In re S.M.

Opinions

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

2022-NCSC-42

No. 534A20

Filed 18 March 2022

IN THE MATTER OF: S.M.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) (2019) from the order entered on

22 September 2020 by Judge Doretta L. Walker in District Court, Durham County.

This matter was calendared in the Supreme Court on 18 February 2022 but

determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of

the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Law Office of Derrick J. Hensley, PLLC, by Derrick J. Hensley, for petitioner-appellee Durham County Department of Social Services.

Brendan A. Bailey and Ashley A. Edwards for Guardian ad Litem.

Kathleen M. Joyce for respondent-appellant mother.

Benjamin J. Kull for respondent-appellant father.

EARLS, Justice.

¶1 Respondents appeal from the trial court’s order terminating their parental

rights to S.M. (Sarah).1 Respondents assert that the trial court erred in concluding it

was in Sarah’s best interests to terminate their parental rights. After careful review,

we affirm the trial court’s order.

1 Pseudonyms are used in this opinion to protect the juvenile’s identity and for ease of

reading.

Opinion of the Court

I. Background

¶2 On 25 May 2017, Durham County Department of Social Services (DSS) filed a

juvenile petition alleging that Sarah, age eight at the time, was neglected. The

petition alleged that respondent-father asked Sarah’s older half-sister, Ginny, to

bathe him, despite being fully capable of bathing himself. The petition further alleged

respondent-father had inappropriate sexualized discussions with Ginny, had engaged

in “grooming” behaviors with Ginny, and had inappropriately disciplined both Ginny

and Sarah by pinching their buttocks. The petition also noted respondent-father’s

previous sex offense convictions for acts against his two oldest daughters, who were

now adults.

¶3 Respondents agreed to place Sarah in an approved kinship placement.

Between May and November, Sarah moved placements three times. The safety

placements reported that Sarah displayed inappropriate sexualized behavior and

language. In November 2017, Sarah’s final kinship placement informed DSS that she

could no longer remain in the home. DSS filed a subsequent petition on 28 November

2017, alleging Sarah to be neglected and dependent. Due to the lack of a safety

placement, DSS was granted nonsecure custody of Sarah.

¶4 On 15 December 2017, Sarah was adjudicated neglected and dependent. The

trial court found she was subjected to inappropriate discipline and exposed to

domestic violence in the home; respondent-father “refused to adhere to normal

interpersonal boundaries” with Sarah and Ginny; and respondent-mother failed to

protect Sarah. The court placed Sarah in the legal custody of DSS.

¶5 Following a permanency planning hearing, the trial court entered an order on

6 February 2019 setting Sarah’s permanent plan as reunification with an alternative

plan of guardianship with a court-approved caretaker. The trial court cited

respondents’ failure to acknowledge or remediate the issues that led to Sarah’s

removal. In a subsequent permanency planning order entered in July 2019, the trial

court noted respondents’ continued lack of progress and changed Sarah’s permanent

plan to adoption with alternative plans of guardianship and reunification. Following

a permanency planning hearing on 14 October 2019, the court relieved DSS from

further reunification efforts and removed reunification as an alternative permanent

plan based on respondents’ continued failure to engage in services or acknowledge

the issues that caused Sarah to be removed from the home.

¶6 On 15 October 2019, DSS filed a motion to terminate respondents’ parental

rights on the grounds of neglect and willfully leaving Sarah in foster care for more

than twelve months without a showing of reasonable progress to correct the

conditions that led to Sarah’s removal. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(2) (2019).

¶7 Following a hearing on 26 and 30 June 2020, the trial court entered an order

on 22 September 2020, concluding that grounds existed to terminate respondents’

parental rights in Sarah pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2). The court also

concluded it was in Sarah’s best interests that respondents’ parental rights be

terminated. Respondents appealed.

II. Analysis

¶8 Our Juvenile Code provides for a two-stage process for the termination of

parental rights—an adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage. N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-

1109, -1110 (2019). At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of

proving by “clear, cogent, and convincing evidence” the existence of one or more

grounds for termination under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a). N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (2019).

Here, the trial court determined there was sufficient evidence to terminate

respondents’ parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2), and

neither respondent has challenged this portion of the trial court’s ruling. Accordingly,

we consider only the dispositional portion of the trial court’s order.

¶9 At the dispositional hearing, “the court shall determine whether terminating

the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interest.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019).

The court may consider any evidence, including hearsay evidence as defined in G.S. 8C-1, Rule 801, that the court finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine the best interests of the juvenile. In each case, the court shall consider the following criteria and make written findings regarding the following that are relevant:

(1) The age of the juvenile.

(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.

(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile.

(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.

(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement.

(6) Any relevant consideration.

Id. “Although the trial court must consider each of the factors in N.C.G.S. § 7B-

1110(a), written findings of fact are required only ‘if there is conflicting evidence

concerning the factor, such that it is placed in issue by virtue of the evidence

presented before the district court.’ ” In re G.G.M., 377 N.C. 29, 2021-NCSC-25, ¶22

(quoting In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190, 199 (2019)).

