In re M.K.

2026 IL App (4th) 251260-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: March 12, 2026
• Docket: 4-25-1260
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 251260-U This Order was filed under FILED March 12, 2026 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NOS. 4-25-1260, 4-25-1261 cons. Carla Bender not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re M.K and J.K., Minors ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Livingston County Petitioner-Appellee, ) Nos. 24JA8 v. ) 24JA9 Danielle H., ) Respondent-Appellant). ) Honorable ) Mary E. Koll, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Zenoff and DeArmond concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court granted appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed the trial court’s judgment terminating respondent’s parental rights.

¶2 In January 2025, the State filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of

respondent, Danielle H., to her minor children, M.K. (born in April 2020) and J.K. (born in April

2018). Following the fitness and best-interest hearings, the trial court granted the State’s petition

and terminated respondent’s parental rights. (The parental rights of the minors’ father were also

terminated; however, he is not a party to this appeal.) Respondent timely filed a notice of appeal,

and counsel was appointed to represent her. Appellate counsel now moves to withdraw pursuant

to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), contending there are no meritorious issues of

procedure or substance to be raised on appeal that would warrant relief. We agree, grant counsel’s

motion to withdraw, and affirm the court’s judgment. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 In January 2024, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship for the

minors pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705

ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2024)), contending the minors’ environment was injurious to their

welfare. The petition alleged (1) respondent had substance abuse issues that prevented her from

properly parenting, (2) the minors had access to illegal substances and other harmful materials,

(3) respondent had distributed illegal substances, and (4) respondent had a history of engaging in

domestic violence that prevented her from properly parenting. Following a hearing, the trial court

entered a temporary custody order placing the minors in the custody of the Illinois Department of

Children and Family Services (DCFS).

¶5 In March 2024, the trial court entered an adjudicatory order finding the minors

neglected after finding the State had proven respondent had a history of engaging in domestic

violence, preventing her from properly parenting. The court subsequently entered a dispositional

order making the minors wards of the court after finding respondent “unfit” to properly care for

the minors. Custody and guardianship of the minors was placed with DCFS, and respondent was

ordered to cooperate with DCFS’s directives.

¶6 In June 2025, the State filed an amended petition to terminate respondent’s parental

rights, alleging she was unfit for (1) failing to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern,

or responsibility as to the minors’ welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2024)); (2) failing to make

reasonable efforts during a nine-month period after adjudication of neglect to correct the conditions

that caused the minors to be removed from her care (id. § 50/1(D)(m)(i)); (3) failing to make

reasonable progress during a nine-month period after adjudication of neglect towards the return of

the minors to her care (id. § 50/1(D)(m)(ii)); and (4) being depraved (id. § 50/1(D)(i)). The State

-2- alleged the relevant nine-month periods were March 18, 2024, to December 18, 2024, and/or April

30, 2024, to January 30, 2025.

¶7 A. Fitness Hearing

¶8 A fitness hearing was held on June 10, 2025. Karli Cox, a caseworker for the

minors, testified she was assigned to the case in September 2024. Cox noted respondent had been

incarcerated during the pendency of the case. She stated respondent’s incarceration had impacted

her ability to complete ordered services. For example, she said the substance abuse and mental

health treatment provided by either the Livingston County jail or the Illinois Department of

Corrections would not be sufficient to meet the standard required by DCFS. Additionally, Cox

said DCFS would need to evaluate whether respondent could “maintain sobriety outside of being

incarcerated.” She stated respondent had been cooperative with DCFS.

¶9 Madison T., the foster parent for the minors since March 2024, testified she

facilitated communication between the minors and respondent but that she has decreased such

facilitation following an incident wherein respondent scolded her. She discussed behavioral issues

with J.K. She said the minors refer to her and her husband as “mom” and “dad” but denied

instructing the minors to identify them as such. The fitness hearing adjourned and resumed on

September 23, 2025.

¶ 10 The trial court admitted into evidence, without objection, three exhibits pertaining

to respondent’s certified convictions, one for residential burglary and two for delivery of

methamphetamine.

¶ 11 Andrew King, a caseworker for the minors, testified he investigated a report that

respondent had been arrested for possessing and selling methamphetamine in January 2024. King

recalled respondent being confused by his involvement in the matter and said she “downplayed”

-3- the seriousness of the matter by describing the methamphetamine recovered as “just a little bit.”

