An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA24-1055
Filed 18 June 2025
Guilford County, No. 20JT000748-400
IN THE MATTER OF:
S.R.-H.
Appeal by respondent-mother from an order terminating parental rights
entered 6 August 2024 by Judge William B. Davis in Guilford County District Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 April 2025.
Mercedes O. Chut for petitioner-appellee Guilford County Department of Health and Human Services.
Batch, Poore & Williams, PC, by Sydney Batch, for respondent-appellant mother.
FREEMAN, Judge.
Respondent-mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights as
to S.R.-H. (“Shannon”).1 On appeal, respondent-mother’s counsel submitted a no-
merit brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and State v. Kinch,
314 N.C. 99 (1985), identifying proposed issues and requesting this Court determine
1 A pseudonym is used to protect the juvenile’s identity pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 42(b). IN RE: S.R.-H.
Opinion of the Court
whether respondent-mother’s appeal wholly lacks merit. After careful review of these
identified issues and the entirety of the proceedings, we conclude this appeal is wholly
frivolous and affirm the trial court’s order terminating respondent-mother’s parental
rights.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
In October 2020, respondent-mother gave birth to Shannon. On 30 October
2020, Guilford County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) received a report
alleging that: (1) respondent-mother did not have custody of her other four children;
(2) respondent-mother was committed to a mental facility in August 2020; (3)
domestic violence was occurring in the home or in the presence of the juvenile; and
(4) respondent-mother had a history of substance abuse and mental health issues.
DSS began conducting home visits and interviews with respondent-mother and other
family members based on this report.
On 19 November 2020, DSS received an emergency report alleging abuse and
neglect of Shannon. Specifically, the emergency report alleged that respondent-
mother was dangling Shannon off a bridge, that both respondent-mother and
Shannon were dressed inappropriately for the weather, and that law enforcement
was attending the scene. DSS social workers arrived and interviewed respondent-
mother, who was sitting in a police car. Although respondent-mother recognized one
of the social workers, she appeared incoherent and stated, “I do not have time for this
right now,” and “my uterus is failing.”
-2- IN RE: S.R.-H.
DSS located Shannon in her father’s care that same day.2 Shannon’s father,
whose left eye was black and blue, and who had staples in the back of his head, denied
knowledge of the earlier bridge incident but reported multiple instances of
respondent-mother’s domestic violence, including an incident in which she hit him in
the head with a brick. According to Shannon’s father, respondent-mother got violent
when she was not taking her medication.
Based upon this incident and its investigation, DSS filed a juvenile petition on
20 November 2020 alleging that Shannon was neglected and dependent, and the trial
court signed a nonsecure custody order that day. On 2 February 2021, respondent-
mother entered into a DSS service agreement that required her to address the
following components: housing/environment/basic physical needs, employment and
income management, and mental health and parenting skills. On 8 December 2021,
the trial court adjudicated Shannon as a neglected juvenile. In March 2023,
respondent-mother’s case plan was amended to include components addressing
domestic violence and continuing employment. On 22 September 2023, based on
respondent-mother’s lack of progress, DSS filed a petition to terminate her parental
rights under subsections 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), (3), and (6) of our General Statutes.
The trial court held a hearing on the petition to terminate parental rights on
2 July 2024. In addition to considering a report and testimony from the guardian ad
2 Shannon’s father is not a party to this appeal as he did not exercise his right to appeal the
trial court’s order terminating his parental rights.
-3- IN RE: S.R.-H.
litem (“GAL”), the trial court heard testimony from social worker Christy Haik and
Shannon’s foster mother. On 6 August 2024, the trial court entered an order
terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights, concluding that DSS proved by
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate respondent-
mother’s parental rights under subsections 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (3) of our General
Statutes and that such termination would be in Shannon’s best interests.
Respondent-mother timely appealed.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction to review any “order that terminates parental
rights or denies a petition or motion to terminate parental rights.”
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a)(7) (2023). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to review the trial
court’s order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights.
III. Standard of Review
Although no-merit review pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967) and State v. Kinch, 314 N.C. 99 (1985) usually appears in criminal appeals,
such review is also available to a respondent-parent appealing from an order
terminating his or her parental rights. See In re L.E.M., 372 N.C. 396 (2019).
