In re: Roger Thomas Haag

• Court: United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: September 27, 2012
• Docket: AZ-11-1661-DJuBr AZ-11-1662-DJuBr AZ-11-1663-DJuBr
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED SEP 27 2012 SUSAN M SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

1 2 3 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL 4 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 5 In re: ) BAP Nos. AZ-11-1661-DJuBr ) AZ-11-1662-DJuBr 6 ROGER THOMAS HAAG, ) AZ-11-1663-DJuBr ) 7 Debtor. ) Bk. No. 10-07917-EWH ________________________________ ) 8 ) Adv. Nos. 10-01207-EWH ROGER THOMAS HAAG, ) 10-01268-EWH 9 ) Appellant, ) 10 ) v. ) 11 ) NORTHWESTERN BANK; M&I BANK, ) M E M O R A N D U M1 12 ) Appellees. ) 13 ________________________________ ) 14 Argued and Submitted on September 19, 2012 at Phoenix, Arizona 15 Filed - September 27, 2012 16 Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court 17 for the District of Arizona 18 Honorable Eileen W. Hollowell, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding 19 Appearances: David Hindman of Mesch, Clark & Rothschild, P.C., 20 argued for Appellant Roger Thomas Haag; Howard C. Meyers of Burch & Cracchiolo, P.A. argued for 21 Appellee Northwestern Bank. 22 23 24 1 This disposition is not appropriate for publication. 25 Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. See 9th 26 Cir. BAP Rule 8013-1.

1 1 Before: DUNN, JURY, and BRAND,2 Bankruptcy Judges. 2 3 Two creditors filed separate adversary proceedings to challenge 4 debtor’s right to a discharge. The bankruptcy court consolidated 5 the adversary proceedings and conducted a four-day trial on the 6 issues raised in the adversary complaints. Ultimately, the 7 bankruptcy court determined that the debtor was not entitled to a 8 discharge solely on the basis that he intended to hinder or delay 9 his largest creditor when, within a year prior to filing bankruptcy, 10 he placed approximately $120,000 in cash in a safety deposit box 11 with the admitted purpose of keeping it from the creditor, whom he 12 believed was engaging in improper collection activities. The debtor 13 appealed.3 We AFFIRM. 14 I. FACTS4 15 16 2 Hon. Julia W. Brand, United States Bankruptcy Judge for 17 the Central District of California, sitting by designation. 3 18 The bankruptcy court’s judgment denying Appellant’s discharge was docketed in both adversary proceedings and in the main 19 case. Appellant filed an appeal from each of the judgments. The appeals were consolidated by the order of our motions panel on 20 January 11, 2012. Though a named Appellee, M&I Bank is not 21 participating in this consolidated appeal. 4 22 Claims for relief were asserted in the adversary proceedings pursuant to §§ 523(a)(2)(B), 523(a)(4), 727(a)(2), 23 727(a)(3), 727(a)(4), and 727(a)(5). After the close of Appellee’s case, the bankruptcy court dismissed the §§ 523(a)(4) and 727(a)(5) 24 claims for relief. After trial, the bankruptcy court ruled in favor 25 of Appellant on all but the § 727(a)(2) claim for relief, which is the subject of this appeal. 26 (continued...)

2 1 On July 27, 2009, Northwestern Bank (“NWB”) obtained a 2 judgment (“Judgment”) against Roger Thomas Haag in the Circuit Court 3 for the County of Leelanau, Michigan in the approximate amount of 4 $1.7 million. The Judgment was based on Mr. Haag’s personal 5 guaranty of the debts of his failed business, HTI, Inc. (“HTI”). 6 NWB domesticated the Judgment in Arizona on February 1, 2010. 7 The domestication of the Judgment in Arizona prompted Mr. Haag 8 to file a voluntary chapter 75 petition in the Bankruptcy Court for 9 the District of Arizona on March 23, 2010 (“Petition Date”), an 10 action he had been contemplating since at least November 29, 2008. 11 NWB filed an adversary complaint seeking alternatively to have 12 its debt excepted from the application of Mr. Haag’s discharge, or 13 14 4 (...continued) 15 As his record on appeal, Appellant submitted five volumes of excerpts, the majority of which are the complete trial 16 transcripts and the transcripts of closing arguments and the hearing on Appellant’s motion for reconsideration, most of which are not 17 relevant to the limited issue before the Panel. The factual record 18 important in this appeal relates to evidence of the receipt of five tax refunds and various banking transactions through which the 19 disposition of the proceeds of those refunds was traced. Yet Appellant did not provide the actual trial exhibits, which would 20 have made that evidentiary record easily accessible. Instead, to 21 put together the facts, it was necessary to read the entire transcript, and then go back to locate the factual information that 22 actually relates to this appeal. The parties provided some assistance in their briefs, but the actual evidence would have made 23 the exercise much easier. 24 5 Unless otherwise specified, all chapter and section 25 references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, and all “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 26 Procedure, Rules 1001-9037.

