In re R.R.

2023 Ohio 2067

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 22, 2023
• Docket: 112135
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re R.R., 2023-Ohio-2067.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE R.R., ET AL. : : No. 112135 Minor Children : : [Appeal by A.R., Mother] :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 22, 2023

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case Nos. AD-18-908319, AD-18-908320, AD-18-908321, AD-18-908322, AD-18-908323

Appearances:

Brian A. Smith Law Firm, LLC and Brian A. Smith, for appellant.

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Zachary J. LaFleur and Anthony R. Beery, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services.

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J.:

{¶ 1} Appellant-mother A.R. (“Mother”) appeals from the decision of the

Juvenile Division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas (the “juvenile

court”) that (1) granted legal custody of her minor children R.R., Dem.C., Z.C. and J.C. to various other relatives and (2) granted permanent custody of her minor

daughter L.R. to appellee, the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family

Services (“CCDCFS” or “the agency”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Factual Background and Procedural History

{¶ 2} This appeal involves Mother’s five minor children — R.R. (d.o.b.

September 18, 2007), L.R. (d.o.b. February 18, 2013), Dem.C. (d.o.b. September 21,

2014), Z.C. (d.o.b. May 26, 2016) and J.C. (d.o.b. June 27, 2018).

{¶ 3} On July 2, 2018, CCDCFS filed a complaint for neglect and temporary

custody and a motion for predispositional temporary custody of the children. The

complaint alleged that Mother had a substance abuse problem (i.e., marijuana,

cocaine and alcohol) that prevented her from providing appropriate care for the

children, that Mother had tested positive for cocaine while pregnant with J.C. and

that, although Mother had completed treatment in the past, she had failed to

maintain her sobriety. The complaint further alleged that Mother lacked the

necessary judgment and parenting skills to provide a stable home for the children,

that Mother had been previously convicted of driving under the influence and had

violated probation after testing positive for cocaine and that Mother had “engaged

in domestic violence” with the children’s fathers or alleged fathers. With respect to

Des.C. (father of Z.C. and Dem.C. and alleged father of J.C.), the complaint alleged

that he had been convicted of attempted drug possession and attempted possession

of criminal tools, that he had failed to establish paternity and that he had minimal

involvement with the children. With respect to E.W. (alleged father of R.R.), the complaint alleged that he had failed to establish paternity and had failed to support,

visit or communicate with R.R. With respect to R.S. (father of L.R.), the complaint

alleged that he had failed to support, visit or communicate with L.R.1 On July 27,

2018, the juvenile court granted the agency’s motion for predispositional temporary

custody and committed the children to the predispositional temporary custody of

CCDCFS.

{¶ 4} The agency filed a case plan that required Mother to complete a

domestic violence program, to complete substance abuse treatment and aftercare

and to submit to random drug screens. The juvenile court approved the case plan.

{¶ 5} In September 2018, the agency amended the dispositional prayer of the

complaint from a request for temporary custody to a request for protective

supervision. On September 13, 2018, the magistrate conducted an adjudicatory

hearing. Mother stipulated to the allegations of an amended complaint,2 and the

1 The children’s fathers are not parties to this appeal. Accordingly, we do not specifically address the allegations relating to the fathers here.

2 As it relates to Mother, the amended complaint for neglect and protective supervision alleged:

1. Mother has a substance use disorder. Mother needs to continue to engage in substance use disorder treatment and maintain her sobriety to ensure the safety of the children. 2. Mother was convicted of driving under the influence. See [C]ase No. 2017 TRC 014855. 3. Mother should engage in domestic violence and parenting classes in order to improve her parenting skills and ability to protect the children.

*** children were adjudicated neglected. In October 2018, the juvenile court terminated

the predispositional temporary custody order and returned the children to the legal

custody of Mother with protective supervision by the agency. The juvenile court

ordered that a CCDCFS social worker visit the home once a week, unannounced, and

that the court be notified immediately if Mother had a positive drug test or failed to

comply with case plan services.

{¶ 6} On February 13, 2019, the agency filed a motion to terminate protective

supervision. The agency indicated that Mother had completed substance abuse

treatment, had maintained her sobriety, had completed a domestic violence

education program and had been providing appropriate care for the children. On

March 8, 2019, the agency notified the juvenile court that Mother had tested positive

for illegal substances. At a dispositional review hearing on June 17, 2019, the agency

made an oral motion to amend its previously filed motion, to seek a first extension

of protective supervision rather than to terminate protective supervision. Mother

stipulated to, and the juvenile court granted, the extension of protective supervision.

The juvenile court ordered that the CCDCFS social worker continue to make weekly

visits to Mother’s home and that the court be notified within 24 hours if Mother had

a positive drug test.

{¶ 7} In December 2019, the agency filed a motion for a second extension of

protective supervision. The agency asserted that Mother had completed case plan

Reasonable efforts were made by Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services to prevent removal of the child[ren] from the home and removal is in the best interest of the child[ren]. services for domestic violence and had been providing negative random urine

screens but that Mother needed to complete substance abuse treatment and

continue to provide negative urine screens. At the January 2020 dispositional

review hearing, the CCDCFS sobriety treatment and recovery team (“START”)

worker assigned to Mother’s case, Catrina Moore, testified that although the agency

had not notified the court as previously ordered, the Women’s Recovery Center,

where Mother was then receiving substance abuse services, reported that Mother

had tested positive for drug use in August and November 2019. Mother stipulated

to, and the juvenile court granted, a second extension of protective supervision. The

juvenile court ordered that the social worker continue to make weekly unannounced

visits to Mother’s home, that Mother submit to monthly follicle drug screens and

that the court be notified within 24 hours if Mother had a positive drug test.

{¶ 8} On January 13, 2020, the agency filed an amended case plan, adding

mental health services to the case plan to address Mother’s diagnosis of

posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and depression and R.R.’s diagnosis of

oppositional defiant disorder, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”)

and bipolar disorder. The amended case plan required that Mother undergo a

psychological evaluation, comply with any treatment recommendations and work

on developing parenting skills to help R.R. function better. The juvenile court

approved the amended case plan.

{¶ 9} On March 27, 2020, the agency filed a notice that Mother had tested

positive for cocaine in urine screens conducted on March 3, 10, 13 and 17, 2020. {¶ 10} On May 13, 2020, the children were removed from Mother’s care and

taken into emergency custody pursuant to an ex parte telephonic order. The

following day, the agency filed a motion for immediate custody to CCDCFS and a

motion to modify protective supervision to temporary custody to CCDCFS. The

agency alleged that Mother continued to actively abuse cocaine, amphetamines and

marijuana while serving as the sole caregiver of the children, that R.R. had special

needs that were not being adequately addressed by Mother, placing the younger

children at risk of harm, that L.R. and Z.C. had head lice that was not being

addressed and that Mother was overwhelmed by the care for her children and unable

to provide adequate care for them. Mother stipulated to a finding of probable cause

for the removal of the children. The juvenile court granted the motion for immediate

custody and the children were, once again, placed in the emergency temporary

custody of the agency.

{¶ 11} On August 13, 2020, the magistrate held a hearing on the agency’s

motion to modify protective supervision to temporary custody. Mother stipulated

to the motion. The juvenile court terminated its emergency custody order and

committed children to the temporary custody of the agency. In March 2021, Mother

stipulated to a first extension of temporary custody.

{¶ 12} In the months that followed, the agency filed a number of different

motions with a number of different permanency options before settling on the

following requests: ● As to L.R., a motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody to CCDCFS,

● As to R.R., a motion to modify temporary custody to legal custody to his maternal grandmother, G.R., and

● As to Dem.C., Z.C. and J.C. a motion to modify temporary custody to legal custody to their maternal aunt, F.S.

{¶ 13} In its motion for permanent custody, the agency argued that it should

be granted permanent custody of L.R. pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) and the

best interest of the child because (1) L.R. had been in continuous agency custody

since May 2020, (2) Mother had failed to maintain her sobriety, (3) L.R.’s father

lacked housing and was unable to provide for her basic needs and (4) no other

relatives had been identified who were willing and able to provide appropriate care

for L.R.

{¶ 14} In its motions for legal custody, the agency asserted that being placed

in the legal custody of G.R. would be in the best interest of R.R. and that being placed

in the legal custody of F.S. would be in the best interest of Dem.C., Z.C. and J.C.

because (1) Mother had failed to maintain long-term sobriety, needed to

demonstrate stability with mental health services and remained unable to provide a

safe and permanent home for the children and (2) the children’s fathers or alleged

fathers had failed to establish paternity or were unwilling to cooperate with the

agency and complete services. Each of the proposed legal custodians submitted a

signed statement of understanding in accordance with R.C. 2151.353(A) and

2151.42, indicating that she was ready, willing and able to assume legal

responsibility for the child or children for which the agency sought legal custody. {¶ 15} On March 25, 2022, Mother filed a motion for legal custody as to all

five children. Mother asserted that she should be granted legal custody of the

children because (1) she had completed all aspects of her case plan, including

inpatient drug treatment, outpatient drug treatment, aftercare and mental health

services through Community Assessment & Treatment Services (“CATS”) and the

Greater Cleveland Drug Court program, (2) she had submitted to random drug

screens and had been sober for more than six months, (3) she had voluntarily re-

engaged with mental health services through Brighter Tomorrow Community

Services (“Brighter Tomorrow”), (4) she had regular visitation with her children and

(5) she had stable and appropriate housing, was employed and was able to meet her

children’s basic needs. Mother argued that she could provide a safe and stable home

for the children and that it was in their best interest for the court to terminate

temporary custody and grant legal custody of the children to her.

