In re: Ryan John Welch and Jolyn M. Welch

Opinion

FILED 1 NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 05 2015

2 SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 3 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL 4 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 5 In re: ) BAP No. NV-14-1079-HlPaJu )

6 RYAN JOHN WELCH and ) Bankr. No. 11-18277-LBR JOLYN M. WELCH, )

7 )

Debtors. )

8 ______________________________)

)

9 DYMON INVESTMENTS, INC.; )

BK LAND INVESTORS, INC.; )

10 CHAD DYMON; JOHN “BUCK” LEE, )

)

11 Appellants, )

)

12 v. ) M E M O R A N D U M1 )

13 RYAN JOHN WELCH; JOLYN M. )

WELCH; BRIAN D. SHAPIRO, )

14 Chapter 7 Trustee, )

)

15 Appellees. )

______________________________)

16 Argued and Submitted on September 18, 2014 17 at Las Vegas, Nevada 18 Filed - January 5, 2015 19 Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada 20 Honorable Linda B. Riegle, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding 21 _________________________ 22 Appearances: Stephanie M. Zinna of Olson, Cannon, Gormley, Angulo & Stoberski argued for appellants Dymon 23 Investments, Inc., BK Land Investors, Inc., Chad Dymon, and John “Buck” Lee; Matthew Philip 24 Pawlowski of Walsh & Friedman, Ltd., argued for appellees Ryan John Welch and Jolyn M. Welch.

25 26 1 This disposition is not appropriate for publication.

27 Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. 28 See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8013-1.

1 Before: HOULE,2 PAPPAS, and JURY, Bankruptcy Judges. 2 3 Creditors Dymon Investments, Inc., BK Land Investors, Inc., 4 Chad Dymon, and John “Buck” Lee (collectively “Creditors” or 5 “Appellants”) appeal the bankruptcy court’s order denying their 6 motion to reopen the closed chapter 73 case of debtors Ryan John 7 Welch (“Welch”) and Jolyn M. Welch (collectively, “Debtors”), by 8 which Creditors sought to conduct an examination of Debtors 9 under Rule 2004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. 10 Finding no abuse of discretion, we AFFIRM. 11 FACTS 12 Pre-petition, Appellants and Welch were all members of 13 several limited liability companies registered in Nevada 14 (“Companies”) that were engaged in the business of acquiring 15 real properties, entitling these properties, and selling them 16 for profit. In 2004, certain members of the Companies initiated 17 a complaint for judicial dissolution (the “dissolution action”) 18 against other members of the Companies, including Welch. On 19 August 5, 2005, an Offer of Judgment was filed in the 20 dissolution action, whereby plaintiffs offered to allow a 21 judgment be taken against them in favor of defendants Welch and 22 RJ Welch, Ltd. (a Nevada corporation in which Welch presumably 23 held some interest) in the amount of $3,500,000. While 24 25 2 The Honorable Mark D. Houle, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.

26

3

27 Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter, section and rule references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532, and 28 to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rules 1001–9037.

3

1 Appellants assert Welch and RJ Welch, Ltd., were paid $3,500,000 2 on account of this offer of judgment (which funds are also 3 characterized by Appellants as an “asset”), no evidence exists 4 in the record showing that Welch or RJ Welch, Ltd. were paid any 5 portion of the $3,500,000 or even accepted the $3,500,000 offer 6 of judgment. 7 The resolution of the dissolution action is not clear from 8 the record. Subsequently, however, the plaintiffs in the 9 dissolution action and other parties filed a complaint in state 10 court against Welch and others on July 7, 2006, asserting 11 various causes of action including fraud and breach of fiduciary 12 duty based on defendants’ alleged failure to contribute as 13 promised to the Companies, and for otherwise interfering with 14 plaintiffs’ efforts to refinance and sell certain real property 15 owned by the Companies. Appellants assert that Debtors filed 16 their bankruptcy petition on the eve of trial in the 2006 17 action. 18 Debtors filed for chapter 7 relief on May 27, 2011, and 19 Lenard E. Schwartzer was appointed chapter 7 trustee (“Trustee 20 Schwartzer”). On June 2, 2011, Creditors were sent notice of 21 the § 341(a) meeting (set for June 27, 2011), notice that the 22 case was a no-asset case, and instructions not to file a proof 23 of claim unless creditors receive a notice to do so. The 24 § 341(a) meeting was continued to July 15, 2011, and then again 25 to August 22, 2011. Appellants appeared at the August 22, 2011 26 § 341(a) meeting, where they contend they were advised that 27 Welch’s attorney stole money Welch allegedly received in the 28 dissolution action, and that Welch was required to produce

