[Cite as In re S.G., 2020-Ohio-4060.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
IN RE S.G., ET AL. : : No. 108711 Minor Children : : [Appeal by N.G., Mother] :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: DISMISSED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 13, 2020
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case Nos. AD18906135 and AD18906136
Appearances:
Scalise Legal Services, L.L.C., and Stephanie Scalise, for appellant.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:
Appellant N.G., the mother of S.G. and A.G., (“Mother”) appeals from
the juvenile court order awarding legal custody of S.G. and A.G. to T.R., the
biological father of S.G. and an interested individual to A.G.
Mother’s appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw pursuant
to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), in which
she asserted that following her examination of the record there are “no meritorious appellate issues that can be raised.” This court held the motion in abeyance and
afforded Mother an opportunity to file a pro se brief. Mother has failed to avail
herself of that opportunity. Following an independent review, this court grants
appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw and we dismiss this appeal.
Factual Background and Procedural History
On May 10, 2018, appellee Cuyahoga County Division of Children and
Family Services (“CCDCFS” or the “agency”) filed a complaint for neglect and
temporary custody of S.G. (d.o.b. December 29, 2012) and A.G. (d.o.b. June 13,
2015). The complaint alleged that at approximately 7:30 p.m. on May 9, 2018,
Mother had left the children without appropriate supervision or food in the home,
that the children were found outside of the home, alone, at approximately 10:00
p.m. and that Mother did not return to the home until 3:00 a.m. The agency also
filed a motion for predispositional temporary custody.
The court conducted a hearing on the issue of predispositional
temporary custody as Mother denied the allegations and objected to a finding of
probable cause. The court granted the motion and committed the children to the
temporary care and custody of CCDCFS.
An amended complaint was filed on August 7, 2018 wherein the
allegations were amended to reflect that, on May 9, 2018, Mother had left the
children in the home with an inappropriate caregiver and that Mother was in need
of parenting classes to improve her parenting skills and judgment. In September 2018, the juvenile court adjudicated the children
neglected. The matter was continued for a dispositional hearing. On January 11,
2019, CCDCFS filed a motion to amend the dispositional prayer from temporary
custody to CCDCFS to legal custody to T.R., the biological father of S.G. and
interested individual to A.G.
On April 4, 2019, the dispositional hearing was held before the
magistrate. Rosalyn Bailey, an extended service social worker with CCDCFS,
testified at the hearing. She stated that she had been assigned to the case since May
or June 2018. According to Bailey, the initial case plan for each of the fathers was
to establish paternity and to bond with and support his child. The initial case plan
for Mother included parenting classes and, due to a history of substance abuse,
submission to a urine screen to determine whether she had a need for substance
abuse services.
Bailey testified that Mother failed to comply with the case plan even
though accommodations were made for her, at her request. She refused to submit
to a urine screen and did not attend all of her parenting classes. On September 26,
2018, during visitation with the children at the West Side Community Collab,
Mother took the children and left. It was not until 9:00 p.m. that night, after police
tracked Mother’s phone, that the children were located at the home of a cousin of
Mother. Mother was not present. Following that incident, Mother’s case plan was
amended to include a mental health assessment. Mother failed to complete any of
the case plan requirements and, after the incident, failed to meet with or contact Bailey. Because Mother did not make herself available, Bailey could not state
whether Mother’s home was appropriate for the children.
Bailey testified that paternity had been established for both children.
Bailey stated that T.R., the father of S.G., had completed his case plan and had
bonded with both S.G. and A.G. Bailey stated that T.R. had informed her that he
wanted A.G. to stay with her sister, “that he didn’t see any difference in them” and
that he was prepared to provide a permanent home for both S.G. and A.G. She
indicated that both T.R. and his wife, D.M., submitted to background checks and
were approved by CCDCFS for placement. The children were placed with T.R. in
December 2018 or January 2019.
Bailey stated that, at the time of the hearing, Al.G., the father of A.G.,
was incarcerated at the Mansfield Correctional Institution and that no appropriate
relative had been identified as a possible care provider for A.G.
Bailey testified that she believed it was in the children’s best interest
to remain together and be placed in the legal custody of T.R. Although Bailey stated
that she believes Mother loves the children, Mother could not care for them or meet
their basic needs. Bailey stated that T.R. was employed, that his home was
appropriate, that the children were doing well in his home and that he was able
provide for their basic needs on a permanent basis.