{¶ 16} On June 13, 2022, the juvenile court conducted in camera interviews

of the four oldest children.3 In September 2022, the parties submitted agreed

journal entries, consenting to the continued extension of temporary custody of the

3 The record indicates that the magistrate also conducted in camera interviews of L.R., Dem.C. and Z.C. on November 16, 2021. There is no transcript from these in camera interviews in the record. However, because it appears that the juvenile court judge relied on his own in camera interviews of the children conducted on June 14, 2022 (rather than those conducted by the magistrate seven months earlier) in reaching his decision — the transcript of which is in the record — the absence of the transcript of the November 16, 2021 in camera interviews does not meaningfully impact our review here. children. On October 18, 2022, the case proceeded to a hearing on the pending

motions.

Hearing on Motions for Permanent Custody and Legal Custody

{¶ 17} Three witnesses testified on behalf of the agency at the hearing:

Dianna Banzhaf, an early childhood mental health specialist and licensed social

worker at Ohio Guidestone, Sharon Mason, a qualified mental health specialist at

Ohio Mentor Network, and Andrea Flynn, an ongoing case worker in CCDCFS’

START department. One witness, Lillian Brown, a clinical mental health therapist

at Brighter Tomorrow, testified on behalf of Mother at the hearing.4 At the time of

the hearing R.R. was 15, L.R. was 9, Dem.C. was 8, Z.C. was 6 and J.C. was 4.

Testimony of CCDCFS’ Witnesses

{¶ 18} Banzhaf testified that she has been Z.C. and J.C.’s therapist since

February 2021. She said that, prior to beginning therapy, she had assessed the

children and diagnosed Z.C. with “other specified trauma and stressor related

disorder” and J.C. with PTSD. Banzhaf stated that she meets with the children once

4In addition to the witness testimony, the agency introduced copies of various motions and orders entered in the five cases, certified medical records for each of the children, certified Ohio Guidestone treatment records for Dem.C. and J.C., certified Applewood treatment records for R.R. and certified Positive Education Program treatment records for R.R. Mother introduced copies of documents from United States Drug Testing Laboratories, Inc. relating to the results of Mother’s April 2022 toenail drug screen and certificates of completion for Mother’s completion of a domestic violence education program in November 2018, parenting classes in May 2021, an anger management program in June 2021, intensive and nonintensive outpatient treatment in December 2021, a drug and alcohol rehabilitation program in July 2021 and the Greater Cleveland Drug Court program in February 2022. No objections were raised to the admissibility of the exhibits, and the juvenile court admitted all of the proffered exhibits. or twice a week for approximately 45 minutes to an hour to address issues associated

with “past neglect and abuse.” She indicated that she utilizes “play therapy” with

the children to build trust and connection, to allow them to “act out past trauma and

abuse” and to “help them work on their feelings about it.”

{¶ 19} Banzhaf testified that Z.C. had disclosed “some neglect and abuse that

ha[d] happened to her, physical abuse” while in Mother’s care. She stated that Z.C.

“worries” that “she’ll go back to mom” or otherwise be taken away from her aunt and

has “nightmares * * * of being hit by mom and a boyfriend.”

{¶ 20} Banzhaf testified that Z.C.’s “past trauma” included “being locked in

her room for extensive periods of time,” i.e., “full days,” “on a consistent basis,”

leading to continuing worries regarding food insecurity even though “she currently

has more than enough food and it’s available to her and accessible at any time.”

Banzhaf stated that, when Z.C. was living with Mother, Z.C. had “no recollection of

having full meals at all.”

{¶ 21} Banzhaf testified that Z.C. “talked about getting hit by mom and

having bruises on her body” and told Banzhaf that she had been “punched in the

face and also hit with a belt; specifically, the buckle of a belt on a number of

occasions.” Banzhaf described one incident Z.C. reported in which Z.C. and her

siblings had been locked in a room. Because they had been unable to access the

bathroom, they went to the bathroom in plastic bags and then threw the bags out

the window. Z.C. told Banzhaf that when Mother discovered what they had done,

Mother “beat [Z.C.] with a belt” and Mother’s boyfriend “punched her in her face.” {¶ 22} Banzhaf testified that Z.C. also described being kept in a high chair for

lengthy periods of time, unable to play with her siblings. She stated that Z.C. did not

understand why she had been kept in the high chair, i.e., she did not believe it was

for disciplinary reasons. According to Banzhaf, Z.C. said that she would nap in her

high chair and would see her siblings “walking around and playing * * * and she

wouldn’t be with them.”

{¶ 23} With respect to supervision and caregiving, Banzhaf testified that L.R.

and, to a lesser extent, R.R., were the only caregivers Z.C. and J.C. identified. When

asked, “[W]hat about mom? What kinds of things does mom do for you and how

has mom taken care of you,” Z.C. replied, “[N]o, not mom, [L.R.]. Just [L.R.].”

{¶ 24} Banzhaf testified that J.C. has had difficulty with behavior regulation

and has exhibited regressive behaviors, e.g., difficulty being toilet trained, difficulty

sleeping in her room and crying a lot. Banzhaf stated that J.C. told her that Mother

had hit her but had not related any memories of being locked in a room or more

detailed descriptions of physical abuse to Banzhaf. Banzhaf explained, it’s “a little

bit common for that age to not have specific stories told verbally.”

{¶ 25} Banzhaf testified that she did not have any concerns regarding the

veracity of the children’s statements or whether they may have been “coached” to

provide “canned answers * * * about their prior experiences” because the children’s

stories would “just come up naturally,” e.g., during play, were expressed “in child

language” (not “adult words”) and, when retold, were consistent, “repeat[ed] * * *

the same way.” {¶ 26} Banzhaf testified that Z.C. told her how much she likes living with her

aunt, F.S., and that she “seems to have grown a very trusting connection and bond

with her aunt.” She stated that J.C. had likewise indicated to her that she is happy

living with F.S. and being with her siblings. Banzhaf indicated that she has no

concerns regarding the children’s safety living with F.S.

{¶ 27} With respect to visitation with Mother, Banzhaf testified that Z.C. and

J.C. are often “a bit withdrawn,” “more quiet” and “don’t interact as much” following

visits with Mother. She stated that the children will also engage in “bad behavior,”

such as marking on the walls, or exhibit “pent up aggression,” arguing with one

another or getting physical and hurting each other, following visits. Banzhaf stated

that Z.C. “express[es] a lot of worries” about visiting with Mother and that the visits

“trigger[] her from her past trauma,” i.e., “she will zone out and disassociate and will

just stare into space, and then she will not verbalize anything and will just stay in

one spot and hold her body really close and just not interact and completely

withdraw.” She indicated that J.C. “switch[es] back and forth” regarding whether

she is happy to see Mother and will often say “how angry she is at mom,” particularly

because of the way Mother has treated R.R.

{¶ 28} With respect to their interactions with Mother at visits, Banzhaf

testified that the girls had said that Mother had told them to “ruin their toys” or

damage other things at their aunt’s home so they could go into foster care. She

stated that Mother had purchased toys for the children and then told them that they

could only keep the toys if they stayed with her. Banzhaf also described an incident (related to her by the children) in which, after the children were given new shoes by

their aunt, Mother stepped on their shoes and untied them.

{¶ 29} Banzhaf testified that the children were currently working on

mindfulness, calming techniques for anxiety and ways to reframe their current

negative past experiences in therapy. She stated that she believed the children

needed a caregiver who understood and acknowledged the trauma they had

experienced and their need for continuing therapy to process that trauma.

{¶ 30} Banzhaf testified that, when she receives a referral, she primarily gets

information about her clients from the CCDCFS case worker and their current

caregiver. She stated that she had never observed any visits between Mother and

the children and that she had never spoken with Mother.

{¶ 31} Mason testified that she has been L.R.’s therapist since March or April

2022. She stated that L.R. had been diagnosed with PTSD and ADHD and, at the

time, was “basically very hyper” and needed someone to help her with coping skills

to deal with the trauma she was experiencing. She indicated that she sees L.R. two

to three times a week for a total of approximately six hours each week.

{¶ 32} Mason testified that L.R. told her that she “never wants to go back

home again” because of “[w]hat [Mother] did to us.” Mason explained that L.R. told

her that Mother had “locked” L.R. and her siblings in a room “for hours at a time, a

long, long time” while Mother was in another room with someone else. She stated

that L.R. told that she was “very hungry,” that she could not go to the refrigerator to get food and that she “would get in trouble” if she left the room, i.e., she would “get

a whooping.”

{¶ 33} Mason testified that L.R. told her that, while in Mother’s care, she had

been “whooped” with a belt. She stated that L.R. told her that her other siblings had

received “worse punishment” from Mother, including “whoopings” or being kept in

a high chair all day.

{¶ 34} Mason testified that L.R. exhibited various trauma symptoms such as

“go[ing] off into a stare” in the middle of a conversation, “thinking about something

that had happened in the past,” “jumping” at loud noises and acting “very fidgety.”

{¶ 35} Mason stated that L.R. has had regular, weekly visits with Mother.

Mason testified that she does not specifically ask L.R. about these visits, i.e., she only

asks “how [L.R.] is doing,” and that “basically she doesn’t talk a lot about it.” Mason

suggested that this could be due to the timing of the visits and when Mason sees

L.R., i.e., “that’s over with and I guess she’s gone on,” she’s “trying to be a kid and

have fun.” Mason indicated that L.R. loves her siblings and that, although she used

to talk a lot about her siblings, she “hasn’t been talking about them as much” because

she does not see them as frequently as she once did.

{¶ 36} Mason indicated that L.R. is currently in a foster placement and told

Mason that she wants to remain there. Mason stated that she has no concerns about

L.R.’s safety or her basic needs being met in the foster placement. Mason testified

that she had never met Banzhaf, had never received any notes from Banzhaf and had

never spoken with any of L.R.’s siblings. She stated that she speaks with the CCDCFS case worker, Flynn, “when[ever] we need to talk” and that this has occurred

approximately four or five times since she started working with L.R.

