In re R.T.-G.

2026 IL App (4th) 250990-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 22, 2026
• Docket: 4-25-0990
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 250990-U FILED This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is January 22, 2026 not precedent except in the NO. 4-25-0990 Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re R.T.-G., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Rock Island County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 23JA70 v. ) Ray G., ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) Norma Kauzlarich, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Zenoff and Vancil concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: There being no nonfrivolous argument to be raised on appeal, appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted, and the trial court’s judgment terminating respondent’s parental rights is affirmed.

¶2 In March 2025, the State filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of

respondent Ray G. as to his minor child, R.T.-G. (born 2022). R.T.-G.’s mother is not a party to

this appeal. In September 2025, the trial court granted the State’s petition and terminated

respondent’s parental rights.

¶3 Respondent appealed and counsel was appointed to represent him. Appointed

counsel now moves to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing

respondent’s appeal presents no issues of arguable merit for review. See In re S.M., 314 Ill. App.

3d 682, 685-86 (2000) (holding Anders applies to termination of parental rights cases and

providing the proper procedure to be followed by appellate counsel). We agree, grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 A. Adjudication of Wardship

¶6 In July 2023, the State filed a petition to adjudicate R.T.-G. neglected. While the

petition contained specific factual allegations, the general theme was that R.T.-G. was subjected

to an injurious environment under section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile

Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2022)). The trial court placed the child in temporary

custody and appointed the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) as

guardian. R.T.-G. was placed with his maternal grandmother.

¶7 At a subsequent hearing in September 2023, the parties discussed compliance with

the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1923 (2018)). The mother of

R.T.-G. was a member of the Pokagon Band of the Potawatomi Indian tribe (Pokagon Band), so

by effect so was R.T.-G. The Pokagon Band appeared at the hearing via a representative. The State

asserted it wanted to file a supplemental motion to ensure compliance with the ICWA. The trial

court also noted that newly appointed counsel for respondent had moved for a continuance. All the

parties agreed that a continuance was appropriate, and the court found good cause to continue the

matter.

¶8 Respondent subsequently filed a motion for discovery. At the following hearing on

September 8, 2023, the matter was once again continued. There is no report of proceedings in the

record for this hearing, but a docket entry shows that counsel for respondent requested a

continuance and none of the parties objected. The trial court found that upon good cause shown,

the matter would be continued.

¶9 On September 18, 2023, the State filed a supplemental petition. At a hearing the

-2- same day, expert testimony was given on the child-rearing practices of the Pokagon Band.

Additional testimony was given concerning the appropriateness of the placement of R.T.-G. with

his grandmother. The trial court ordered that placement with R.T.-G.’s grandmother would

continue, a decision with which the representative for the Pokagon Band agreed.

¶ 10 The matter was continued to October 12, 2023, and then again to November 16,

2023, without objection. At the November hearing, R.T.-G.’s mother stipulated to the petition, and

no objection was raised by the Pokagon Band. On December 11, 2023, the trial court entered an

adjudicatory order finding R.T.-G. neglected and a dispositional order finding respondent unfit.

¶ 11 Subsequently, the Pokagon Band exercised its right to intervene in the matter. In

August 2024, respondent was incarcerated in a county jail in Iowa, so he was unable to complete

services or visit R.T.-G. Respondent was subsequently moved to Anamosa State Penitentiary in

Iowa and had other pending criminal charges in Rock Island County.

¶ 12 B. Petition to Terminate Parental Rights

¶ 13 In March 2025, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights,

alleging that he was unfit under sections 1(D(b), (m)(i), and (m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS

50/1(D)(b), (m)(i), (m)(ii) (West 2024)) based on a failure to (1) maintain a reasonable degree of

interest, concern, or responsibility as to the child’s welfare; (2) make reasonable efforts to correct

the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the child during a nine-month period after the

adjudication of neglect; and (3) make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to his care

during a nine-month period after the adjudication of neglect. The petition alleged a nine-month

period of December 12, 2023, to September 12, 2024.

¶ 14 1. Fitness Hearing

¶ 15 In August 2025, the trial court held a fitness hearing. Exhibits, including agency

-3- reports and birth certificates for the mother and R.T.-G. establishing tribal membership, were

submitted into evidence. An expert in the child-rearing practices of the Pokagon Band testified to

her opinion that R.T.-G. had not been raised consistently with tribal practices. A caseworker also

testified regarding respondent and his service plan. While respondent had engaged in some

services, he failed to complete any. Respondent’s visitation with the minor became inconsistent in

January 2024 before ceasing completely that same month. Respondent’s tentative discharge date

from the Iowa prison was set for 2031. Respondent had not reached out to the caseworker despite

having her contact information and the ability to do so and had failed to reach out to the child.