The guardian ad litem recommended that legal custody of the
children be granted to T.R. On April 8, 2019, the magistrate issued her decision, recommending
the termination of predispositional temporary custody to the agency and that legal
custody of S.G. and A.G. be granted to T.R. The magistrate also recommended that
Mother be granted supervised visitation with the children every Sunday from 2:00
p.m. to 6:00 p.m. Mother filed objections to the magistrate’s decision.
In June 2019, following a review of the court file, the magistrate’s
decision and Mother’s objections, the juvenile court overruled Mother’s objections
and approved and adopted the magistrate’s decision.
Law and Analysis
Anders Standard
Anders outlines the procedure that counsel must follow to withdraw
due to the lack of any meritorious grounds for appeal. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87
S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493. In Anders, the United States Supreme Court held that
if appointed counsel, after a conscientious examination of the case, determines an
appeal to be wholly frivolous, he or she should advise the court of that fact and
request permission to withdraw. Id. This request, however, must be accompanied
by a brief identifying anything in the record that could arguably support the appeal.
Id. Counsel must also provide the client with a copy of the brief and allow the client
sufficient time to file his or her own brief. Id.
Once the appellant’s counsel satisfies these requirements, this court
must fully examine the proceedings below to determine if any arguably meritorious
issues exist. Id. If the court determines that the appeal is wholly frivolous, the court may grant counsel’s request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal. Id.; see also State
v. Sims, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107724, 2019-Ohio-4975, ¶ 7-9.
Although Anders arose in a criminal context, this court approved the
application of the Anders procedure to an appeal from the juvenile court’s decision
on a motion for legal custody in In re T.E., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104228, 2016-
Ohio-5935, ¶ 31, 40; see also In re J.B., 9th Dist. Summit No. C.A. No. 29443, 2020-
Ohio-2917. Courts have also applied Anders in appeals involving the termination of
parental rights. See, e.g., In re A.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106789, 2018-Ohio-
3186, ¶ 11.
Previously, former Loc.App.R. 16(C) set forth the specific procedure
governing Anders briefs and motions to withdraw followed by this court. That rule
was amended on February 1, 2019 and no longer includes any procedure for the
filing of Anders briefs. However, as this court has previously stated, “the absence of
a local rule governing Anders briefs does not prevent this court from accepting these
briefs nor from following the procedure the United States Supreme Court outlined
in Anders.” Sims at ¶ 7-14 (discussing “the duties of appellate counsel when filing an
Anders brief and our duties when ruling on counsel’s motion to withdraw on the
grounds that the appeal would be frivolous” even in the absence of former
Loc.App.R. 16(C), different Ohio appellate courts’ views on Anders briefs and this
court’s decision that “until the Ohio Supreme Court resolves the split among the
Ohio Appellate Districts regarding the application of Anders * * * we will continue
to adhere to the procedures outlined in Anders pertaining to both counsel and the court when appointed appellate counsel files a motion to withdraw because an
appeal would be wholly frivolous”); see also State v. Lariche, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
108512, 2020-Ohio-804, ¶ 7.
Independent Review
Standard for Determining Legal Custody
Pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A)(3), a juvenile court may award legal
custody of a child who has been adjudicated abused, neglected or dependent “to
either parent or to any other person who, prior to the dispositional hearing, files a
motion requesting legal custody of the child or is identified as a proposed legal
custodian in a complaint or motion filed prior to the dispositional hearing by any
party to the proceedings.” “Legal custody” is
a legal status that vests in the custodian the right to have physical care and control of the child and to determine where and with whom the child shall live, and the right and duty to protect, train, and discipline the child and to provide the child with food, shelter, education, and medical care, all subject to any residual parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities.
R.C. 2151.011(B)(21). A person identified in a complaint or motion filed by a party
to the proceedings as a proposed legal custodian must comply with various statutory
requirements, including signing a statement of understanding for legal custody.
R.C. 2151.353(A)(3).
Legal custody is “significantly different” than the termination of
parental rights. Unlike a case in which parental rights are terminated, when a parent
loses legal custody of his or her child, the parent “retains residual parental rights, privileges and responsibilities and is not permanently foreclosed from regaining
custody.” In re M.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108567, 2019-Ohio-5128, ¶ 32, citing
In re T.R., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102071, 2015-Ohio-4177, ¶ 32, In re G.M., 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95410, 2011-Ohio-4090, ¶ 14, and R.C. 2151.353(A)(3)(c).