{¶ 37} When asked whether L.R. had ever lied to her or told her “made up”

stories, Mason testified that she has questioned L.R. “over and over sometimes” and

that, “for the most part,” L.R. “tells the truth.” Mason stated that L.R. had been

“consistent” in her descriptions of the trauma she has experienced. Mason stated

that she has never perceived L.R. as having been “coached” or as having provided

“canned answers” in discussing her prior traumatic experiences.

{¶ 38} Mason stated that she was working with L.R. to develop coping skills

to deal with her trauma and associated anger and believed that L.R. needed a

caregiver who understood and acknowledged the trauma she had experienced and

her need for “a lot” of ongoing counseling.

{¶ 39} Mason testified that, before being placed in her current foster home,

L.R. had spent one year living with her father, R.S. Mason indicated that during the

time L.R. was in his care, there were allegations of sexual abuse of L.R. by R.S. She

stated that issues associated with that alleged abuse were among the issues she had

been working on in her treatment of L.R. Mason stated that although she and L.R.

had previously discussed what happened with her father, L.R. was not talking about

it “anymore,” likely because “it makes her feel uncomfortable.”

{¶ 40} Flynn, the current CCDCFS case worker assigned to the case, testified

that the children had been involved with the agency since August 2018 and that she

was assigned to the case in August 2020. {¶ 41} Flynn testified that, in 2018, the agency received a referral after

Mother tested positive for cocaine during her pregnancy with J.C. She stated that

the children were adjudicated neglected in October 2018 and remained in Mother’s

legal custody with protective supervision until May 2020. Flynn explained that, on

May 14, 2020, the agency filed a motion for immediate custody and a motion to

modify protective supervision to temporary custody because Mother had relapsed

and, when the children were taken to the hospital, it was discovered that they had

been beaten. Flynn stated that both motions were granted; the children were placed

in the emergency custody of the agency on May 14, 2020, and the agency was

granted temporary custody of the children in September 2020. She indicated that

the children had remained in the temporary custody of the agency since that time.

{¶ 42} Flynn then discussed the case plan for the family. With respect to the

children’s fathers, Flynn testified that R.R.’s alleged father was E.W. but paternity

had never been established. She indicated that the agency had made efforts to

contact E.W. but that he did not respond and that the agency was unaware of any

existing relationship between E.W. and R.R.

{¶ 43} Paternity was established for the remaining children. Flynn testified

that R.S. was the father of L.R. and that Des.C. was the father of Dem.C., Z.C. and

J.C. She stated that no services were listed on the case plan for Des.C. because he

told Flynn he was “not willing to work case plan services.” She stated that Des.C.

informed Flynn that he “preferred for the children to stay where they were” and had

“not looked for reunification” with his children. {¶ 44} Flynn testified that R.S. had served as L.R.’s caregiver from October

2000 until December 2021 — when he lost his housing. She stated that, as of the

week prior to the hearing, R.S. still had not obtained housing and, therefore, the

agency could not recommend reunification with him because he was “not stable.”

{¶ 45} Flynn acknowledged that L.R.’s counselor had notified her of

allegations that had been made against R.S. regarding his alleged inappropriate

touching of L.R. She stated that the agency’s sex abuse unit investigated the

allegations and determined that they were unsubstantiated due to a lack of evidence.

She explained that “[t]hat doesn’t mean that something didn’t happen,” just that

“the investigation wasn’t enough to prove the allegation.” She noted that L.R. was

young, and “she didn’t say physical things that would prove the allegations, so it

wasn’t enough to substantiate,” but that “a criminal referral was made” in the

matter. Flynn was not aware of the results of the criminal referral.

{¶ 46} Flynn testified that case plan services for Mother included referrals

for substance abuse, mental health, domestic violence and parenting services. With

respect to Mother’s engagement with substance abuse services, Flynn stated that, in

August 2020, Mother was engaged in a program through the Women’s Recovery

Center to address her cocaine and alcohol use. She indicated that Mother was

unsuccessfully discharged from that program and referred to Sandusky Treatment

Center for a higher level of care. Flynn stated that Mother successfully completed

that program in December 2020 but, shortly after discharge, again tested positive

for cocaine. {¶ 47} Flynn testified that Mother’s probation officer referred her to a higher

level of care, i.e., to Jordan Home, a sober living home, and to Moore Counseling for

intensive outpatient treatment. Flynn stated that Mother was discharged from both

programs because “[s]he was not following the rules” and was referred to CATS,

another substance abuse treatment provider, in April 2021. Flynn testified that

Mother successfully completed all CATS services in December 2021 and then needed

to live a “sober lifestyle” that was “consistent with the recovery program.”

{¶ 48} To determine whether Mother was maintaining her sobriety, the

agency asked Mother to submit to random drugs screens. Flynn stated that, because

Mother had cancer, the agency could not obtain a hair sample from Mother and,

therefore, requested that she submit to a nail screen. Flynn testified that a toenail

screen conducted in April 2022 was positive for methamphetamines, which Mother

claimed was due to her cancer treatment medication. Flynn stated that the agency

requested, but was unable to obtain, a subsequent nail screen because Mother had

placed acrylic on all her fingernails and toenails.

{¶ 49} Flynn testified that, during this time, Mother also submitted to

random weekly urine screens, one of which tested positive for alcohol. Flynn stated

that Mother, once again, indicated that the positive screen was due to her cancer

treatment medication. Flynn indicated that although Mother had not been referred

for any further substance abuse treatment, substance use “remain[ed] open” for

Mother on the case plan to monitor Mother’s sobriety. {¶ 50} With respect to parenting, Flynn testified that Mother had

successfully completed parenting classes in 2018, but that the agency continued to

monitor Mother’s progress with parenting during visits to determine the extent to

which she had benefited from those services. Flynn stated that she did not believe

Mother had fully benefited from the parenting classes because Mother engaged in

actions such as having conversations that were not age appropriate with her children

(e.g., sharing her cancer diagnosis with her oldest child, which caused him to begin

bedwetting, acting out and locking himself in his room), stepping on the shoes the

children had been given by their aunt and taking aways toys she had given to the

children during visits.

{¶ 51} With respect to the mental health and domestic violence services on

the case plan, Flynn stated that Mother had told the agency that she had PTSD due

to a series of incidents in which she was a victim of domestic violence. Flynn stated

that Mother successfully completed a domestic violence program in 2018 and that

Mother had previously engaged in mental health services through Moore

Counseling and remained actively engaged in counseling at Brighter Tomorrow.

{¶ 52} Flynn testified that, although Mother had completed all case plan

services, the agency could not recommend reunification of Mother and the children

because “[t]he kids throughout their counseling have had concerns with being

returned to [Mother] due to the trauma they received while they were in her care.”

{¶ 53} Flynn identified certified copies of medical records the agency had

obtained for each of the children, which documented physical abuse while in Mother’s care. She read excerpts from those medical records into the record,

including the following:

In medical records relating to R.R.,

● Progress notes dated May 13, 2020, stating, in part: “During triage, [R.R.’s] sister reports mom hits the siblings with a belt. Reports this has been ongoing and involves all children. [R.R.] denies, does not offer information. He has multiple unexplained scars, including J-shape[d] scars concerning [sic] for being hit with a cord.”

● Notes from February 11, 2022 regarding patient history, stating, in part: “4/4/14 brought to ED by 2 DCFS caseworkers & [patient’s] mother[.] ‘A call was made to the Children Services Hotline today stating that patient had marks on his face and neck.’ Found to have excoriated areas on his neck and marks on his left cheek. * * * Due to physician concerns of abuse, [patient] was sent to CT scan where a head CT and skeletal scan was done. Head CT was clear. [Patient] admitted for observation. There is already an open case with DCFS. He has witnessed domestic violence against his mother and two of her partners, one his biological father. He has been diagnosed with ADHD and the mother describes a wide array of deeply troubling behaviors (including fire-setting, aggressiveness toward other children, and cruelty towards small pets).”

● Progress notes dated May 6, 2022, stating, in part, under the heading “trauma/loss/stressors”: “11 referrals to CCDCFS for [sic] kindergarten — abuse or neglect, poor hygiene, not being fed (mom PTSD and cocaine use). * * * Witnessed interpersonal violence with every one of mom’s partners. * * * He jumped out of a second floor window because he feared one of mom’s boyfriend[s] — bruised, went to aunt’s home. She called the police. * * * 5/2019 — when removed from the home, he had many bruises of various ages. (siblings were abused also)”

In medical records relating to L.R.,

● Progress notes dated May 13, 2020, stating, in part: “During triage [LR.] reports mom hits the siblings with a belt. Reports this has been ongoing and involves all children. [L.R.] did not present with any injuries noted today.” ● Notes dated May 28, 2020, stating, under the heading “[c]aregiver narrative”: “[L.R.] has been very talkative about the abuse her younger siblings have sustained at the hands of the adult relatives.[5] She has also stated that this has not happened to her. She is very often quiet and to herself while in her current placement.”

In medical records relating to Dem.C.,

● Notes dated May 28, 2020, under the headings “[c]aregiver narrative” and “significant concerns,” stating, in part: “[Dem.C.] has had some difficulty adjust[ing]. He came with multiple scars, disclosing he had been hit with the belt by his relatives, aunties. He and his older brother were also witness to adult sexual acts in their household.” * * * [S]cars, the most of any of the children, emotional regulation/sexualized behaviors.”6

In medical records relating to J.C.,

● Progress notes dated May 13, 2020, stating, in part: “No rash, bruises or signs of acute injury. No open sores. No evidence of scabies, ringworm, bed bug bites, or lice. Superficial scratches noted to chest. Right shin with linear scar. Bilateral posterior thighs with raised purple/red welts, warm to the touch, child flinches when touched. * * * During triage [J.C.’s] sister reports mom hits the siblings with a belt. Reports this has been ongoing and involves all children. [J.C.] present with welts to bilateral posterior thighs, sister reports mom hit her with a belt, as recent as last night.”