¶ 10 “ ‘The trial court’s dispositional findings are binding . . . if they are supported

by any competent evidence’ or if not specifically contested on appeal.” In re B.E., 375

N.C. 730, 745 (2020) (quoting In re E.F., 375 N.C. 88, 91 (2020)). The trial court’s

assessment of a juvenile’s best interests is reviewed solely for abuse of discretion. In

re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 842 (2016) (citing In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. 165, 171 (2013); see

also In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110 (1984)). “Under this standard, we defer to

the trial court’s decision unless it is manifestly unsupported by reason or one so

arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” In re J.J.B.,

374 N.C. 787, 791 (2020) (cleaned up).

¶ 11 Here, respondents argue that there was insufficient evidence to support many

of the trial court’s dispositional findings and that the court abused its discretion when

it determined that termination of their parental rights was in Sarah’s best interests.

¶ 12 The trial court made the following findings of fact regarding the statutory

criteria set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a):

82. The Court accepted into evidence the DSS court summary dispositional report, addendum, a letter from the child’s psychiatrist, and the [guardian ad litem’s] dispositional report.

83. [Sarah] is eleven years old . . . .

84. [Sarah] has been in Durham DSS custody for over two years.

85. The permanent plan for the child is adoption and termination of the parental rights of [respondents] will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the child.

86. Although [Sarah] is older and has behavioral challenges, she has also displayed the ability to bond and connect with her caretaker and has shown consistency in the last ten months with her current care provider. During that ten months, there has been no physical aggression against the caregiver, and supportive services have helped her find stability and reduce the number of revenge bouts she has at school. Her therapist has also identified the child’s connections to her parents as holding her back from being able to develop. The child is continuing to receive mental health assistance and there is a likelihood that she could be adopted.

87. [Sarah] has shown the ability to bond with her current caretaker, who she has lived with for the last eight months. Her behaviors have dramatically improved and she has even asked if she could call the caretaker “Mom.” While [Sarah] is not in a pre-adoptive placement, her current caretaker has committed to helping [Sarah] transfer to her forever home. [Sarah] approaches the caregiver for

affection, seeks affirmations from her, and shows a desire to please her.

88. The foster parent has expressed that she is very fond of [Sarah] and sees potential in her. [Sarah] has communicated to the social worker that she enjoys time on the farm with the current foster parent and the foster parent’s extended family who live beside the farm. During [Sarah’s] time in the current placement, she has begun to open up regarding her anger and responsiveness to others when upset being what she has seen growing up. [Sarah] has been responsive to the structure and consistency provided in the current home and seems somewhat trusting of the caregiver to discuss her feelings and act accordingly when redirected.

89. There is no denying that [Sarah] loves her parents and that her parents love [Sarah]. There are concerns about the parents’ manipulation of [Sarah] in their feedback with her.

90. [Sarah] has an undeniable bond with her mother and father, as she has maintained a sense of loyalty to them since coming into care. Often times children who have experienced some form of trauma, feel a sense of loyalty as the control of the offender is all they know. This control has convinced them that the offender has their best interest at heart therefore making it easier for the offender to manipulate their actions and emotions. [Sarah’s] experience with trauma is no different, being exposed to sexually inappropriate boundaries, inappropriate discipline, and grooming behaviors have somehow given her a sense of trust and normalcy in the home of her biological parents, thus creating negative attachments that are not conducive to her over all well-being and safety. [Sarah’s] psychiatrist has expressed concern due to [Sarah’s] emotional immaturity that she is more vulnerable and at risk for further mental health instability if she is not provided the opportunity to properly receive mental health treatment in a neutral setting. [Sarah]

continues to demonstrate a level of guilt around the bond with her parents.

91. [Sarah’s] bond with her parents inhibits her ability to trust. Trust issues have carried through the past behavior issues and prior 18 placements over the last three years.

92. [Sarah] desired to cut her hair and after months of refusal of her parents, she cut her hair herself. After receiving negative feedback from the parents regarding why she would cut her hair, [Sarah] reverted to stating that she changed her mind and no longer desired to cut her “locs” out because she did not want to upset her parents. She changed her decision after talking to her parents because she feared upsetting her parents, which shows guilt and loyalty.

93. [Sarah’s] inability to work through her own trauma is a repetition of her guilt issues with her parents.

94. [Sarah] demonstrates a hesitancy to discuss her trauma or any event that occurred in her biological family’s home prior to coming into care, stating “we don’t talk about family business.” Although the parent’s support of [Sarah] seems appropriate in their communication to her, as they often encourage her to do her best and that she can become anything she desires when she grows up, the result ends with the parents discussing points of the case in how [Sarah’s] current circumstance is not her fault but merely her response to all of the stress and trauma that the “system” and DSS has pressed upon her by placing her in foster care. This is a clear deflection of accountability of the parent’s actions and that of [Sarah] over her negative behaviors. Although [Sarah] may have a bond with her parents, this bond is not healthy and hinders [Sarah’s] ability to work through her trauma and grow into a healthy young adult.

