In re Search Warrant

2021 IL App (4th) 200037-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 25, 2021
• Docket: 4-20-0037
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2021 IL App (4th) 200037-U This Order was filed under FILED NOS. 4-20-0037, 4-20-0038, 4-20-0168 cons. January 25, 2021 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is Carla Bender not precedent except in the IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re SEARCH WARRANT ) ) Appeal from the (Mattoon Police Department, ) Circuit Court of Petitioner-Appellee, ) Coles County v. (No. 4-20-0037, No. 4-20-0038) ) Nos. 19MR312 Todd Reardon, ) 19MR313 Respondent-Appellant). ) ___________________________________________ ) ) ) TODD M. REARDON SR., Individually and on Behalf ) of His Former and Current Clients, ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) v. (No. 4-20-0168) ) No. 19CH45 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ) (Including the City of Mattoon, Its Police Department ) Officers and Detectives Including but Not Limited to ) Jason Taylor, Michael Johnson, Sam Gaines, Ryan ) Hurst, Alex Hess, John Hedges, Any Other ) Prosecutorial Agency That May Be Appointed ) Including the Illinois Attorney General, and the Illinois ) ) Honorable Appellate Prosecutor Conflicts Division), ) Thomas M. O’Shaughnessy, Respondent-Appellee. ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Turner and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.

ORDER ¶1 Held: Because it is impossible to grant effectual relief in this appeal, the appellate court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal as moot. ¶2 In these consolidated appeals, appellant, Todd Reardon, challenged the trial court’s

orders (1) denying his petition to intervene (Coles County case Nos. 19-MR-312 and 19-MR-313)

and (2) dismissing his complaint for injunctive relief (Coles County case No. 19-CH-45). Because

these appeals are moot, we grant the State’s motion to dismiss.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On August 26, 2019, as part of an investigation of subornation of perjury, the

Mattoon Police Department filed two complaints for a search and seizure warrant in Coles County

case Nos. 19-MR-312 and 19-MR-313. The complaints were supported by Detective Michael

Johnson’s affidavit. The police asked to search appellant’s residence and office and to seize any

cellular telephone found. The trial court issued the warrants on the facts, finding sufficient

probable cause. Thereafter, appellant voluntarily surrendered his cellular telephone.

¶5 On August 26, 2019, appellant, who is a licensed attorney, filed a petition for

emergency, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief, claiming his cellular telephone contained

privileged content relating to current and former clients (Coles County case No. 19-CH-45). He

sought to enjoin the State from viewing or downloading any content from his phone and challenged

the issuance and validity of the warrants. On September 9, 2019, the chancery court, the Honorable

Thomas O’Shaughnessy presiding, dismissed appellant’s complaint, finding it lacked jurisdiction

as a court in equity to interfere with the investigation and prosecution of a criminal matter.

¶6 On October 25, 2019, appellant filed a petition to intervene in Coles County case

Nos. 19-MR-312 and 19-MR-313 (the search warrant proceedings), claiming the warrant and the

search and seizure of his cellular telephone violated his constitutional rights. On December 20,

2019, the trial court, the Honorable Thomas O’Shaughnessy presiding, denied appellant’s petition,

finding it was without authority to grant the relief requested. The court stated it “found no statutory

-2- or case authority, nor has [appellant] here provided the court statutory or case law that would allow

[a] person upon whom a search warrant is served to intervene [in] the underlying search warrant

proceeding.” These consolidated appeals followed.

¶7 II. ANALYSIS

¶8 In his appeal, appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his (1) petition for

injunctive relief, where he had asked the State to return his phone before searching its contents,

and (2) petition to intervene, where he sought to challenge the issuance and validity of the warrants.

In its motion to dismiss the appeal as moot, the State asserts appellant’s requested relief has either

already been granted or is impossible to provide. According to the State, the following events have

occurred since the filing of these appeals: (1) appellant has since agreed to the search of his phone

with a certain search protocol in place to protect any attorney-client privilege, (2) the search was

conducted pursuant to those protocols and appellant’s cellular telephone was returned to him, and

(3) the State has declined to file charges against appellant. Considering these events, the State

argues, it would be impossible for this court to grant appellant any effectual relief and that no

exception to the mootness doctrine applies. In his response, appellant does not dispute the above

events have transpired but he insists, despite mootness, this court should consider his appeal

pursuant to the public-interest exception. We agree with the State.

¶9 An appeal is moot if “the occurrence of events since filing of the appeal makes it

impossible for the reviewing court to render effectual relief.” People v. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286,

294 (2002). “The existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate

jurisdiction, and courts of review will generally not decide abstract, hypothetical, or moot

questions.” In re Marriage of Nienhouse, 355 Ill. App. 3d 146, 149 (2004). “An appeal is moot

when it involves no actual controversy or the reviewing court cannot grant the complaining party

-3- effectual relief.” Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 522-23 (2001). It would be

impossible to grant effectual relief in this appeal when (1) the search warrants were issued and

executed, (2) the cellular telephone was searched with appellant’s consent, (3) the cellular

telephone has been returned to appellant’s possession, and (4) appellant has not been charged with

any crime as a result of the search.

¶ 10 Nevertheless, appellant claims the public-interest exception to the mootness

doctrine applies. “[The supreme] court has recognized an exception to the mootness doctrine when

the question involved is of a public nature, the circumstances are likely to recur, and an

authoritative determination for the future guidance of public officers is desirable.” In re Adoption

of Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d 362, 365 (1999). The public-interest exception allows for review of an

otherwise moot issue when the magnitude of the interests involved warrants action by the court.

In re Shelby R., 2013 IL 114994, ¶ 16. The exception is narrowly construed and requires a clear

showing of each criterion. In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 355-56 (2009).

¶ 11 This appeal presents none of the above qualities. For example, should an individual

seek to challenge the issuance and/or execution of a search warrant, he may do so by filing a

motion to suppress in the resulting criminal proceedings or a complaint in a separate civil-rights

action. A search-warrant proceeding generally encompasses only the application for the warrant

and the court-ordered warrant, leaving no means within which to challenge the warrant itself.

Further, we can discern no scenario, given the clear status of the applicable law and the proceedings

that govern such actions, where a question of public interest of such a magnitude is aroused that

would require court action here. In other words, the law is clear that neither a petition to intervene

in a search-warrant proceeding nor an order entered by a chancery court enjoining certain conduct

in a criminal investigation would be of substantial public interest, would be likely to recur, or

-4- would demand an authoritative response from this court for future guidance. Thus, absent an

applicable exception to the doctrine of mootness, a moot appeal must be dismissed.

Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2016 IL 118129, ¶ 21.

¶ 12 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 13 Because this appeal is moot, we grant the State’s motion and dismiss the appeal.

¶ 14 Appeal dismissed.

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