King recalled interviewing J.K. at the time, who said “a lot of people [would] come in and out of”

the home, including “go[ing] into [respondent’s] bedroom and then be there for a short amount of

time and then they would leave.” King stated he was concerned because J.K. “seemed to be

describing potential drug deals.” King said the minors were staying with their great-grandfather.

He spoke with the great-grandfather, who said the minors would return to respondent’s care after

she was released from custody.

¶ 12 Respondent testified she was incarcerated at the time of the hearing. She stated she

had been incarcerated since January 2024 and expected she would be released in January 2029.

She stated she communicated with the minors regularly and that they had strong relationships with

extended family. She said she was enrolled in college courses and working while incarcerated.

¶ 13 The trial court noted respondent had “tried harder than almost any other parent” it

had observed in her position. However, the court found the State had shown by clear and

convincing evidence respondent was unfit for failing to make reasonable progress towards the

return of the minors to her care and depravity. The court found the State had not met its burden as

to her unfitness related to maintaining reasonable interest or making reasonable efforts. The court

found respondent had “demonstrated that [she] think[s] about the [minors] every day; that despite

[her] current limitations, which are by [her] own doing, that they are still top of mind for [her].”

The court found that objectively, respondent had not completed services that were sufficient to

satisfy her service plan requirements, and due to her release date, the minors could not be returned

to her in the near future. Regarding depravity, the court noted the certified convictions were all

felonies that occurred within five years of the filing of the petition to terminate her parental rights.

The court found there was no evidence presented to overcome the presumption of depravity. The

-4- court found respondent unfit.

¶ 14 B. Best-Interest Hearing

¶ 15 The matter proceeded to a best-interest hearing on November 18, 2025. Cox

testified the minors had been placed with their foster parents for nearly two years. Cox visited the

minors monthly and noted all of their needs were being met and they did not have any unique

developmental or medical needs. She stated the minors referred to their foster parents as “mom”

and “dad” and considered the foster parents’ other child as their sibling. She said the minors felt

loved by the foster parents and secure. On cross-examination, Cox recalled respondent provided

her with a list of family members who would care for the minors in January 2025. Cox did not

attempt to place the minors with family members, as recommended by respondent, because the

minors “had already been with their foster parents and they were well-adjusted in the home they

were in.” Cox said keeping the minors with their foster parents was the least disruptive placement.

¶ 16 The guardian ad litem (GAL) proffered to the trial court she met with the minors in

April 2025. She said the minors referred to the foster parents as “mom and dad” and the foster

parents’ child as their sister. The GAL said M.K. discussed the foster family in possessive terms,

demonstrating she “claimed them as her family.” The GAL explained the minors were “well-

adjusted” and said, “[P]retty much all of the best-interest factors *** showed up to me in favor of

*** their foster mom and dad.”

¶ 17 The trial court found the “KIND Act” was not in effect for a majority of the case,

but had it been, DCFS had made extensive efforts to find a relative placement for the minors. See

Public Act 103-1061 (eff. Feb. 5, 2025), commonly known as the Kinship in Demand (KIND) Act,

which amended the Juvenile Court Act. The court found all of the best-interest factors weighed in

favor of terminating respondent’s parental rights. The court concluded the State had met its burden

-5- of proving it was in the best interest of the minors to terminate respondent’s parental rights.

¶ 18 Respondent timely filed a notice of appeal, and the trial court appointed counsel to

represent her. Appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders and a supporting

brief providing a statement of facts, a list of potential issues, and arguments as to why those issues

lack arguable merit. See In re J.P., 2016 IL App (1st) 161518, ¶ 8 (finding Anders applies when

counsel seeks to withdraw from representation on direct appeal from orders affecting parental

rights under the Juvenile Court Act). Appellate counsel provided proof of service of her motion

and a memorandum on respondent, and this court granted respondent the opportunity to file a

response. Respondent failed to respond.

¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 20 Appellate counsel seeks to withdraw as counsel, contending there are no

meritorious claims for review. Counsel indicated he considered whether the trial court’s fitness

and best-interest findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Counsel determined

the preceding arguments would be frivolous and patently without merit. After reviewing the

record, we agree with counsel and conclude there are no meritorious arguments to be considered

on appeal.