Regardless of whether the respondent-parent files a pro se brief, so long as his or her
counsel properly complies with the requirements of Anders, “such [no-merit] briefs
will, in fact, be considered by the appellate court and . . . an independent review will
be conducted of the issues identified therein.” Id. at 402. Accordingly, we
-4- IN RE: S.R.-H.
independently review the issues identified in counsel’s no-merit brief and conduct “a
full examination of all the proceedings . . . to decide whether the case is wholly
frivolous.” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.
“We review a district court’s adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) to
determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence and the findings support the conclusion of law.” In re J.S., 374 N.C. 811,
814 (2020) (cleaned up). “Unchallenged findings of fact are deemed supported by
competent evidence and are binding on appeal.” Id. “The issue of whether a trial
court’s findings of fact support its conclusions of law is reviewed de novo” and “an
adjudication of any single ground for terminating a parent’s rights . . . will suffice to
support a termination order.” Id. at 814–15. Therefore, if this Court affirms a trial
court’s conclusion “that a particular ground for termination exists, then we need not
review any remaining grounds.” Id. at 815. At the dispositional stage, “[t]he trial
court’s determination of a child’s best interests . . . is reviewed only for abuse of
discretion.” Id. at 822.
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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA24-1055
Filed 18 June 2025
Guilford County, No. 20JT000748-400
IN THE MATTER OF:
S.R.-H.
Appeal by respondent-mother from an order terminating parental rights
entered 6 August 2024 by Judge William B. Davis in Guilford County District Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 April 2025.
Mercedes O. Chut for petitioner-appellee Guilford County Department of Health and Human Services.
Batch, Poore & Williams, PC, by Sydney Batch, for respondent-appellant mother.
FREEMAN, Judge.
Respondent-mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights as
to S.R.-H. (“Shannon”).1 On appeal, respondent-mother’s counsel submitted a no-
merit brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and State v. Kinch,
314 N.C. 99 (1985), identifying proposed issues and requesting this Court determine
1 A pseudonym is used to protect the juvenile’s identity pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 42(b). IN RE: S.R.-H.
Opinion of the Court
whether respondent-mother’s appeal wholly lacks merit. After careful review of these
identified issues and the entirety of the proceedings, we conclude this appeal is wholly
frivolous and affirm the trial court’s order terminating respondent-mother’s parental
rights.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
In October 2020, respondent-mother gave birth to Shannon. On 30 October
2020, Guilford County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) received a report
alleging that: (1) respondent-mother did not have custody of her other four children;
(2) respondent-mother was committed to a mental facility in August 2020; (3)
domestic violence was occurring in the home or in the presence of the juvenile; and
(4) respondent-mother had a history of substance abuse and mental health issues.
DSS began conducting home visits and interviews with respondent-mother and other
family members based on this report.
On 19 November 2020, DSS received an emergency report alleging abuse and
neglect of Shannon. Specifically, the emergency report alleged that respondent-
mother was dangling Shannon off a bridge, that both respondent-mother and
Shannon were dressed inappropriately for the weather, and that law enforcement
was attending the scene. DSS social workers arrived and interviewed respondent-
mother, who was sitting in a police car. Although respondent-mother recognized one
of the social workers, she appeared incoherent and stated, “I do not have time for this
right now,” and “my uterus is failing.”
-2- IN RE: S.R.-H.
DSS located Shannon in her father’s care that same day.2 Shannon’s father,
whose left eye was black and blue, and who had staples in the back of his head, denied
knowledge of the earlier bridge incident but reported multiple instances of
respondent-mother’s domestic violence, including an incident in which she hit him in
the head with a brick. According to Shannon’s father, respondent-mother got violent
when she was not taking her medication.
Based upon this incident and its investigation, DSS filed a juvenile petition on
20 November 2020 alleging that Shannon was neglected and dependent, and the trial
court signed a nonsecure custody order that day. On 2 February 2021, respondent-
mother entered into a DSS service agreement that required her to address the
following components: housing/environment/basic physical needs, employment and
income management, and mental health and parenting skills. On 8 December 2021,
the trial court adjudicated Shannon as a neglected juvenile. In March 2023,
respondent-mother’s case plan was amended to include components addressing
domestic violence and continuing employment. On 22 September 2023, based on
respondent-mother’s lack of progress, DSS filed a petition to terminate her parental
rights under subsections 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), (3), and (6) of our General Statutes.
