FILED JUN 11 2026 NOT FOR PUBLICATION SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: BAP No. CC-25-1153-GLS SHERRIE NICOLE LOCKHART- JOHNSON, Bk. No. 2:20-bk-10969-BB Debtor. Adv. No. 2:20-ap-01073-BB SHARLENE WILLARD, Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM* SHERRIE NICOLE LOCKHART- JOHNSON; STEVE TODD JOHNSON, Appellees.
Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California Sheri Bluebond, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding
Before: GAN, LAFFERTY, and SPRAKER, Bankruptcy Judges.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Sharlene Willard seeks reversal of the judgment entered in
favor of chapter 7 1 debtor Sherrie Nicole Lockhart-Johnson (“Debtor”) and
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1. 1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532, all “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and all “Civil Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. her non-filing spouse, Steve Todd Johnson, on Willard’s complaint to
except from the community discharge a debt incurred by Johnson.
Pursuant to § 524(a)(3), Willard was required to prove that Johnson’s debt
was a community obligation, and it would be held nondischargeable in a
hypothetical case filed by Johnson.
The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of Debtor
on individual claims for nondischargeability because Willard alleged
fraudulent conduct by only Johnson, not Debtor. The court entered
judgment after trial because Willard did not establish a basis for
nondischargeability in a hypothetical case filed by Johnson.
Willard argues the court erred by granting summary judgment and
by entering judgment after trial. She asserts the court erred by denying her
motion to recuse and made several errors in its evidentiary rulings.
Willard’s claims are baseless. We AFFIRM.
FACTS 2
A. Prepetition Events and Debtor’s bankruptcy
In 2017, Willard filed a complaint in state court for breach of a
contract to perform home repairs against Johnson, Pro-Team Contractor
(“Pro-Team”), and Joe Powell, who was Johnson’s uncle and the owner of
Pro-Team. She obtained a default judgment for $10,395, and subsequently
2 We exercise our discretion to take judicial notice of documents electronically filed in the adversary proceeding and main bankruptcy case. See Atwood v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood), 293 B.R. 227, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003). 2 sought to garnish Debtor’s wages, asserting that the debt was a community
obligation.
Debtor filed a chapter 7 petition in January 2020 and indicated she
was married but either legally separated or living separately from her
spouse. Debtor scheduled the debt to Willard as a community debt.
B. Willard’s adversary complaint
Willard filed an adversary complaint under § 523(a)(2)(A) to hold her
claim nondischargeable. She alleged that Johnson fraudulently represented
that he was a licensed contractor who then abandoned the job after
receiving payment. Willard also alleged that Johnson willfully and
maliciously damaged her property. According to Willard, the state court
had determined that the debt was not a community debt, but she argued
that Debtor was attempting to discharge the debt as a community
obligation by listing Willard as a creditor.
Debtor filed a motion to dismiss because Willard did not allege any
wrongful conduct by Debtor. At the hearing, Willard stated that she made
factual errors in her complaint and, after obtaining transcripts, she realized
the state court had not conclusively determined whether the judgment was
a community debt.
The bankruptcy court dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
Willard appealed, and though we agreed that dismissal was appropriate,
we vacated the order and remanded with instructions to dismiss with leave
to amend. Willard v. Lockhart-Johnson (In re Lockhart-Johnson), 631 B.R. 38, 49
3 (9th Cir. BAP 2021). We reasoned that Willard conceivably could amend
the complaint to assert a claim for relief from the community property
discharge under § 524(a)(3) by alleging the existence of a community debt
and “sufficient facts to support a hypothetical claim of nondischargeability
or denial of discharge against the nondebtor spouse as of the petition date.”
Id. at 48.
On remand, the bankruptcy court granted leave, and Willard filed an
amended complaint. She alleged that her judgment against Johnson was a
community debt, and that Johnson fraudulently represented that he was a
licensed contractor, he was a proprietor of Pro-Team, and he had the
expertise to complete the home repairs in a timely manner. Willard
asserted that Joe Powell had previously testified that Johnson fraudulently
used his business name and license. Willard further alleged that Johnson
willfully left a pipe open in her upstairs bathroom which caused extensive
water damage, and he destroyed her upstairs bathroom by removing the
toilet and sink, breaking the shower tile, ripping out walls, and leaving
debris and trash throughout the adjacent room. She maintained that the
debt would be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(6) in a
hypothetical case filed by Johnson.
C. The protective order, motion for summary judgment, and motion to recuse
Neither Willard nor Debtor and Johnson were represented by
counsel, and the parties had substantial difficulty in conducting discovery.