● Progress notes dated May 15, 2020, stating, in part: “[Foster mother] reports that she has a lot of scars and very dry skin. * * * [Foster mother] also reports that older sister [L.R.] said mom was whipping her.”

5 Flynn testified that, at that time, the “adult relatives” who had access to the children were Mother and Mother’s boyfriend.

6 With respect to the identity of these “aunties,” Flynn testified that Dem.C. indicated that they were “[h]is mom’s friends.” Flynn stated that G.R. and F.S. did not have access to the children during the time of the alleged abuse because they were “feuding” with Mother. ● Progress notes dated May 28, 2020, stating, in part, under the heading “[c]aregiver narrative”: “[J.C.]’s skin has much improved since coming into their care. * * * [T]he redness and swelling at the thighs has resolved. Just a few dark marks are still there. [Caregiver] also had concern about the dark marks on [J.C.’s] back.”

In medical records relating to Z.C.,

● Progress notes dated May 13, 2020, stating, in part: “[L]ice. DCFS caseworker Catrina Moore reports that child had scratches to her upper left chest a few days ago. Child reported today during examination that mom hit her with a belt.”

{¶ 54} Flynn also testified regarding various “scars” and “markings” on the

children that were documented in the medical records, some of which were still

visible on R.R. as of the time of the hearing. Flynn testified that, when asked about

the injuries reflected in the medical records, Mother claimed they were “self-

inflicted” and that “she never harmed” her children. Although Mother had told

Flynn that she “whoops” the children “properly,” Mother denied hitting any of the

children with a belt or other “foreign object” and denied any other physical abuse of

the children. Mother also denied the children’s claims of being locked in a room for

extended periods of time, lacking access to food and having to throw their excrement

out of the window. According to Flynn, Mother stated that she “did not have locks

or doors” and “always fed her children” and claimed that her children’s stories were

the result of the children “being manipulated by their caregivers.”

{¶ 55} Flynn testified that she raised the issue of engaging in family

counseling related to the abuse the children had disclosed during a call with Mother,

Mother’s counselor, the family advocate and a social worker from the Public Defender’s Office a week before the hearing. She explained that family counseling

had not previously been part of the case plan because Mother had never

acknowledged that any physical abuse had occurred and she did not know “how to

help the mom if she continues to say that this never happened.” Flynn indicated

that, during the call, Mother was “very defensive” and distinguished between “a

whooping” and “a beating.” Mother stated that she had never “beat” her children,

she had “only whooped them” and that the children “might not understand that they

were whooped, not beat.” Flynn stated that she tried to ask Mother to explain the

difference between the two but that Mother “kept over-talking” her so “she “wasn’t

able to get much through.” Flynn testified that Mother later indicated that she would

be willing to participate in family counseling and the agency amended the case plan

to include family counseling but it had not yet commenced as of the time of the

hearing.

{¶ 56} With respect to visitation, Flynn testified that the children had weekly

two-hour visits with Mother, and that Mother appeared for every visit. Flynn stated

that until December 2021, visits were usually at the library. To make it easier for

Mother, while she was undergoing chemotherapy, supervised visits then occurred

in Mother’s home, until April 2022, when one of the children reported seeing beer

cans and a white substance in Mother’s bedroom. Mother was then sent for a urine

screen and visits returned to the library. Flynn stated that the result of that drug

screen was negative. {¶ 57} Flynn testified that, when they arrived for visits, Mother typically sat

in the car and listened to music and the children got in the back of the car, climbed

in the trunk or ran around the car. They then went into the library, had lunch in the

cafeteria and then went to a play area, computer area or reading area. Flynn testified

that Mother engaged most with R.R. and L.R. during visits and had “some

engagement” with the younger children. She stated that it was “a common

occurrence” for there to be periods of time in which Mother was not engaged with

any of the children during visits.

{¶ 58} Regarding the children’s placements, Flynn testified that R.R. had

been placed with his grandmother, G.R. She stated that G.R. was currently residing

with her mother, S.S., while an issue related to G.R.’s CMHA housing was resolved.

She indicated that there were no concerns for R.R.’s safety while in G.R.’s care and

that S.S.’s home had been previously investigated and deemed safe. She indicated

that R.R. had, at times, wavered a bit as to whether he wanted to live with Mother

or G.R. but that he had most recently advised Flynn that he wanted to remain with

G.R.

{¶ 59} Flynn testified that L.R. was in a foster placement as of the time of the

hearing and that there were no safety concerns for L.R. at that placement. She stated

that if the agency were granted permanent custody of L.R., she would remain in the

placement “while adoption service is undergoing.”

{¶ 60} Flynn testified that the three youngest children, Dem.C., Z.C. and J.C.

were living with their maternal aunt, F.S. Flynn stated that while the children were living with F.S., a referral was called in, alleging that F.S. had spanked Dem.C.

outside his school. An investigation was conducted and F.S. confirmed that she had

spanked Dem.C. with her hand three times on his buttocks. Flynn stated that the

agency explained to F.S. that it does not allow corporal punishment and that Dem.C.

should not be spanked due to his prior trauma. Flynn said that she had had a similar

conversation with Banzhaf and the children’s maternal great-grandmother, S.S.,

about not hitting J.C. with a ruler. Flynn indicated that F.S.’s spanking of Dem.C.

was “controlled,” left no bruises and was “not considered abuse.” Flynn stated that,

following that incident, there had been no further concerns regarding F.S. spanking

the children.

{¶ 61} Flynn stated that another referral came in alleging that F.S.’s

boyfriend had spanked the children. The boyfriend did not live in F.S.’s home but

visited her there. She stated that the agency had conducted a background check of

the boyfriend and that he had submitted to drug screens, which were negative.

Flynn testified that the agency investigated the spanking allegations against F.S.’s

boyfriend. She stated that she spoke with each of the children, F.S., the children’s

grandmother and Banzhaf regarding the allegations and found them to be

unsubstantiated. She indicated that the children all denied any spankings by F.S.’s

boyfriend.

{¶ 62} Flynn testified that F.S. moved and bought a larger home for the

children and that there were no safety concerns regarding the children’s placement

with her. She stated that the agency believed it was in R.R.’s best interest to remain with G.R., for the agency to be granted permanent custody of L.R. and for Dem.C.,

Z.C. and J.C. to remain with F.S.

{¶ 63} On cross-examination, Flynn acknowledged that the children had

been in protective supervision for approximately 18 months in 2018-2020, during

which time, the prior case worker visited the family at least twice a month. She

stated that, if the prior case worker had seen signs of physical abuse or neglect

during that time, she would have expected the prior case worker to have documented

it in her notes and/or sought a higher level of care for the children.

{¶ 64} Flynn further acknowledged that, “most times,” when a child is seen

for a doctor’s appointment, the physician will document scars, marks or bruises on

the child and that R.R.’s medical records from January and February 2022 (after he

was removed from Mother’s custody) documented several healed scars to his legs

and hypopigmentation that were not documented in medical records from May

2020 (when the children were removed from Mother’s care). Flynn indicated that

she had not asked R.R. about them because “[h]e didn’t say anything about being

abused” at that time and that it is “typical” for children to fall and get scars and

marks at his age due to the physical activities in which they participate.

{¶ 65} Flynn confirmed that, when the children were triaged after having

been removed from Mother’s care on May 13, 2020, (1) L.R. denied any abuse and

did not have any bruises, injuries or scars, (2) Dem.C. stated that his “aunties” “gave

him a whooping” and said nothing about Mother hitting him, (3) Z.C. had some

scratches on her chest, which had been documented by the worker of record a few days earlier and which L.R. claimed was the result of Z.C. having scratched herself,

and (4) then-two-year-old J.C. reported nothing. Flynn acknowledged that the

worker of record’s activity log included an entry dated May 8, 2020 (one week prior

to the children’s removal) that stated, in part, “Worker of record observed all

children to be free of marks and bruises and dressed appropriately,” but also noted

that “[t]here’s a lot in this activity log about the conditions [the children] were in”

and that those “conditions” were “pretty bad.” Flynn testified that she had never

reviewed the children’s medical records, pictures or other “specific reports” of

physical abuse with Mother.

{¶ 66} Referring to various certificates of completion introduced by Mother,

Flynn confirmed that Mother had completed a domestic violence education program

in November 2018, parenting classes in 2018 and May 2021, an anger management

program in June 2021, intensive and nonintensive outpatient substance abuse

treatment in December 2021, a drug and alcohol rehabilitation program in July 2021

and the Greater Cleveland Drug Court program in February 2022. Flynn also

confirmed that Mother was actively engaged in mental health services and that there

had been no recent domestic violence incidents involving Mother. She further

confirmed that Mother had been submitting to weekly drug screens and had tested

positive only twice — one positive urine screen for alcohol in December 2021 and

one positive toenail screen for methamphetamine in April 2022.

{¶ 67} Referring to documents Mother introduced from the lab that

conducted the toenail screen, Flynn acknowledged that the documents indicated that the detection window for drugs in a toenail screen is approximately 8 to 14

months, that the toenail screen revealed only the presence of methamphetamine in

the toenail — which was “conclusive evidence of the environmental exposure of

methamphetamine and [did] not provide evidence for the ingestion of

methamphetamine” — and that none of Mother’s weekly urine screens had tested

positive for methamphetamine. Flynn stated that her partner had spoken with

medical providers regarding Mother’s claim that the positive alcohol test could be

attributable to Mother’s chemotherapy and that the providers said, “that could be.”

