In re S.A.

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: May 26, 2026
• Docket: 4-26-0158
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 260158-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NOS. 4-26-0158, 26-0159 cons. May 26, 2026 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re S.A. and K.F., Minors ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Fulton County Petitioner-Appellee, ) Nos. 23JA13 v. ) 23JA17 Nicole A., ) Respondent-Appellant). ) Honorable ) Curtis S. Lane, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Doherty concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court granted appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed the orders terminating respondent’s parental rights where there was no nonfrivolous basis to challenge the judgments.

¶2 Respondent, Nicole A., appeals orders terminating her parental rights to her

children, S.A. (born in 2017) and K.F. (born in 2023). Respondent’s appointed counsel has moved

to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), upon concluding that there is

no nonfrivolous issue to raise on respondent’s behalf. See In re S.M., 314 Ill. App. 3d 682, 685-86

(2000) (explaining the procedure to move to withdraw pursuant to Anders in a case involving

termination of parental rights). Respondent did not file a response to this motion, and the time to

do so has passed. For the following reasons, we grant counsel’s motion and affirm the judgments

in these consolidated appeals. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 In May 2023, the State filed a three-count neglect petition with respect to S.A.,

alleging that her environment was injurious to her welfare pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the

Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2022)).

Specifically, count I alleged that respondent’s substance abuse issues had not been adequately

addressed and negatively impacted her ability to care for S.A. Count II alleged that S.A.’s putative

father, Levi F., failed to maintain a reasonable degree of care or concern. Count III alleged that

respondent and her paramour (Cory F.) engaged in domestic violence in S.A.’s presence.

¶5 Shortly after the State filed the petition in S.A.’s case, respondent gave birth to

K.F., whose father is Cory F. In July 2023, the State filed a three-count neglect petition with respect

to K.F. that was similar to the one in S.A.’s case.

¶6 In October 2023, respondent admitted to the allegations regarding her substance

abuse, and the trial court adjudicated both S.A. and K.F. neglected on count I of the petitions. In

December 2023, the court entered dispositional orders making the children wards of the court and

placing guardianship and custody with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services

(DCFS). Among the services the court ordered respondent to complete were a substance abuse

assessment, any recommendations arising from that assessment, and drug screenings.

¶7 The trial court held four permanency review hearings between April 2024 and

August 2025. At each one, the court made findings that respondent failed to make either reasonable

efforts or progress. The record shows that K.F.’s father, Cory F., was incarcerated for a conviction

involving delivery of methamphetamines during most of that time and was eventually paroled to

respondent’s residence. S.A.’s putative father, Levi F., was uninvolved with the proceedings.

¶8 In September 2025, the State filed petitions to terminate respondent’s parental

-2- rights to S.A. and K.F. The State alleged that respondent failed to make reasonable efforts or

progress from November 20, 2024, through August 20, 2025. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i)-(ii)

(West 2024) (providing that a parent is unfit if, during any nine-month period after the adjudication

of neglect, he or she fails to make (1) “reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the

basis for the removal of the child from the parent” or (2) “reasonable progress toward the return

of the child to the parent”). Cory F. surrendered his parental rights to K.F. Levi F. was defaulted

in connection with S.A.’s case for failing to appear.

¶9 On December 11, 2025, the trial court held a hearing to determine respondent’s

parental fitness. Respondent failed to appear at the hearing, though her counsel confirmed

respondent had notice of the court date. The only witness was Ashlynn Hoyle, the family’s

caseworker from Lutheran Social Services of Illinois. Without objection, the court allowed into

evidence an exhibit that Hoyle prepared to provide a timeline of respondent’s life circumstances

and participation in services during the pendency of these cases. This exhibit is not included in the

record on appeal. Hoyle testified that although respondent “completed quite a few of the

requirements” under the service plan, the “glaring deficiency” pertained to the required drug

screenings. Specifically, respondent either failed to appear for or refused to participate in 36 out

of 38 screenings during the nine-month period at issue in the State’s petitions. Hoyle explained

that on four occasions during the relevant period, respondent was given the option of providing an

oral screening rather than a urine screening. Respondent refused to complete two of those oral

screenings. Of the two oral screenings she agreed to complete, one on February 19, 2025, was

positive for methamphetamines. Hoyle opined that respondent “fails to understand the impact that

her substance use has on her children and her ability to parent them.”

¶ 10 On cross-examination by respondent’s counsel, Hoyle acknowledged that

-3- respondent was attending individual counseling. Hoyle also testified that although her timeline

indicated that respondent participated in a substance abuse assessment in May 2025, Hoyle was

unable to confirm that information because respondent did not execute the necessary consents.