¶ 16 The trial court found that the State proved respondent unfit by clear and convincing

evidence based on, among other grounds, his failure to make reasonable progress toward the return

of the child to his care during a nine-month period after the adjudication of neglect.

¶ 17 2. Best-Interest Hearing

¶ 18 In September 2025, the trial court proceeded to a best-interest hearing. The court

took judicial notice of the best-interest report without objection. The report stated that R.T.-G. was

bonded with his maternal grandmother and that he had been in the placement for essentially his

entire life. All of R.T.-G.’s needs were being met in his placement. Everything R.T.-G. knew or

relied on in relation to the statutory best-interest factors favored termination. The grandmother

involved R.T.-G. in tribal culture and attended tribal events with all the children in her care. The

caseworker briefly testified that R.T.-G. was placed with his maternal grandmother and his older

half-siblings. The grandmother wished to give R.T.-G. permanence through adoption. Counsel for

the Pokagon Band did not object to the termination of respondent’s parental rights.

¶ 19 The trial court found the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it

was in R.T.-G.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights. The court enumerated the

-4- statutory best-interest factors and found that they supported termination. The court therefore

ordered that respondent’s parental rights were terminated, and it set the permanency goal for

R.T.-G. to adoption.

¶ 20 This appeal followed.

¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22 Appellate counsel now moves to withdraw on appeal pursuant to Anders and argues

that the appeal of this case presents no potentially meritorious issues for review. See S.M., 314 Ill.

App. 3d at 685-86. Notice of counsel’s intent to withdraw was sent to respondent, and he has not

filed a response. Counsel states she has reviewed the common law record and report of proceedings

for this matter and has identified four potential issues for review: (1) timeliness of the adjudicatory

hearing; (2) whether incarceration tolls the time to comply with the service plan; (3) compliance

with the ICWA; and (4) whether the findings of the trial court at the fitness and best-interest

hearings were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 23 A. Timeliness of Adjudicatory Hearing

¶ 24 Appellate counsel acknowledges that the trial court failed to conduct the

adjudicatory hearing within 90 days. The Juvenile Court Act requires that “an adjudicatory hearing

shall be commenced within 90 days of the date of service of process upon the minor, parents, any

guardian and any legal custodian, unless an earlier date is required pursuant to Section 2-13.1.”

705 ILCS 405/2-14(b) (West 2024). However, “[t]he time limits of this Section may be waived

only by consent of all parties and approval by the court.” Id. § 2-14(d). If the time limits of the

statute are not met, “upon motion by any party the petition shall be dismissed without prejudice.”

Id. § 2-14(c).

¶ 25 Counsel asserts that the delay of 112 days between the July 27, 2023, grant of

-5- temporary custody and the November 16, 2023, adjudicatory hearing was beyond that allowed by

statute. However, we agree with counsel that this does not form a basis for reversal where the

parties agreed to every continuance and the trial court found that there was good cause shown at

the two hearings in September 2023. Furthermore, there was no motion filed by any party to

dismiss the action based on procedural noncompliance. See In re S.G., 175 Ill. 2d 471, 481-82

(1997). The plain language of the statute requires the filing of a motion in order to dismiss the

petition for procedural noncompliance by the State. See Rainey v. Retirement Board Of the

Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago, 2025 IL 131305, ¶ 12 (“A statute’s

plain language is the best indicator of legislative intent, and where the statute’s language is clear,

we apply it as written.”). We agree with counsel that, based on the plain language of the statute

and the agreement by the parties to continue the matter without objection, there is no nonfrivolous

argument to be advanced on this point.

¶ 26 B. Incarceration and Progress on Service Plan

¶ 27 Counsel notes that she considered the argument that respondent’s incarceration and

resulting inability to perform services provided a sufficient basis to undermine the trial court’s

fitness finding. However, it is well established that “[t]ime in prison is included in the nine-month

period during which reasonable progress must be made.” In re F.P., 2014 IL App (4th)

140360, ¶ 89 (citing In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 329, 343 (2010)). In other words, incarceration does not

toll the requirement of reasonable progress toward the goals of the service plan. To that end, the

fact that personal circumstances, such as incarceration, inhibit reasonable progress is irrelevant to

the “ ‘objective standard’ ” of determining reasonable progress when making a fitness

determination. Id. (quoting In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 461 (1991)). Accordingly, there is

no nonfrivolous argument that could be made regarding respondent’s incarceration and its impact

-6- on his ability to complete services.