4 Debtor sought a protective order, claiming that Willard violated discovery
rules and sought to harass her and Johnson by making damaging
statements to people in their churches.
Because of the parties’ difficulties in dealing with each other, the
court bifurcated the issues for discovery and trial. The court entered an
order requiring the parties to conduct and complete any discovery
necessary to proceed to trial on the sole issue of whether Willard’s claim
would be nondischargeable in a hypothetical case filed by Johnson, and to
refrain from propounding or responding to any discovery related to
whether the debt was a community obligation.
The court then entered a protective order precluding Willard from
driving to the homes of Debtor or Johnson and from visiting or telephoning
the clergy, agents, or employees of Debtor’s or Johnson’s church. The order
required Willard to utilize only formal discovery devices, and consistent
with the order bifurcating issues, to refrain from conducting any discovery
concerning the community property issue pending further order from the
court.
Debtor then filed a motion for summary judgment. She argued that
she did not have financial or business relations with Willard and did not
make any misrepresentations to her. The bankruptcy court granted partial
summary judgment in favor of Debtor to the extent that Willard sought a
nondischargeable judgment against her individually. The court denied
5 summary judgment to the extent that Willard sought a determination that
her claim should be excepted from the community property discharge.
The bankruptcy court set trial on the community property
nondischargeability claim for May 23, 2024. Willard did not appear for
trial, and the court entered judgment in favor of Debtor and Johnson. The
bankruptcy court denied Willard’s motion for a new trial, but the United
States District Court for the Central District of California (“District Court”)
reversed. The bankruptcy court set a new trial for August 7, 2025.
In July 2025, Willard filed a motion to recuse Judge Bluebond based
on alleged bias. Willard argued that Judge Bluebond’s adverse rulings
revealed a “biased and prejudiced mindset” and that any reasonable
person aware of the facts and circumstances would conclude that Judge
Bluebond was biased against her. Willard maintained that her recusal
motion was timely because the full extent of Judge Bluebond’s bias became
evident only after the District Court’s decision.
The bankruptcy court denied the motion, reasoning that recusal is
not warranted merely because a judge issues adverse rulings; an allegation
of personal bias must be based on an extrajudicial source and result in an
opinion on the merits on a basis other than what the judge learned from
her participation in the case. The court meticulously explained its
reasoning for its prior rulings and noted that despite Willard’s attempt to
paint the court as biased, it ruled in her favor in several other instances
during the case.
6 D. The trial and the court’s ruling
At the new trial, the court heard testimony from Johnson, Willard,
and Willard’s son, Marcus Curry. The court found Johnson and Curry to be
credible, but it found that Willard was not credible because her testimony
was inconsistent with documentary evidence and her previous positions,
and uncorroborated by any other witness.
Because Joe Powell died prior to trial, the court admitted his
deposition transcript and his declaration in lieu of live testimony. The court
identified inconsistencies in Powell’s testimony and his possible failing
mental capacity due to his advanced age. 3 Powell testified both: (1) that
Johnson used his Pro-Team business name and license without his
knowledge or permission; and (2) that Johnson worked with Pro-Team for
many years, he was authorized to secure contracts on behalf of Pro-Team,
and he was authorized by Powell to perform the work for Willard. Powell
explained that he only tried to disassociate himself from Johnson after
Willard promised she would cease efforts to get Powell’s contractor’s
license revoked if the parties agreed to pay her. The court believed the
latter version of events to be more credible.
The bankruptcy court concluded that Johnson visited Willard at her
property on behalf of Pro-Team with the knowledge and consent of Powell.
In a pre-trial stipulation, Willard admitted that Johnson gave her a business
3 At the time of his deposition, Powell was 91 years old. 7 card for Pro-Team that listed his name and Powell’s as well as the
contractor’s license number for Pro-Team. Willard acknowledged that she
checked the license number with the Contractor’s State License Board and
saw that it was valid. The court took judicial notice of the fact that entering
a license number into the Contractor’s State License Board website returns
the status of the license and the business information of the licensed party.
Based on trial testimony and Willard’s statements in the pretrial
stipulation, the court concluded that Johnson did not misrepresent that he
personally held a contractor’s license and, alternatively, that Willard did
not justifiably rely on any such representation because she checked the
information before authorizing the work.