To the extent respondents do not except to these findings, they are binding. In re B.E.,

375 N.C. at 745.

¶ 13 We begin by addressing respondent-father’s exception to the statement in

finding of fact 82 that the letter accepted into evidence at the dispositional hearing

was prepared by Sarah’s “psychiatrist”—which he contends “is simply not true.” We

agree with respondent-father that the only letter admitted into evidence for

disposition was from Morrow Dowdle, a physician’s assistant at Carolina Behavioral

Health, who made clear in her letter that “my role in treating [Sarah] is limited to

psychiatric medication management, and I do not claim to be a trained

psychotherapist[.]” However, we conclude the trial court’s mischaracterization of the

letter’s source is harmless. See generally In re N.C.E., 379 N.C. 283, 2021-NCSC-141,

¶22 (applying harmless error standard to dispositional findings). Ms. Dowdle’s letter

states that Sarah had been her “patient” since 18 November 2019, and she was

familiar with Sarah’s “history, physical, and mental status examination” in addition

to her psychiatric diagnoses and medications. Ms. Dowdle’s observations and opinions

about Sarah were based on “[her] own interactions with [Sarah,] and reports by her

foster parent and social worker” and are consistent with those of Sarah’s psychiatrist

and therapist, as described in DSS’s written report to the court, as well as those of

Sarah’s guardian ad litem (GAL) and DSS social worker.

¶ 14 Respondent-mother challenges findings of fact 85–94, claiming they are based

on “conjecture and erroneous, incomplete, misleading, and contradictory statements,

and thus are not competent evidence to support the trial court’s best interest

determination.” She argues the trial court abused its discretion in terminating her

parental rights “when there was no plan for Sarah’s adoption and serious obstacles

existed to her successful placement.” Respondent-father also challenges portions of

these findings. He further argues that the only dispositional factor in N.C.G.S. § 7B-

1110(a) weighing in favor of termination was the parent-child bond, and that the trial

court therefore abused its discretion in determining it was in Sarah’s best interests

to terminate his rights. We consider each parent’s evidentiary arguments in the

context of the relevant statutory factor.

A. Age of the juvenile

¶ 15 Neither respondent challenges the trial court’s finding that Sarah was eleven

years old at the time of the termination hearing, but they both contend that Sarah’s

age should have weighed against terminating their parental rights. Respondent-

mother argues Sarah’s age was a possible barrier to adoption. Respondent-father

adds that, because Sarah was nearly twelve at the time of the termination hearing

and had expressed a preference against adoption, “the trial court knew that Sarah’s

age weighed against her likelihood of adoption.” In her reply brief, respondent-mother

adopts respondent-father’s argument that the trial court’s failure to consider Sarah’s

feelings on the matter of adoption amounts to an abuse of discretion. We disagree.

¶ 16 As a general matter, our adoption statutes require a child’s consent to an

adoption if she is at least twelve years of age. N.C.G.S. § 48-3-601(a)(1) (2019). Under

N.C.G.S. § 48-3-603(b)(2) (2019), however, the trial court may waive this consent

requirement “upon a finding that it is not in the best interest of the minor to require

the consent.” In re C.B., 375 N.C. 556, 562 (2020) (quoting In re M.A., 374 N.C. 865,

880 (2020)).

¶ 17 Here, the trial court sustained DSS’s objection on relevance grounds when

counsel for respondent-mother asked the social worker whether DSS would consider

Sarah’s feelings on adoption when she turned twelve. The court ruled the question

irrelevant because “[w]hen [Sarah] turns twelve, this case will be over.” Presuming,

arguendo, that the court should have permitted this line of inquiry, we conclude the

ruling was harmless inasmuch as Sarah’s potential objection “would not preclude

[her] adoption.” In re M.A., 374 N.C. at 880.

B. Likelihood of adoption and whether termination will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan

¶ 18 Respondents raise several challenges to findings of fact 85–88 that combine

arguments related to Sarah’s likelihood of adoption with those disputing the trial

court’s finding that terminating their parental rights will aid in the accomplishment

of her permanent plan. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(2), (3). We consider these

arguments together.

¶ 19 Respondent-mother challenges finding of fact 85 on the ground that the

evidence at the termination hearing “failed to show how the drastic step of severing

the parental bond actually aided in accomplishing [Sarah’s] adoption.” She asserts

that terminating her parental rights will bring Sarah no closer to a “forever home”

given the continued mental health supports Sarah would need. Respondent-mother

contends adoption would complicate the stability Sarah has found in her current

foster home, noting the lack of evidence on the effect that severing the bond with her

current foster mother would have on Sarah. Respondent-mother also points to the

absence of evidence of an identified adoptive placement for Sarah, DSS’s efforts to

locate such a placement, and the possible barriers to adoption such as Sarah’s age

and behavioral problems.

¶ 20 While respondent-father does not expressly challenge the evidentiary support

for finding of fact 85, he contends the finding fails to take account of Sarah’s

concurrent permanent plan of guardianship which, unlike adoption, would not

require the termination of his parental rights. Respondent-mother also alludes to the

trial court’s failure to consider guardianship as an alternative to termination.

