IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
2022-NCSC-92
No. 305A21
Filed 15 July 2022
IN THE MATTER OF: R.L.R.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) (2019) from an order entered on
28 May 2021 by Judge D. Brent Cloninger in District Court, Cabarrus County. This
matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 1 July 2022, but was
determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of
the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
William L. Esser, IV, for Guardian ad Litem, and E. Garrison White for petitioner-appellee Cabarrus County Department of Human Services.
Christopher M. Watford for respondent-appellant mother.
ERVIN, Justice.
¶1 Respondent-mother Kayla H. appeals from an order entered by the trial court
terminating her parental rights in her daughter, R.L.R.1 After careful consideration
of respondent-mother’s challenges to the trial court’s termination order in light of the
1 R.L.R. will be referred to throughout the remainder of this opinion as “Rachel,” which is a pseudonym used to protect the identity of the juvenile and for ease of reading. IN RE R.L.R.
Opinion of the Court
record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court’s order should be
affirmed.2
I. Background
¶2 On 2 April 2019, the Cabarrus County Department of Human Services filed a
verified juvenile petition alleging that Rachel was a neglected and dependent juvenile
and obtained the entry of an order placing her in nonsecure custody. In its petition,
DHS described its interactions with Rachel’s family following the receipt of a child
protective services report on 26 November 2018 concerning a “nasty black, blue and
red bruise on the left side of [Rachel’s] face covering her lip, neck, jaw, and face[.]”
Although the initial report indicated that Rachel had sustained this bruise as the
result of a fall that had occurred while she was in her stepfather’s care, Rachel stated
during an appointment at the Child Advocacy Center that “her daddy pushed her[,]”
an assertion that caused the Child Advocacy Center staff to reach the conclusion that
Rachel’s “injuries were from non-accidental trauma” and to become concerned about
the possibility that Rachel had been subjected to physical abuse. After the maternal
grandmother had been identified as a temporary safety provider, Rachel was placed
in the maternal grandmother’s care pursuant to a safety agreement stating that
2 Although the trial court terminated the parental rights of Rachel’s father, Ricky R., as well, the father did not note an appeal to this Court from the trial court’s termination order. As a result, we will refrain from discussing the facts relating to the father’s situation in any detail in this opinion. IN RE R.L.R.
respondent-mother could only have supervised contact with Rachel and that the
stepfather could not have any contact with Rachel at all.
¶3 DHS also alleged that the stepfather had been charged with committing felony
and misdemeanor drug offenses on 16 December 2018 and that respondent-mother
had reported on 17 December 2018 that she had used cocaine and marijuana while
Rachel had been temporarily placed with the maternal grandmother. DHS asserted
that, on 19 December 2019, “[t]he case was substantiated for physical abuse and
neglect due to concerns of improper supervision, substance abuse, and injurious
environment” and transferred it to the in-home services unit. Although respondent-
mother missed an initial child and family team meeting that was held on 14 January
2019, she attended a rescheduled meeting that was held on 25 January 2019, at which
time she agreed to a case plan that required her to participate in parenting education
and demonstrate the skills that she had learned in disciplining, supervising, and
protecting Rachel; complete a substance abuse assessment and comply with any
resulting recommendations; submit to random drug screening within two hours after
having been requested to do so; and sign releases authorizing the provision of
information to DHS.
¶4 DHS further alleged that, while the family was receiving in-home services, the
agency had received a second child protective services report on 29 January 2019
indicating that Rachel had been in the care of respondent-mother rather than the IN RE R.L.R.
maternal grandmother and that the respondent-mother was taking Rachel to the
stepfather’s home. DHS asserted that it had received a third child protective services
report on 14 March 2019 indicating that there were drugs in the family home and
that respondent-mother and the stepfather had “fallen asleep (passed out) due to
possible heroin use” while Rachel was in the home and unsupervised. According to
DHS, respondent-mother had failed three drug screens in March, having tested
positive for the presence of methamphetamine, opiates, amphetamines, and
marijuana.
¶5 Finally, DHS alleged that, despite the fact that respondent-mother, the
stepfather, and the maternal grandmother had repeatedly denied that they had
violated the safety agreement, the agency remained concerned that Rachel was
having unauthorized contact with respondent-mother and the stepfather. DHS
alleged that its concerns had been validated on 1 April 2019, when Rachel was
discovered with respondent-mother and the stepfather at a time when the maternal
grandmother was absent.
