HERRMANN, Chief Justice:
This certification of questions of law [Del.Const. Art. 4, § 11(9)], arose from an action filed by the State Board of Pension Trustees (hereinafter “Board”) in the Court of Chancery, pursuant to that Court’s inherent jurisdiction over trusts and trustees. The action seeks, as a protective order, instructions that certain Statutes enacted by the General Assembly are valid, and that the Board and its members may comply with the terms thereof without violating their fiduciary duties to the State Employees’ Pension Plan and the State Employees’ Retirement Fund. See 29 Del. C. Ch. 55; §§ 5541, 5542, and 8308.
I.
The Statutes in question are of four types:
(1) The first type requires the Board to accept the applications of and award service, disability, or survivor’s pensions to individuals who do not meet the existing eligibility requirements of the State Employees’ Pension Plan, as set forth in 29 Del.C. Ch. 55.
The Statutes in this category are:
60 Del.Laws, Chs. 112, 178, 222, and 256.
(2) The second type directs the Board to award pension benefits in excess of the amount to which the named pensioners are otherwise entitled. The Statutes in this category are 60 Del.Laws, Chs. 186 and 188.
(3) The third type directs the Board to include, for computational purposes, time which a pensioner spent as an employee of New Castle County, despite the fact that the State Employees’ Pension Plan does not allow for the inclusion of such service for computational purposes. The Statute in this category is 60 Del.Laws, Ch. 239.
(4) The fourth type directs that pension benefits be' paid from the proceeds of the State Employees’ Pension Fund to a class of former State legislators who were not entitled
to
such benefits at the time they left public office. The Statute in this category is 60 Del.Laws, Ch. 214.
None of the aforesaid Statutes includes an implementing appropriation; each pension benefit created thereby is to be paid out of the State Employees’ Pension Fund.
II.
Upon the basis of the foregoing, the following questions of law were certified and accepted:
Question No. 1:
Does 60 Del.Laws, Ch. 214, which awards pension benefits under the State Employees’ Pension Plan to individuals who did not qualify for such benefits at the time they terminated State employment, authorize the payment of public funds for a non-public purpose in violation of Art. I, § 7, and Art. VIII, § 4, of the Constitution of the State of Delaware and the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution ?
Question No. 2:
Do 60 Del.Laws, Ch. 112, 178, 186, 188, 222, 239 and 256 violate the separation of powers doctrine in that, by direction of the General Assembly, they require petitioner, an administrative agency of the State of Delaware, to award pension benefits in situations not authorized by the existing provisions of the statute which petitioner is required to enforce, i. e. 29 Del.C., Ch. 55?
Question No. 3:
Do the statutes in issue violate the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution by:
(a) Directing petitioner to award pension benefits to certain named individuals who do not meet the existing eligibility requirements of the State Employees’ Pension Plan, while failing to award similar benefits to others with identical employment records?
(b) Directing petitioner to award pensions to certain named individuals in amounts exceeding that to which they are entitled under the existing provisions of the State Employees’ Pension Plan, while failing to award similar levels of benefits to others with identical employment records?
(c)Directing petitioner to compute a named individual’s pension benefit based in part on a period of employment which does not qualify as credited service under the existing provisions of the State Employees’ Pension Plan, while failing to make similar provisions for others with identical employment records ?
Question No. 4:
Do the statutes in issue unlawfully impair the contractual rights of former and present State employees (participants in the Plan) in violation of Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution?
Question No. 5:
Do petitioner’s fiduciary obligations to the State Employees’ Pension Plan and the State Employees’ Retirement Fund preclude petitioner’s approving the payment of pension benefits from said Fund in amounts not authorized by the existing provisions of the Plan or to individuals who do not meet the existing eligibility requirements of the Plan?
James F. Burnett, Esquire, was appointed
amicus curiae
by the Court of Chancery to represent the interests of all those persons who might be adversely affected by the Statutes here in question.
We find the Answer to Question No. 4 determinative.
III.
The Fourth Question certified is whether the Statutes unlawfully impair or infringe the contractual rights of former and present State employees, participants in the Plan and compulsory contributors to the Fund, in violation of Article I, Section 10, of the Federal Constitution. We conclude that the answer is affirmative at least as to all those with statutory vested rights to
service pensions
or otherwise presently eligible for pensions under the Plan.
Article I, Section 10, of the Federal Constitution provides: “No State shall * * * pass any * * * Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts * *
Although the “prohibition of the contract clause is no longer absolute and must yield to the right of the State to legislate to protect vital interests of the people,” only “minor impairment or infringement of contractual rights is permissible.”
