases.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has recognized that disal-lowance of tardily-filed claims is inconsistent with § 726(a). Faced with the question whether the Bankruptcy Rules prohibited the IRS to file an allowable tardy claim, the court explained in U.S. v. Cardinal Mine Supply, Inc., 916 F.2d 1087, 1089 (6th Cir.1990): “certainly §§ 726(a)(3) contemplates that some tardily-filed claims can and will be filed and allowed.... [W]e cannot have a statute that specifically allows payment of tardily-filed claims and rules that prohibit their filing.”
*282 5. Late-filed claims are allowable in Chapter 13 cases to avoid statutory gridlock at confirmation. To confirm a plan, a Chapter 13 debtor must satisfy the best interests of creditors test in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). 7 That test requires that the property to be distributed on account of each allowed unsecured claim must be not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate were liquidated under Chapter 7 on the effective date of the plan.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
164 B.R. 279, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 187, 1994 WL 58273, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-gullatt-tnmb-1994.