¶ 28 C. Compliance with the ICWA

¶ 29 Counsel asserts she considered arguing that the State failed to comply with the

ICWA. “The ICWA sets forth minimum federal standards for the removal of an Indian child from

his or her family.” In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 203 (2001). Jurisdictional provisions concerning

Indian child custody proceedings are at the heart of the ICWA. In re H.D., 343 Ill. App. 3d 483,

487-88 (2003). “Under section 1911(b) [of the ICWA], the state courts and the tribal courts enjoy

concurrent jurisdiction over proceedings for the foster care placement of, or termination of parental

rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the reservation of the Indian child’s

tribe.” C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 203-04 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1994)). Further,

“In any involuntary proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or has

reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care

placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify the

parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child’s tribe *** of the pending

proceedings and of their right of intervention.” 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (2018).

“A violation of sections 1911 or 1912 of the ICWA may be cause to invalidate the child custody

proceeding.” C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 204 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (1994)).

¶ 30 We agree with counsel that there is no nonfrivolous argument that could be

advanced that the ICWA was violated. It is clear from the report of proceedings that the State and

the trial court were cognizant of the ICWA and R.T.-G.’s status early on in the proceedings. The

Pokagon Band was represented throughout the proceedings, and the State repeatedly requested the

enhanced findings required by the ICWA. The service plans and findings of the court documented

the active efforts of the agencies. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2018); 25 C.F.R. § 23.120 (2023).

-7- Tribal counsel participated in this case and did not raise any objections to the procedure or ruling

of the court.

¶ 31 D. Fitness and Best-Interest Determinations

¶ 32 Under section 2-29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West

2022)), the involuntary termination of parental rights is a two-step process. First, the State must

prove by clear and convincing evidence the parent is “unfit,” as defined in the Adoption Act. In re

Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d 234, 244 (2006). If the State proves unfitness, it then must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the

children. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 363-66 (2004). A trial court’s fitness and best-interest findings

will not be reversed unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re N.G., 2018

IL 121939, ¶ 29; In re T.A., 359 Ill. App. 3d 953, 961 (2005).

¶ 33 Among the grounds of unfitness, the trial court found respondent failed to make

reasonable progress toward the return of the child during the relevant nine-month period. See 750

ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2024); see also In re D.C., 209 Ill. 2d 287, 296 (2004) (“A parent’s

rights may be terminated if a single alleged ground for unfitness is supported by clear and

convincing evidence.”). Illinois courts have defined “reasonable progress” as “demonstrable

movement toward the goal of reunification.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Reiny S.,

374 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 1046 (2007). Reasonable progress is an objective standard (In re A.R., 2023

IL App (1st) 220700, ¶ 70), and it exists when the trial court can conclude that a parent is making

sufficient progress under the service plan that the minor will be “returned to parental custody in

the near future” (In re D.T., 2017 IL App (3d) 170120, ¶ 17).

¶ 34 Here, the evidence established that respondent failed to complete any of the

required services. As discussed above, respondent’s incarceration offers no respite from the trial

-8- court’s finding. From an objective view, respondent failed to make reasonable progress during the

nine-month period because R.T.-G. could not be returned to him in the near future. It appears from

the record that respondent ceased contact with R.T.-G. in January 2024 and had not reestablished

communication as of the time of the hearing. We agree with appellate counsel that there is no

nonfrivolous argument that can be asserted challenging the court’s fitness finding.

¶ 35 Turning to the best-interest determination, the trial court must consider the factors

set forth in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2024)).

These factors include:

“(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child’s

identity; (3) the child’s background and ties, including familial, cultural, and

religious; (4) the child’s sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity,

and continuity of affection, and the least-disruptive placement alternative; (5) the

child’s wishes; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s need for permanence,

including the need for stability and continuity of relationships with parental figures

and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks related to

substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the persons available to care for the

child.” In re Jay. H., 395 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1071 (2009) (citing 705 ILCS

405/1-3(4.05) (West 2008)).

¶ 36 The best-interest report establishes that R.T.-G. had been with his maternal

grandmother almost his entire life. His background, including familial, cultural, religious, and

community ties, was connected to his current placement. The grandmother involved R.T.-G. in

tribal rituals and activities, and he was bonded with her and his half-siblings, who also resided

with the grandmother. His sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity, and

-9- continuity of affection, was also with his grandmother. R.T.-G.’s grandmother provided for all of

his needs, was the least disruptive placement, and wished to give him permanence through

adoption.

¶ 37 Respondent was incarcerated, and estimates were that he would remain so until at

least 2031. He failed to maintain his connection with the child and had no way to provide for the

child’s needs or offer shelter.

¶ 38 Given the facts of this case, it would be frivolous to argue that the trial court’s

fitness and best-interest findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 39 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 40 For the reasons stated, we grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm

the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 41 Affirmed.

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