In Re Russell

52 F.2d 749, 1931 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1692
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Hampshire
DecidedMay 14, 1931
Docket1:98-adr-00002
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 52 F.2d 749 (In Re Russell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Russell, 52 F.2d 749, 1931 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1692 (D.N.H. 1931).

Opinion

MORRIS, District Judge.

Javan M. Bussell of Somersworth, N. H., was adjudged a bankrupt upon his voluntary petition on August 9, 1929. May 19, 1930, he made application for his discharge which was duly published and made returnable before the court on July 1, 1930. On June 27, 1930, various creditors filed objections to the bankrupt’s discharge specifications of which were filed July 10, 1930. The matter came on for hearing before the court on September 26, 1930, and at the suggestion of counsel, after the day’s hearing, was continued for further evidence. The matter came on again for hearing before the court January 28, 1931, since which time counsel have prepared and filed written arguments.

The objections to the discharge are eight in number, all of which appear to be embodied in the specifications of the North Berwick National Bank.

Objection No. 1.

The first objection alleges that the bankrupt in an attempt to defraud his creditors failed to make true statements of his property and purposely omitted from his assets his automobile and a considerable amount of household goods and that in so doing he made a material false statement in writing respecting his assets and property and made a false oath thereto.

With reference to this objection I find as follows: At the time of the adjudication the bankrupt owned a Hudson sedan which he did not list in his schedule of assets. At a meeting of the creditors, George E. Varney of Somersworth was elected trustee and three appraisers were appointed to make an appraisal of the bankrupt’s property. When the appraisal was being made, the trustee knowing that Russell had an automobile called his attention to the fact that he had not listed it in his schedule. The bankrupt admitted that he owned an automobile; that it was left out and should have been included. An amendment was thereafter made to the original schedule including the automobile, which amendment was filed with Referee Clifford.

The bankrupt’s explanation as to the automobile is -¡that when it occurred to him that he had an automobile in his bam he reported it to the trustee; that he did not intentionally omit it, that he did not conceal it, and that its omission was a mistake.

I find that there was no intention on the part of the bankrupt to omit the automobile from his schedule of property, but that the omission was inadvertent, as he must have been aware of the fact that his ownership of it was well known to his creditors and neighbors.

I find that in signing and making oath to his schedules with the automobile omitted, he did not intentionally take a false oath within the meaning of section 14 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 USCA § 32).

It is further alleged in creditors’ objection No. 1 that the bankrupt, intending to defraud his creditors, falsely and fraudulently set forth in his schedule his household goods at the value of $100, and claimed an exemption as to all of them; whereas) in fact he well knew his household goods were very valuable and worth many hundreds of dollars and not exempt as claimed.

With reference to the furniture, I find as a fact that the bankrupt listed in his schedule of assets $100 worth of furniture and claimed an exemption of all of it. When the appraisers were going over the other property, the trustee asked about the furniture and was given to understand that there was no furniture in the house belonging to Mr. Russell with the exception of a desk and chair or two in his office and that they were of nominal value so no appraisal of furniture was made. Later, the trustee, knowing that Mr. Bussell lived in a nice residence and maintained a nice establishment, made further inquiry and investigation with reference to his furniture and found that Mr. Bussell did own more than had been listed, and as a result of the investigation a further amendment listing a considerable number of articles totaling $576.25 in value was made to the bankrupt’s *751 schedule and filed January 7, 1930. The bankrupt when asked about Ms furniture by his counsel at the hearing before the court answered: “The question of furniture was raised in your office and my answer was this: I have practically no furniture that I purchased. The furniture we are using was largely given as a wedding present at the* time we were married and recently by bequest to my wife from her mother.”

“Q. What was your honest judgment at that time as to the value of your furniture if you gave it a thought with respect to the exemption? A. I wasn’t impressed that there was an item that called for a very strict accounting. I had reported that I had practically no furniture and that seemed to counsel to justify making no entry of it.”

The fact that the furniture was mentioned and valued at $100 convinces the court that when the bankrupt was asked concerning tho furniture he knew that he owned more than $100 worth and he knew that $100 worth was exempt and therefore reported that amount. This was a false representation as to his assets. I cannot find that it was other than intentional, and unless bankrupt’s subsequent conduct in permitting and assisting tho trustee in separating bankrupt’s own furniture from that of his wife purges him from tho result of his prior conduct, his discharge must bo denied upon this ground. Whether or not bankrupt’s conduct will be excused will be taken up later in this rescript.

Other grounds argued by creditors’ counsel relating to the Champlin preferred stock, Butler liability, coal, and testimony relating to Gowell lumber deals, are not considered because not specifically alleged in creditors’ specifications of objections. To refuse bankrupt a discharge on grounds not covered by specifications of objections would be error. In re Feinsilver (C. C. A.) 24 F.(2d) 408.

Objection No. 2.

Objection No. 2 alleges that on March 30, 1929, said bankrupt applied to tho North Berwick National Bank for extension and renewal of credit on his note and did then and there obtain an extension and renewal of credit from the bank on Ms note by making on said March 30, 1929, a materially false statement in writing subscribed and sworn to by Mm respecting Ms financial condition.

I find with reference thereto that the bankrupt was owing the Berwick Bank two notes aggregating $4,000. Jarvan N. Bus-sell, the bankrupt, was the maker, and Edward F. Gowell was the payee and indorser. The notes had been renewed from time to time and there was a request made for a further renewal. On or about March 30, 1929, the bank sent J. M. Bussell a blank form upon which to make return of a financial statement. Tho statement with the exception of the address at the top and jurat at the bottom is in the handwriting of tho bankrupt and was returned to the bank on March 30, 1929. It shows a net worth of $95,392, as follows:

Assets
Cash on hand and in hank...... 338.00
Notes and accounts receivable... 20,955.00
Beal Estate .................. 25,400.00
Other Property............... 108,853.00
Total Assets.............. 155,526.00
Liabilities
Chattel Mortgages on Lumber... 8,000.00

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Bluebook (online)
52 F.2d 749, 1931 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1692, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-russell-nhd-1931.