4

1 documents to Trustee Schwartzer related to Welch’s claim against 2 his attorney. Welch allegedly failed to produce any such 3 documents. On August 24, 2011, Trustee Schwartzer withdrew his 4 initial no asset report on the grounds that he had submitted his 5 resignation in the case due to a conflict of interest. 6 Debtors received a discharge on August 29, 2011. While 7 Appellants contend that the discharge was entered in error, 8 there is no evidence in the record that the discharge was 9 revoked or vacated subsequent to its entry, nor is there any 10 indication of error in entry of the discharge since no 11 section 727 adversary had been filed to deny the discharge. 12 On October 26, 2011, successor trustee Brian Shapiro 13 (“Trustee Shapiro”) was appointed. The § 341(a) meeting was 14 continued to October 31, 2011, and again continued to 15 November 14, 2011, although Creditors argue they did not have 16 notice of this continued § 341(a) meeting. On November 16, 17 2011, Trustee Shapiro filed a notice of assets. Several months 18 later on January 18, 2002, however, Trustee Shapiro filed a 19 report of no distribution, and the clerk of the bankruptcy court 20 entered a final decree that same day discharging Trustee Shapiro 21 and closing the case. 22 Two months after the case was closed, on March 23, 2012, 23 Creditors filed a Motion in the bankruptcy case for an order 24 requiring Debtors to appear for examination under Rule 2004. 25 Creditors later filed a Motion to Reopen Chapter 7 Case 26 (“Motion”) on August 28, 2012, seven months after the case was 27 closed. The record provides no explanation for the delay. By 28 the Motion, Creditors requested that the bankruptcy court reopen

5

1 the case to allow Creditors to examine Debtors under oath as to 2 allegedly concealed assets that would be subject to liquidation 3 and distribution to Debtors’ creditors. 4 While the Creditors’ appellate briefs reference a 5 $3,500,000 “asset” allegedly paid to Welch to resolve the 6 dissolution action, and at the hearing on the Motion Creditors’ 7 counsel made vague reference to a $5,000,000 sum allegedly paid 8 to Welch pre-petition, neither the Motion nor Creditors’ reply 9 (“Reply”) references any specific asset in existence or to be 10 discovered. Instead, Creditors alleged in the Motion and Reply 11 that they were led to believe there was some potential for a 12 distribution of assets when the case was converted from a 13 no-asset to an asset case by Trustee Shapiro, and further that 14 Creditors had “specific knowledge about the tactics commonly 15 employed by Debtors to secret assets away from the reach of 16 their creditors.” 17 The Motion was first heard on April 24, 2013, before the 18 Honorable Linda B. Riegle. From our review of the case docket,4 19 it appears the delay between the filing of the Motion and the 20 April 24, 2013 hearing was entirely due to Creditors’ delay in 21 scheduling the hearing; Appellants do not assert otherwise. At 22 the hearing, Judge Riegle expressed that she was unlikely to 23 grant the Motion because discharge had been entered over a year 24 earlier, in August of 2011, and she ultimately continued the 25 4 We obtained this information by reviewing the items on the bankruptcy court’s automated bankruptcy case docket in the 26 Debtors’ bankruptcy case. We may take judicial notice of the 27 contents and filing of these items. See O’Rourke v. Seaboard Sur. Co. (In re E.R. Fegert, Inc.), 887 F.2d 955, 957-58 (9th 28 Cir. 1989).