¶ 21 “Unquestionably, the termination of respondent[s’] parental rights was a

necessary precondition of [the child’s] adoption.” In re E.F., 375 N.C. 88, 93 (2020).

Moreover, competent evidence supports the trial court’s finding that termination

would aid in accomplishing the permanent plan. The record confirms that adoption

was Sarah’s primary plan, and guardianship was the secondary plan. The GAL

advised the court that Sarah’s permanent plan had been “changed to [a]doption” on

10 July 2019. DSS’s dispositional report also states that “[t]he permanent plan for

the child currently is adoption with a secondary plan of guardianship[,]” and that

“[t]ermination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of

adoption/guardianship for the child.” At the termination hearing, DSS social worker

Tamika Jenkins testified that Sarah’s permanent plan was adoption and that

terminating respondents’ parental rights would aid in realizing the plan.

¶ 22 Respondent-father offers no authority for his assertion that N.C.G.S. § 7B-

1110(a)(3) requires the trial court’s order to address the secondary plan. Nor does he

point to any conflicting evidence about whether terminating his parental rights would

aid in achieving a guardianship for Sarah, such that written findings would have

been required. See In re G.G.M., 2021-NCSC-25 at ¶22.

¶ 23 We further find no evidence tending to show that it was in Sarah’s best

interests to appoint a guardian for her while leaving respondents’ parental rights

intact. The trial court established a primary permanent plan of adoption based on

respondents’ failure to acknowledge and remedy the issues that led to Sarah’s

removal from their home. Respondent-father argued at the hearing that the alternate

permanent plan of guardianship without a termination of parental rights would allow

respondents to “continue to be a positive influence on [Sarah’s] life.” However, the

evidence showed that, despite the love Sarah and respondents had for each other,

respondents were not a positive influence in her life, and adoption rather than

guardianship was in her best interests. See In re J.J.B., 374 N.C. 787, 795–96 (2020)

(rejecting respondent-parents’ argument that, “given the strong bond between

themselves and [their children], the trial court should have considered other

dispositional alternatives, such as guardianship”).

¶ 24 Respondent-mother next challenges the portion of finding of fact 86 stating

“there has been no physical aggression against [Sarah’s] caregiver” during the ten

months that preceded the 26 June 2020 termination hearing. We agree with

respondent-mother that this finding is inconsistent with the evidence presented at

the hearing and included in the record on appeal. The evidence showed Sarah had

been in her current foster placement for ten months at the time of the hearing and

had exhibited no physical aggression toward her foster mother since an incident on 4

October 2019—a period of almost nine months.2 Accordingly, we disregard the extra

month included in this finding for purposes of our review. See In re J.M.J.-J., 374

N.C. 553, 559 (2020).

¶ 25 Respondent-mother also challenges the trial court’s finding of a “likelihood

that [Sarah] could be adopted” in finding of fact 86. Respondent-father does not deny

the evidentiary support for the finding, but he characterizes the court’s assessment

of Sarah’s adoptability as “[nothing] more than a mere hypothetical possibility” given

2 Likewise, the DSS disposition report dated 17 June 2020 states that “[i]n the last six

months [Sarah] has maintained behavioral stability with the caregiver, as no new incidents have been reported of physical aggression against the caregiver.”

Sarah’s behavioral problems.

¶ 26 The finding that Sarah is likely to be adopted is supported by competent

evidence. Ms. Jenkins attested to the likelihood of Sarah being adopted if she was

provided continued stability and support, Ms. Jenkins acknowledged Sarah’s

struggles with behavioral issues, including an aggressive incident with her current

foster mother, but noted improvements—mostly at home but also in school—as her

living situation and mental health providers stabilized in the months leading up to

the termination hearing. Ms. Jenkins also described Sarah’s bond with her foster

mother and how Sarah was opening up and seeking affection, something she had not

done in her earlier placements. The written reports submitted by DSS and GAL also

acknowledged Sarah’s misbehaviors but noted they had improved during Sarah’s

placement with her current foster mother, with whom she had formed a positive and

trusting attachment. See generally In re M.A., 374 N.C. at 880 (“[T]he trial court’s

findings concerning the ability of the children to bond with their current caregivers

did tend to support a conclusion that the children were adoptable given their ability

to develop a bond with other human beings.”). The foster mother expressed a

willingness to serve as a “bridge” caretaker for Sarah until a pre-adoptive placement

was identified. Moreover, the hearing testimony tended to show Sarah would receive

additional resources for finding an adoptive placement once she was free for adoption.

Therefore, it was within the trial court’s discretion to view Sarah’s likelihood of

adoption as a fact favoring the termination of respondents’ parental rights. See In re

N.C.E., 379 N.C. 283, 2021-NCSC-141 ¶30 (explaining that “it is left to the trial

court’s discretion to weigh the various competing factors in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) in

arriving at its determination of the child’s best interests”).

¶ 27 Respondent-mother characterizes finding of fact 87 as “incomplete and

misleading” in depicting Sarah’s improved behavior in the months leading up to the

termination hearing. She contends the finding “downplays the seriousness of Sarah’s

behavioral problems and does not account for the effect of the [COVID-19] pandemic,

which . . . limited her contact with others.” We find no merit to this claim. The trial

court acknowledged Sarah’s ongoing “behavioral challenges” in finding of fact 86.

