In re S.T.F.

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: June 17, 2014
• Docket: 13-1408
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-1408 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 17 June 2014

IN THE MATTER OF: Robeson County Nos. 10 J 217-20 S.T.F., J.T.F., A.T.F., A.T.F.

Appeal by respondent-father from order entered 19 September

2013 by Judge Herbert L. Richardson in Robeson County District

Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 May 2014.

No brief filed for petitioner-appellee Robeson County Department of Social Services.

Ryan McKaig for respondent-father.

Sandlin Family Law Group, by Debra A. Griffiths, for guardian ad litem.

BRYANT, Judge.

Respondent-father appeals from a district court order

terminating his parental rights to S.T.F., J.T.F., A.T.F., and

A.T.F. challenging only the trial court’s conclusion that it is

in the best interests of the juveniles to terminate respondent-

father’s parental rights. We affirm. -2- On 16 September 2010, the Robeson County Department of

Social Services (“DSS”) obtained nonsecure custody of

respondent-father’s four children and filed juvenile petitions

alleging that the children were neglected. The petitions

alleged, inter alia, that respondent-father, his wife, and their

children had no place to live and that the parents had

inadequate kinship placements for the children. On 5 April

2011, DSS filed amended petitions alleging abuse. In an

adjudication order filed on 29 August 2011,1 the trial court

concluded that all four children were neglected and that S.T.F.

was abused. In a separate disposition order, the trial court

concluded that it was in the children’s best interests to remain

in DSS custody and continue with a permanent plan of

reunification with the parents.

On 20 June 2012, DSS filed petitions to terminate both

parents’ rights to the children. Following a hearing on 12

September 2013, the trial court entered an order in which it

found the existence of the following grounds for termination

against respondent-father: (1) failure to make reasonable

progress; and (2) dependency. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-

1 The order was amended on 13 September 2011, but the amendment made no substantive changes to the adjudication of neglect and abuse. -3- 1111(a)(2), (6) (2011). The trial court also concluded that

termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was in the

children’s best interests. Respondent-father appeals.2

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It is well-established that termination of parental rights

proceedings involve a two-stage process: (1) the adjudication

stage, where the petitioner is required to prove the existence

of grounds for termination, and (2) the disposition stage, where

the court considers the best interest of the juvenile. N.C.

Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-1110, -1111 (2013); In re White, 81 N.C. App.

82, 85, 344 S.E.2d 36, 38 (1986) (citation omitted). At the

adjudication stage, the burden is “upon the petitioner or movant

and all findings of fact shall be based on clear, cogent, and

convincing evidence.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109 (f) (2013); see

also In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1997)

(“At the adjudication stage, the party petitioning for the

termination must show by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence

that grounds authorizing the termination of parental rights

exist.” (citation omitted)). On appeal, respondent-father does

not make any challenges to the adjudicatory stage of the

proceedings.

2 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the mother, but she is not a party to this appeal. -4- Respondent-father challenges the trial court’s conclusion

that it is in the best interests of S.T.F., J.T.F., A.T.F., and

A.T.F. to terminate his parental rights. Respondent-father

contends that in light of the progress he has made, the desire

he has expressed to be a good father, and the bond he has formed

with his children, the trial court erred in terminating his

parental rights. We disagree.

We review the trial court’s determination that a

termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the

juvenile for an abuse of discretion. In re Anderson, 151 N.C.

App. 94, 98, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002) (citation omitted).

While respondent-father’s desire to make progress in the

future is admirable, it is not dispositive at this stage of the

termination proceeding. At the disposition stage, the trial

court’s focus is on the best interests of the child, not the

circumstances surrounding the parents. See In re Montgomery,

311 N.C. 101, 109, 316 S.E.2d 246, 251 (1984) (“[T]he

fundamental principle underlying North Carolina’s approach to

controversies involving child neglect and custody [is] that the

best interest of the child is the polar star.”). We have

previously stated “that the child[ren] and [their] best

interests are at issue here, not respondent’s hopes for the -5- future.” In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 614, 543 S.E.2d

906, 911 (2001) (citation omitted).

The trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact in the

disposition of its order indicate that S.T.F., A.T.F., and

A.T.F. are in prospective adoptive placements and that DSS is

looking at a family that may be interested in adopting J.T.F.

Further, S.T.F., J.T.F., A.T.F., and A.T.F. “are in a stable

environment which will allow them to grow up in a secure

environment and benefit emotionally, socially, and

educationally.”

Upon review of the record, we conclude that the trial court

weighed the evidence and made a reasoned decision that

termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was in the

best interests of the children. We find no abuse of discretion

in this determination and, therefore, affirm the order of the

trial court terminating respondent-father’s parental rights.

Affirmed.

Judges STEPHENS and DILLON concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).