In Re Sochia

231 B.R. 158, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 286, 34 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 76, 1999 WL 159855
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. New York
DecidedMarch 19, 1999
Docket1-15-10783
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 231 B.R. 158 (In Re Sochia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Sochia, 231 B.R. 158, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 286, 34 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 76, 1999 WL 159855 (N.Y. 1999).

Opinion

DECISION & ORDER

JOHN C. NINFO, II, Bankruptcy Judge.

BACKGROUND

On December 16, 1998, Phillip John Sochia (the “Debtor”) filed a petition initiating a Chapter 7 case. On the petition, the Debtor listed his address as the Wayne County Jail, and on the schedules and statements required to be filed by Section 521 and Rule 1007, the Debtor indicated that: (1) he *159 owned no real property; (2) his only personal property was two exempt bank accounts totaling $164.50 and exempt clothing which he valued at $500; (3) he had no secured creditors; (4) he owed the Internal Revenue Service $821.65 for 1996 income taxes 1 ; (5) he owed the New York State Department of Labor $534 for 1997 unemployment overpay-ments; (6) he had creditors holding unsecured nonpriority claims totaling $16,805.70, which included a deficiency balance of $8,835.52 due on a repossessed automobile loan; (7) he was single with no dependents; (8) he had no current income because he was incarcerated; (9) there were no pending lawsuits, judgments, executions or garnishments against him; and (10) a third-party had paid his attorney a fee of $500 as well as the $175 bankruptcy filing fee.

On December 23, 1998, a Notice was sent to all creditors and the Debtor, at the Wayne County Jail, which indicated that a Section 341 Meeting of Creditors (the “Meeting of Creditors”) would be conducted in his Chapter 7 case by the Debtor’s “Trustee” on January 22, 1999. The Notice specifically stated that “the debtor (both spouses in a joint case) must be present at the meeting to be questioned under oath by the trustee and by creditors.” A Minute Report of the Meeting of Creditors, filed by the Trustee on January 29, 1999, indicated that: (1) the Debtor had not appeared at the Meeting; (2) the Debtor was not expected to be released from prison in the near future; (3) in the Trustee’s opinion, no hardship to a non-debt- or existed that would justify waiving the Debtor’s appearance at a meeting of creditors; (4) his attorney had never met with the Debtor in person; and (5) it was the recommendation of the Trustee that there should be an immediate motion to dismiss the Debt- or’s case.

On February 1, 1999, the Office of the United States Trustee (the “US Trustee”) filed a motion (the “Dismissal Motion”), pursuant to Section 707(a), 2 that requested an order dismissing the Debtor’s Chapter 7 case. The Motion alleged that: (1) the Debt- or had failed to appear at the January 22, 1999 Meeting of Creditors; and (2) the failure to appear constituted cause under Section 707(a) to dismiss the case because, in the absence of an examination of the Debtor, the Trustee was unable to effectively administer the bankruptcy estate and determine if cause existed to raise an objection to the discharge of the Debtor pursuant to Section 727.

On February 26, 1999, the Debtor’s attorney filed a Response to the Dismissal Motion which alleged that: (1) the Debtor failed to appear at the Meeting of Creditors because he was incarcerated in the Wayne County Jail; (2) prior to the Meeting, the Debtor’s attorney had contacted the Trustee to request that he examine the Debtor by written interrogatories, but the Trustee had refused; (3) prior to the Meeting, the Debtor’s attorney had requested that the Trustee examine the Debtor telephonically, which the Trustee advised was unacceptable to the U.S. Trustee; (4) even though the Debtor was incarcerated at the time of his filing, and had made no arrangements with the proper prison officials to insure that he could personally attend the Meeting of Creditors, as required by Section 343, 3 the Court, in its discretion, could waive the requirement that the Debtor personally appear at a meeting of creditors; *160 (5) the Bankruptcy Court in In re Vilt, 56 B.R. 723 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1986) (“Vilt”) had held that when a debtor is incarcerated the Court may permit the Trustee and creditors to question him telephonically or by written interrogatories; (6) since the Debtor could be questioned telephonically or by written interrogatories, there was not sufficient cause, as required by Section 707(a), to dismiss his case because of his failure to personally appear at the Meeting of Creditors; and (7) the Court should deny the Dismissal Motion and require the Trustee to conduct a meeting of creditors telephonically or by the use of written interrogatories.

At the March 3, 1999 return date of the Dismissal Motion, the U.S. Trustee argued that: (1) the schedules and statements which he filed indicated that the incarcerated and unemployed Debtor who had: (a) no nonexempt personal property; (b) no real property; (c) no lawsuits, judgments or executions against him; and (d) no dependents, did not have a sufficient need for relief under the Bankruptcy Code that would justify the U.S. Trustee or the Court waiving the specific requirement of Section 343 that he personally appear for an examination by his Trustee and his creditors; (2) the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of New York, Rochester Division, had a specific written “Policy” which addressed the filing of petitions by inmates of correctional facilities; (3) this Policy made it clear that it was a prisoner’s responsibility to make sure, before filing a bankruptcy petition, that the appropriate prison officials were willing to provide the necessary security and transportation to permit the prisoner, as required by Section 343, to personally attend a meeting of creditors; (4) the Policy further stated that the Court, as a matter of practice, would not issue writs of habeas corpus or “body orders,” so that if a prisoner could not make arrangements with the appropriate prison officials for security and transportation, he or she should not file a petition until released from prison; (5) the Policy did, however, indicate that in extraordinary circumstances where a prisoner or his dependents demonstrated a sufficient need by the debtor for bankruptcy relief, the Court would consider an application to waive or modify: (a) established procedures regarding security and transportation; and (b) the requirement for an appearance at a meeting of creditors; and (6) in the past in appropriate circumstances, the U.S. Trustee had allowed telephonic examinations of debtors.

At the return date of the Dismissal Motion, the Debtor’s attorney was unable to demonstrate why the Debtor: (1) had any immediate need for relief under the Bankruptcy Code; or (2) would be prejudiced if he simply waited and filed a new petition immediately upon his release from prison when he could fulfill the requirements of Section 343 and personally attend a meeting of creditors.

DISCUSSION

A. Statute and Case Law

This and other Bankruptcy Courts have often stated that: (1) bankruptcy is a privilege and not a right; and (2) in exchange for the extraordinary relief available to an “honest” debtor in a Chapter 7 case, a discharge and “fresh start,” the Bankruptcy Code and Rules require very little from the debtor.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
231 B.R. 158, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 286, 34 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 76, 1999 WL 159855, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-sochia-nywb-1999.