Based on the evidence, the bankruptcy court determined the parties
had two contracts. Johnson initially sent Willard a proposal for the work
she requested, and after Willard agreed, he performed the work under the
first contract to Willard’s satisfaction. Willard paid the amount due under
the first contract, then asked Johnson to perform additional work. The
parties entered into a second contract for repairs to Willard’s bathroom, but
after Willard informed Johnson she would not be able to pay the amounts
due under the second contract and wished to remove certain items from
the scope of work, Johnson responded that the contract was a package deal
which included discounted prices based on the total work. The court
concluded that Johnson stopped work and left the property after the
8 parties were unable to come to an agreement about modifications to the
second contract.
The bankruptcy court also held that Willard failed to establish that
Johnson damaged the water pipe, either accidentally or intentionally.
Because the leaking pipe was discovered by Curry two days after Johnson
left the property, and was leaking from a pipe that had burst, not from a
pipe that was severed or “left open,” the court found that Johnson did not
damage the pipe as Willard alleged. Based on the magnitude of the leak,
the court reasoned that Willard would have noticed it sooner if Johnson
had damaged the pipe. And although Johnson left substantial debris at the
premises, it was later removed by Pro-Team.
The bankruptcy court held that Willard breached the second contract
by anticipatory repudiation, thus relieving Johnson of any duty to further
perform. Willard did not prove any damage proximately caused by
Johnson’s conduct, and she failed to prove any of the elements of
§ 523(a)(2)(A) or (a)(6).
Because Willard failed to establish a hypothetically nondischargeable
debt, the bankruptcy court held that she could not except the debt from the
community property discharge of § 524(a)(3). The court entered judgment
in favor of Debtor and Johnson. Willard timely appealed.
JURISDICTION
The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and
157(b)(2)(I). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.
9 ISSUES
Did the bankruptcy court err by ruling that Willard’s claim against
Johnson would not be excepted from discharge in a hypothetical chapter 7
case?
Did the bankruptcy court err by granting summary judgment in
favor of Debtor?
Was the bankruptcy court obligated to recuse?
Did the bankruptcy court err by entering the protective order?
Did the bankruptcy court err in its evidentiary rulings?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The ultimate question of whether a claim is nondischargeable is a
mixed question of law and fact, which we review de novo. Carrillo v. Su (In
re Su), 290 F.3d 1140, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002). Similarly, we review de novo the
bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment. Patow v. Marshack (In re
Patow), 632 B.R. 195, 201 (9th Cir. BAP 2021), aff’d, 2022 WL 2256325 (9th
Cir. June 23, 2022). Under de novo review, “we consider a matter anew, as
if no decision had been made previously.” Francis v. Wallace (In re Francis),
505 B.R. 914, 917 (9th Cir. BAP 2014).
We review for abuse of discretion the grant of a protective order,
Beckman Industries, Inc. v. International Insurance Co., 966 F.2d 470, 472 (9th
Cir. 1992), and the bankruptcy court’s denial of a motion to recuse, Hale v.
United States Trustee (In re Basham), 208 B.R. 926, 930 (9th Cir. BAP 1997).
We also review a bankruptcy court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of
10 discretion and reverse only if any error would have been prejudicial to the
appellant. Van Zandt v. Mbunda (In re Mbunda), 484 B.R. 344, 351 (9th Cir.
BAP 2012), aff'd, 604 F. App’x 552 (9th Cir. 2015). A bankruptcy
court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard or
when its findings of fact or its application of law to fact is “illogical,
implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the
record.” United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en
banc).
When the appellant challenges the bankruptcy court’s factual
findings supporting its nondischargeability decision, we review those
findings for clear error. In re Su, 290 F.3d at 1142. Factual findings are
clearly erroneous if they are illogical, implausible, or without support in
the record. Retz v. Samson (In re Retz), 606 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010).
DISCUSSION
Willard contends the court misapplied the legal standards for
nondischargeability and its findings of fact and conclusions of law are
unsupported by the record. She maintains the court erred by failing to
recuse and by entering summary judgment in favor of Debtor, and she
claims the court made numerous evidentiary errors which cumulatively
deprived her of due process. But she offers almost no explanation or
argument to support her contentions, and we find no basis to disturb any
of the court’s rulings.
11 A. The bankruptcy court did not err by holding that Willard’s claim against Johnson would be dischargeable.
As we explained in the prior appeal in this case, the community
property discharge of § 524(a)(3) ordinarily applies to prevent a creditor
with a community claim from collecting against community property
acquired after the petition date. In re Lockhart-Johnson, 631 B.R. at 45. While
Debtor’s discharge does not affect Johnson’s personal liability on the
existing judgment debt, “a judgment creditor of the nondebtor spouse on a
community claim loses the ability to collect from anything other than the
judgment debtor’s separate property.” Rooz v. Kimmel (In re Kimmel), 378
B.R. 630, 636 (9th Cir. BAP 2007), aff'd, 302 F. App’x 518 (9th Cir. 2008).