6

1 hearing because Creditors had failed to provide Debtors with 2 notice of the hearing. 3 The excerpt of the transcript from the April 24, 2013, 4 hearing does not reflect that Judge Riegle continued the hearing 5 to a particular date, but on November 1, 2013, Creditors filed a 6 Notice of Hearing for the Motion for November 27, 2013. It is 7 unclear from the record why there was a seven-month delay 8 between the first hearing on the Motion and the second hearing. 9 The docket and record seems to indicate, however, that the delay 10 was due to Creditors’ delay in re-noticing the hearing; 11 Appellants do not assert otherwise. 12 On November 14, 2013, Debtors filed an Opposition to the 13 Motion. Debtors argued that the Motion was untimely and that 14 Creditors failed to present evidence to support the proposition 15 that Debtors concealed assets. On November 22, 2013, Creditors 16 filed a Reply to Debtors’ Opposition. 17 At the hearing on November 27, 2013, the Honorable Bruce T. 18 Beesley presiding, the bankruptcy court denied the Motion. The 19 excerpt of transcript reflects that Creditors’ counsel stated at 20 the November 27, 2013, hearing that Welch was supposed to submit 21 additional documentation regarding “where the money went,” but 22 that these documents were never submitted. Creditors’ counsel 23 further expressed to the court that they were never given notice 24 of the appointment of the new trustee, discharge, or closing of 25 the case. Finally, Creditors’ counsel asked the court to reopen 26 the case to conduct a Rule 2004 examination to find the 27 information Welch was supposed to have provided to the trustee, 28 conceding that Creditors delayed in seeking to reopen but

7

1 arguing that where there is a potential for recovery for 2 creditors there is “no time line under the bankruptcy code that 3 precludes reopening the bankruptcy case.” The court, in 4 response, finding that Creditors had delayed in filing the 5 Motion and did not exercise their other remedies, found lack of 6 good grounds to reopen and denied the Motion. 7 An order was entered denying the Motion on February 6, 8 2014. On February 20, 2014, Creditors timely filed a notice of 9 appeal. 10 JURISDICTION 11 The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 12 §§ 1334, 157(b)(2)(A) and (O). We have jurisdiction under 13 28 U.S.C. § 158. 14 ISSUE 15 Whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion when it 16 denied Creditors’ Motion because Creditors delayed in filing the 17 Motion and did not exercise their other remedies, such as timely 18 requesting a 2004 examination. 19 STANDARD OF REVIEW 20 Denial of a motion to reopen a bankruptcy case is reviewed 21 for abuse of discretion. See Weiner v. Perry, Settles & Lawson, 22 Inc. (In re Weiner), 161 F.3d 1216, 1217 (9th Cir. 1998); Lopez 23 v. Specialty Restaurants, Inc. (In re Lopez), 283 B.R. 22, 26 24 (9th Cir. BAP 2002). Similarly, a bankruptcy court's exercise 25 of its equitable powers is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 26 Baker v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 6 F.3d 632, 639 (9th Cir. 1993). 27 The Panel applies a two-part test to determine whether the 28 bankruptcy court abused its discretion. See United States v.

8

1 Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1261–63 (9th Cir. 2009)(en banc). A 2 bankruptcy court abuses its discretion if it applies an 3 incorrect legal standard, or misapplies the correct legal 4 standard, or if its factual findings are illogical, implausible, 5 or without support from evidence in the record. Hinkson, 6 585 F.3d at 1262. 7 We may affirm on any ground supported by the record, even 8 if the ground was not relied upon by the bankruptcy court. 9 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 10 322 F.3d 1064, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2003). 11 DISCUSSION 12 Appellants raise two main issues on appeal: (1) whether the 13 bankruptcy court abused its discretion when it denied the Motion 14 and (2) whether cause existed to grant the Motion. 15 “Application to have the estate reopened may be made by an 16 ‘interested party’ who would be benefitted by the reopening.” 17 In re Mullendore, 741 F.2d 306, 308 (10th Cir. 1984)(citations 18 omitted). Pursuant to section 350(b), the court may reopen a 19 closed bankruptcy case to administer assets, to accord relief to 20 the debtor or “for other cause.” § 350(b). Rule 5010 provides: 21 A case may be reopened on motion of the debtor or other party in interest pursuant to § 350(b) of the Code. In 22 a chapter 7, 12, or 13 case a trustee shall not be appointed by the United States trustee unless the court 23 determines that a trustee is necessary to protect the interests of creditors and the debtor or to insure 24 efficient administration of the case. 25 Rule 5010. 26 “While the Code does not define ‘other cause’ for purposes 27 of reopening a case under section 350(b), the decision to reopen 28 or not is discretionary with the court, which may consider

