In Re Senior

255 B.R. 794, 45 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 825, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 1615, 2000 WL 1827892
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedDecember 1, 2000
Docket00-333-3F3
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 255 B.R. 794 (In Re Senior) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Senior, 255 B.R. 794, 45 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 825, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 1615, 2000 WL 1827892 (Fla. 2000).

Opinion

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

JERRY A. FUNK, Bankruptcy Judge.

This Case is before the Court for confirmation of the Second Amended Chapter 13 *796 Plan filed by Carl L. Senior, Jr. and Pe-trease L. Senior (“Debtors”) on July 18, 2000. (Doc. 89.) On August 9, 2000, WFS Financial, Inc. (“WFS”) filed an Amended Objection to Confirmation of Debtors’ Plan on the grounds that Debtors’ Plan failed to provide a proper market rate of interest on WFS’ claim and failed to provide for any payment to WFS during the first eight months of the Plan. (Doc. 44.) On October 17, 2000, the Court held a confirmation hearing at which the parties presented evidence and argument as to the proper measure of the market rate of interest. The Court elects to publish its findings as to the proper market rate in this case in order to hopefully limit litigation on interest rate issues in the future and provide consistency and predictability in the Chapter 13 cram-down process.

FINDINGS OF FACT

On June 1, 1999, Debtors purchased a 1994 Acura Legend four-door sedan. Debtors agreed to pay a total of $37,916.34 for the vehicle — $22,948.28 in principal and $14,968.06 in interest at 19.89% annually. (WFS’ Ex. 1.) This worked out to a monthly payment of $574.49.

WFS financed the purchase and received a purchase-money security interest in the vehicle as collateral for the loan.

Debtors testified at the confirmation hearing that the vehicle now has about 80,000 miles on it.

On January 18, 2000, Debtors filed their Chapter 13 petition in this Court. (Doc. 1.) Debtors had not filed for Chapter 13 protection anytime in the last six years.

Debtors’ Summary of Schedules indicated $321,925.00 in assets and $340,380.01 in liabilities. Debtors valued the Acura at $13,875.00 and WFS’ claim at $19,000.00, leaving $5,125.00 of WFS’ claim unsecured.

Debtors proposed a fifty-three month Plan. The Plan provided that WFS receive $363.10 per month in distribution. Debtors came up with this number by adding 8% interest to their estimate of WFS’ secured claim, $16,275.00, over forty-five months of payments to be made from month eight to month fifty-three of the Plan.

The remainder of WFS’ claim, $7,322.00, would be paid off pro rata with the rest of the unsecured claims. The Plan provided that the unsecured creditors receive 21% of their claims.

WFS contends that Debtor’s Plan does not satisfy the requirement that a debtor’s plan provide a secured creditor property amounting to the full present value of a secured claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). More specifically, WFS argues that the “market rate” of interest required to bolster a deferred secured claim payout to present value must be closer to the contract rate of interest that a creditor would have earned on the money by loaning it to a similarly risky consumer outside bankruptcy.

Debtors, of course, argue that 8% interest compensates WFS sufficiently for the inconvenience of having its profit slashed and dragged out over fifty-three months.

Such disputes have become alarmingly typical and theoretically intractable. There is currently no effective substantive or procedural device able to pragmatically conduct the necessary balancing between a creditor’s profit interest and a debtor’s reorganization interest.

The Court, therefore, finds that some definite, numerical guidelines must be imposed in order to bring order and simplicity to this arena. First, the Court will analyze the interest-rate computation methods currently in place. Then, the Court will establish presumptively valid interest rate parameters dependent on the length of a proposed plan. Finally, the Court will add a list of factors to be considered in departing from those guidelines, and will offer three exceptions to the application of these standards.

*797 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. THE REQUIREMENT OF PRESENT VALUE PAYMENT UNDER § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) AND CURRENT METHODS FOR DETERMINING THE CORRECT PRESENT VALUE RATE

Section 1325(a)(5) provides, in relevant part:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm a plan if—
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan—
(B)(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such claim ...

11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2000). Secured creditors must be accorded full present value of their claims in exchange for being forced to accept deferred payment and for losing any rights against the collateral during a plan. See United States v. Southern States Motor Inns, Inc. (In re Southern States Motor Inns, Inc.), 709 F.2d 647 (11th Cir.1983) (addressing the present value requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9), a cram-down provision analogous to § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii)).

The Eleventh Circuit declared rather cryptically in Southern States that creditors who are forced to receive deferred payments in lieu of contractual payments or collateral foreclosure should receive interest on the secured portions of their claims at the prevailing market rate. See Southern States, 709 F.2d at 652-653. Left to their own devices in determining exactly what “market rate” means, bankruptcy courts in Florida have split between two approaches: the “formula” method, a debt- or darling that generally produces lower interest rates, and the “coerced loan” method, whose very appellation hints at its appeal to creditors. 1 See e.g. In re Hollinger, 245 B.R. 691 (Bankr.N.D.Fla.2000) (discussing the merits of the two methods and electing to employ the formula method); In re Felipe, 229 B.R. 489, 491-492 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1998) (adopting the coerced loan method); In re Star Trust, 237 B.R. 827, 841-842 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1999) (adopting the coerced loan method).

This Court adopted the “coerced loan” approach just three months ago in In re Haskell, 252 B.R. 236, 242 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2000). The Court found that, in determining the proper Chapter 13 cram-down interest rate, the Court must look to the interest rates charged for making a loan with similar terms, duration, collateral, and risk. See id. In effect, the coerced loan method obligates the parties to produce evidence as to the sort of interest rate a financier would charge for a loan to a consumer with a history of default and bankruptcy secured by collateral that cannot be foreclosed without venturing into a bankruptcy court. See id.

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Bluebook (online)
255 B.R. 794, 45 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 825, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 1615, 2000 WL 1827892, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-senior-flmb-2000.