Finding 87 in no way suggests an end to these issues and is fully supported by Ms.

Jenkins’s testimony and the information found in the DSS and GAL’s reports.

Respondent-mother’s conjecture about the effect of the pandemic on Sarah’s behavior

provides no basis to overturn the court’s otherwise-supported finding.

¶ 28 Respondent-mother objects to finding of fact 87 because it states approvingly

that Sarah “shows a desire to please her” foster mother, while subsequent findings

describe Sarah’s ongoing desire to please respondents as indicative of unresolved

“guilt issues with her parents.” What respondent-mother casts as an unexplained

“contradiction” in the trial court’s findings, we find to be a clear distinction drawn by

the court between Sarah’s newfound responsiveness to the care and nurturing she

has received from her foster mother and the lingering effects of the manipulative,

controlling relationship respondents cultivated with their daughter. We thus find no

merit to respondent-mother’s objections to finding of fact 87.

¶ 29 Respondent-mother next contends the account of Sarah’s relationship with her

current foster mother in finding of fact 88 “is not supported by competent evidence”

to the extent it states Sarah “has begun to open up regarding her anger and

responsiveness to others when upset being what she has seen growing up.” (Emphasis

added). We agree with respondent-mother that the italicized portion of this finding is

unintelligible, likely resulting from a scrivener’s error. Therefore, we disregard this

portion of finding of fact 88. However, the remainder of this finding is supported by

Ms. Jenkins’s testimony and the written reports submitted by DSS and the GAL.

¶ 30 We find no merit to respondent-mother’s argument that the DSS report does

not constitute competent evidence because it “does not identify the sources for this

information or provide any details to determine its reliability within the meaning of

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a).” See In re R.D., 376 N.C. 244, 251 (2020) (concluding the GAL’s

report summarizing multiple interviews was properly admitted for dispositional

purposes under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) even though neither the GAL nor the

interviewees testified at the hearing). Respondents allowed the dispositional reports

into evidence without objection and were free to cross-examine Ms. Jenkins, who

signed the report, about her observations and sources.

¶ 31 In a footnote to his brief, respondent-father suggests that finding of fact 87

“overstates the level of commitment” shown by Sarah’s foster mother to continue

caring for Sarah until a pre-adoptive home is located. He takes issue with the trial

court’s statement that the foster mother “has committed to helping Sarah transfer to

her forever home,” when the DSS report says only that she “expressed a willingness

to be a bridge caregiver for Sarah until a preadoptive placement can be identified.”

We find respondent-father’s parsing of the trial court’s language wholly

unpersuasive. To the extent he contests the evidentiary basis for finding 87, we

conclude competent evidence supports the finding.

C. The bond between the juvenile and the parents

¶ 32 Respondent-father claims “[t]here was no evidence that Sarah’s therapist

believes Sarah’s relationship with her parents is ‘holding her back’ ” as stated in

finding of fact 86. We agree with respondent-father that the trial court appears to

have wrongly attributed this opinion to Sarah’s therapist. The evidence shows

Sarah’s psychiatrist, the GAL, and Ms. Dowdle shared the belief that Sarah’s

relationship with her parents was hindering her development. However, nothing in

the record indicates that Sarah’s therapist also voiced this opinion. Nevertheless, we

conclude the trial court’s misattribution was harmless, given that two of Sarah’s

mental health treatment providers and her GAL did express this view.

¶ 33 We further find no merit to respondent-father’s suggestion that Ms. Dowdle’s

letter was the sole “evidentiary basis” for this portion of finding of fact 86. The

opinions of Sarah’s GAL and psychiatrist were conveyed in the written reports

submitted to the court. Equally unfounded is respondent-father’s speculation that the

references to Sarah’s psychiatrist in the DSS report were actually “mistaken

reference[s] to the physician’s assistant[,]” Ms. Dowdle. See generally State v.

Daughtry, 340 N.C. 488, 517 (1995) (“We will not assume error ‘when none appears

on the record.’ ” (quoting State v. Williams, 274 N.C. 328, 333 (1968))). The fact that

DSS conveyed the opinion of Sarah’s psychiatrist in its written report—rather than

obtaining a letter from the psychiatrist like the one provided by Ms. Dowdle—does

not render the report unreliable for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). See In re R.D.,

376 N.C. at 251 (recognizing “the trial court possessed the discretion to determine

that the [GAL’s] report was, in fact, ‘relevant, reliable, and necessary’ to determine

the best interests of [juvenile]” (quoting N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a))).

¶ 34 Both respondent-mother and respondent-father take exception to the trial

court’s description of their bond with Sarah in findings of fact 89 and 90. They

specifically challenge the evidentiary support for the trial court’s findings that “there

‘are concerns about the parents’ manipulation of [Sarah] in their feedback with

her[,]’ ” that Sarah’s bond with respondents reflects “negative attachments that are

not conducive to her overall well-being and safety[,]”and that Sarah’s “experience

with trauma” is similar to other traumatized children and has left her with an

unhealthy sense of loyalty toward her “offender[s,]” i.e., respondents.