9

1 numerous factors including equitable concerns, and ought to 2 emphasize substance over technical considerations.” Emmerling 3 v. Batson (In re Emmerling), 223 B.R. 860, 864 (2d Cir. BAP 4 1997)(citations omitted); see also Matter of Bianucci, 4 F.3d 5 526, 528 (7th Cir. 1993); Ashe v. Ashe (In re Ashe), 228 B.R. 6 457, 461 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 7 As explained by this Panel in Menk v. Lapaglia 8 (In re Menk), 241 B.R. 896, 916-17 (9th Cir. BAP 1999): 9 In short, the motion to reopen legitimately presents only a narrow range of issues: whether further 10 administration appears to be warranted; whether a trustee should be appointed; and whether the 11 circumstances of reopening necessitate payment of another filing fee. Extraneous issues should be 12 excluded. 13 Further, a bankruptcy court may consider a number of 14 nonexclusive factors in determining whether to reopen, including 15 (1) the length of time that the case has been closed; 16 (2) whether the debtor would be entitled to relief if the case 17 were reopened; and (3) the availability of nonbankruptcy courts, 18 such as state courts, to entertain the claims. In re Antonious, 19 373 B.R. 400, 405-06 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007). Bankruptcy Courts 20 can also consider whether any parties would be prejudiced were 21 the case reopened or not. In re Otto, 311 B.R. 43, 47 (Bankr. 22 E.D. Pa. 2004). 23 A. Lack of Diligence in Seeking Relief 24 While there is no express time period under § 350 within 25 which a motion to reopen must be filed, the request to reopen 26 must be made within a “reasonable” time, and what constitutes 27 reasonableness is determined on a totality basis. See, e.g., 28 Matter of Pagan, 59 B.R. 394 (D.P.R. 1986)(denying motion to

10

1 reopen under a laches analysis where movant had knowledge of the 2 bankruptcy, but waited four years to file the motion); 3 Stackhouse v. Plumee (In re Plumee), 236 B.R. 606, 610-11 (E.D. 4 Va. 1999)(“in deciding whether to reopen an estate, the length 5 of time between the estate’s closing and the motion to reopen it 6 should be ‘of crucial significance’ to the bankruptcy court. 7 ‘[A]s the time between closing of the estate and its reopening 8 increases, so must also the cause for reopening increase in 9 weight.’”) (citation omitted). As stated on this point by the 10 Seventh Circuit in Redmond v. Fifth Third Bank, 624 F.3d 793, 11 799 (7th Cir. 2010 ): 12 The passage of time weighs heavily against reopening.

The longer a party waits to file a motion to reopen a 13 closed bankruptcy case, the more compelling the reason to reopen must be. In assessing whether a motion is 14 timely, courts may consider the lack of diligence of the party seeking to reopen and the prejudice to the 15 nonmoving party caused by the delay. 16 Redmond, 624 F.3d at 799 (citations omitted). 17 Here, the bankruptcy court determined that Creditors’ delay 18 in filing the Motion was significant. Creditors were well aware 19 of Debtors’ bankruptcy, as they had notice of the May 27, 2011, 20 petition date, and actively participated in, at least, Debtors’ 21 § 341(a) meeting on August 22, 2011. Nonetheless, Creditors did 22 not seek permission to conduct a Rule 2004 examination until 23 more than two months after the Debtors’ case closed on 24 January 18, 2012, or more than ten months after the case was 25 filed. More importantly, Creditors thereafter did not file the 26 Motion until August 28, 2012, five months after seeking the 27 Rule 2004 examination and more than eight months after the case 28 closed, and then inexplicably did not set the Motion for hearing