¶6 Within a week after the filing of the juvenile petition, DHS sought leave to
amend its petition for the purpose of including additional factual allegations
concerning information of which it had been unaware at the time at which the initial
petition had been filed. According to the additional allegations set out in the amended
petition, the stepfather’s probation officer had made an unannounced visit to the IN RE R.L.R.
home in March 2019; the probation officer had discovered Rachel, respondent-mother,
and the stepfather at the residence during his visit; the stepfather had informed the
probation officer that Rachel had been placed back in the family home; and an
incident involving domestic violence between the stepfather and respondent-mother
in Rachel’s presence had occurred on 24 March 2019.
¶7 On 25 July 2019, Judge Christy E. Wilhelm entered an order determining that
Rachel was a neglected and dependent juvenile based, in part, upon respondent-
mother’s stipulation to the making of findings of fact that were consistent with the
allegations that had been made in the amended petition. In addition, Judge Wilhelm
ordered that Rachel remain in DHS custody, provided for weekly supervised
visitation between respondent-mother and Rachel for a period of one hour, and
authorized DHS to expand the amount of time within which respondent-mother was
allowed to visit with Rachel as the proceeding progressed. Similarly, Judge Wilhelm
ordered respondent-mother to obtain a substance abuse assessment and to comply
with any resulting recommendations; to submit to random drug screens; to obtain a
comprehensive clinical assessment following a period of sobriety and comply with any
resulting recommendations; complete parenting education; adhere to the weekly
visitation plan; attend Rachel’s medical and dental appointments and educational
meetings; obtain and maintain housing that was appropriate for herself and Rachel
for a minimum of six months; provide verification that she had sufficient income to IN RE R.L.R.
provide for herself and Rachel; provide financial support for Rachel; sign any
information releases requested by DHS; and maintain bi-weekly contact with the
social worker. Finally, Judge Wilhelm established a primary permanent plan of
reunification for Rachel, with a secondary plan of legal guardianship.
¶8 After a permanency planning hearing held on 12 March 2020, Judge Wilhelm
entered an order on or about 2 April 2020 finding that respondent-mother had failed
to make adequate progress toward correcting the conditions that had led to Rachel’s
removal from the family home within a reasonable period of time and that the
conditions that had resulted in Rachel’s placement in DHS custody continued to exist
because respondent-mother had not participated in substance abuse and parenting
education-related services and had failed to consistently visit with Rachel. As a
result, Judge Wilhelm ordered that Rachel’s primary permanent plan be changed to
one of legal guardianship, with a secondary plan of reunification. In addition, Judge
Wilhelm reduced the amount of time during which respondent-mother was entitled
to visit with Rachel to a period of one hour every other week and ordered respondent-
mother to confirm her attendance at least two hours prior to each visit. According to
Judge Wilhelm, while Rachel was doing well in her current placement, her foster
parents were not interested in serving as a permanent placement for her. On the
other hand, respondent-mother’s second cousin had expressed an interest in
providing Rachel with a permanent placement and was the subject of a home study IN RE R.L.R.
that was in the process of being performed. As a result, Judge Wilhelm ordered that
Rachel be placed with the maternal second cousin in the event that a favorable result
was reported at the conclusion of the pending home study.
¶9 After another permanency planning hearing held on 11 June 2020, the trial
court entered an order on 2 July 2020 finding that the maternal second cousin’s home
had been approved at the conclusion of the home study and that Rachel had been
transitioned to this relative placement on 25 May 2020. In addition, the trial court
clarified that Rachel’s primary permanent plan involved legal guardianship with a
relative. The trial court found that respondent-mother had not visited with Rachel
during the past ninety days and that her failure to visit with Rachel had negatively
affected the child. As a result, the trial court ordered that respondent-mother’s visits
with Rachel be terminated until respondent-mother had made herself available to the
court and had begun to actively engage in complying with the requirements of her
case plan.
¶ 10 In an order entered on 20 October 2020 following a 10 September 2020
permanency planning hearing, Judge Wilhelm found that respondent-mother had
continued to make no progress in complying with the requirements of her case plan
and that the maternal second cousin had expressed a desire to adopt Rachel. As the
result of respondent-mother’s failure to make satisfactory progress in addressing the
conditions that had led to Rachel’s removal from the family home and Rachel’s need IN RE R.L.R.
for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time, Judge Wilhelm
changed Rachel’s primary permanent plan to one of adoption and ordered DHS to
seek the termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights in Rachel.