{¶ 68} Flynn testified that Mother’s home was appropriate for the children.

Mother’s Witness

{¶ 69} Brown, a licensed professional counselor, testified that she began

seeing Mother in January 2022. Brown indicated that Mother had been referred to

her agency by Moore Counseling for individual counseling as part of her case plan.

Brown stated her agency assessed Mother and diagnosed Mother with PTSD and

major depressive order and that Brown then worked with Mother to develop a

treatment plan. Brown said that she meets with Mother weekly and that Mother is

“very engaged” in her therapy.

{¶ 70} Brown testified that they have been working on Mother’s coping skills

“to challenge negative thoughts and turn them into positive thoughts” and that

Mother has been making progress towards her goals. Brown indicated that she was

not aware of any outstanding services on Mother’s case plan. {¶ 71} Brown testified that she had only spoken with Flynn twice — both

times in the last three weeks. She stated that she attended a zoom meeting on

October 7, 2022, the purpose of which — she believed — was to address reunification

of Mother with the children based on Mother’s treatment plan and the case plan.

Brown indicated that the tone of the meeting was “a little aggressive” on the agency’s

part because the agency sought to get Mother to admit that she had physically

abused her children. Brown said that, in response, Mother was “[d]efensive.” She

indicated that Mother denied abusing her children but admitted to “disciplin[ing]

them” and that Mother claimed the agency did not understand “the difference

between a beating and a whooping.” Brown testified that no clarification was sought

during the meeting as to how Mother disciplined the children and that Mother was

not given an opportunity to explain what she meant by discipline, i.e., “it was more

of her trying to be able to say I did something that I didn’t do.” Brown stated that

she believed there was a “miscommunication” between Mother and the agency and

that Mother was “confused about what’s gonna really reunite her with her kids.”

{¶ 72} Brown testified that Flynn raised the issue of participating in family

counseling during the meeting, that Mother responded that she was willing to

engage in family counseling and that Flynn indicated that she would make a referral

for family counseling but, to her knowledge, had not yet done so.

{¶ 73} Brown testified that, prior to the October 2022 meeting, she had never

discussed Mother’s alleged physical abuse or discipline of the children with Mother.

When shown portions of the medical records reporting scars, marks and/or welts on R.R., Dem.C. and J.C., Brown acknowledged that such marks were not indicative of

ordinary discipline. Brown testified that she had not discussed the medical records

with Mother and had no knowledge regarding how any such marks occurred.

The Guardian Ad Litem’s Recommendation

{¶ 74} On October 17, 2022, the children’s guardian ad litem submitted a

written report in which he recommended that, “due to all the trauma the children

have disclosed while in [M]other[’]s care,” legal custody of Dem.C., Z.C. and J.C. be

granted to F.S., that legal custody of R.R. be granted to G.R. and that permanent

custody of L.R. be granted to the agency. The guardian ad litem stated that his

recommendation was based on interviews with Mother and the CCDCFS social

worker, meetings with the children, review of court documents and attending

hearings in the case.

{¶ 75} After Mother concluded her presentation of evidence, the guardian ad

litem placed his recommendation on the record. He stated that he had last spoken

with the children two days prior to the hearing and that the testimony presented at

the hearing was “pretty consistent” with what the children had disclosed to him both

during his interviews with the children and during the in camera interviews.

Although he acknowledged that R.R. had previously wavered between wanting to

stay with G.R. and being returned to Mother, the guardian ad litem stated that he

believed “there was some manipulation in place,” i.e., that Mother had offered R.R.

a car if he went back to her. He stated that, most recently, R.R. had confirmed that

he wanted to remain with G.R. {¶ 76} The guardian ad litem indicated that he last spoke with Mother several

days before the hearing. Although he commended Mother “on working her services

and trying to get herself in a better place,” he, nevertheless, recommended that G.R.

be granted legal custody of R.R., that F.S. be granted legal custody of Dem.C., Z.C.

and J.C. and that L.R. be placed in the permanent custody of the agency “due to all

the trauma” the children had sustained while in her care. The guardian ad litem

stated that he had not personally discussed the physical abuse allegations with

Mother because, after hearing about the abuse from the children, “seeing the

scarring and the bruising and the marks” and hearing from the agency that Mother

had always denied that she had abused the children, he “didn’t see how it would

progress the situation.” The guardian ad litem explained:

[T]he issue is the trauma that the children sustained while in mom’s care and like I said, I commend mom for getting sober, doing the treatment, getting herself in housing, all those great things, but at the end of the day in the best interests of the children from all the trauma they sustained and all the services they are going through, you know, there’s no way that these children can be back with mother.

The Juvenile Court’s Decision

{¶ 77} On October 27, 2022, the juvenile court issued written journal entries

(1) granting permanent custody of L.R. to the agency, (2) granting legal custody of

R.R. to his grandmother, G.R., (3) granting legal custody of Dem.C., Z.C. and J.C. to

their aunt, F.S. and (4) denying Mother’s motion for legal custody of the children.

{¶ 78} As to L.R., the juvenile court found, by clear and convincing evidence,

that L.R. had been in the temporary custody of CCDCFS for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, that reasonable efforts had been made

to prevent the removal of the child from the home and to return the child to the

home, that L.R. could not be placed with one of her parents within a reasonable time

or should not be placed with either parent, that no relatives had been identified who

were both willing and able to provide appropriate care for L.R. and that it was in

L.R.’s best interest to be placed in the permanent custody of the agency.

{¶ 79} As to R.R., Dem.C., Z.C. and J.C., the juvenile court found that the

children had been in the temporary custody of CCDCFS for twelve or more months

of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, that reasonable efforts had been made

to prevent the removal of the children from the home and to return the children to

the home, that the children could not be placed with one of their parents within a

reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent and that it was in the

children’s best interest to be placed in the legal custody of their maternal

grandmother or aunt.

{¶ 80} Mother appealed, raising the following three assignments of error for

review:

Assignment of Error I: The trial court’s rulings in case numbers AD18908319, AD18908321, AD18908322, and AD18908323, granting Appellee’s Motion to Modify Temporary Custody to Legal Custody, were each an abuse of discretion.

Assignment of Error II: The trial court’s ruling in case number AD18908320, granting Appellee’s Motion to Modify Temporary Custody to Permanent Custody, was an abuse of discretion.

Assignment of Error III: The trial court’s decision to overrule Mother’s trial counsel’s objection to the case worker’s testimony on re-redirect, regarding alleged prior referrals to DCFS for R.R. as of April 2014, was an abuse of discretion.

{¶ 81} For ease of discussion, we address Mother’s assignments of error out

of order.

Law and Analysis

The Juvenile Court’s Decision to Grant Permanent Custody of L.R. to CCDCFS

{¶ 82} In her second assignment of error, Mother contends that the juvenile

court abused its discretion in terminating her parental rights and granting

permanent custody of L.R. to the agency.

{¶ 83} The right to raise one’s own child is “‘an essential and basic civil

right.’” In re N.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101390, 2015-Ohio-314, ¶ 67, quoting In

re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48, 679 N.E.2d 680 (1997); see also In re Murray, 52

Ohio St.3d 155, 157, 556 N.E.2d 1169 (1990) (a parent has a “‘fundamental liberty

interest’ in the care, custody, and management” of his or her child), quoting

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982).

However, this right is not absolute. It is “‘always subject to the ultimate welfare of

the child, which is the polestar or controlling principle to be observed.’” In re L.D.,

2017-Ohio-1037, 86 N.E.3d 1012, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.), quoting In re Cunningham, 59

Ohio St.2d 100, 106, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979).

{¶ 84} Because termination of parental rights is “‘the family law equivalent

of the death penalty in a criminal case,’” In re J.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98546,

2013-Ohio-1704, ¶ 66, quoting In re Hoffman, 97 Ohio St.3d 92, 2002-Ohio-5368, 776 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 14, it is “an alternative of last resort,” In re Gill, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 79640, 2002-Ohio-3242, ¶ 21. It is, however, “sanctioned when necessary for

the welfare of a child.” In re M.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 101693 and 101694,

2015-Ohio-1028, ¶ 7, citing In re Wise, 96 Ohio App.3d 619, 624, 645 N.E.2d 812

(9th Dist.1994). “‘All children have the right, if possible, to parenting from either

natural or adoptive parents which provides support, care, discipline, protection and

motivation.’” In re J.B. at ¶ 66, quoting In re Hitchcock, 120 Ohio App.3d 88, 102,

696 N.E.2d 1090 (8th Dist.1996). Where parental rights are terminated, the goal is

to create “a more stable life for the dependent children” and to “facilitate adoption

to foster permanency for children.” In re N.B. at ¶ 67, citing In re Howard, 5th Dist.

Tuscarawas No. 85 A10-077, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 7860, 5 (Aug. 1, 1986)

Standard for Terminating Parental Rights and Granting Permanent Custody of L.R. to CCDCFS

{¶ 85} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) establishes a two-part test for courts to apply

when determining whether to grant a motion for permanent custody. A juvenile

court may grant a public child services agency’s motion for permanent custody if it

determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) permanent custody is in the

best interest of the child and (2) any of the following circumstances exists:

(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period if, as described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents.

(b) The child is abandoned.

(c) The child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child who are able to take permanent custody.

(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state.

(e) The child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents from whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated an abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions by any court in this state or another state.

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1).

{¶ 86} “A juvenile court’s decision to grant permanent custody will not be

reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence ‘if the record contains

some competent, credible evidence from which the court could have found that the

essential statutory elements for permanent custody had been established by clear

and convincing evidence.’” In re G.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107512, 2019-Ohio-

1533, ¶ 62, quoting In re A.P., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104130, 2016-Ohio-5849, ¶ 16.