Globe Liquor Co. v. Four Roses Distillers Co.,
Del.Supr., 281 A.2d 19, 21 (1971).
The threshold question is whether there is a contractual relationship between the State, as employer, and those present and former State employees who have participated in the Plan and contributed to the Fund.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
HERRMANN, Chief Justice:
This certification of questions of law [Del.Const. Art. 4, § 11(9)], arose from an action filed by the State Board of Pension Trustees (hereinafter “Board”) in the Court of Chancery, pursuant to that Court’s inherent jurisdiction over trusts and trustees. The action seeks, as a protective order, instructions that certain Statutes enacted by the General Assembly are valid, and that the Board and its members may comply with the terms thereof without violating their fiduciary duties to the State Employees’ Pension Plan and the State Employees’ Retirement Fund. See 29 Del. C. Ch. 55; §§ 5541, 5542, and 8308.
I.
The Statutes in question are of four types:
(1) The first type requires the Board to accept the applications of and award service, disability, or survivor’s pensions to individuals who do not meet the existing eligibility requirements of the State Employees’ Pension Plan, as set forth in 29 Del.C. Ch. 55.
The Statutes in this category are:
60 Del.Laws, Chs. 112, 178, 222, and 256.
(2) The second type directs the Board to award pension benefits in excess of the amount to which the named pensioners are otherwise entitled. The Statutes in this category are 60 Del.Laws, Chs. 186 and 188.
(3) The third type directs the Board to include, for computational purposes, time which a pensioner spent as an employee of New Castle County, despite the fact that the State Employees’ Pension Plan does not allow for the inclusion of such service for computational purposes. The Statute in this category is 60 Del.Laws, Ch. 239.
(4) The fourth type directs that pension benefits be' paid from the proceeds of the State Employees’ Pension Fund to a class of former State legislators who were not entitled
to
such benefits at the time they left public office. The Statute in this category is 60 Del.Laws, Ch. 214.
None of the aforesaid Statutes includes an implementing appropriation; each pension benefit created thereby is to be paid out of the State Employees’ Pension Fund.
II.
Upon the basis of the foregoing, the following questions of law were certified and accepted:
Question No. 1:
Does 60 Del.Laws, Ch. 214, which awards pension benefits under the State Employees’ Pension Plan to individuals who did not qualify for such benefits at the time they terminated State employment, authorize the payment of public funds for a non-public purpose in violation of Art. I, § 7, and Art. VIII, § 4, of the Constitution of the State of Delaware and the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution ?
Question No. 2:
Do 60 Del.Laws, Ch. 112, 178, 186, 188, 222, 239 and 256 violate the separation of powers doctrine in that, by direction of the General Assembly, they require petitioner, an administrative agency of the State of Delaware, to award pension benefits in situations not authorized by the existing provisions of the statute which petitioner is required to enforce, i. e. 29 Del.C., Ch. 55?
Question No. 3:
Do the statutes in issue violate the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution by:
(a) Directing petitioner to award pension benefits to certain named individuals who do not meet the existing eligibility requirements of the State Employees’ Pension Plan, while failing to award similar benefits to others with identical employment records?
(b) Directing petitioner to award pensions to certain named individuals in amounts exceeding that to which they are entitled under the existing provisions of the State Employees’ Pension Plan, while failing to award similar levels of benefits to others with identical employment records?
(c)Directing petitioner to compute a named individual’s pension benefit based in part on a period of employment which does not qualify as credited service under the existing provisions of the State Employees’ Pension Plan, while failing to make similar provisions for others with identical employment records ?
Question No. 4:
Do the statutes in issue unlawfully impair the contractual rights of former and present State employees (participants in the Plan) in violation of Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution?
Question No. 5:
Do petitioner’s fiduciary obligations to the State Employees’ Pension Plan and the State Employees’ Retirement Fund preclude petitioner’s approving the payment of pension benefits from said Fund in amounts not authorized by the existing provisions of the Plan or to individuals who do not meet the existing eligibility requirements of the Plan?
James F. Burnett, Esquire, was appointed
amicus curiae
by the Court of Chancery to represent the interests of all those persons who might be adversely affected by the Statutes here in question.
We find the Answer to Question No. 4 determinative.
III.