¶ 11 On 11 December 2020, DHS filed a motion in which it alleged that respondent-
mother’s parental rights in Rachel were subject to termination based upon neglect
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), willful failure to make reasonable progress
toward correcting the conditions that had led to Rachel’s removal from the family
home pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), willful failure to pay a reasonable portion
of the cost of the care that Rachel had received while in DHS custody pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 7B1111(a)(3), and dependency pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) and
that the termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights would be in Rachel’s best
interests. During the pendency of the termination motion, the maternal second
cousin had a change of heart concerning her interest in adopting Rachel, resulting in
Rachel’s placement in foster care. After a hearing held on 25 March 2021, the trial
court entered an order on 28 May 2021 in which it concluded that respondent-
mother’s parental rights in Rachel were subject to termination on the basis of each of
the grounds for termination alleged in the termination motion, see N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(1)–(3), (6) (2021), and that the termination of respondent-mother’s parental
rights would be in Rachel’s best interests. Respondent-mother noted an appeal to
this Court from the trial court’s termination order. IN RE R.L.R.
II. Analysis
¶ 12 In seeking relief from the trial court’s termination order before this Court,
respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred by concluding that her parental
rights in Rachel were subject to termination and that the termination of her parental
rights would be in Rachel’s best interests. We will address each of respondent-
mother’s challenges to the trial court’s termination order in the order in which she
has presented them in her brief.
A. Adjudication of Grounds
¶ 13 “In conducting a termination of parental rights proceeding, the trial court
begins by determining whether any of the grounds for termination delineated in
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) exist.” In re A.E., 379 N.C. 177, 2021-NCSC-130, ¶ 13 (citing
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109). “At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of
proving by ‘clear, cogent, and convincing evidence’ the existence of one or more
grounds for termination under section 7B-1111(a) of the General Statutes.” In re
A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 5–6, (2019) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f)). “[A]n adjudication of
any single ground in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) is sufficient to support a termination of
parental rights.” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 395 (2019).
¶ 14 “We review a trial court’s adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 ‘to determine
whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the
findings support the conclusions of law.” Id. at 392 (quoting In re Montgomery, 311 IN RE R.L.R.
N.C. 101, 111 (1984)). “A trial court’s finding of fact that is supported by clear, cogent,
and convincing evidence is deemed conclusive even if the record contains evidence
that would support a contrary finding.” In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 379 (2019) (citing
In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 403–04 (1982)). “Unchallenged findings are deemed to be
supported by the evidence and are binding on appeal.” In re R.G.L., 379 N.C. 452,
2021-NCSC-155, ¶ 12. “Moreover, we review only those findings necessary to support
the trial court’s determination that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s
parental rights.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407 (2019). “The trial court’s conclusions
of law are reviewable de novo on appeal.” In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 19 (2019).
¶ 15 A parent’s parental rights in a child are subject to termination for neglect
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) in the event that the trial court determines that
the parent has neglected the juvenile within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-101.
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2021). A neglected juvenile is defined, in pertinent part, as
a juvenile “whose parent . . . [d]oes not provide proper care, supervision, or discipline”
or “[c]reates or allows to be created a living environment that is injurious to the
juvenile’s welfare.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15)(a), (e) (2021).
Termination of parental rights based upon this statutory ground requires a showing of neglect at the time of the termination hearing or, if the child has been separated from the parent for a long period of time, there must be a showing of a likelihood of future neglect by the parent. When determining whether such future neglect is likely, the district court must consider evidence of changed IN RE R.L.R.
circumstances occurring between the period of past neglect and the time of the termination hearing.
In re R.L.D., 375 N.C. 838, 841 (2020) (cleaned up). “[E]vidence of changed conditions
must be considered in light of the history of neglect by the parents and the probability
of a repetition of neglect.” In re O.W.D.A., 375 N.C. 645, 648 (2020). “A parent’s
failure to make progress in completing a case plan is indicative of a likelihood of
future neglect.” In re M.A., 374 N.C. 865, 870 (2020) (quoting In re M.J.S.M., 257
N.C. App. 633, 637 (2018)). On the other hand, “a parent’s compliance with his or her
case plan does not preclude a finding of neglect.” In re J.J.H., 376 N.C. 161, 185
(2020) (citing In re D.W.P., 373 N.C. 327, 339–40 (2020)). “The determinative factors
must be the best interests of the child and the fitness of the parent to care for the
child at the time of the termination proceeding.” In re Z.G.J., 378 N.C. 500, 2021-
NCSC-102, ¶ 26 (quoting In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 715 (1984)).