¶ 35 Respondent-mother also asserts the remaining statements about the parent-

child bond in findings of fact 91 through 94 are unsupported by the evidence and

based on psychological speculation. She argues “no trained psychologist or

psychiatrist testified or submitted direct evidence in the case” and, therefore, there

is no competent evidence to support the court’s findings that (1) the parent-child bond

inhibits Sarah’s ability to trust; (2) Sarah changing her decision to cut her hair

exhibited “guilt and loyalty” toward respondents; (3) Sarah’s “inability to work

through her own trauma is a repetition of her guilt issues” with respondents; and (4)

respondents’ “deflection of accountability” of their actions and Sarah’s behavior “is

not healthy and hinders [Sarah’s] ability to work through her trauma and grow into

a healthy young adult.”

¶ 36 Respondent-father objects to finding of fact 90 on the ground that it “includes

expert opinion” which the DSS social worker was not qualified to offer. He raises a

similar challenge to the statement in finding of fact 91 that Sarah’s “bond with her

parents inhibits her ability to trust[,]” claiming the GAL who asserted as much in her

written report was not qualified to render this opinion. More generally, respondent-

father contends there was no evidence Sarah suffered from guilt arising from her

bond with her parents as stated in findings of fact 90, 92, and 93.

¶ 37 Respondent-father also challenges the statement in finding of fact 94 that the

parent-child “bond is not healthy and hinders [Sarah’s] ability to work through her

trauma and grow into a healthy young adult.” He reiterates the position he raised in

disputing finding 86 that the only the evidence for this finding was the letter written

by Ms. Dowdle, the contents of which he believes were mischaracterized in the DSS

report as the opinions of a psychiatrist. To the extent the DSS report conveyed the

opinions of an unidentified psychiatrist rather than Ms. Dowdle, respondent-father

contends this evidence amounts to “unreliable double hearsay.”

¶ 38 Finally, respondents take issue with Ms. Jenkins’s and the trial court’s

characterization of “[t]he hair-cutting incident” described in finding of fact 92. Ms.

Jenkins cited this episode as an example of respondents’ unhealthy manipulation of

Sarah and her resulting feelings of guilt. Respondents insist it merely showed that

they opposed Sarah’s desire to change her hairstyle and expressed disapproval when

she disregarded their wishes and cut her hair—what respondent-father deems “a

mundane example of everyday parenting.” Respondents also reiterate the argument

raised by respondent-mother in her challenge to finding of fact 87, that the trial court

portrayed Sarah’s “desire to please her foster mother . . . [a]s positive” while treating

her “desire to please her natural parents . . . as unhealthy[.]”

¶ 39 In their numerous challenges to the trial court’s findings about the parent-

child bond under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(4), respondents tacitly acknowledge the

court’s findings are consistent with Ms. Jenkins’s hearing testimony, the contents of

the reports prepared by DSS and the GAL, and the statements in Ms. Dowdle’s letter.

Despite respondents’ strenuous arguments to the contrary, we conclude the findings

are supported by some relevant and reliable evidence and are thus binding on appeal.

See In re B.E., 375 N.C. at 745.3

¶ 40 In her testimony for purposes of adjudication, Ms. Jenkins expressed concern

about respondents’ “negatively communicating to [Sarah]” at visitations. While

encouraging Sarah to do better in school and in managing her behavior, respondent-

father emphasized to Sarah that her behaviors were not her fault, and that DSS or

“the system” was the cause of the family’s problems. Respondent-father testified he

always instructed Sarah not to trust strangers, including “anyone she has not been

affiliated with or had been introduced solely from her parents to her”—although he

denied telling Sarah not to trust DSS.

¶ 41 At disposition, Ms. Jenkins further attested to respondents instilling in Sarah

an us-versus-them worldview, such that her cooperation with DSS or openness to

others represented to Sarah a betrayal of her parents. Ms. Jenkins explained that

Sarah’s feelings of loyalty to respondents impeded her ability to develop relationships

with others, as follows:

[Sarah] has this mind set that, you know, “My family’s business is my business. I can’t get close to anyone. I

3 As noted in our discussion to follow, pursuant to N.C.G.S. §7B-1110(a), a trial court

may “consider any evidence, including hearsay evidence . . . that the court finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine the best interests of the juvenile.”

shouldn’t open up to let them get close to me.” Our concern is her ability to be able to live a normal life open up and trust others and embrace peers, embrace friends, embrace those that are here, in addition to her parents and her history with her parents . . . .

. . . I’ve seen this child begin to open up and, you know, seek nurturing, seek affirmations from caregivers, open up to even talk to me about some trainings that she has asked me not to tell her parents. And for [Sarah] that’s big. She doesn’t trust very easily. And so our concern is her being able to build on that. The — I don’t want to say fear, but the continued concern of hers about what her parents think, and what are they going to say, I think hinders her from growing, hinders her from being open to be receptive to be loved. . . .