The Fourth Question certified is whether the Statutes unlawfully impair or infringe the contractual rights of former and present State employees, participants in the Plan and compulsory contributors to the Fund, in violation of Article I, Section 10, of the Federal Constitution. We conclude that the answer is affirmative at least as to all those with statutory vested rights to
service pensions
or otherwise presently eligible for pensions under the Plan.
Article I, Section 10, of the Federal Constitution provides: “No State shall * * * pass any * * * Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts * *
Although the “prohibition of the contract clause is no longer absolute and must yield to the right of the State to legislate to protect vital interests of the people,” only “minor impairment or infringement of contractual rights is permissible.”
Globe Liquor Co. v. Four Roses Distillers Co.,
Del.Supr., 281 A.2d 19, 21 (1971).
The threshold question is whether there is a contractual relationship between the State, as employer, and those present and former State employees who have participated in the Plan and contributed to the Fund.
That question was resolved by this Court, at least as to those with statutory vested rights in service pensions or otherwise presently eligible for pensions under the Plan, in
Dorsey v. State ex rel. Mulrine,
Del.Supr., 283 A.2d 834 (1971). There it was held that, under a contributory plan, “pensions are a part of the compensation of an employee to which ordinarily he is as much entitled as he is to the wages he is paid for the work actually performed by him.” 283 A.2d at 836.
Accord, City of Wilmington v. Miller,
Del. Supr., 293 A.2d 574 (1972).
At a later phase of the
Dorsey
case, this Court discussed in more detail the contractual nature of the relationship between a public employer and a public employee under a compulsory contribution pension plan: (301 A.2d at 518).
“Contrary to The City’s position, we are of the opinion that the Police Pension Law does indeed create a form of quasi-contract which binds The City to certain performances. The implied, or quasi-contract, is one where the law will infer the existence of a contractual relationship without regard to the actual intention of the parties where circumstances are such that justice warrants a recovery as though there had been a promise or contract.
“Originally a pension was a gratuity usually offered to a retiring officer or executive of a company to show the company’s appreciation for past services rendered. Those first pension systems were non-contributory and, although a person might have expected to receive a pension, the recipient usually did not accept employment or continue therein in reliance upon the expectation of a pension. As time and the nature of employment relationships passed, employers— even governments — found it necessary as a matter of competition to offer a pension plan benefit as an inducement for the hire or retention of employees. Indeed, in today’s economy, the terms and conditions of an employer’s pension plan play an important role in inducing a man to enter or continue in the service of that employer. In other words, it is a part of the consideration for the contract of hire.”
The State points out that
Dorsey
involved a retired police officer’s pension rights which had vested by reason of his completion of specific service eligibility requirements. Similarly, it is pointed out that the
Miller
case involved a police offi
cer who had satisfied the statutory requirements for a disability pension. With those observations, the State seems to have no quarrel with the following conclusion of
Dorsey:
(283 A.2d at 836)
“There is a division of authority among the States as to whether or not a contributory pension system creates a vested interest in an employee who has satisfied the requirements for retirement. We have carefully considered the division in the authorities and are of the opinion . . . that pension rights under a municipality pension law become vested at least when the requirements for the grant of a pension has been fulfilled, ...”
In accord with
Dorsey,
we hold that vested contractual rights exist under the State Pension Law and in the State Pension Fund, at least as to those employees and former employees who have statutory vested rights in service pensions or who have otherwise fulfilled eligibility requirements for pension. It is unnecessary for us to reach the question of whether other employees have vested contract rights under the Plan; for if each Statute in question is unconstitutional as to employees presently eligible for pension benefits, it is indivisible as to other employees and must be held wholly invalid.
The question then becomes the extent to which the General Assembly may change contractual rights of participants in the Plan. The better rule, in our view, is that a public employee having a vested contractual right in a Pension Plan is entitled to protection against unreasonable modification of the Plan. See 3
Mc-Quillen, Municipal Corporations,
§ 12.144 (3rd Ed. 1973); 60 Am.Jur.2d, “Pension & Retirement Funds” § 49; e. g.,
Police Pension and Relief Board of Denver v. Bills,
148 Colo. 383, 366 P.2d 581 (1961). We adopt that rule of reason.
The issue then is whether the Statutes in question.purport to make unreasonable modifications in the Pension Plan. We are of the opinion that the answer to that question is affirmative, for the following reasons:
First, as indicated in
Dorsey,
the fundamental intent and purpose of a public Pension Plan is to encourage individuals to enter and remain in public service by arranging for a pension which, by fulfillment of specified eligibility requirements, may become the property of the individual as a matter of right upon termination of public service. See also
Fraternal Order of Firemen v. Shaw,
Del.Supr., 41 Del.Ch. 399, 196 A.2d 734 (1963).