{¶ 87} “Clear and convincing evidence” is that “measure or degree of proof”

that “produce[s] in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the

facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus; In re M.S., 2015-Ohio-1028, at ¶ 8. “It is

intermediate, being more than a mere preponderance, but not to the extent of such

certainty as is required beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. It does not

mean clear and unequivocal.” (Emphasis deleted.) Cross at 477.

{¶ 88} In this case, the agency moved for permanent custody of L.R.

pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). In its closing argument, the agency alternatively

argued that permanent custody was warranted under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a). The

juvenile court found that L.R. had been in the temporary custody of CCDCFS “for

twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period” and further

found that L.R. could not be placed with Mother or her father within a reasonable

time and should not be placed with either of them.

{¶ 89} Mother does not dispute that CCDCFS met its burden of establishing

that one of the conditions set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) existed as

to L.R. Mother challenges only the juvenile court’s best-interest determination.

Mother contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in determining that

granting permanent custody to the agency and terminating her parental rights was

in L.R.’s best interest. Best-interest Determination

{¶ 90} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) states that in determining whether permanent

custody is in a child’s best interest,7 the court “shall consider all relevant factors,”

including, but not limited to, the following:

(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;

(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child;

(c) The custodial history of the child * * *;

(d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency; [and]

(e) Whether any of the factors in [R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) to (11)] apply in relation to the parents and child.

{¶ 91} The best-interest determination focuses on the child, not the parent.

In re N.B., 2015-Ohio-314, at ¶ 59. Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), the juvenile court

weighs multiple factors to decide whether granting an agency permanent custody of

a child is in that child’s best interest. A juvenile court has considerable discretion in

7 In addition to the best-interest factors identified in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) sets forth a list of circumstances that, if all are found to exist, mandates a finding that permanent custody is in the best interest of the child. “R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) and 2151.414(D)(2) are ‘alternative means’ for determining whether permanent custody is in a child’s best interest.” In re R.D., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111798, 2022-Ohio-4519, ¶ 51, quoting In re J.P., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-834, 2019-Ohio-1619, ¶ 39-40. Because no argument has been made that all of the R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) circumstances exist here and only one of the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors needs to be resolved in favor of the award of permanent custody, we need not address R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) in this appeal. In re Za.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111683, 2023-Ohio-1477, ¶ 60. weighing these factors. Although the juvenile court is required to consider each

statutory factor in determining what is in a child’s best interest under R.C.

2151.414(D)(1), no one factor is required to be given greater weight than the others.

In re T.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100852, 2014-Ohio-2985, ¶ 23, citing In re

Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.3d 498, 2006-Ohio-5513, 857 N.E.2d 532, ¶ 56. Further, only

one of the factors need be resolved in favor of permanent custody to terminate

parental rights. In re J.C-A, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109480, 2020-Ohio-5336, ¶ 80;

In re A.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99836, 2013-Ohio-3818, ¶ 17; In re N.B. at ¶ 53.

{¶ 92} We review a juvenile court’s determination of a child’s best interest

under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) for abuse of discretion. In re P.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

Nos. 109518 and 109519, 2020-Ohio-4471, ¶ 76, citing In re D.A., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 95188, 2010-Ohio-5618, ¶ 47; see also In re J.B., 2013-Ohio-1704, at ¶ 97

(“[T]he discretion that a trial court has in custody matters should be accorded the

utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact the court's

determination will have on the lives of the parties concerned.”). A juvenile court

abuses its discretion where its decision is unreasonable, arbitrary or

unconscionable. In re R.D., 2022-Ohio-4519, at ¶ 49, citing Blakemore v.

Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). A decision is

unreasonable if there is ‘“no sound reasoning process that would support that

decision.’” In re C.D.Y., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108355, 2019-Ohio-4987, ¶ 8,

quoting Baxter v. Thomas, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101186, 2015-Ohio-2148, ¶ 21. A

decision is arbitrary if it is made “‘without consideration of or regard for facts [or] circumstances.’” In re C.D.Y. at ¶ 8, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 125 (10th

Ed.2014).

{¶ 93} Mother contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in

determining that permanent custody was in L.R.’s best interest because (1) Mother

had “completed her case plan objectives” with respect to substance abuse and

mental health services — the only specific concerns the agency had raised with

respect to L.R., (2) L.R. was alleged to have been sexually abused when living with

her father, R.S., not when living with Mother, (3) there was no evidence that Mother

had physically abused L.R., (4) the agency did not present evidence “as to how the

visits between Mother and L.R. were going” or “as to L.R.’s wishes regarding her

placement” and (5) Mother’s “successful[] complet[ion] [of] her case plan

objectives” combined with her “ongoing efforts” at substance abuse treatment and

monitoring and counseling “demonstrate[d] that L.R. could have received a ‘legally

secure placement’ without a grant of permanent custody to the agency.” We

disagree.

{¶ 94} The record reflects that the juvenile court considered each of the

relevant R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors in determining that an award of permanent

custody to the agency was in L.R.’s best interest. In its October 27, 2022 journal

entry, the juvenile court identified the factors it considered as follows:

Upon considering the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, and foster parents; the wishes of the child; the custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in temporary custody of a public children services agency or private child placing agency under one or more separate orders of disposition for twelve (12) or more months of a consecutive twenty-two (22) month period; the child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody; and, the report of the Guardian ad Litem, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a grant of permanent custody is in the best interests of the child and the child cannot be placed with one of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.

The juvenile court also found that “[n]o relatives have been identified who are both

willing and able to provide appropriate care for the child.”

{¶ 95} In determining that L.R. could not be placed with one of her parents

within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent, the juvenile

court further found, as it relates to Mother:

Following the placement of the child outside the child’s home and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency to assist the mother and father to remedy the problems that initially caused the child to be placed outside the home, the mother and father have failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child’s home.

Mother has a chronic mental illness that is so severe that it makes the parent unable to provide an adequate permanent home for the child at the present time and, as anticipated, within one (1) year after the Court holds the hearing in this matter.

***

Mother has committed abuse or neglect to the child and the child’s siblings and the likelihood of recurrence of the abuse or neglect makes the child’s placement with the parent a threat to the child’s safety.

{¶ 96} The juvenile court also found, with respect to the services provided by

the agency and the reasons those services were not successful, that “Mother has

completed some services but has demonstrated physical abuse to siblings of the

child.” {¶ 97} Following careful consideration of the evidence presented at the

permanent custody hearing and the transcript of the juvenile court’s June 13, 2022

in camera interview of L.R., we cannot say that the juvenile court abused its

discretion in weighing the relevant factors under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) and

concluding that granting permanent custody to the agency was in L.R.’s best

interest. Competent, credible, clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile

court’s findings related to Mother’s physical abuse or neglect of L.R. and her siblings

and its ultimate best-interest determination.8

{¶ 98} Although it is undisputed that Mother completed most, if not all, of

her case plan services, “substantial compliance” with case plan services is not, in and

of itself, “dispositive” and “does not preclude a grant of permanent custody to a

social services agency.” In re J.B., 2013-Ohio-1704, at ¶ 90, citing In re C.C., 187

Ohio App.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-780, 932 N.E.2d 360, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.); see also In re

R.D., 2022-Ohio-4519, at ¶ 59.

{¶ 99} Simply because a parent completes the services identified in a case

plan does not mean he or she has achieved the objectives of the case plan or has

substantially remedied the conditions that caused the child to be removed. In re

8 There is limited information in the record regarding Mother’s mental illness and its impact on her parenting of the children. Although the parties have not raised the issue, it does not appear that the juvenile court’s finding that “Mother has a chronic mental illness that is so severe that it makes the parent unable to provide an adequate permanent home for the child at the present time and, as anticipated, within one (1) year after the Court holds the hearing in this matter” is adequately supported by the record. However, because the record otherwise supports the juvenile court’s permanent custody determination, we do not further address the issue here. J.B. at ¶ 90. ‘“The issue is not whether the parent has substantially complied with

the case plan, but whether the parent has substantially remedied the conditions that

caused the child’s removal.’” Id., quoting In re McKenzie, 9th Dist. Wayne No.

95CA0015, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4618, 11 (Oct. 18, 1995).

{¶ 100} In this case, L.R. was placed in the temporary custody of the agency

after Mother relapsed and it was discovered that the children had been physically

abused while in Mother’s care. At the time of the hearing, L.R. had been in agency

custody for more than two years.

{¶ 101} Contrary to Mother’s assertion, evidence was presented that L.R. had

been abused while in Mother’s custody. Although certain of the medical records

admitted into evidence contain entries suggesting that L.R. herself may not have

been physically abused by Mother, as detailed above, Mason, L.R.’s therapist,

testified that L.R. told her that Mother had “locked” L.R. and her siblings in a room

“for hours at a time, a long, long time” without food and that, while in Mother’s care,

she had also been “whooped” with a belt. The juvenile court also heard from L.R.

directly during the in camera interview regarding her experiences while in Mother’s

care and her relationship with Mother.

{¶ 102} Further, even if there had been no evidence that L.R. had been

physically abused by Mother, the agency presented ample competent, credible

evidence, based on the testimony of Banzhaf, Flynn and the medical records, to

support the juvenile court’s finding that Mother had physically abused and

neglected L.R.’s siblings (and that L.R. had observed that abuse) by (1) hitting the children with belts causing significant bruising, marks or welts, (2) locking the

children in a room for hours at a time without access to adequate food or bathroom

facilities and (3) leaving the younger children strapped into high chairs for extended

periods of time. Mason testified regarding the trauma L.R. experienced as a result

of Mother’s physical abuse and the continuing effects of that trauma. Based on the

evidence presented, the juvenile court reasonably concluded that placement with

Mother would pose “a threat to [L.R.’s] safety.” The record reflects that Mother has

refused to even acknowledge that any abuse occurred, denying that she ever locked

her children in a room and consistently downplaying the abuse as “proper”

“whoopings” rather than “beatings.” There is nothing in the record to suggest that

Mother would be able to appropriately parent and provide a safe, secure and stable

home for L.R. that meets her needs at any reasonable time in the future.