In her letter, Ms. Dowdle likewise expressed a belief that Sarah “will not be able to

appropriately verbalize and process her trauma as long as she continues to interact

with [respondents] . . . as she is likely to experience feelings of guilt and loyalty that

are typical for a child of her age and circumstances, but are likely to hinder her

progress.”

¶ 42 The written reports submitted by DSS and the GAL include similar

observations and opinions from Ms. Jenkins, the GAL, and Sarah’s psychiatrist. Ms.

Jenkins, who signed the DSS report, wrote that Sarah’s exposure to traumatic

experiences in the home, including “sexual inappropriate boundaries, inappropriate

discipline, and grooming behaviors,” led her to form “negative attachments [to

respondents] that are not conducive to her overall well-being and safety.” Her report

describes Sarah as “continu[ing] to demonstrate a level of guilt around the bond with

her parents.” The GAL suggested that Sarah “may be resistant to the idea of adoption

due to her sense of loyalty to her parents,” which “has hindered her willingness to

open up and trust others,” as well as her “lack of understanding as to why she is in

foster care[.]” Sarah’s psychiatrist expressed “concern regarding [Sarah’s] ability to

fully process the idea of adoption and move forward with the chapter in her life, [due]

to a fear of making a decision against her parents.” The psychiatrist “conclude[d] that

although [Sarah] may have a bond with her parents, this bond is not healthy and

hinders [her] ability to work through her trauma and grow into a healthy young

adult.”

¶ 43 Findings of fact 89–94 are thus consistent with the evidence received by the

trial court regarding Sarah’s bond with respondents and the negative impact of the

relationship on Sarah’s emotional development and well-being. The evidence provides

ample basis for the trial court’s findings that Sarah continued to experience guilt

arising from a distorted sense of loyalty to respondents, who refused to acknowledge

the injurious environment they created for Sarah while she was in their care. The

evidence also demonstrates the distinction between Sarah’s unhealthy tendency to

avoid upsetting respondents and her growing openness to and desire to please her

foster mother, who “provides [Sarah] with a safe, nurturing, and structured loving

and structured home environment.”

¶ 44 As respondents did not object to the trial court’s consideration of DSS’s and the

GAL’s written reports for purposes of disposition, their current arguments regarding

the sourcing or overall reliability of these reports are not properly before us. See N.C.

R. App. P. 10(a)(1). As previously noted, the dispositional statute expressly permits

the trial court to “consider any evidence, including hearsay evidence . . . , that the

court finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine the best interests of

the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (emphasis added). The trial court thus had the

discretion to rely on the information contained in these reports—including the

opinions of Sarah’s DSS social worker and GAL, as well as those offered by Sarah’s

psychiatrist and therapist. See In re R.D., 376 N.C. at 251 (concluding the GAL’s

report containing summaries of witness interviews, an analysis of the juvenile’s

needs, and the GAL’s opinion that termination was in the juvenile’s best interests

was “directly related to the trial court’s task during the dispositional stage” and was

properly considered to “aid the trial court in determining the juvenile’s best

interests”).

¶ 45 Ms. Jenkins’s testimony also supports the account of Sarah’s decision to cut

her hair contained in finding of fact 92. Ms. Jenkins recalled Sarah expressing her

intention to remove the locs from her hair “for weeks” to both Ms. Jenkins and her

foster mother. Sarah was told respondents did not want her hair cut, but she

proceeded to cut some of her locs out anyway, telling Ms. Jenkins that she did not

want to have locs anymore. After a visit where respondents told Sarah that she would

be “bald-headed” if she cut her locs, she became “very upset” at respondents’ reaction,

changed her mind, and said she would keep her locs. Ms. Jenkins saw this episode as

an example of Sarah setting aside her own wishes in order to avoid upsetting

respondents. Although respondents may disagree with Ms. Jenkins’s view of this

episode, we decline to second-guess the trial court’s decision to credit the social

worker’s perspective, given her familiarity with the family and their interpersonal

dynamics. See generally In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 411 (2019) (“[I]t is the trial judge’s

duty to consider all the evidence, pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, and

determine the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the testimony.”).

¶ 46 Aside from the trial court’s mistaken attribution of an opinion to Sarah’s

therapist in finding of fact 86, we conclude that competent evidence supports each of

the findings about the parent-child bond challenged by respondents—specifically

findings of fact 89–94. We further note that, in addition to the contested findings, the

court made additional findings about the injurious environment respondents created

in their home that led to Sarah’s adjudication as neglected, as well as respondents’

persistent refusal to acknowledge a problem requiring any changes if Sarah were

returned to their care. The court also made findings on the unreliability of

respondent-father’s testimony and his lack of credibility at the hearing. Each of these

findings tends to show the deleterious nature of respondents’ bond with Sarah.

D. The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent plan

¶ 47 Respondent-father emphasizes that the trial court’s findings about Sarah’s

bond with her current foster mother do not speak to the dispositional factor in

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(5) because the placement was not expected to be permanent.

However, as the court explained at the hearing, these findings were probative on the

likelihood of Sarah’s eventual adoption and were properly considered under N.C.G.S.