The portion of 60 Del.L. Ch. 214 dealing with former members of the General Assembly, and the other Statutes here in question, bear no reasonable relationship to that fundamental intent and purpose.
They are more in the nature of gratuities awarded by an appreciative General Assembly out of compassion or gratitude. “A pension is a gratuity when it is granted for services previously rendered and which at the time they were rendered gave rise to no legal obligation.”
Lamb v. Board of County Peace Officers Retirement Comm.,
29 Cal.App.2d 348, 84 P.2d 183 (1938);
Mattson v. Flynn,
216 Minn. 354, 13 N.W.2d 11 (1944). Compare, however, the established Delaware concept of public con-
tributary pension plans: “pensions are a part of the compensation of an employee
to
which ordinarily he is as much entitled as he is to the wages he is paid for the work actually performed by him.”
Dorsey v. State ex rel. Mulrine,
Del.Supr., 283 A.2d 834, 836 (1971).
Implementation of the basic purpose and intent of the Pension Plan requires careful preservation of the Trust Fund for its intended beneficiaries — those individuals who have entered and remained in public service in reliance upon it and who have been obliged to contribute to it. The purpose and intent of the Plan and the Trust Fund is not served by a statute which provides for the payment of gratuitous pensions from the corpus of the Trust Fund created for the support of the contributory plan. Such action, in our view, can only weaken the confidence and dedication of employees who are required to contribute a portion of their salaries, year after year, to the Fund.
Secondly, we find the Statutes in question (except Ch. 214) to be unreasonable modifications of the Pension Plan because they constitute an effort by the General Assembly to administer eligibility for pension on an individual case-by-case basis, with no standards or ■ guidelines except, perhaps, gratitude or compassion. “Band-aid” eligibility exceptions are created and the duties and functions of the Board of Trustees, an arm of the Executive Branch of State Government, are usurped in violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine. This is just as unreasonable as would be a like case-by-case effort by the General Assembly to administer the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the Unemployment Compensation Act, as to which contributory Trust Funds have also been created.
That is not to say, however, that the General Assembly lacks the inherent power to grant a separate and individual pension award, with separate implementing appropriation, to a deserving person, out of gratitude or compassion or in the fulfillment of a moral obligation. Such power may well exist in an appropriate case. See, e, g.
Mayor of Wilmington v. Wolcott,
Del.Supr., 12 Del.Ch. 379, 112 A. 703 (1921);
In re Opinion of Justices,
240 Mass. 616, 136 N.E. 157 (1922);
State v. Carter,
30 Wyo. 22, 215 P. 477 (1923);
Bedford v. White, 106
Colo. 439, 106 P.2d 469 (1940);
State ex rel. Hawkins v. Amos, 97
Fla. 675, 122 So. 8 (1929);
In re Advisory Opinions,
98 Fla. 843, 124 So. 728 (1929).
However, such cases, involving individual pension grants as gratuities payable by special appropriations out of the general funds of the State, must be distinguished from contributory pension plans such as ours, involving a Trust Fund and providing a form of deferred compensation which is a “part of the consideration for the contract of hire”.
Dorsey v. State ex rel. Mulrine,
Del.Supr., 301 A.2d 516, 518 (1972). It is clear that the Statutes in question did not attempt to grant independent pension awards, supported by special appropriations, separate and apart from the Pension Plan and Trust Fund.
Finally, the State argues that there can be no impairment of contractual rights because 29 Del.C. § 5544
“requires that the
Board’s actuary make a valuation of the Plan at least once every three years and that the State’s contribution to the Plan, based on that valuation, be sufficient to keep the Plan actuarially sound.”
The thrust of this argument seems to be that it is permissible to invade the Pension Trust Fund for payment of benefits to non-contributing ineligible beneficiaries so long as actuarial adjustments may be made «by future State contributions thereto. But an impairment plus such provision for future repair does not meet the constitutional guaranty of the Contract Clause of the Federal Constitution. The improper invasion of a trust fund is not excused and made proper by such promises of restitution; and this is especially so when the promises are not binding upon the future General Assemblies which must execute them from year to year. Accordingly, it is our opinion that § 5544 does not cure the infringement of contract we find here.
% %
‡ >}í i}c
We hold that Question No. 4 must be answered in the affirmative.
In view of that conclusion, it is unnecessary to reach any of the other Questions certified.