11

1 until eight months later on April 24, 2013. Because Creditors 2 initially failed to serve Debtors with notice of the Motion, the 3 April 24, 2013 hearing then had to be continued, and Creditors 4 delayed again in waiting until November 1, 2013, to give notice 5 of the continued hearing date on November 27, 2013. Ultimately, 6 due entirely to Creditors’ lack of diligence, the Motion was not 7 heard until more than a year after the Motion was filed, and 8 almost two years after the case had been closed. 9 Creditors concede without explanation that they were solely 10 responsible for this delay. As Creditors’ counsel opaquely 11 acknowledged at the hearing on the Motion: “there were problems 12 on my clients’ side and there was a delay on my clients’ side in 13 asking to reopen.” Given the record before the bankruptcy 14 court, where (i) Creditors had substantial pre-petition 15 experience with Welch as former business partners and litigation 16 adversaries, (ii) Creditors had notice of and actively 17 participated in the bankruptcy case, and (iii) because of 18 Creditors’ numerous failures the hearing on the Motion did not 19 take place until almost two years after the case was closed, it 20 was not an abuse of discretion for the bankruptcy court to find 21 that the delay in seeking to reopen the case was unreasonable 22 under the circumstances. 23 On this point we echo the comments of the district court in 24 In the Matter of Pagan, which stated, in denying a motion to 25 reopen a bankruptcy case, that: 26 We note that equity assists the vigilant and diligent, not those who sleep on their rights. Appellants’

27 actions after receiving notice of the bankruptcy constitute dilatory behavior under the circumstances.

12

1 Pagan, 59 B.R. 394 at 397. To that end, we find unpersuasive 2 Appellants’ arguments that Creditors’ failure to promptly seek a 3 Rule 2004 examination was caused by the lack of notice of 4 several § 341(a) meetings. Creditors clearly were familiar with 5 Debtors at the time the bankruptcy case was filed, had apparent 6 reason to believe Debtors were hiding assets, and actively 7 participated in the bankruptcy case. Nonetheless, at every turn 8 in the course of defending their interests in Debtors’ case, 9 Creditors’ behavior was inexplicably dilatory. 10 In this light, and while creditors are certainly entitled to 11 notice of § 341(a) meetings as a general rule, the alleged 12 partial failure of such notice, along with some level of 13 confusion caused by the substitution of trustees, is 14 insufficient in the totality of circumstances to excuse 15 Creditors’ delay in protecting their rights. It is common 16 practice for a chapter 7 trustee to orally announce the 17 continued § 341(a) meeting date at the conclusion of the 18 meeting, which would negate the obligation to give notice of the 19 continued meeting, and here Creditors appeared at at least one 20 § 341(a) meeting. Moreover, Creditors were aware of the filing 21 of the case but failed to seek a Rule 2004 examination during 22 the almost eight months the case was open, nor did they take 23 minimal steps to monitor the case such as filing a request for 24 special notice or periodically viewing the docket 25 electronically. 26 Finally, Creditors’ counsel was sent BNC notice of the 27 discharge on August 29, 2011. Creditors were thereby, at a 28 minimum, on constructive notice that the closing of Debtors’

13

1 case was imminent. However, the record does not reflect any 2 inquiry by Appellants as to the status of the case or any effort 3 to set a Rule 2004 exam until after the case was closed. This 4 is particularly compelling given the close and litigious pre- 5 petition relationship between the parties, and supports the 6 conclusion that the bankruptcy court’s ruling was not an abuse 7 of discretion. 8 As such, the bankruptcy court did not err when it considered 9 the delay in seeking to reopen as cause to deny the Motion. 10 B. No prima facie proof that case was not fully administered 11 With respect to the potential for recovery for the estate, 12 the bankruptcy court has the duty to reopen an estate whenever 13 prima facie proof is made that it has not been fully 14 administered. Lopez v. Specialty Restaurants Corp. 15 (In re Lopez), 283 B.R. 22, 27 (9th Cir. BAP 2002)(citing Kozman 16 v. Herzig (In re Herzig), 96 B.R. 264, 266 (9th Cir. BAP 1989)). 17 “In particular, it is an abuse of discretion to deny a motion to 18 reopen where assets of such probability, administrability, and 19 substance appear to exist as to make it unreasonable under all 20 the circumstances for the court not to deal with them.” Id. 21 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A motion to reopen can be 22 denied, however, where the chance of any substantial recovery 23 for creditors appears too remote to make the effort worth the 24 risk.” Lopez, 283 B.R. at 27 (internal quotation marks 25 omitted). 26 As to Creditors’ contention that the case had not been fully 27 administered, Creditors merely state in the Motion that: 28 Creditors have suspected that Debtors are concealing