Nevertheless, an order granting legal custody of a child to a person
under R.C. 2151.353(A) “is intended to be permanent in nature.” R.C. 2151.42(B)
(“A court shall not modify or terminate an order granting legal custody of a child
unless it finds, based on facts that have arisen since the order was issued or that were
unknown to the court at that time, that a change has occurred in the circumstances
of the child or the person who was granted legal custody, and that modification or
termination of the order is necessary to serve the best interest of the child.”).
Where a juvenile court considers an award of legal custody following
an adjudication of abuse, neglect or dependency, “‘it does so by examining what
would be in the best interest of the child based on a preponderance of the evidence.’”
In re T.R. at ¶ 44, quoting In re M.J.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94130, 2010-Ohio-
1674, ¶ 11, 14. Thus, we apply the “preponderance of the evidence” standard of
appellate review to the court’s factual findings on a request for legal custody. In re
W.A.J., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99813, 2014-Ohio-604, ¶ 2. A “preponderance of
the evidence” means evidence that is “‘more probable, more persuasive, or of greater
value.’” In re C.V.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98340, 2012-Ohio-5514, ¶ 7, quoting
In re D.P., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-117, 2005-Ohio-5097, ¶ 52. However, the decision whether to grant or deny a request for legal
custody is within the sound discretion of the juvenile court. When reviewing a
juvenile court’s “‘ultimate decision on whether the facts as determined would make
it in the child’s best interests to be placed in legal custody,’” we apply an abuse of
discretion standard. In re W.A.J. at ¶ 2, quoting In re G.M., 2011-Ohio-4090, at
¶ 14. A juvenile court abuses its discretion where its decision is unreasonable,
arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450
N.E.2d 1140 (1983). A decision is unreasonable if there is “‘no sound reasoning
process that would support that decision.’” In re C.D.Y., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
108355, 2019-Ohio-4987, ¶ 8, quoting Baxter v. Thomas, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
101186, 2015-Ohio-2148, ¶ 21. A decision is arbitrary if it is made “‘without
consideration of or regard for facts [or] circumstances.’” In re C.D.Y. at ¶ 8, quoting
Black’s Law Dictionary 125 (10th Ed.2014).
There is no “specific test or set of criteria” that must be applied or
considered when determining what is in a child’s best interest on a motion for legal
custody. In re T.R., 2015-Ohio-4177, at ¶ 48. Unlike permanent custody cases in
which the juvenile court must consider the factors outlined in R.C. 2151.414(D), R.C.
2151.353(A)(3) does not independently specify the factors to be considered in
determining what is in a child’s best interest on a request for legal custody. In re
G.M., 2011-Ohio-4090, at ¶ 15. Nevertheless, this court has held that the R.C.
2151.414(D) best interest factors may be “instructive” in making that determination.
See, e.g., In re R.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107709, 2019-Ohio-1656, ¶ 48, 52; In re D.T., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 100970 and 100971, 2014-Ohio-4818, ¶ 20, citing In
re E.A., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99065, 2013-Ohio-1193, ¶ 13; see also In re B.D.,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105650, 2017-Ohio-8663, ¶ 26 (“In determining the best
interest of the child in a legal custody case, the juvenile court should consider all
relevant factors, and may look to the factors listed under R.C. 2151.414(D) * * * for
guidance.”), citing In re M.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105168, 2017-Ohio-7481, ¶ 11.
Those factors include: (1) the interaction of the child with the child’s parents,
relatives, caregivers and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (2)
the wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s
guardian ad litem; (3) the custodial history of the child and (4) the child’s need for a
legally secure permanent placement. R.C. 2151.414(D).
Courts have also looked to the best interest factors set forth in R.C.
3109.04(F) as a potential guide in determining what is in a child’s best interest for
purpose of a motion for legal custody. See, e.g., In re J.O., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
87626, 2007-Ohio-407, ¶ 11; see also In re K.S., 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2019-01-
009 and CA2019-02-015, 2019-Ohio-2384, ¶ 37 (“As the paramount concern is the
best interest of the child, the court ‘should consider the totality of the circumstances
affecting the best interest of the child.’” * * * A court may therefore consider the
relevant best interest factors set forth in either R.C. 3109.04(F) or R.C. 2151.414(D)
in determining the best interest of the child.”), quoting In re S.L., 12th Dist. Butler
Nos. CA2012-07-137 through CA2012-07-142 and CA2012-07-147 through CA2012-
07-149, 2013-Ohio-781, ¶ 54. Such factors include, but are not limited to (1) the wishes of the child’s parents regarding the child’s care; (2) the child’s interaction and
interrelationships with the child’s parents, siblings and any other person who may
significantly affect the child’s best interest; (3) the child’s adjustment to home,
school and community; (4) the mental and physical health of all persons involved in
the situation and (5) the extent to which court-approved visitation and
companionship rights are likely to be honored and facilitated. See R.C. 3109.04(F).