Hoyle testified that because respondent refused to go to a DCFS office to provide urine screenings,

Hoyle routinely offered to meet her for oral screenings, including after the nine-month period at

issue in the State’s petitions. The most recent time Hoyle made that offer, in November 2025,

respondent told her, “ ‘I don’t see the need to complete this.’ ”

¶ 11 The trial court found respondent unfit for failing to make either reasonable efforts

or progress from November 20, 2024, through August 20, 2025. Although the court acknowledged

that respondent was consistent in attending visitation with her children and completed some

services outside of the relevant time period, the court found that respondent was not incorporating

what she learned in those classes. The court also reasoned that respondent had a drug problem, did

not complete screenings, and did not understand that using drugs impacted her ability to be a

parent.

¶ 12 On January 8, 2026, the trial court held a hearing to determine whether terminating

respondent’s parental rights would be in the best interests of S.A. and K.F. Hoyle testified for the

State consistently with a report she prepared, which was admitted into evidence. Hoyle’s testimony

and report showed that S.A. and K.F. resided with respondent’s mother, Edith, who provided a

safe home and met all the children’s needs. S.A. had lived with Edith since coming into care in

May 2023, and K.F. joined them in December 2023, after living with one of respondent’s friends

for about five months. The children were “very bonded” with Edith, and she was willing to adopt

them. On cross-examination by respondent’s counsel, Hoyle acknowledged that respondent

showed an interest in and concern for her children and wanted to serve as a parent to them. On

-4- questioning by the court, Hoyle testified that respondent admitted to using methamphetamines

during the pendency of this case. According to Hoyle, the last time respondent made such an

admission to her was in November 2025, when respondent reported using methamphetamines to

self-medicate for a medical condition. Hoyle testified that respondent was adamant that she should

have her children, regardless of her use of substances.

¶ 13 Respondent testified on her own behalf in narrative form. She explained that she

attended all events she was allowed to for her children, including school conferences and medical

appointments. She also provided clothes for the children and cooked for them when allowed to go

to Edith’s home. Respondent testified that she spoke with S.A. almost every night on the phone

and was involved in getting S.A. to participate in extracurricular activities. Respondent denied

using drugs “during the whole case” but acknowledged telling Hoyle something to the effect that

she self-medicated to feel normal. Respondent testified that she was honest with Hoyle when she

used drugs and took accountability for it. However, respondent did not feel that her drug use made

her neglectful, as her children were never harmed.

¶ 14 The trial court found that it was in the best interests of S.A. and K.F. to terminate

respondent’s parental rights. The court noted that it considered all relevant statutory factors. See

705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2024) (identifying numerous factors to consider when evaluating a

child’s best interests). The court emphasized that the children had been in care for more than two

years, during which time Edith had “stepped into the shoes as a parent.” Although there was love

and probably a bond between respondent and her children, respondent had “severe substance abuse

issues” and was self-medicating with methamphetamines. The court observed that respondent

“clearly does not understand that being an active substance abuser impacts her ability to parent.”

¶ 15 Respondent filed timely notices of appeal in both S.A.’s case and K.F.’s case. We

-5- granted respondent’s motion to consolidate the appeals.

¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17 In moving to withdraw, respondent’s counsel identifies three potential issues for

appeal: (1) whether the trial court’s unfitness finding was against the manifest weight of the

evidence, (2) whether the court’s best interests finding was against the manifest weight of the

evidence, and (3) whether respondent received effective assistance of counsel. Counsel explains

why any challenges to the judgments lack arguable merit. We agree with counsel’s assessment and

have identified no other nonfrivolous issues that could be raised on appeal. Accordingly, we grant

counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the judgments terminating respondent’s parental rights.

¶ 18 Involuntary termination of parental rights is a two-step process. In re D.D., 2022

IL App (4th) 220257, ¶ 27. The State must first prove by clear and convincing evidence that the

parent is unfit under section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2024)). D.D.,

2022 IL App (4th) 220257, ¶ 27. If the parent is unfit, the matter proceeds to a second hearing, at

which the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is in the best interests of the

minor to terminate parental rights. D.D., 2022 IL App (4th) 220257, ¶ 27. We will not disturb the

finding of unfitness or the best interests determination unless the court’s rulings are against the

manifest weight of the evidence. D.D., 2022 IL App (4th) 220257, ¶ 28. “A finding is against the

manifest weight of the evidence only if the evidence clearly calls for the opposite finding [citation],

such that no reasonable person could arrive at the circuit court’s finding on the basis of the

evidence in the record.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150,

¶ 68.

¶ 19 A. Unfitness Finding

¶ 20 The trial court found that respondent was an unfit parent because she failed to make

-6- either reasonable efforts or reasonable progress from November 20, 2024, through August 20,

2025. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i)-(ii) (West 2024) (providing that a parent is unfit if, during any

nine-month period after the adjudication of neglect, he or she fails to make (1) “reasonable efforts

to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the child from the parent” or

(2) “reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the parent”). Respondent’s appellate

counsel submits that there is no nonfrivolous basis to challenge either ground of unfitness. We

may affirm the judgment if the evidence supports any ground on which the court found respondent

unfit. See J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150, ¶ 74. Accordingly, we choose to focus on respondent’s

lack of reasonable progress. See In re M.K., 2026 IL App (4th) 251260-U, ¶¶ 23-24 (in granting

an appellate attorney’s motion to withdraw, this court addressed only one of the grounds on which

the trial court found the respondent unfit, as any single ground that is proved by clear and

convincing evidence provides a basis to affirm a finding of unfitness).