The trial court held a hearing on the petition to terminate parental rights on
2 July 2024. In addition to considering a report and testimony from the guardian ad
2 Shannon’s father is not a party to this appeal as he did not exercise his right to appeal the
trial court’s order terminating his parental rights.
-3- IN RE: S.R.-H.
litem (“GAL”), the trial court heard testimony from social worker Christy Haik and
Shannon’s foster mother. On 6 August 2024, the trial court entered an order
terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights, concluding that DSS proved by
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate respondent-
mother’s parental rights under subsections 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (3) of our General
Statutes and that such termination would be in Shannon’s best interests.
Respondent-mother timely appealed.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction to review any “order that terminates parental
rights or denies a petition or motion to terminate parental rights.”
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a)(7) (2023). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to review the trial
court’s order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights.
III. Standard of Review
Although no-merit review pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967) and State v. Kinch, 314 N.C. 99 (1985) usually appears in criminal appeals,
such review is also available to a respondent-parent appealing from an order
terminating his or her parental rights. See In re L.E.M., 372 N.C. 396 (2019).
Regardless of whether the respondent-parent files a pro se brief, so long as his or her
counsel properly complies with the requirements of Anders, “such [no-merit] briefs
will, in fact, be considered by the appellate court and . . . an independent review will
be conducted of the issues identified therein.” Id. at 402. Accordingly, we
-4- IN RE: S.R.-H.
independently review the issues identified in counsel’s no-merit brief and conduct “a
full examination of all the proceedings . . . to decide whether the case is wholly
frivolous.” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.
“We review a district court’s adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) to
determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence and the findings support the conclusion of law.” In re J.S., 374 N.C. 811,
814 (2020) (cleaned up). “Unchallenged findings of fact are deemed supported by
competent evidence and are binding on appeal.” Id. “The issue of whether a trial
court’s findings of fact support its conclusions of law is reviewed de novo” and “an
adjudication of any single ground for terminating a parent’s rights . . . will suffice to
support a termination order.” Id. at 814–15. Therefore, if this Court affirms a trial
court’s conclusion “that a particular ground for termination exists, then we need not
review any remaining grounds.” Id. at 815. At the dispositional stage, “[t]he trial
court’s determination of a child’s best interests . . . is reviewed only for abuse of
discretion.” Id. at 822.
IV. Discussion
We are satisfied that respondent-mother’s counsel fully complied with the
requirements of Anders and Rule 3.1(d) of our Rules of Appellate Procedure.3 As
3 Respondent-mother’s counsel conducted a thorough review of the record on appeal, the hearing transcript, and all documents in the case file. She requested and received no-merit review from another attorney in the Office of the Appellate Defender, advised respondent-mother of her option to the file a pro se brief, and identified potential issues for review in her no-merits brief.
-5- IN RE: S.R.-H.
respondent-mother has not filed a pro se brief, we conduct “an independent review . . .
of the issues identified” in counsel’s brief. In re L.E.M., 372 N.C. at 402. Specifically,
we review whether the trial court erred in concluding grounds existed to terminate
respondent-mother’s parental rights and whether the trial court abused its discretion
in determining termination was in Shannon’s best interest.
A. Adjudication
A trial court may terminate an individual’s parental rights upon a finding that
the parent has “willfully left the juvenile in foster care or placement outside the home
for more than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the court that
reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting the
conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) (2023).
“[T]he nature and extent of the parent’s reasonable progress . . . is evaluated
for the duration leading up to the hearing on the motion or petition to terminate
parental rights.” In re J.S., 374 N.C. at 815 (quoting In re A.C.F., 176 N.C. App. 250,
528 (2006)). “Willfulness is established when the respondent had the ability to show
reasonable progress, but was unwilling to make the effort.” In re K.D.C., 375 N.C.