{¶ 103} Likewise, although Mother contends that no evidence was presented

at the hearing regarding Mother’s visitation with L.R. or L.R.’s wishes regarding

placement, the record reveals otherwise. As detailed above, Flynn testified

regarding L.R.’s visits with Mother. Mason testified that L.R. told her that she

“never wants to go back home again” because of “[w]hat [Mother] did to us.” The

guardian ad litem stated that the testimony presented at the hearing was

“consistent” with what the children had communicated to him regarding their

wishes and L.R.’s counsel clearly stated in her closing argument that it was “[L.R.’s]

desire to be placed in permanent custody of the [a]gency so that she can remain with her current foster mother.” In addition, the juvenile court judge heard from L.R.

regarding her wishes during his in camera interview of L.R.

{¶ 104} “A child’s best interests require permanency and a safe and secure

environment.” In re E.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 100473 and 100474, 2014-Ohio-

2534, ¶ 29. Although “[f]amily unity and blood relationship are vital factors to

carefully and fully consider,” the “paramount consideration” is always the best

interest of the child. In re J.B., 2013-Ohio-1704, at ¶ 111.

{¶ 105} Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the juvenile court

acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or unconscionably in determining that it was in

L.R.’s best interest to grant permanent custody to the agency. The record reflects

that the juvenile court carefully considered and weighed all of the relevant factors in

determining that permanent custody was in L.R.’s best interest. The juvenile court’s

best-interest determination is supported by competent, credible, clear and

convincing evidence.

{¶ 106} Accordingly, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in

granting permanent custody of L.R. to CCDCFS. Mother’s second assignment of

error is overruled.

The Juvenile Court’s Decisions Granting Legal Custody of R.R., Dem.C., Z.C. and J.C. to Other Relatives

{¶ 107} In her first assignment of error, Mother contends that the juvenile

court abused its discretion in granting legal custody of R.R. to G.R. and legal custody

of Dem.C., Z.C. and J.C. to F.S. Mother contends that the juvenile court’s decision was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence and was not in the best

interest of the children because (1) there were “reasons to doubt the children’s

credibility with respect to the allegations [of physical abuse] against Mother,” (2)

Mother had completed, or had “at least made substantial progress on, all of her case

plan objectives,” (3) there was “minimal evidence” of Mother’s drug use, (4) Mother

had cooperated with the agency and complied with weekly drug screens, (5) there

were no concerns regarding Mother’s engagement in mental health counseling and

(6) Mother “showed up for every visit” with her children.

Standard for Determining Legal Custody

{¶ 108} As an alternative to an award of permanent custody, a juvenile court

may award legal custody of an abused, neglected or dependent child “to either

parent or to any other person who, prior to the dispositional hearing, files a motion

requesting legal custody of the child or is identified as a proposed legal custodian in

a complaint or motion filed prior to the dispositional hearing by any party to the

proceedings.” R.C. 2151.353(A)(3). “Legal custody” is

a legal status that vests in the custodian the right to have physical care and control of the child and to determine where and with whom the child shall live, and the right and duty to protect, train, and discipline the child and to provide the child with food, shelter, education, and medical care, all subject to any residual parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities.

R.C. 2151.011(B)(21). A person identified in a complaint or motion filed by a party

to the proceedings as a proposed legal custodian must comply with various statutory requirements, including signing a statement of understanding for legal custody.

R.C. 2151.353(A)(3).

{¶ 109} Legal custody is “significantly different” than the termination of

parental rights. In re K.L.V.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112067, 2023-Ohio-1287,

¶ 30. Unlike an award of permanent custody, “[a]n award of legal custody of a child

does not divest parents of their residual parental rights, privileges, and

responsibilities.” In re C.R., 108 Ohio St.3d 369, 2006-Ohio-1191, 843 N.E.2d 1188,

paragraph one of the syllabus. When a parent loses legal custody of his or her child,

the parent “retains residual parental rights, privileges and responsibilities and is not

permanently foreclosed from regaining custody.” In re M.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

108567, 2019-Ohio-5128, ¶ 32; R.C. 2151.353(A)(3)(c). Nevertheless, an order

granting legal custody of a child to another is “intended to be permanent in nature.”

R.C. 2151.42(B) (“An order of disposition issued under division (A)(3) of section

2151.353 * * * granting legal custody of a child to a person is intended to be

permanent in nature. A court shall not modify or terminate an order granting legal

custody of a child unless it finds, based on facts that have arisen since the order was

issued or that were unknown to the court at that time, that a change has occurred in

the circumstances of the child or the person who was granted legal custody, and that

modification or termination of the order is necessary to serve the best interest of the

child.”).

{¶ 110} The touchstone of a decision regarding legal custody is the best

interest of the child. See, e.g., In re C.S., 3d Dist. Paulding No. 11-21-07, 2022-Ohio- 2451, ¶ 20 (“At a dispositional hearing involving a request for legal custody, the focus

is on the best interest of the child.”); In re A.P., 9th Dist. Summit No. 30056, 2022-

Ohio-276, ¶ 7 (‘“Following an adjudication of neglect, dependency, or abuse, the

juvenile court’s determination of whether to place a child in the legal custody of a

parent or a relative is based solely on the best interest of the child.’”), quoting In re

K.H., 9th Dist. Summit No. 27952, 2016-Ohio-1330, ¶ 12. Where a juvenile court

considers an award of legal custody following an adjudication of abuse, neglect or

dependency, ‘“it does so by examining what would be in the best interest of the child

based on a preponderance of the evidence.’” In re K.T., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

111996, 2023-Ohio-1288, ¶ 33, quoting In re M.J.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94130,

2010-Ohio-1674, ¶ 11. Thus, we apply a “preponderance of the evidence” standard

when reviewing a juvenile court’s factual findings on a request for legal custody. In

re W.A.J., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99813, 2014-Ohio-604, ¶ 2; In re O.P., 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 109355, 2020-Ohio-4835, ¶ 12 (lesser preponderance of the evidence

standard is appropriate in legal custody cases because ‘“legal custody where parental

rights are not terminated is not as drastic a remedy as permanent custody’”), quoting

In re C.V.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98340, 2012-Ohio-5514, ¶ 7. A

“preponderance of the evidence” means evidence that is ‘“more probable, more

persuasive, or of greater value.’” In re C.V.M. at ¶ 7, quoting In re D.P., 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 05AP-117, 2005-Ohio-5097, ¶ 52.

{¶ 111} The decision whether to grant or deny a request for legal custody is

within the sound discretion of the juvenile court. When reviewing a juvenile court’s ‘“ultimate decision on whether the facts as determined would make it in the child’s

best interests to be placed in legal custody,’” we apply an abuse of discretion

standard. In re W.A.J. at ¶ 2, quoting In re G.M., 2011-Ohio-4090, at ¶ 14.

{¶ 112} Unlike permanent custody cases — in which the juvenile court must

generally consider the factors outlined in R.C. 2151.414(D) — there is no “specific

test or set of criteria” that must be applied or considered when determining what is

in a child’s best interest on a motion for legal custody. In re S.G., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 108711, 2020-Ohio-4060, ¶ 24; In re C.D.Y., 2019-Ohio-4987, at ¶ 10. However,

the best-interest factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) may be “instructive” in

making that determination. See, e.g., In re V.P., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109649,

2020-Ohio-5626, ¶ 32; In re R.B., 2019-Ohio-1656, 136 N.E.3d 42, ¶ 48, 52 (8th

Dist.); see also In re B.D., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105650, 2017-Ohio-8663, ¶ 26

(“In determining the best interest of the child in a legal custody case, the juvenile

court should consider all relevant factors, and may look to the factors listed under

R.C. 2151.414(D) * * * for guidance.”), citing In re M.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

105168, 2017-Ohio-7481, ¶ 11.

{¶ 113} Courts have also looked to the best-interest factors set forth in R.C.

3109.04(F) in determining what is in a child’s best interest for purpose of a motion

for legal custody. See, e.g., In re C.D.Y. at ¶ 12; In re J.O., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

87626, 2007-Ohio-407, ¶ 11-12; see also In re K.S., 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2019-

01-009 and CA2019-02-015, 2019-Ohio-2384, ¶ 37 (“As the paramount concern is

the best interest of the child, the court ‘should consider the totality of the circumstances affecting the best interest of the child.’” * * * A court may therefore

consider the relevant best interest factors set forth in either R.C. 3109.04(F) or R.C.

2151.414(D) in determining the best interest of the child.”), quoting In re S.L., 12th

Dist. Butler Nos. CA2012-07-137 through CA2012-07-142 and CA2012-07-147

through CA2012-07-149, 2013-Ohio-781, ¶ 54. Relevant to the issues in this appeal,

those factors include: (1) the wishes of the child’s parents regarding the child’s care;

(2) the wishes and concerns of the child, as expressed to the court; (3) the child’s

interaction and interrelationships with the child’s parents, siblings and any other

person who may significantly affect the child’s best interest; (4) the child’s

adjustment to home, school and community; (5) the mental and physical health of

all persons involved in the situation and (6) whether there is reason to believe that

either parent has acted in a manner resulting in a child being an abused child or a

neglected child. See R.C. 3109.04(F)(1).