3 1 to deny Mr. Haag his discharge altogether. After four days of 2 trial, the bankruptcy court denied Mr. Haag a discharge, based 3 solely on its finding that Mr. Haag intended to hinder or delay NWB 4 in its efforts to collect on the Judgment. 5 Mr. Haag is an engineer with expertise in biosolids 6 applications and in the construction of biosolids storage tanks. 7 Mr. Haag was the sole owner of HTI, which built and installed 8 precast concrete tanks for use in wastewater treatment plants. 9 Beginning in 2003, Mr. Haag and HTI began their banking 10 relationship with NWB. By June 2007, HTI’s line of credit with NWB 11 had increased to $1.3 million. Mr. Haag and HTI had two options 12 available to repay the NWB debt: generating funds through 13 performance on HTI’s contracts or the sale of HTI as a going 14 concern. Following the 2007 collapse of the housing market, HTI was 15 unable to obtain sufficient new business to support its debt 16 payments to NWB. Mr. Haag thereafter obtained a buyer for HTI; 17 however, the attempted sale ultimately failed in November 2008. 18 By email dated November 29, 2008, Mr. Haag advised NWB that he 19 had retained counsel with the intent to file a personal chapter 7 20 case and to live on social security benefits and the IRAs held by 21 Mr. Haag and his wife, Carol. Mr. Haag left HTI’s office and 22 everything in it, including HTI’s books and records, in December 23 2008. Also in December 2008, Mr. Haag surrendered his residence to 24 NWB and moved to Arizona. 25 In January 2009, NWB took possession of all HTI assets. 26 Mr. Haag testified he fully cooperated with NWB in turning over

4 1 HTI’s equipment. By letter dated January 17, 2009 (“January 2009 2 Letter”), Ms. Haag advised NWB that “[Mr. Haag’s] only income is 3 unemployment, social security, and IRAs.” At the end of the January 4 2009 Letter is a statement by Mr. Haag that he had read and approved 5 the January 2009 Letter. 6 Beginning in February of 2009,6 Mr. Haag received a total of 7 $231,838 from refunds of taxes for the years 2007 and 2008: $12,549 8 from the State of Michigan as a refund of personal income taxes; 9 $61,206 as a refund of federal personal income taxes; $68,194 from a 10 federal income tax refund attributable to a loss carry forward; 11 $13,114 from the State of Michigan attributable to a loss carry 12 forward; and $76,775 from a federal income tax refund attributable 13 to a loss carry forward. Some or all of the refund checks were 14 deposited into Mr. Haag’s personal checking account at the Bank of 15 Tucson. 16 On July 11, 2009, less than three weeks before NWB obtained the 17 Judgment, Mr. Haag withdrew $120,000 in cash from the Bank of Tucson 18 account and placed it in a safety deposit box he and Ms. Haag rented 19 jointly at Wachovia Bank. When asked at trial why he had converted 20 $120,000 from his Bank of Tucson account to cash, Mr. Haag 21 responded: “I guess the reason was that I felt at some point in 22 time [NWB] had taken – gotten into stuff that I didn’t think they 23 should get into, so I took it out in cash.” In subsequent 24 25 6 Ms. Haag testified that she believed that Mr. Haag started 26 receiving the tax refunds in February of 2009.