¶ 21 This court has explained:

“Reasonable progress, which is assessed under an objective standard, exists

when a parent’s compliance with the service plan and the trial court’s directives is

sufficiently demonstrable and of such a quality that the court, in the near future,

will be able to order the child returned to parental custody. (Emphasis in original.)

[Citation.] A parent fails to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child

when the parent fails to substantially fulfill his or her obligations under the service

plan and correct the conditions that brought the child into care. [Citation.]

Importantly, there is a significant difference between going through the motions,

checking off the boxes, and mechanically doing what is asked of the parent and

actually changing the circumstances that brought the children into care. [Citation.]

-7- A finding of unfitness is appropriate if the court will not be able to return the child

home in the near future, despite ample time and opportunity for compliance with

the court’s directives.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Baby Boy, 2025 IL

App (4th) 241427, ¶ 65.

¶ 22 We hold that there is no nonfrivolous basis to challenge the trial court’s unfitness

finding based on respondent’s lack of reasonable progress. S.A. and K.F. came into care in 2023.

In October 2023, respondent admitted to count I of the neglect petitions, which alleged that the

children’s environment was injurious to their welfare in that respondent had “substance abuse

issues which have not been adequately addressed and which negatively impact her ability to care

for the minor [children].” At the time of the unfitness hearing more than two years later, respondent

was no closer to having her children returned to her care. During the nine-month period at issue in

the State’s petitions, respondent failed to appear for or refused to participate in 36 out of 38 drug

screenings, which were required under her service plan. See In re Za. G., 2023 IL App (5th)

220793, ¶ 49 (in the course of affirming an order terminating parental rights based on failure to

make reasonable progress, the court noted that “missing a multitude of drug testing opportunities

reflects [the respondent’s] lack of commitment to the process”). Respondent’s statement to her

caseworker about the drug screenings—“ ‘I don’t see the need to complete this’ ”—speaks

volumes about her lack of insight into the danger that her drug use poses to her children. On one

of the rare occasions respondent agreed to submit to a drug screening, she tested positive for

methamphetamines, which confirms that she was using drugs during the time period at issue in the

State’s petitions. Respondent plainly did not make objectively reasonable progress toward the

return of the children to her care from November 20, 2024, through August 20, 2025. There is no

nonfrivolous basis to challenge the unfitness finding.

-8- ¶ 23 B. Best Interests Finding

¶ 24 After a trial court makes a finding of parental unfitness, “the focus shifts to the

child.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 364 (2004). To that end, terminating parental rights is warranted

only if the State proves by a preponderance of the evidence that doing so would serve the child’s

best interests. D.D., 2022 IL App (4th) 220257, ¶ 50. Section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act

(705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2024)) sets forth a lengthy list of factors guiding a court’s

assessment of a child’s best interests. D.D., 2022 IL App (4th) 220257, ¶ 49.

¶ 25 Respondent’s appellate counsel determined there was no nonfrivolous basis to

challenge the trial court’s finding that terminating respondent’s parental rights was in the best

interests of S.A. and K.F. We agree. The evidence showed that respondent’s mother, Edith, raised

respondent’s children for more than two years when respondent was unable to do so, providing a

safe home for the children and attending to their needs. Edith was bonded with the children and

was committed to adopting them. Respondent obviously loves her children and expressed her

desire to be their parent. However, the evidence at the best interests hearing showed that

respondent lacked insight about how her ongoing use of methamphetamines would be detrimental

to her children’s well-being if she were placed in a caretaking role. Under the circumstances, there

is no nonfrivolous basis to challenge the court’s best interests finding.

¶ 26 C. Potential Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claim

¶ 27 Finally, respondent’s appellate counsel considered whether there was any basis to

assert ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He determined there was no nonfrivolous basis to

raise such a claim. We agree.

¶ 28 To sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, respondent would have to

show that (1) “her attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and

-9- (2) “but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” In re A.P.-M., 2018 IL App (4th) 180208, ¶¶ 40-41. Here, the record

does not show that respondent could advance a nonfrivolous argument as to either prong. The

attorney who appeared for respondent at the unfitness hearing did all she could to represent

respondent, who chose not to attend that hearing and plainly had not made reasonable progress

toward the children’s return to her care. The attorney who appeared for respondent at the best

interests hearing likewise did his best to represent her under the circumstances, including by

requesting the trial court allow her to present her testimony in narrative form. We discern no

arguable deficiencies in the representation that respondent received, let alone any deficiency

threatening to change the outcome of the proceedings. Accordingly, there is no arguable basis for

an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.

¶ 29 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 30 For the reasons stated, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial

court’s judgments.

¶ 31 Affirmed.

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