In this case, the juvenile court made the following findings as to S.G.:
The Court finds that the child’s continued residence in or return to the home of [N.G.], Mother will be contrary to the child’s best interest.
The Court finds that the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services has made reasonable efforts to prevent removal of the child, to eliminate the continued removal of the child from home, or to make it possible for the child to return home and to make and finalize a permanency plan for the child. Parenting and drug screening. The Mother did not submit to drug testing and needs to complete parenting. The child has been residing with the Father since 12/2018. The Father’s home is appropriate and the Father has been providing for the child’s basic needs.
The court made the following findings as to A.G.:
The Court finds that the child’s continued residence in or return to the home of [N.G.], Mother will be contrary to the child’s best interest.
The Court finds that the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services has made reasonable efforts to prevent removal of the child, to eliminate the continued removal of the child from home, or to make it possible for the child to return home and to make and finalize a permanency plan for the child. Parenting and drug screening. The Mother did not submit to drug testing and needs to complete parenting. The child has been residing with T.R., Interested Individual, since 12/2018. T.R.’s home is appropriate and he has been providing for the child’s basic needs.
The Court finds that T.R., the proposed legal custodian for A.G., has signed a Statement of Understanding for Legal Custody. The record supports these findings by a preponderance of the
evidence. The record shows that at the time of the hearing, S.G. and A.G. had been
in the predispositional temporary custody of the agency for nearly a year and had
been living with T.R. for four or five months. The record reflects that both children
have a strong bond with T.R. and with each other, that they had been doing well
when living with T.R., that his home was appropriate, safe and stable and that all of
their basic needs were being met.
The record further reflects that Mother had done almost none of the
case plan services required of her, i.e., attending some but not completing parenting
classes, refusing to submit to a urine screen or a mental health assessment and
refusing to comply with the social worker’s efforts to see her home to determine if it
was appropriate for the children. The record further reflects that although Mother
had, at times, been inconsistent with visitation, T.R. was willing to work with Mother
and facilitate regular visitation between her and the children and with other family
members.
Following an independent examination of the record as required by
Anders, we cannot say, based on the record before us, that the trial court abused its
discretion in finding that an award of legal custody of S.G. and A.G. to T.R. was in
the children’s best interests.
Accordingly, we agree that there is no merit to an appeal and that this
appeal is wholly frivolous. We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismiss this
appeal. Appeal dismissed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCURS; MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE OPINION
MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE OPINION:
I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority that we should
grant appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). As I explained in my dissenting
opinion in State v. Sims, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107724, 2019-Ohio-4975, it is now
my view that this court should no longer permit appointed counsel to file an Anders
brief or withdraw from a case. Id. at ¶ 60 (Boyle, J., dissenting). Although much of
my reasoning in Sims applied when attorneys are appointed to represent indigent
criminal defendants, it is my view that this reasoning extends to all appointed
counsel. All attorneys, not just defense attorneys, have an “‘overarching duty’” to
“advanc[e] ‘the undivided interests’” of their clients. Id. at ¶ 61, quoting McCoy v.
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 435, 108 S.Ct. 1895, 100
L.Ed.2d 440 (1988). But “[w]hen appellate counsel files an Anders brief saying, ‘My client should lose,’ appellate counsel undoubtedly prejudices his or her client.” Sims
at ¶ 60 (Boyle, J., dissenting).
Likewise, the following reasoning from my dissent in Sims is
applicable to all situations where appointed counsel files an Anders brief and
requests to withdraw from the case:
Under Anders, the appellate court must complete an independent review of the record and then appoint counsel to argue that appeal if the court finds that a claim of arguable merit exists. This procedure places the court in the role of both advocate and adjudicator. In Ohio, how can a judge who has reviewed a record and identified issues of arguable merit then rule on the actual merits of the claims he or she previously identified without there being an appearance of impropriety, which is barred by the rules of judicial ethics? See Canon 1 of the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct.
Sims at ¶ 62 (Boyle, J., dissenting), citing State v. Upkins, 154 Ohio St.3d 30, 2018-
Ohio-1812, ¶ 10 (Fischer, J., dissenting).
Accordingly, in line with my dissent in Sims, I would not accept the
Anders brief in this case and would deny appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw.
I would also order both attorneys, mother’s and CCDCFS’s, to file briefs in the case
(CCDCFS did not yet file one).