5 1 testimony, he stated: “I didn’t feel comfortable with leaving it in 2 a bank. If I had the cash in my hand and if something -- somebody 3 decided that they wanted to take it from me if it was in a bank, I’d 4 have to get a lawyer to try to get it back. And it was much easier 5 for me to take it as cash because I knew I needed it to live on.” 6 Ms. Haag also testified at trial that the process of taking $120,000 7 of the tax refunds proceeds from Mr. Haag’s Bank of Tucson account 8 in cash, putting it in the safety deposit box at Wachovia Bank, and 9 then depositing some of the cash into her bank accounts was done 10 “[b]ecause we were nervous because we felt our opinion that [NWB] 11 had been quite aggressive with us, and I just felt that this was an 12 appropriate way to manage the tax returns.” Mr. Haag asserts that 13 in moving the cash to the safety deposit box he merely was acting to 14 protect himself from improper conduct by NWB. Specifically, he was 15 protecting his right to privacy and his financial information from 16 improper inquiries by NWB. 17 By the Petition Date, some eight months after Mr. Haag put the 18 $120,000 cash into the safety deposit box, the cash was, in 19 Mr. Haag’s words, “long gone.”7 Mr. Haag did not keep records of 20 how or when the money was taken from the safety deposit box and 21 spent. Nevertheless, the record establishes that he and/or Ms. Haag 22 removed cash from the safety deposit box, and that Ms. Haag spent 23 the cash on what Mr. Haag characterized as reasonable expenses. The 24 7 25 Ms. Haag testified that when she filed for a legal separation from Mr. Haag in September 2009 [see n.8], there was no 26 money left in the safety deposit box.

6 1 record is undisputed that Ms. Haag used cash from the safety deposit 2 box, in part, for the following: $37,000 to remodel a condo in 3 Mexico owned by Mr. Haag, at least $18,000 to purchase new 4 furnishings for the remodeled condo in Mexico, and $2,000 to an 5 attorney Ms. Haag hired to draft a separation agreement through 6 which she became legally separated from Mr. Haag and was “awarded” 7 the condo in Mexico.8 8 The bankruptcy court ultimately found that within one year 9 prior to the Petition Date, Mr. Haag withdrew $120,00 in cash from 10 his account at the Bank of Tucson and placed it in a safety deposit 11 box he jointly owned with Ms. Haag; that he converted the funds in 12 his bank account to cash because he was concerned about collection 13 action by NWB; that between July and November of 2009, at least 14 15 8 Ms. Haag is a successful business woman. Ms. Haag acted 16 as CFO of HTI and managed HTI’s banking relationship with NWB. NWB believes Ms. Haag prepared, and Mr. Haag provided, fraudulent 17 financial statements to NWB. 18 The Haags maintained separate bank accounts and separate assets. 19 In August 2009, the Haags participated in a Mexican marriage ceremony, likely as a renewal of their vows as their 40th 20 anniversary approached. In September 2009, they signed the 21 separation agreement. A short time thereafter they took an overseas trip together which they referred to as their “anniversary” 22 vacation. Mr. Haag’s explanation as to why they took the trip was that it already had been paid for. They still travel together for 23 family visits. At the time of trial in 2011, the Haags still had not told 24 all of their children they were legally separated. Ms. Haag 25 frequently stays at the Arizona condo Mr. Haag claims as his residence. Mr. Haag explained that the separation agreement 26 “awarded” her the use of a room there.

7 1 $36,000 of the cash from the safety deposit box was deposited by 2 Ms. Haag into her personal checking account; and that Ms. Haag used 3 the cash received from Mr. Haag to pay family and business expenses. 4 The bankruptcy court concluded that the transfer of money from the 5 Bank of Tucson account to a safety deposit box jointly owned with 6 Ms. Haag was a transfer of property by Mr. Haag, that the removal of 7 cash from the safety deposit box into Ms. Haag’s individual account 8 was a transfer, and that Mr. Haag transferred the money with a 9 subjective intent to hinder or delay. Finally, while the bankruptcy 10 court determined that Mr. Haag’s admission that he intended to 11 hinder or delay NWB in its collection activities was sufficient to 12 deny Mr. Haag his discharge, the bankruptcy court noted that, even 13 without his admission, there were sufficient badges of fraud to 14 support a finding of intent: the close relationship between 15 Mr. Haag and Ms. Haag, Mr. Haag’s poor financial condition at the 16 time of the transfers, and the lack of any consideration for the 17 transfers. 18 After his motion for reconsideration was denied, Mr. Haag filed 19 a timely notice of appeal asking that we determine that the 20 bankruptcy court erred in finding that his actions constituted an 21 intent to hinder sufficient to deny his discharge pursuant to 22 § 727(a)(2). 23 II. JURISDICTION 24 The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 25 and 157(b)(2)(J). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158. 26