¶ 16 The trial court concluded in its termination order that respondent-mother’s
parental rights in Rachel were subject to termination for neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S.
§ 7B-1111(a)(1) “in that [respondent-mother] . . . ha[s] caused [Rachel] to be neglected,
as defined in [N.C.G.S.] § 7B-101(a)(15) in that [Rachel] lives in an environment
injurious to [her] welfare, [respondent-mother] . . . does not provide proper care,
supervision, or discipline, . . . and . . . there is a reasonable probability that such will IN RE R.L.R.
continue for the foreseeable future.”3 In view of the fact that Rachel had been out of
respondent-mother’s custody for an extended period of time, the trial court based its
determination that respondent-mother’s parental rights in Rachel were subject to
termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) on the theory that Rachel had been
neglected at an earlier period of time and that she was likely to be subject to further
neglect in the event that she was returned to respondent-mother’s care. In support
of this set of determinations, the trial court found as a fact that:
10. On or about July 25, 2019, at an adjudication hearing, after stipulations and consent by the parties, arguments of counsel, and evidence presented, the Court found by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that [Rachel] was neglected and dependent.
11. . . . [A] case plan was established for [respondent- mother] . . . to address the issues which led to the removal of [Rachel] from the home.
12. . . . [T]he Court has consistently reviewed [respondent-mother’s] progress towards the case plan and [respondent-mother’s] efforts to alleviate or remedy the issues which led to the removal of [Rachel] from the home and regain custody of [Rachel]. [Respondent-mother] . . . ha[s] not made reasonable and adequate efforts towards the case plan to ensure the safety of the juvenile. There is a high probability of repetition of neglect of [Rachel] if [she] were returned to [respondent-mother’s] . . . custody based upon [her] lack of commitment towards working on the[]
3Although the trial court also concluded that respondent-mother’s parental rights in Rachel were subject to termination on the basis of neglect by abandonment, we need not determine whether the trial court erred in reaching this conclusion in light of our determination that the trial court did not err in concluding that Rachel had been neglected in the past and that it was likely that Rachel would be neglected in the future in the event that she was returned to respondent-mother’s care. IN RE R.L.R.
case plan[]. The concerns at the time of removal are still a concern, and there have not been any sustained behavior changes shown by [respondent-mother] . . . .
....
14. [Respondent-mother] has made minimal progress on her case plan to alleviate the issues which brought [Rachel] into care. She waited until after the TPR was filed to start working any of her services. Prior to that, [respondent- mother] had not completed any tasks of her case plan in nineteen (19) months. [Respondent-mother’s] lack of progress extends beyond substance abuse treatment and concerns with her ability to maintain sobriety into parenting education and visitation with [Rachel] as well. [Respondent-mother] has missed several scheduled appointments that prevent her from receiving ongoing services from her provider, that [respondent-mother] had acknowledged would be very beneficial for her obtaining sobriety and addressing [DHS’s] concerns. [Respondent- mother] has made no behavioral changes necessary to ensure [Rachel’s] safety.
15. Although [respondent-mother] did attend some assessments in March 2019[,] she did not follow through with recommendations and treatment, including life skills, parenting, individual counseling and intensive outpatient substance abuse program until almost two years later. She did not complete any of these services, but instead did another assessment in September 2020. [Respondent- mother] was consistently testing positive for illegal substances during 2019. During 2020, she did not submit to screens upon request. She did not start submitting to screens again until 2021.
16. [Respondent-mother’s] visits were discontinued in June 2020 due to her lack of consistent participation and the adverse effects of missing scheduled visits had on [Rachel’s] emotional wellbeing. [Respondent-mother] was not engaging in visitations prior to visits being suspended and [her] participation in scheduled visits with [Rachel] IN RE R.L.R.
has been inconsistent throughout the entirety of the case. [Respondent-mother’s] failure to comply with her visitation plan and case plan suggests that providing safe and appropriate care is not a priority for [her].
17. [Respondent-mother] has never maintained suitable housing throughout the life of this case. Just in January 2021[, she] got a place to stay but has never provided a lease. Similarly, her employment has not been stable. She has bounced around to different jobs over the last few months. Transportation is also not consistent, and she does not have an active driver’s license.