¶ 21 A. Findings of Parental Unfitness

¶ 22 Parental rights may not be terminated without the parent’s consent unless the trial

court first determines, by clear and convincing evidence, the parent is unfit under section 1(D) of

the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2024)). In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d 340, 354 (2005).

Pursuant to section 1(D)(i) of the Adoption Act, a rebuttable presumption that a parent is depraved

may be found where he or she is “convicted of at least 3 felonies under the laws of this State ***

and at least one of these convictions took place within 5 years of the filing of the petition or motion

-6- seeking termination of parental rights.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i) (West 2024). “A trial court’s

determination that a parent’s unfitness has been established by clear and convincing evidence will

not be disturbed on review unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.” Gwynne

P., 215 Ill. 2d at 354.

¶ 23 The trial court found the State established respondent’s unfitness by clear and

convincing evidence on multiple grounds. The State provided a certified copy of respondent’s

felony convictions for residential burglary and delivery of methamphetamine. All of the

convictions occurred within five years of the State’s petition to terminate respondent’s parental

rights. At the time of the fitness hearing, respondent, due to her incarceration, was unable to

satisfactorily complete court-ordered services and was unable to provide for the minors. The

evidence presented on respondent’s behalf was insufficient to overcome the presumption she was

a depraved person pursuant to section 1(D)(i) of the Adoption Act.

¶ 24 Based on the evidence presented, we agree with appellate counsel any argument the

trial court’s finding of unfitness was against the manifest weight of the evidence would be

meritless. The court’s determination respondent was a depraved person and an unfit parent is

supported by the record and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Because we need only

find one of the alleged grounds of unfitness to be supported by clear and convincing evidence, we

need not address the other ground alleged in the State’s petition. See id. at 349 (“A parent’s rights

may be terminated if even a single alleged ground for unfitness is supported by clear and

convincing evidence.”).

¶ 25 B. Best-Interest Determination

¶ 26 After a trial court finds a parent is unfit, “the court then determines whether it is in

the best interests of the minor that parental rights be terminated.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 352

-7- (2004). The trial court’s best-interest determination will not be reversed unless it is against the

manifest weight of the evidence. In re J.B., 2019 IL App (4th) 190537, ¶ 33. “A best-interest

determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the facts clearly demonstrate

that the trial court should have reached the opposite result.” Id.

¶ 27 At the best-interest hearing, the State must prove by a preponderance of the

evidence termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest. See D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 367.

The trial court must consider the factors set forth in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act

(705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2024)). However, the court is not required to make a specific

reference to each factor in its findings. In re Tajannah O., 2014 IL App (1st) 133119, ¶ 19. These

statutory factors include:

“(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of

the child’s identity; (3) the child’s background and ties, including

familial, cultural, and religious; (4) the child’s sense of attachments,

including love, security, familiarity, and continuity of affection, and

the least-disruptive placement alternative; (5) the child’s wishes;

(6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s need for permanence,

including the need for stability and continuity of relationships with

parental figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family and

child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences

of the persons available to care for the child.” In re Jay. H., 395 Ill.

App. 3d 1063, 1071 (2009) (citing 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West

2008)).

¶ 28 In this case, the evidence demonstrated the minors’ needs were being met by their

-8- foster parents, and they had developed a bond. The trial court noted all of the statutory factors

supported termination and discussed several of them in more detail. In addition, respondent

testified her expected release date was in 2029. It is unreasonable to expect any reunification in

the near future between respondent and the minors.

¶ 29 The trial court did not take terminating respondent’s parental rights lightly. As a

reviewing court, we afford great deference to a court’s best-interest findings because it sits in a

superior position to observe the witnesses, judge credibility, and assess the evidence. In re C.P.,

2019 IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 71. Based on our review of the evidence, we agree with appellate

counsel any argument it was not in the minors’ best interest to terminate respondent’s parental

rights would be meritless. The court’s best-interest findings were based on an appropriate

consideration of the statutory factors. Accordingly, we conclude the court’s best-interest

determination was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 30 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 31 For the reasons stated, we grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm

the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 32 Affirmed.

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