8 1 III. ISSUES 2 Whether the bankruptcy court erred when it found that Mr. Haag 3 intended to hinder or delay NWB in its efforts to collect on the 4 Judgment when he withdrew $120,000 from his Bank of Tucson account 5 and placed it in a safety deposit box to which he and Ms. Haag had 6 access. 7 Whether the bankruptcy court erred when it denied Mr. Haag a 8 discharge. 9 IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 10 [T]he Ninth Circuit standard of review of a judgment on an objection to discharge is that: (1) the court’s 11 determinations of the historical facts are reviewed for clear error; (2) the selection of the applicable legal 12 rules under § 727 is reviewed de novo; and (3) the application of the facts to those rules requiring the 13 exercise of judgments about values animating the rules is reviewed de novo. 14 15 Searles v. Riley (In re Searles), 317 B.R. 368, 373 (9th Cir. BAP 16 2004), aff’d, 212 Fed. Appx. 589 (9th Cir. 2006). 17 A factual finding is clearly erroneous if the appellate court, 18 after reviewing the record, has a firm and definite conviction that 19 a mistake has been made. Wall Street Plaza, LLC v. JSJF Corp. 20 (In re JSJF Corp.), 344 B.R. 94, 99 (9th Cir. BAP 2006). If two 21 views of the evidence are possible, the trial judge's 22 choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Anderson v. City 23 of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985); Hansen v. Moore 24 (In re Hansen), 368 B.R. 868, 874-75 (9th Cir. BAP 2007). 25 “De novo means review is independent, with no deference given 26 to the trial court's conclusion. See First Ave. W. Bldg., LLC v.

9 1 James (In re Onecast Media, Inc.), 439 F.3d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 2 2006).” Mwangi v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Mwangi), 432 B.R. 3 812, 818 (9th Cir. BAP 2010). 4 We may affirm the bankruptcy court’s ruling on any basis 5 supported by the record. See, e.g., Heilman v. Heilman (In re 6 Heilman), 430 B.R. 213, 216 (9th Cir. BAP 2010); FDIC v. Kipperman 7 (In re Commercial Money Center, Inc.), 392 B.R. 814, 826-27 (9th 8 Cir. BAP 2008); see also McSherry v. City of Long Beach, 584 F.3d 9 1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009). 10 V. DISCUSSION 11 A. General Considerations. 12 Many debtors seek a fresh start, available to them by virtue of 13 the discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, when they have 14 become unable to meet their financial obligations. The bankruptcy 15 court denied Mr. Haag a discharge, and in this appeal, we are asked 16 to determine whether the bankruptcy court erred when it did so. 17 In our review of the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact and 18 conclusions of law, we are guided by certain general principles 19 governing denial of discharge claims. Most important is the 20 admonition that “[a] denial of a discharge is an act of mammoth 21 proportions, and must not be taken lightly. In light of this 22 gravity . . . Section 727 must be construed liberally in favor of 23 the debtor and against the objector.” In re Goldstein, 66 B.R. 909, 24 917 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986). See First Beverly Bank v. Adeeb (In re 25 Adeeb), 787 F.2d 1339, 1342 (9th Cir. 1986); Devers v. Bank of 26 Sheridan (In re Devers), 759 F.2d 751, 754 (9th Cir. 1985). The