14

1 substantial assets that would be subject to liquidation and distribution to their creditors. . . . these 2 Creditors have specific knowledge about the tactics commonly employed by Debtors to secret assets away from 3 the reach of their creditors. 4 Motion, page 3, lines 27-28, page 4, lines 4-5. 5 Similarly, Creditors contend in their Reply that: 6 Creditors are not making this request with a light heart and mere speculation. Creditors were business 7 associates of the Debtors and know them well, and although Debtors have argued that there are no specific 8 allegations about Creditors’ knowledge of Debtors’

activities, facts regarding Debtors’ true finances may 9 come to light during a debtor examination. 10 Reply, page 2, lines 10-13 (emphasis added). 11 Noting the business relationship and subsequent prolonged 12 litigation between the parties (which would presumably result in 13 a more detailed understanding of the existence of Debtors’ 14 alleged substantial assets and/or the tactics used to hide 15 them), and at the same time the lack of detail regarding the 16 “tactics” allegedly employed by Debtors along with only 17 unsubstantiated and vague assertions insinuating the possible 18 existence of some undefined asset (be it the $3,500,000 “asset” 19 referred to in Appellants’ appeal briefs that was allegedly paid 20 to Debtors at some point pre-petition, the $5,000,000 “payment” 21 referred to by Creditors’ counsel during the hearing on the 22 Motion, or otherwise), there is nothing in the record to 23 establish prima facie proof the case was not fully administered. 24 Moreover, while Appellants assert that Debtors never 25 produced certain documents requested by Trustee Schwartzer, 26 including settlement documents regarding the $3,500,000 offer of 27 judgment, Creditors conceded at oral argument on appeal that 28 they never followed up with Trustee Schwartzer or Debtors to

15

1 confirm whether such documents were in fact ever produced. The 2 lack of diligence by Creditors in this regard further serves to 3 undermine the existence and substance of any hidden assets. 4 Even though Creditors’ focus in seeking a Rule 2004 examination 5 reflects that Creditors needed to conduct an investigation to 6 identify and locate allegedly hidden assets, these facts warrant 7 denial since there was no showing to support a finding that 8 there was a chance of substantial recovery for creditors. See 9 Lopez, 283 B.R. at 27. 10 Based on the foregoing, the bankruptcy court did not abuse 11 its discretion in denying the Motion given the lack of any 12 specific asset and the mere speculative prospect (much less a 13 substantial one) of any ultimate recovery for creditors. See 14 id. 15 C. Prejudice to Debtors upon Reopening 16 “In the absence of some meaningful prejudice, a court of 17 equity would abuse its discretion by barring the reopening of a 18 case.” In re Emmerling, 223 B.R. at 865. This Panel has found 19 that a bankruptcy court abused its discretion where it denied a 20 debtor’s motion to reopen the case to schedule an omitted cause 21 of action based on debtor’s bad faith. Lopez, 283 B.R. at 22. 22 Where, as here, there is no evidence of any asset (or 23 likelihood of discovering any asset) to be recovered for 24 creditors, notwithstanding the extensive pre-petition 25 relationship between the parties and where Creditors had ample 26 opportunity during the pendency of the case to investigate 27 potential assets, and given that the chapter 7 trustee 28 implicitly determined there were no assets worth pursuing,

16

1 reopening the case would cause meaningful prejudice to Debtors. 2 Among other things, reopening the case to allow Creditors to 3 conduct a Rule 2004 examination would subject Debtors to 4 examination and additional litigation fees more than two years 5 after they had received their discharge. Given these 6 circumstances the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion 7 in denying the Motion. 8 CONCLUSION 9 Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the 10 court below did not abuse its discretion when it denied the 11 Motion. We therefore AFFIRM the bankruptcy court’s order. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26