In re Salmonella Litigation

618 N.E.2d 473, 248 Ill. App. 3d 513
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
DecidedJune 4, 1993
DocketNos. 1-88-2535, 1-89-0927, 1-90-0992, 1-90-1713, 1-90-1962 cons.
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 618 N.E.2d 473 (In re Salmonella Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Salmonella Litigation, 618 N.E.2d 473, 248 Ill. App. 3d 513 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993).

Opinion

JUSTICE McNULTY

delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal involves the trial court’s denial of the claims of 77 plaintiffs filed pursuant to the “Salmonella Personal Injury Claims Facility Agreement” (the Agreement). Plaintiffs in the case at bar are members of a consolidated class of persons who experienced injuries or damages arising from dairy products purchased from Jewel Companies, Inc. (Jewel), and contaminated with the salmonella bacteria. Jewel conceded its liability for compensatory damages to this class of individuals and on April 30, 1987, entered into the aforementioned Agreement, which set forth a procedure for the submission of an “Official Claim Form” (claim form) by a cutoff date or “bar date.” The Agreement further provided that the court could, in its discretion, and in the interests of justice, permit the filing of claim forms after the bar date.

Plaintiffs in the present appeal were entitled under the provisions of the Agreement to file and to participate in the settlement of their claims. For various reasons, however, plaintiffs were unable to file their claims prior to the bar dates set by the court. (By order of April 30, 1987, the trial court initially designated August 15, 1987, as the bar date. By order of December 10, 1987, the trial court ordered that all claims filed from August 17, 1987, through September 15, 1987, were to be considered as though timely filed.) Plaintiffs filed motions in the trial court seeking the discretion of the trial judge as provided by the Agreement in allowing their late claims to be filed. The trial judge, however, denied these motions, and plaintiffs appealed.

On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying their late-filed claims. They maintain that such discretion is not “unbridled” (Virginia Corp. v. Russ (1975), 27 Ill. App. 3d 608, 613, 327 N.E.2d 403, 407) and further allege that the trial judge acted without any rational basis whatsoever in denying their motions while allowing the claims of other plaintiffs who gave identical reasons for their late filings. While agreeing with plaintiffs that an abuse of discretion would occur if no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court (In re Marriage of Petrovich (1987), 154 Ill. App. 3d 881, 507 N.E.2d 207), defendants maintain that the trial judge’s decisions were reasonable, that his evaluation of one late claim did not set a precedent for future claims, and that under any standards his rulings should withstand the scrutiny of this court.

In our review of the various rulings from which plaintiffs appeal, we consider not whether we agree with the decisions of the trial court, but whether such decisions were reached arbitrarily or made in a principled manner so that substantial injustice would not occur. Our evaluation necessarily takes into account the factual differences and similarities of the claims denied by the trial court.

In the late claim hearing of April 14, 1988, the trial judge denied the claims of the following plaintiffs.

1. CAROL BAUSSER

Carol Bausser filed her claim on October 13, 1987. She testified in her affidavit and at the April 14, 1988, hearing that although she had filed a timely claim for her minor son, she was confused about whether she herself was eligible to file as she did not have a positive culture for the salmonella bacteria. The trial judge denied her claim although he allowed the claims of Anthony Borre filed on the same day due to his confusion over eligibility. Borre explained that he was confused about his eligibility as he thought his children’s previous settlements foreclosed further litigation. In response to Borre’s claim, the trial judge stated, “Well, he was under a misapprehension. I’ll allow that one.” (The trial judge also allowed the claims of Jay Cabera, filed September 17, 1987, and Cynthia Kramer, filed September 18, 1987, which were filed late due to confusion over eligibility.) Since Bausser’s and Borre’s claims were filed on the same day and presented almost the identical reasons for lateness (confusion over eligibility and filing for another family member), the denial of one and the allowance of the other is arbitrary. Consequently, we reverse the decision of the trial court as to Carol Bausser.

2. WILLIAM BAUSSER

William Bausser, like his wife, Carol, and Anthony Borre, filed a claim on October 13, 1987, because he was confused over eligibility. His claim was denied by the trial judge. For the same reasons we reverse the denial of Carol’s claim, we also reverse the denial of William’s claim.

3. KATHLEEN BENNETT

Kathleen Bennett filed her claim on December 11, 1987. She testified that her claim was delayed because she was preoccupied with personal problems. (Her husband had left her and three small children and her house was put up for sale to avoid foreclosure.) The trial judge denied Bennett’s claim. On appeal, Bennett claims that her case is similar to that of Robert Full, who also filed late because of personal problems (the birth of a new child and a demanding work schedule). Full’s claim, however, is distinguishable from Bennett’s as it was filed on September 20, 1987, just five days late. However, the claim of Laverne Julian is factually similar to Bennett’s — Julian filed late because she was preoccupied with personal matters (a breast biopsy). Her claim was filed only five days before Bennett’s on December 6, 1987. The trial judge allowed Julian’s claim. On this basis, it was unreasonable and arbitrary to deny Bennett’s claim, and this decision is therefore reversed.

4. WENDY CAVANAUGH

Wendy Cavanaugh filed late — on December 1, 1987, as she also was preoccupied with personal matters (the birth of a second child). Like Kathleen Bennett, she compares her claim to that of Robert Full, who also filed late because of personal problems. Like Bennett’s claim, Cavanaugh’s claim was filed substantially later than Full’s and is therefore not comparable for this reason. However, Cavanaugh’s claim, based on preoccupation with personal problems, is factually comparable to Julian’s claim, which was filed even later and was allowed by the trial judge. The denial of Cavanaugh’s claim is therefore unreasonable and it is reversed.

5. THOMAS DUNAWAY

Thomas Dunaway filed a late claim on September 19, 1987. He claimed that he knew nothing about the class action suit against Jewel until he received a telephone call from the committee in early September 1987. He was informed that correspondence from the committee had been returned to the committee by the post office because of an incorrect address. Although the trial judge denied Dunaway’s claim, he allowed the claim of Don Houser, filed December 12, 1987 (three months later). Hauser, like Dunaway, claimed that he had never received a claim form, as he had moved from Glen Ellyn to Addison, Illinois, and his mail had not been forwarded. Despite the arguments of opposing counsel that Hauser had been within the public notice area throughout the pertinent time frame, the trial judge allowed the claim.

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618 N.E.2d 473, 248 Ill. App. 3d 513, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-salmonella-litigation-illappct-1993.