10 1 opposing tension to this admonition is that the bankruptcy discharge 2 and its opportunity for a fresh start are available only to the 3 “honest but unfortunate debtor.” See Cohen v. De La Cruz, 523 U.S. 4 213, 217 (1998), citing Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286-87 5 (1990). 6 Finally, a party objecting to the debtor’s discharge has the 7 burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 8 debtor’s actions or conduct fall within one of the exceptions to 9 discharge set forth in § 727. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. at 289. 10 With these guidelines in mind, we turn to our review of the 11 specific issues in this appeal. 12 B. The Record Supports Denial of Mr. Haag’s Discharge Under § 727(a)(2). 13 14 As relevant to this appeal, § 727(a)(2) provides: 15 (a) The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless– . . . 16 (2) the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or an officer of the estate charged 17 with custody of property under this title, has transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed, 18 or has permitted to be transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed – 19 (A) property of the debtor, within one year before the date of the filing of the petition9 . . . . 20 21 (Emphasis added.) 22 To prevail on its claim for relief under § 727(a)(2)(A), NWB 23 9 There is no dispute that all relevant events occurred 24 within one year before the Petition Date. The property with which 25 we are concerned in this appeal are the proceeds of the tax refunds Mr. Haag took from his bank account and placed into the safety 26 deposit box at Wachovia Bank in July 2009.

11 1 was required to prove two things: “(1) a disposition of property, 2 such as transfer or concealment, and (2) a subjective intent on the 3 debtor's part to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor through the act 4 [of] disposing of the property.” Hughes v. Lawson (In re Lawson), 5 122 F.3d 1237, 1240 (9th Cir. 1997). Ninth Circuit case law makes 6 clear that Mr. Haag’s intent need not have been fraudulent. 7 “Because the language of the statute is in the disjunctive it is 8 sufficient if the debtor's intent is to hinder or delay a creditor.” 9 Retz v. Samson (In re Retz), 606 F.3d 1189, 1198 (9th Cir. 2010), 10 citing Bernard v. Sheaffer (In re Bernard), 96 F.3d 1279, 1281 (9th 11 Cir. 1996). 12 The term “transfer” is defined by the Bankruptcy Code to mean: 13 (A) the creation of a lien; (B) the retention of title as a security interest; 14 (C) the foreclosure of a debtor’s equity of redemption; or (D) each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or 15 conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with – 16 (I) property; or (ii) an interest in property. 17 18 Section 101(54). 19 A withdrawal from a bank account is a transfer. See In re 20 Bernard, 96 F.3d at 1283. As explained by the Bernard court: 21 Instead of owning money sitting in their accounts, the Bernards owned claims against their bank. When they 22 withdrew from their accounts, they exchanged debt for money (which, more than incidentally, was more difficult 23 for the Sheaffers to acquire). Thus, when the Bernards made their withdrawals they parted with property, 24 satisfying the Code’s definition of transfer. 25 Id. The Ninth Circuit determined that the mere act of removing the 26 money from their bank account in order to hinder their creditors

12 1 warranted denial of the Bernards’ discharge. 2 Here, in addition to transferring $120,000 in cash from his 3 Bank of Tucson account, Mr. Haag took the further step of placing 4 the $120,000 cash into a safety deposit box at Wachovia Bank to 5 which only he and Ms. Haag had access, thereby concealing it from 6 his creditors, including NWB.10 Further, each time cash was removed 7 from the safety deposit box and placed in Ms. Haag’s control, there 8 was a separate transfer. 9 Mr. Haag asserts on appeal that the bankruptcy court erred in 10 finding he held an actual intent to hinder or delay NWB. Mr. Haag 11 faults the bankruptcy court for relying only on his “admission” that 12 he placed cash into the safety deposit box out of concern about 13 NWB’s collection efforts. He asserts that the bankruptcy court 14 failed to consider all of the circumstantial evidence and inferences 15 from his conduct. 16 We note that “[w]hen a debtor admits that he acted with the 17 intent penalized by section 727(a)(2)(A), there is no need for the 18 court to rely on circumstantial evidence or inferences in 19 determining whether the debtor had the requisite intent.” First 20 Beverly Bank v. Adeeb (In re Adeeb), 787 F.2d 1339, 1343 (9th Cir. 21 1986). We further note that, notwithstanding the sufficiency of 22 Mr. Haag’s admission of intent to hinder or delay, the bankruptcy 23 court buttressed its conclusion with additional findings that 24 10 25 The term “conceal” means “[t]o keep from being seen, found, observed, or discovered; hide.” The American Heritage 26 Dictionary of the English Language, 4th ed. p. 381 (2000).