The community property discharge does not apply to a community
claim that has been excepted from discharge under §§ 523, 1228(a)(1), or
1328(a)(1), or if the bankruptcy court determines the claim would be
excepted from discharge in a hypothetical case filed by the debtor’s non-
filing spouse on the same petition date. See In re Lockhart-Johnson, 631 B.R.
at 45.
After bifurcating the trial, the court determined that Willard did not
establish hypothetical nondischargeability of her claim against Johnson and
thus could not establish the exception to the community property
discharge. We discern no error by the bankruptcy court.
12 1. Section 523(a)(2)(A)
Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts from discharge any debt “obtained
by . . . false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a
statement respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition.” To
prevail on a nondischargeability claim under § 523(a)(2)(A), a creditor must
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) misrepresentation,
fraudulent omission, or deceptive conduct by the debtor; (2) knowledge of
the falsity or deceptiveness of his statement or conduct; (3) an intent to
deceive; (4) justifiable reliance on the debtor’s statement or conduct; and
(5) damage proximately caused by its reliance on the statement or
conduct. Turtle Rock Meadows Homeowners Ass'n v. Slyman (In re Slyman),
234 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 1996).
Willard’s assertion of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A) is
based on Johnson’s alleged misrepresentation that he was a licensed
contractor and the proprietor of Pro-Team. The bankruptcy court believed
Johnson’s testimony that he made no such representation, and it found
Willard not credible. “[W]e give singular deference to a trial court’s
judgments about the credibility of witnesses . . . because the various cues
that ‘bear so heavily on the listener’s understanding of and belief in what is
said’ are lost on an appellate court later sifting through a paper record.”
Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285, 309 (2017) (quoting Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, 471 U.S. 564, 575 (1985)). And “[w]here there are two
13 permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them
cannot be clearly erroneous.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574.
Moreover, Willard’s own statements in the pretrial stipulation
demonstrate that she did not rely on any purported representation that
Johnson personally held a contractor’s license because she checked the
license number before entering into the agreement, and Johnson performed
all work under the first contract to Willard’s satisfaction. The bankruptcy
court correctly applied the law and did not clearly err in its factual findings
regarding Willard’s failure to demonstrate nondischargeability under
§ 523(a)(2)(A).
2. Section 523(a)(6)
Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge debts arising from willful
and malicious injuries to an entity or its property. Ormsby v. First Am. Title
Co. of Nev. (In re Ormsby), 591 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2010); Barboza v. New
Form, Inc. (In re Barboza), 545 F.3d 702, 706 (9th Cir. 2008). The willfulness
and malice elements are legally distinct and require separate consideration.
In re Su, 290 F.3d at 1146-47. Under § 523(a)(6), a debt arises from a
“willful” injury when the debtor subjectively intends to cause injury to the
creditor or subjectively believes that injury is substantially certain to occur.
In re Ormsby, 591 F.3d at 1206; In re Su, 290 F.3d at 1144-46. A debt arises
from a “malicious” injury when it is based on: “(1) a wrongful act, (2) done
intentionally, (3) which necessarily causes injury, and (4) is done without
14 just cause or excuse.” In re Ormsby, 591 F.3d at 1207 (quoting Petralia v.
Jercich (In re Jercich), 238 F.3d 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 2001)).
Willard offers no argument relevant to the court’s ruling under
§ 523(a)(6), other than to repeat her claim that “Johnson deliberately
severed a water pipe, causing damage and harm,” and “intent to cause
injury is inferred from deliberate acts certain to cause harm.”
The record is devoid of any evidence of a willful or malicious act by
Johnson. Willard did not witness any action by Johnson to damage her
property, and her contention that Johnson severed or left open the
bathroom water pipe is contradicted by Curry’s testimony that he found
the pipe had burst and was not unconnected. The bankruptcy court’s
finding that Johnson did not damage the pipe, either intentionally or
unintentionally, is logical and supported by evidence in the record.
Willard does not demonstrate clear error in the court’s findings, and
the bankruptcy court appropriately held that Willard did not prove
nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6).
B. The bankruptcy court did not err by granting partial summary judgment in favor of Debtor.
Civil Rule 56(a), made applicable by Rule 7056, provides that
summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” In reviewing summary judgment, we must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all justifiable
15 inferences in its favor. Fresno Motors, LLC v. Mercedes Benz USA, LLC, 771
F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Cnty. of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty.
Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001) and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating an
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 n.10 (1986). A material fact is one that
“under the governing substantive law . . . could affect the outcome of the
case.” Caneva v. Sun Cmtys. Operating Ltd. P'ship (In re Caneva), 550 F.3d 755,
760 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). A factual dispute is genuine if “a
jury could reasonably find in the nonmovant’s favor from the evidence
presented.” Emeldi v. Univ. of Or., 698 F.3d 715, 730 (9th Cir. 2012).
Willard suggests the court erred by granting summary judgment in
favor of Debtor because there were disputed facts regarding Johnson’s
alleged fraudulent conduct. Willard misconstrues the partial summary
judgment order.
The court clearly stated that it granted summary judgment to the
extent that Willard asserted direct claims for nondischargeability against
Debtor individually, but not to the extent that Willard asserted her claims
would be nondischargeable in a hypothetical case filed by Johnson. And
the court expressly noted: “Nothing contained herein constitutes an
adjudication of the extent to which any claims asserted by [Willard] are, or
16 are not, community claims within the meaning of Bankruptcy Code section
524(a)(3).”
The court properly granted summary judgment for individual claims
asserted against Debtor because the purported fraud and willful and
malicious injury was based solely on Johnson’s alleged conduct. Disputed
facts regarding Johnson’s conduct were relevant to Willard’s action to
except her claim from the community discharge, but they had no bearing
on nondischargeability claims against Debtor individually.
C. The court did not abuse its discretion by denying the request for recusal.
Willard argues the court erred by denying the motion for recusal
because its decisions demonstrate an appearance of bias. Willard claims the
court permitted Debtor to sit with and assist Johnson, it made remarks at
trial that displayed favoritism toward Johnson, and it reviewed exhibits
after testimony and improperly excluded much of Willard’s evidence.
Recusal of a bankruptcy judge is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 455. See
Rule 5004(a); Seidel v. Durkin (In re Goodwin), 194 B.R. 214, 221 (9th Cir. BAP
1996). Section § 455(a) requires a judge to “disqualify [herself] in any
proceeding in which [her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”
The judge also must recuse herself when she has a personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1).
But, where a judge’s impression of a party is formed exclusively from
events in the judicial proceedings in question, those impressions “do not
17 constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-
seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment
impossible.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); see also United
States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 913-14 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[Section] 455(a) is
limited by the ‘extrajudicial source’ factor which generally requires as the
basis for recusal something other than rulings, opinions formed or
statements made by the judge during the course of trial.” (citing Liteky, 510
U.S. at 554-56)). And, “a judge has [a] strong . . . duty to sit when there is no
legitimate reason to recuse . . . .” Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 428 F.3d 1175,
1179 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation modified).
On appeal, Willard offers no argument why the court erred by
denying her motion for recusal. Instead, she points to evidence of alleged
bias that occurred at trial, after the court denied the motion for recusal. Her
motion for recusal was based entirely on the court’s rulings and statements
made during the case, none of which support a claim of bias or recusal
under 28 U.S.C. § 455. We find no abuse of discretion by the court in
denying the motion for recusal.
D. Willard does not demonstrate reversible error in the court’s grant of the protective order or its evidentiary rulings.
Willard makes conclusive statements that the court erred by entering
the protective order, admitting unauthenticated exhibits, relying on
fabricated evidence, and selectively handling exhibits.
18 Willard argues the protective order was overly broad and restricted
her ability to obtain testimony essential to her fraud claim. We disagree.
The protective order was narrowly tailored to require Willard to utilize
formal discovery devices and refrain from driving to Johnson’s or Debtor’s
home or visiting their churches for any reason except to attend worship
services or other church events. The order also restricted Willard from
propounding discovery related to the community property issue because
the court had bifurcated the issues for trial. Willard provides no
explanation of how the protective order limited her ability to obtain
evidence or testimony, and we discern no abuse of discretion.
Similarly, Willard does not explain how the court erred by admitting
the Powell declaration or by excluding certain exhibits, and she does not
identify what the excluded exhibits purport to prove. Again, we discern no
abuse of discretion.
Moreover, we do not disturb the bankruptcy court’s evidentiary
rulings unless Willard can demonstrate prejudice. But the court’s decision
turned primarily on witness credibility. It did not believe Willard’s
testimony that Johnson made a fraudulent representation or damaged her
property, and it believed Johnson’s version of events. Thus, Willard has not
shown any prejudice caused by the court’s evidentiary rulings.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM.