In Re Seman

4 B.R. 568, 2 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 394, 1980 Bankr. LEXIS 5031, 6 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 626
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 6, 1980
Docket19-10668
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 4 B.R. 568 (In Re Seman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Seman, 4 B.R. 568, 2 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 394, 1980 Bankr. LEXIS 5031, 6 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 626 (N.Y. 1980).

Opinion

DECISION ON OBJECTION TO CONFIRMATION OF PLAN AND DISCHARGE OF DEBTOR.

HOWARD SCHWARTZBERG, Bankruptcy Judge.

This is another in the stream of cases under Chapter 13 where the debtor’s plan offers nothing to unsecured creditors and simultaneously seeks the blessings under Code § 1328 in order to discharge obligations that would otherwise be nondischargeable in a straight liquidation case under Chapter 7. Confirmation is sought as a result of literal compliance with the distribution requirement in Code § 1325(a)(4) that the creditors will receive “not less than” the amount that would be paid if the estate were liquidated under Chapter 7. The standing Chapter 13 trustee and an unsecured creditor have objected to confirmation on the ground that a zero plan designed to discharge an otherwise nondis-chargeable debt must be regarded as lacking the good faith required under Code § 1325(aX3).

The debtor filed her petition under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 on April 28,1980; listing six unsecured creditors totalling $2,447.77, a secured automobile loan for $340. and a contingent liability for an alleged intentional tort arising out of a pending legal action. The petition reveals that the debtor has regular income as a waitress in the approximate amount of $574.00 per month, with monthly expenses of $526.00. She is also entitled to receive alimony and child support from her husband under a separation agreement, although it is asserted that she has not been able to enforce these obligations. All of her assets are exempt. Thus, unsecured creditors would receive nothing if this were a straight liquidation case under Chapter 7. The debtor’s plan calls for payment of the secured debt and no payment to the unsecured creditors.

The debtor reasons that it would be the rankest sort of discrimination against the poor to hold that their inability to make payments to unsecured creditors makes them ineligible for the benefits of the dischargeability provisions under Chapter 13. If she were required to file a straight bankruptcy petition she contends that she would be left with a potentially substantial undischarged obligation which would impair the possibility of her ever achieving financial stability, although the debt may not be collectible. This argument elides the point that to be eligible for relief under Chapter 13 a debtor must be “an individual with regular income.” See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e). An “individual with regular income” is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(24) to mean an “individual whose income is sufficiently stable and regular to enable such individual to make payments under a plan under Chapter 13 of this title . . ”. [Emphasis added] Thus, payments must be made as a prerequisite for relief. Secured creditors may look to the value of their collateral for the payment available to them whether the debtor chooses to file under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13. 1 Therefore *570 the payments required under Chapter 13 must be made to unsecured creditors consistent with the Congressional intent that Chapter 13 was designed to encourage more debtors to repay their debts over an extended period rather than opt for straight bankruptcy liquidation and discharge. 2

That zero plans for unsecured creditors were not intended under the Code is manifest from the terminology in Chapter 13. The confirmation standard in Code § 1325(a)(4) refers to “property to be distributed under the plan”; Code § 1326 directs that administration expenses must be paid before or at the time “of each payment to creditors under the plan”; Code § 1328(a) grants a broad discharge to the debtor “after completion by the debtor of all payments under the plan”; Code § 1328(b) grants a hardship discharge to the debtor under certain conditions if “the debtor has not completed payments under the plan”, but restores to nondischargeable status those nondischargeable debts under Code § 523(a) that would otherwise have been discharged if all payments were completed under the plan; and Code § 1329 permits modification of a Chapter 13 plan after confirmation “but before the completion of payments under a plan.”

A debtor who does not propose to make any payments to unsecured creditors, and whose unsecured creditors would receive nothing if a petition were filed under Chapter 7, is not given the alternative of avoiding the consequences of nondischargeability of debts under Code § 523 by simply filing a petition for relief under Chapter 13. A disguised Chapter 7 liquidation under Chapter 13 would subvert the purpose of Chapter 13 which was expressed in the House Report No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) 118, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1978, p. 6079:

“The purpose of Chapter 13 is to enable an individual, under court supervision and protection, to develop and perform under a plan for the repayment of his debts over an extended period.”

The privilege of obtaining the benefit of the broad dischargeability provisions under Code § 1328(a) is conditioned on, and the encouragement for, debt repayment under a plan. The failure to complete the required payments then triggers the hardship discharge relief under Code § 1328(b), where the concept of dischargeability is more restricted. To accept the debtor’s reasoning that a debtor who proposes nothing to unsecured creditors because they would receive nothing under Chapter 7 is therefore entitled to the benefit of the broad discharge under Code § 1328(a) would undermine the basic purpose for Chapter 13, which is to encourage individuals with regular income to repay their debts. The debt- or’s reasoning would produce the absurd result of penalizing a debtor who offers to make payments to unsecured creditors, and does make partial payment, but cannot fully complete them under a plan, by restoring the debtor’s nondischargeable obligations pursuant to a hardship discharge under Code § 1328(b), whereas a debtor who offers and pays nothing may emerge from a Chapter 13 case with a broad discharge under Code § 1328(a).

The debtor justifies her position by a literal reading of the words “not less than” in Code § 1325(a)(4) and argues that since her unsecured creditors would receive no distribution under Chapter 7, a zero Chapter 13 plan offers a distribution that is “not less than” what the creditors would receive in the event of a Chapter 7 liquidation. The courts that have rejected this argument have done so on the ground that one *571 of the prerequisites to confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan is that it must have “been proposed in good faith” as mandated under Code § 1325(a)(3) and that a zero plan cannot be deemed to have been filed in good faith. 3 Similarly, other courts have rejected nominal or marginal payment plans as lacking good faith because the debtor should propose meaningful or substantial payments to creditors. 4 Accordingly, in rejecting zero or nominal payment plans, the courts have infused a quantitative standard into the term “good faith” somewhat paralleling the concept of best effort.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
4 B.R. 568, 2 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 394, 1980 Bankr. LEXIS 5031, 6 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 626, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-seman-nysb-1980.