13 1 sufficient badges of fraud were present to support an inference of 2 fraud under § 727(a)(2), utilizing the proper standard articulated 3 in Emmett Valley Assocs. v. Woodfield (In re Woodfield), 978 F.2d 4 516 (9th Cir. 1992). Mr. Haag simply does not like the additional 5 findings. 6 In Mr. Haag’s view, the “admission” itself needed to be 7 considered within the circumstances as they existed. In particular, 8 Mr. Haag points out that both he and his wife testified that he 9 withdrew cash and placed it in a safety deposit box because 10 “(1) they needed cash for their expenses in Mexico and (2) to 11 protect against improper conduct of NWB including privacy 12 violations.” Appellant’s Opening Brief at 13:3-4. He further 13 asserts (1) that it is “uncontested” that all funds in the safety 14 deposit box were used for the payment of his reasonable business, 15 medical, legal, and living expenses, (2) that his course of conduct 16 demonstrated “an ongoing intent to cooperate with all lawful 17 collection actions against him,” and (3) that there was no evidence 18 that he “misled or deflected creditors.” 19 We find these assertions troubling based on the record before 20 us. The bankruptcy court made no finding as to the reasonableness 21 of the expenses for which the $120,000 cash was used. We would not 22 characterize a complete remodeling and redecorating of a second 23 residence in a foreign country as an “ordinary” expense for anyone, 24 most especially for an insolvent debtor, so we find it difficult to 25 determine how the expense could be found to be reasonable. Neither 26 do we see in the record the “ongoing intent to cooperate” with NWB.

14 1 The record in fact suggests a longer-term plan to conceal the 2 existence of the tax refunds from NWB. Specifically, Mr. Haag twice 3 communicated with NWB to volunteer to them the information that his 4 only sources of funds on which he would be living were IRAs, social 5 security benefits, and unemployment benefits. These representations 6 were made in December of 2008 and in January of 2009. Within a 7 month of the last representation, he began receiving large tax 8 refunds. It is inconceivable that it was only after January 17, 9 2009 that Mr. Haag realized he was entitled to these substantial 10 refunds, gathered his records for the preparation of the returns, 11 prepared the returns, and had the good fortune to have the returns 12 expeditiously processed by the taxing authorities and the refunds 13 disbursed. 14 Finally, Mr. Haag asserts that seeking haven from untoward 15 creditor behavior and intending to hinder or delay are “not mutually 16 exclusive.” Beauchamp v. Hoose (In re Beauchamp), 236 B.R. 727, 731 17 (9th Cir. BAP 1999). In other words, he asserts that both 18 intentions can exist, and, under his reading of Beauchamp, because 19 the bankruptcy court did not make an explicit finding that Mr. Haag 20 was not acting to protect his privacy when he placed cash in the 21 safety deposit box, the existence of the safe haven intention 22 precludes a finding that Mr. Haag had the intent to hinder or delay 23 the creditor. We do not read Beauchamp to require the bankruptcy 24 court to explicitly reject alternate, co-existing motivations. In 25 concluding that Mr. Haag possessed the requisite intent to hinder or 26 delay NWB, the bankruptcy court may even have recognized, but

15 1 discounted Mr. Haag’s intent to seek a safe haven.11 We observe 2 that a debtor’s belief that his conduct was morally justifiable does 3 not provide a defense to § 727(a)(2) allegations. See 6 COLLIER ON

4 BANKRUPTCY ¶ 727.02[3][a](Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer, eds., 5 16th ed. 2012). 6 The bankruptcy court did not err when it denied Mr. Haag his 7 discharge. 8 VI. CONCLUSION 9 The bankruptcy court’s findings that Mr. Haag placed $120,000 10 in cash into a safety deposit box, which funds subsequently were 11 spent by Mr. Haag and his wife, with the intent to hinder or delay 12 NWB in its efforts to collect its Judgment are more than adequately 13 supported by the record. We AFFIRM. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 11 22 Mr. Haag’s concern about violation of his privacy rights seems to have arisen when NWB made inquiries about the Haags’ IRAs 23 as potential sources of recovery. At trial, his attorney attempted to make that point. Mr. Haag’s response is illuminating as to the 24 true nature of his concern about his “privacy” rights: 25 Q: So you were concerned about your privacy related to your IRA? 26 A: Yes, I was. That’s all we had to live on.