In Re Slaughter

141 B.R. 661, 26 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1501, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 839, 1992 WL 116792
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedApril 28, 1992
Docket19-05256
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 141 B.R. 661 (In Re Slaughter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Slaughter, 141 B.R. 661, 26 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1501, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 839, 1992 WL 116792 (Ill. 1992).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND ORDER

ROBERT E. GINSBERG, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter is before the court on the trustee’s motion for an order directing payment of funds held by the trustee at the time of dismissal to the Slaughter’s creditors, or in the alternative, to the Slaughters.

The relevant facts are simple. The Slaughters filed a joint Chapter 13 petition on October 20, 1989. Before the debtor’s plan was confirmed, an order was entered directing Aridell Slaughter’s employer, the Chicago Board of Education, to withhold $636.00 biweekly from her paycheck to fund first the payments required by § 1326 in connection with a proposed plan and later the payments required by the confirmed plan. The debtors’ plan was confirmed on February 9, 1990. In February, 1992 the debtors moved to dismiss their Chapter 13 case. That motion was granted of right on February 12, 1992. See, 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b). At present, the trustee is holding approximately $2,313 available for distribution to creditors, from funds paid over to the trustee by the Board of Education under the wage deduction order, before the order of dismissal. The trustee thinks that money should be distributed to creditors as provided in the debtors’ plan. The debtors take the view that the plan was terminated with the dismissal of the case and the money should be turned over to them.

JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE

The matter is before this court for determination under Local Rule 2.33 of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois automatically referring bankruptcy cases and proceedings to this court for hearing and determination. Upon dismissal, this court has jurisdiction to hear and decide this dispute as a proceeding arising under 11 U.S.C. § 349. See, 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This dispute is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and (L).

DISCUSSION

The issue before the court is whether the money the trustee was holding from the wage deduction order at the time of the debtors’ voluntary dismissal of their Chapter 13 case should be distributed to creditors in accordance with the terms of the debtors confirmed plan or should be given back to the debtors.

The court is aware of only one appellate decision, In re Nash, 765 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir.1985), that discusses this precise issue. All the other cases cited by both the debtors and the trustee concern the status of funds held by the Chapter 13 trustee when a Chapter 13 case is converted to a case under Chapter 7 rather than the status of the funds on dismissal. Although conversion and dismissal of a Chapter 13 case have some substantive and procedural similarities, this court believes that there are also significant differences between conversion and dismissal such that cases resolving the respective rights of various parties to funds held by the Chapter 13 trustee at the time of conversion offer little guidance for the issue presently before this court. 1 The consequences of conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 are dealt with by § 348 of the Bankruptcy Code. The instant dispute arises because the debtors chose to dismiss their Chapter 13 case rather than convert it to a Chapter 7 case. Accordingly, this court will have to look to *663 § 349 of the Bankruptcy Code rather than § 348 for guidance.

Chapter 13 debtors can choose, of right, between conversion or dismissal when a Chapter 13 fails. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a), (b). However, as suggested above, the consequences differ sharply between the two remedies. When a case is converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7, there is still a bankruptcy estate to administer under the Bankruptcy Code, and the debtor will ultimately receive a discharge from her debts if the provisions of Chapter 7 are met. See, 11 U.S.C. §§ 348, 727. On the other hand, dismissal of a Chapter 13 case has the effect of restoring, as nearly as possible, the various parties to their pre-bank-ruptcy positions. If a case is dismissed, the debtor is not and will not be discharged from his debts. 11 U.S.C. § 349(b). In addition, liens and transfers that were avoided in the Chapter 13 case under various avoiding powers are reinstated. Cf., 11 U.S.C. § 349(a). While conversion does not generally alter estate property, dismissal terminates the estate and returns pre-petition estate property to the entity in which the property was vested immediately prior to the commencement of the Chapter 13 case. 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(3). Therefore, cases deciding whether property that was property of the estate in the Chapter 13 case should be part of the Chapter 7 estate upon conversion, including the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision In re Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136 (7th Cir.1991), are of little assistance to this court in the instant case where the court must determine the status of property held by the Chapter 13 trustee at the time the case was dismissed, not when it was converted.

As stated previously, of greater relevance is In re Nash, 765 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir.1985), where the court sorted out the rights of the debtor, creditors, and the trustee to funds that were produced by a wage deduction order entered to fund the Chapter 13 plan and that were held by the trustee when the Chapter 13 case was voluntarily dismissed. 2 The court held that the debtor owned the undistributed funds held by the trustee because confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan vested ownership of the estate’s assets in the debtor. See, § 1327(b). In addition, the court found that § 349(b)(3), which revested estate property in the entity that owned it prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case, further supported its holding that the debt- or owned the funds held by the trustee upon dismissal. It is hard to challenge the logic of Nash.

While the Bankruptcy Code in § 349(b)(3) only deals with property that was property of the estate prepetition, the same logic should apply to postpetition property of the estate, such as a Chapter 13 debtor’s wages. See, § 1306. It would be anomalous to give prepetition property of the estate to the debtor under § 349(b)(3) and postpetition property of the estate to creditors. For example, suppose that on Day 1, the debtor filed a Chapter 13 petition. On Day 2 the debtor inherits property.

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Bluebook (online)
141 B.R. 661, 26 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1501, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 839, 1992 WL 116792, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-slaughter-ilnb-1992.