784, 793 (2020) (cleaned up). A respondent-parent’s “prolonged inability to improve
her situation, despite some efforts in that direction, will support a finding of
willfulness regardless of her good intentions, and will support a finding of lack of
progress sufficient to warrant termination of parental rights under section
7B-1111(a)(2).” In re J.S., 374 N.C. at 815 (cleaned up).
-6- IN RE: S.R.-H.
“[P]arental compliance with a judicially adopted case plan is relevant in
determining whether grounds for termination exist pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2).” In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 384 (2019). However, “in order
for a respondent’s noncompliance with her case plan to support the termination of
her parental rights, there must be a nexus between the components of the court-
approved case plan with which the respondent failed to comply and the conditions
which led to the child’s removal.” In re K.D.C., 375 N.C. at 794 (cleaned up).
Here, respondent-mother’s case plan required her to address the following
objectives: “Housing/Environment/Basic Physical Needs, Employment and Income
Management, Mental Health and Parenting Skills.” This case plan was later
amended to include components addressing domestic violence and continuing
employment. The trial court found that “[t]he conditions that resulted in the
Department obtaining custody of the juvenile include but are not limited to
allegations of domestic violence between the parents, substance use by the mother,
allegations that the mother dangled the juvenile off a bridge, and untreated mental
health needs for the mother.” The components of respondent-mother’s case plan that
most directly address these removal conditions are the mental health, parenting
skills, and domestic violence components.
Our review of the entire record and hearing transcript satisfies us that the trial
court did not err in concluding respondent-mother willfully failed to make reasonable
progress in addressing these components of her case plan. The trial court’s
-7- IN RE: S.R.-H.
unchallenged findings of fact regarding these components are supported by clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence in the form of hearing testimony, DSS reports, and
GAL reports.
Further, because there is “a nexus between the components of the court-
approved case plan with which the respondent failed to comply and the conditions
which led to the child’s removal,” In re K.D.C., 375 N.C. at 794 (cleaned up), the trial
court’s findings regarding respondent-mother’s noncompliance with these
components support its conclusion that grounds existed to terminate respondent-
mother’s parental rights under subsection 7B-1111(a)(2). We therefore uphold the
trial court’s termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights under subsection
7B-1111(a)(2) and decline to review the trial court’s conclusions that grounds for
termination existed under subsections 7B-1111(a)(1) and (3). See In re J.S., 374 N.C.
at 815 (“[I]f this Court upholds the trial court’s order in which it concludes that a
particular ground for termination exists, then we need not review any remaining
grounds.”).
B. Disposition
Respondent-mother’s counsel identified another potential issue for review—
whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining termination of
respondent-mother’s parental rights was in Shannon’s best interest. “At the
dispositional stage of a termination proceeding, the trial court must ‘determine
whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interest.’ ” In re J.S.,
-8- IN RE: S.R.-H.
374 N.C. at 821–22 (quoting N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019)).
In each case, the court shall consider the following criteria and make written findings regarding the following that are relevant:
(1) The age of the juvenile.
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile.
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement.
(6) Any relevant consideration.
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2023).
“Although the trial court must consider each of the factors, . . . written findings
of fact are required only if there is conflicting evidence concerning the factor . . . .” In
re J.S., 374 N.C. at 822 (cleaned up). “The trial court’s dispositional findings are
binding on appeal if supported by any competent evidence,” and the trial court’s
“determination of a child’s best interests under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) is reviewed
only for abuse of discretion.” Id. (cleaned up). “An abuse of discretion is a decision
manifestly unsupported by reason or one so arbitrary that it could not have been the
result of a reasoned decision.” Id. (cleaned up).
Here, the trial court entered written, supported findings of fact regarding each
-9- IN RE: S.R.-H.
of the five required statutory factors. Considering the evidence presented, the
entirety of the record, and the hearing transcript, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights
was in Shannon’s best interest.
V. Conclusion
After a careful Anders review of the entirety of this matter and respondent-
mother’s counsel’s identified issues, we conclude the trial court did not err in
concluding grounds existed to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights or in
determining that such termination was in Shannon’s best interest. This appeal is
wholly frivolous and we affirm the trial court’s order terminating respondent-
mother’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
Judges COLLINS and MURRY concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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