{¶ 114} In determining that legal custody was in the children’s best interest,

the juvenile court considered several relevant factors, including best-interest factors

set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(d) and 3109.04(F)(1), and set forth specific

findings identifying those factors and explaining its determination that an award of

legal custody of R.R. to his maternal grandmother, G.R., and an award of legal

custody of Dem.C., Z.C. and J.C. to their aunt, F.S., was in the children’s best

interest. The juvenile court found that the children had been in the temporary

custody of CCDCFS for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month

period and could not be placed with one of their parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent, that R.R. was bonded with G.R. and Dem.C.,

Z.C. and J.C. were bonded with F.S. and that the wishes of the children, “as

expressed directly by the child or through the Guardian ad Litem with due regard

for the maturity of the child,” were that they remain with G.R. or F.S. The juvenile

court further found as to each child, considering “[t]he child’s need for a legally

secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved

without a grant of legal custody”:

The child deserves a safe and stable environment where all [his/her] needs can be met and [he/she] can thrive. This cannot be achieved with either parent. * * * Additionally, the Court finds that the child was physically abused by mother while in her care and as a result has permanent scar[r]ing on [his/her] body and is currently participating in counseling to address Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.

Mother has committed abuse as described in ORC 2151.031 against the child and the child’s siblings and the Court determines that the seriousness, nature, or likelihood of recurrence of the abuse makes the child’s placement with the mother a threat to the child’s safety.

{¶ 115} The record supports the juvenile court’s findings by a preponderance

of the evidence.

{¶ 116} Mother argues that the record did not support a finding that Mother

had physically abused the children and that the juvenile court “acted in an arbitrary,

unreasonable, and unconscionable manner in assigning weight” to the “counselors’

hearsay testimony” regarding the children’s claims of physical abuse because (1)

there was no clear “timetable for when the alleged acts of abuse occurred,” (2) the

medical records contained “conflicting reports from the children” regarding the

alleged physical abuse, (3) certain of medical records noting marks or scars on the children were dated after the children had been removed from Mother’s care, (4) the

children had made “allegations of abuse” against other caregivers and (5) after the

children were placed in the care of F.S., “they would have a reason to tell the

counselor that Mother, and not F.S., had abused them.” We disagree.

{¶ 117} Although the children spoke separately with their counselors, the

siblings’ descriptions of the abuse by Mother were largely consistent, e.g.,

descriptions of being hit with a belt or belt buckle or being locked in a room or

strapped into a high chair for extended periods of time. The children’s counselors,

Banzhaf and Mason, testified that the children’s description of abuse would “just

come up naturally,” were expressed in age-appropriate language and, when retold,

were “repeat[ed] * * * the same way.” The children’s medical records include reports

of similar claims of abuse, which the children described to multiple, different

medical providers, and documented scars, bruises and welts resulting from such

abuse. The guardian ad litem stated that the testimony presented at the hearing was

“pretty consistent” with what the children had disclosed to him. Further, the

juvenile court judge heard from R.R., L.R., Dem.C. and Z.C. directly, during his

separate, in camera interviews of the children, regarding their relationship with

Mother and what happened while in her care.

{¶ 118} Mother also contends that the juvenile court gave undue weight to

the children’s wishes regarding whether they should be returned to Mother,

particularly given that the children had expressed their wishes after being removed from Mother’s care and while in the care of others who may have influenced the

children’s wishes.

{¶ 119} There is no evidence in the record that the children’s expression of

their wishes regarding where they wished to reside was due to manipulation or

undue influence by their caregivers. The record reflects that R.R. expressed his

desire to live with G.R. both to Flynn and the guardian ad litem. Banzhaf testified

that Z.C. and J.C. stated that they enjoyed living with F.S. The guardian ad litem

stated, based on his interviews with the children and other factors, that he believed

it would be in the best interest of R.R. to be placed in the legal custody of G.R. and

in the best interest of Dem.C., Z.C. and J.C. to be placed in the legal custody of F.S.

In addition, the juvenile court judge heard directly from R.R., Dem.C. and Z.C.

regarding their wishes during his separate, in camera interviews of the children.

{¶ 120} A child’s “best interests are served by the child being placed in a

permanent situation that fosters growth, stability, and security.” In re M.S., 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 101693 and 101694, 2015-Ohio-1028, ¶ 11, citing In re Adoption

of Ridenour, 61 Ohio St.3d 319, 324, 574 N.E.2d 1055 (1991). At the time of the

hearing, the children had been in agency custody for more than two years. During

that time, Mother had never acknowledged the physical harm she had caused to her

children or the continuing effects of the trauma they had sustained while in her care.

As stated above, Mother’s efforts to complete case plan services, although

commendable, does not mean she has achieved the objectives of the case plan or has

substantially remedied the conditions that caused the children to be removed from her care. Banzhaf testified that Z.C. and J.C. need a caregiver who understands and

acknowledges the trauma they have experienced and their need for continuing

therapy to process that trauma. Evidence was presented that, in their current

placements with G.R. and F.S., the children feel safe and are receiving counseling to

address the trauma they experienced while living with Mother. There is nothing in

the record to suggest that Mother would be able to appropriately parent and provide

a safe home for R.R., Dem.C., Z.C. and J.C. that meets their needs at any reasonable

time in the future.

{¶ 121} Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the juvenile court

acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or unconscionably. Competent, credible evidence

supports the juvenile court’s determination that granting legal custody of R.R. to

G.R. and granting legal custody of Dem.C., Z.C. and J.C. to F.S. was in the children’s

best interest.

{¶ 122} Accordingly, we overrule Mother’s first assignment of error.

Scope of Re-redirect Examination

{¶ 123} In her third assignment of error, Mother contends that the juvenile

court abused its discretion in allowing the agency, over her objection, to inquire

about prior agency referrals relating to R.R. during its re-redirect examination of

Flynn.

{¶ 124} After Mother completed her recross-examination of Flynn, the

agency asked Flynn, on re-redirect examination, about testimony she had given

during her direct examination relating to prior agency referrals documented in R.R.’s medical records. Over Mother’s counsel’s objection, the juvenile court

permitted Flynn to testify as follows:

Q. You testified earlier in reviewing [R.R.’s] medical documents that there was a report of his history of medical diagnoses, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And as part of your review of those records you read out that as of April of 2014 there had been 12 referrals into DCFS for [R.R.] for various marks and scars and bruising on him, correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. To your knowledge, in 2014 —

[Mother’s counsel]: Your Honor, I’m gonna object. This is beyond the scope of my recross.

[Counsel for the agency]: Your Honor, she —

THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead.

[Counsel for the agency]: Thank you. One final question.

Q. * * * In 2014 do you know in whose care [R.R.] was?

A. His mother.

(Emphasis added.) After this exchange, the agency rested its case.

{¶ 125} Mother argues that her recross-examination was limited to “specific

marks” observed on R.R. in May 2020 and whether those marks “occurred in

Mother’s presence” — “not [about] other unrelated incidents dating back to 2014”

— and that the agency’s re-redirect examination, therefore, exceeded the scope of

Mother’s recross-examination. Mother contends that admission of this testimony

“severely prejudiced” Mother by making it “more likely that the trier of fact would

consider the marks on R.R. to have originated from Mother, rather than F.S. or some other source,” and had “the effect of ‘bolstering’ statements from the children made

to [their] counselors” that Mother had physically abused them.

{¶ 126} The agency responds that the juvenile court properly overruled

Mother’s objection because on recross-examination, Mother asked Flynn “about

scarring on R.R.” and whether any of the images of scarring documented in his

medical records after he was removed from Mother’s care in May 2020 showed

“open wounds.” The agency contends that the re-redirect examination was simply

“a handful of follow-up questions” about whether the agency had ever received

reports of physical harm to R.R. while in Mother’s care before he came into agency

custody.

{¶ 127} Generally, the scope of redirect examination is limited to matters

inquired into by the adverse party on cross-examination. State v. Rucker, 2018-

Ohio-1832, 113 N.E.3d 81, ¶ 59 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Thomas, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 101797, 2015-Ohio-3226, ¶ 41, and State v. Wilson, 30 Ohio St.2d 199,

204, 283 N.E.2d 632 (1972); Thomas v. Thomas, 2012-Ohio-2893, 974 N.E.2d 679,

¶ 67 (5th Dist.). However, the control of redirect examination is committed to the

discretion of the trial judge, and “a reversal upon that ground can be predicated

upon nothing less than a clear abuse thereof.” Wilson at 204; Thomas, 2012-Ohio-

2893, 974 N.E.2d 679, at ¶ 67; see also Rucker at ¶ 59 (observing that “redirect

examination is not necessarily limited to subject areas brought out on cross-

examination”); see also Saker Family Trust v. Elio Internatl., Inc., 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 99AP-945, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2393, 4 (June 6, 2000) (“The trial court * * * has discretion to allow a witness to testify on redirect examination to facts

that might have been elicited during the witness’ testimony in chief.”). Based on our

review of the record, we find no reversible error here.

{¶ 128} Even if the agency’s inquiry in its re-redirect examination of Flynn

was outside the scope of Mother’s recross-examination, Mother has not shown that

she was in any way prejudiced as a result. During her re-redirect examination, Flynn

was asked, in large part, to reiterate facts identified in her review of medical records

relating to R.R. to which she had “testified earlier” during her direct examination.

See tr. 129-131 and State exhibit No. 23. Although Mother claims that she had no

opportunity to address this testimony, Mother did not request the opportunity to

ask any further questions of Flynn or to “address it in some other fashion” at the

hearing. Ample other evidence supported the juvenile court’s decisions; there is

nothing in the record to suggest that the juvenile court relied on this testimony in

rendering its decision in the case or that the juvenile court’s decision would have

been different if the testimony had not been admitted. Mother’s third assignment

of error is overruled.

{¶ 129} Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment

into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_____ EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE

LISA B. FORBES, J., and EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR