Tenney v. Terry (In Re Terry)

3 B.R. 63, 1 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 525, 1980 Bankr. LEXIS 5551, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1397
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Arkansas
DecidedFebruary 22, 1980
DocketBankruptcy HS 79 83 B
StatusPublished
Cited by29 cases

This text of 3 B.R. 63 (Tenney v. Terry (In Re Terry)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tenney v. Terry (In Re Terry), 3 B.R. 63, 1 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 525, 1980 Bankr. LEXIS 5551, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1397 (Ark. 1980).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OVERRULING TRUSTEE’S OBJECTION TO CONFIRMATION OF CHAPTER 13 PLAN

CHARLES W. BAKER, Bankruptcy Judge.

The debtors’ plan provides for no payments to any creditors. The filing fee and attorney’s fee have been paid. All creditors are unsecured. All of the debtors’ property is claimed exempt and is within the allowable limits. The standing Chapter 13 trustee has filed written objection to the plan on two grounds:

*64 1) The debtors are not individuals with regular income within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(24) and, therefore, not eligible for Chapter 13 pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 109(e).
2) The plan is not proposed in good faith as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3).

INDIVIDUAL WITH REGULAR INCOME

11 U.S.C. § 109(e) says that “Only an individual with regular income may be a debtor under Chapter 13 . . ”. 11 U.S.C. § 101(24) provides as follows:

Individual with regular income means individual whose income is sufficiently stable and regular to enable such individual to make payments under a plan under chapter 13 of this title, other than a stockbroker or a commodity broker.

The trustee’s theory is that the debtors do not qualify because their petition shows, in the monthly family budget, that their monthly expenses exceed their monthly income by $8.00. Therefore, the trustee argues they do not have any income “. to make payments under a plan . . . The answer to the trustee’s argument is that 11 U.S.C. § 101(24) requires that the income be “. . . sufficiently stable and regular to enable such individual to make payments under a plan . . . ” Because the plan does not require payments, the debtors’ income is sufficient to make the payments. This section of the Code only makes sense if the question is: Does the debtor have sufficiently stable and regular income to make the payments called for in the plan that is proposed? The debtors’ income meets this test and, therefore, the debtor is eligible for relief under Chapter 13 insofar as 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) is concerned.

This view of the requirements for eligibility is supported by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) which sets forth the six conditions, which if found to exist, require the Court to confirm the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) is as follows:

(6) the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to comply with the plan, (emphasis added).

GOOD FAITH

11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) is one of the series of conditions which if found to exist, requires the Court to confirm the plan. It reads as follows:

ifc * ¡}s ‡ Hi *
(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law;

Although the language of the Code does not directly say that failure to meet one of the conditions of 11 U.S.C. § 1325 requires the Court not to confirm the plan, the Court for purposes of this opinion is assuming that all conditions of 11 U.S.C. § 1325 must be met before the Court may confirm.

Concerning the good faith requirement Collier says:

Section 1325(a)(3) is derived from Bankruptcy Act § 651. There is no reported case law construing the good faith requirement under Bankruptcy Act § 651, nor does the legislative history of section 1325(a)(3) reveal its rationale. Vol. 5 Collier on Bankruptcy, 15th Edition ¶ 1325.-01(C). 1

The editors of Bankruptcy Service, Lawyers Edition, add nothing to the discussion.

The trustee argues that the Court should look to the old Bankruptcy Act under Chapter X for the meaning of “good faith”. There we find in old § 146 (11 U.S.C. § 546) the following:

“Sec. 146. Without limiting the generality of the meaning of the term ‘good faith’, a petition shall be deemed not to be filed in good faith if—
(1) the petitioning creditors have acquired their claims for the purpose of filing the petition; or
(2) adequate relief would be obtainable by a debtor’s petition under the provisions of chapter XI of this Act; or
*65 (3) it is unreasonable to expect that a plan of reorganization can be effected; or
(4) a prior proceeding is pending in any court and it appears that the interests of creditors and stockholders would be best subserved in such prior proceeding.”
Collier says:
“Section 146 provides four specific negative tests, to be discussed hereafter in detail, which may be applied to determine whether a petition is filed in good faith. But the section expressly provides at the outset that the generality of the term is not limited to these four provisions. Consequently, the statutory enumeration, while inclusive, is not exclusive; the court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, may enlarge it, and if in a particular case it shall appear that good faith was not used in connection with the filing of the petition, it may accordingly dismiss the petition on that ground.” Collier On Bankruptcy, 14th Ed., p. 1045.

First of all, Congress could have said “good faith” means what we said in old § 146. Congress did not say that. Congress said nothing. ' For purposes of analysis, the Court will assume that good faith under Chapter 13 of the new Bankruptcy Code means what it meant under old § 146.

Obviously, subpart (1) of old § 146 is not applicable because this Chapter 13 is as all 13’s must be, filed by the debtor and not by creditors.

Likewise, subpart (3) of old § 146 is not applicable because the plan calls for nothing to be paid and that is possible.

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Bluebook (online)
3 B.R. 63, 1 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 525, 1980 Bankr. LEXIS 5551, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1397, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tenney-v-terry-in-re-terry-arwb-1980.