§ 7B-1110(a)(2). See In re M.A., 374 N.C. at 880.

E. Determination of Sarah’s best interests

¶ 48 Respondent-mother argues the trial court abused its discretion under N.C.G.S.

§ 7B-1110(a) in terminating her parental rights “when there was no plan for Sarah’s

adoption and serious obstacles existed to her successful placement.” Respondent-

father also objects to the trial court’s “decision that turns Sarah into a legal orphan[.]”

Though he acknowledges it is not this Court’s prerogative to reweigh the factors,

respondent-father spends considerable time arguing that the weight of the factors

does not support termination.4

4 We find no merit to respondent-father assertion that “the General Assembly made a

fundamental change” to the dispositional statute in 2005, “the magnitude [of which] cannot be overstated.” According to respondent-father, “[b]efore the 2005 change, there existed in the Juvenile Code a preference in favor of terminating the parent-child relationship if the grounds to do so had been established[,]” and “[b]y explicitly removing that preference for termination, the General Assembly clearly indicated that it no longer believed such a preference was appropriate.”

Prior to 2005, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110 provided that, upon an adjudication of one or more grounds for terminating parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a), “the court shall issue an order terminating the parental rights of such parent . . . unless the court shall further determine that the best interests of the juvenile require that the parental rights of the parent

¶ 49 Respondents also cite the risk that Sarah will not be adopted as demonstrating

the trial court’s abuse of its discretion. Respondent-father contends the court’s

“decision . . . turns Sarah into a legal orphan” much like the termination order

reversed by our Court of Appeals in In re J.A.O., 166 N.C. App. 222 (2004).

Respondent-mother likewise emphasizes that “there was no plan for Sarah’s

adoption” at the time the trial court chose to terminate her parental rights.

¶ 50 We find the instant case readily distinguishable from In re J.A.O. The Court of

Appeals found that J.A.O. was “a troubled teenager with a woefully insufficient

support system” who had been shuffled through multiple treatment centers due to

his significant physical, mental, and behavioral disorders. Id. at 227. His mother was

“connected to and interested in” him, and she provided a stabilizing influence in his

life. Id. at 227–28. She had also “made reasonable progress to correct the conditions

not be terminated.” In re Mitchell, 148 N.C. App. 483, 492 (Hunter, J., dissenting in part) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (1999)), rev’d per curiam for reasons stated in dissenting opinion, 356 N.C. 288 (2002). The General Assembly amended this language in 2005 to provide simply that, “[a]fter an adjudication that one or more grounds for terminating a parent’s rights exist, the court shall determine whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interest.” An Act to Amend the Juvenile Code to Expedite the Outcomes for Children and Families Involved in Welfare Cases and Appeals and to Limit the Appointment of Guardians ad Litem for Parents in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings, S.L. 2005-398, § 17, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 1455, 1463.

Contrary to respondent-father’s contention, the pre-2005 language did not create a statutory “preference for termination.” See Mitchell, 148 N.C. App. 483, 492–93 (Hunter, J., dissenting in part) (noting “there is no burden of proof at disposition” and rejecting the respondent’s argument that the trial court improperly required him to prove that terminating his parental rights was not in the child’s best interest (citation omitted)); see also In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 613 (2001) (concluding the statute created no presumption in favor of terminating parental rights).

that led to the petition to terminate her parental rights.” Id. at 224. Under these

circumstances and given the “remote chance” of sixteen-year-old J.A.O.’s adoption,

the trial court was held to have abused its discretion by disregarding the

recommendation of the GAL and terminating the mother’s parental rights. Id.

¶ 51 Here, while Sarah had been in multiple placements due to her behavior, she

had shown real improvement after finding stability in her current foster home, a

factor that increased the likelihood of her adoption. Moreover, as discussed above, the

evidence showed respondents refused to acknowledge that the reasons for Sarah’s

removal from their home were problems to be corrected, and made no progress

towards correcting those conditions. Finally, rather than providing a stabilizing

influence, Sarah’s relationship with respondent-parents negatively affected her

development.

¶ 52 To the extent respondents ask this Court to undertake our own assessment of

the record evidence and to substitute our weighing of the relevant statutory criteria

for that of the trial court, we decline to do so. “[S]uch an approach would be

inconsistent with the applicable standard of review, which focuses upon whether the

trial court’s dispositional decision constitutes an abuse of discretion rather than upon

the manner in which the reviewing court would weigh the evidence were it the finder

of fact.” In re I.N.C., 374 N.C. 542, 551 (2020). A careful review of the dispositional

findings shows the trial court considered all of the relevant statutory criteria in

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) and made a reasoned determination that termination of

respondents’ parental rights in Sarah would be in her best interests.

III. Conclusion

¶ 53 The trial court’s findings demonstrate that it considered the dispositional

factors set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) and “performed a reasoned analysis

weighing those factors.” In re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. at 101. “Because the trial court made

sufficient dispositional findings and performed the proper analysis of the

dispositional factors,” id., we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in concluding that termination of respondents’ parental rights was in Sarah’s best

interests. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.

AFFIRMED.