18. . . . . [Respondent-mother] is still married to [the stepfather], who is currently incarcerated in Kentucky. Throughout the life of the underlying case, [respondent- mother] has chosen [the stepfather] and her relationship with him over [Rachel].
32. [Respondent-mother] . . . ha[s] not remedied any of the conditions that led to [Rachel’s] removal. [Respondent- mother] . . . ha[s] not shown any behavior changes, or the ability to care for [Rachel’s] health, safety, and welfare.
¶ 17 Although respondent-mother “concedes and stipulates to a past adjudication of
neglect,” she contends that the “trial court cannot support its conclusion of likely
future neglect.”4 More specifically, respondent-mother argues that certain of the trial
court’s findings of fact relating to this issue lack sufficient evidentiary support and
4 Although the trial court stated that there “is a high probability of repetition of neglect if [Rachel] were returned to [respondent-mother’s] . . . custody” in Finding of Fact No. 12, this determination is more properly classified as a conclusion of law and will be treated as such for purposes of our review of the trial court’s termination order in this case. See In re D.L.A.D., 375 N.C. 565, 571 (2020) (citing In re J.O.D., 374 N.C. 797, 807 (2020)). IN RE R.L.R.
that other findings fail to accurately reflect the changes in respondent-mother’s
circumstances that had occurred following Rachel’s removal from the family home.5
¶ 18 As an initial matter, respondent-mother argues that the first portion of
Finding of Fact No. 17, which states that respondent-mother “never maintained
suitable housing,” lacks sufficient evidentiary support. In support of this contention,
respondent-mother directs our attention to the social worker’s testimony that
respondent-mother had housing with working utilities and a bedroom that was
available for Rachel’s use at the time of the termination hearing. Respondent-
mother’s argument ignores the trial court’s determination in the second sentence of
Finding of Fact No. 17 that, “[j]ust in January 2021[, respondent-mother] got a place
to stay but has never provided a lease.” When read in context, Finding of Fact No.
17 indicates that, while the trial court considered respondent-mother’s claim to have
obtained adequate housing, it also noted that she had failed to verify that she had
actually done so. As a result, we hold that Finding of Fact No. 17 is supported by the
social worker’s testimony that respondent-mother had provided her current address
in late January 2021, that the social worker had been able to visit the apartment on
5 In view of the fact that a number of the findings of fact that are addressed in respondent-mother’s brief as having been made in error are not necessary to the trial court’s determination that respondent-mother’s parental rights in Rachel were subject to termination on the basis of neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), we will refrain from discussing the arguments that respondent-mother has made with respect to those findings in this opinion. IN RE R.L.R.
24 March 2021, and that respondent-mother had failed to provide a copy of her lease
to DHS despite the social worker’s request that she do so.
¶ 19 Although respondent-mother does not argue that the trial court erred by
stating in Finding of Fact No. 17 that her employment situation had lacked stability,
she does assert that she had made progress in seeking and obtaining employment. A
careful review of the record satisfies us that the trial court’s findings that respondent-
mother’s “employment has not been stable” and “[s]he has bounced around to
different jobs over the last few months” are supported by testimony provided by both
the social worker and respondent-mother herself concerning the nature and extent of
respondent-mother’s employment. For that reason, we hold that respondent-mother’s
challenge to the trial court’s employment-related findings in Finding of Fact No. 17
lacks merit.
¶ 20 Next, respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred in making Finding
of Fact No. 18, which states that she had chosen her relationship with the stepfather
over her ability to regain the right to parent Rachel. As an initial matter, respondent-
mother concedes that her case plan required her to sever her ties with the stepfather
and has failed to argue that the trial court’s finding that she remained married to the
stepfather lacked sufficient evidentiary support. In addition, we note that the social
worker testified that DHS remained concerned that respondent-mother’s continued
marriage to the stepfather created the possibility that Rachel would have contact IN RE R.L.R.
with him in the future even though his actions had contributed to Rachel’s removal
from the family home and even though the stepfather had not made any progress
toward satisfying the requirements of his own case plan. On the other hand, the
record does not contain any evidence tending to show that any relationship between
respondent-mother and the stepfather continued to exist other than the fact that they
remained married to each other and does contain evidence tending to show that the
stepfather had been incarcerated since April 2019, that respondent-mother had
reported shortly after the underlying juvenile case had commenced that she had not
been in contact with the stepfather, and that respondent-mother claimed that the
stepfather had told her “to move on.” As a result, while the record does support the
trial court’s finding that respondent-mother remained married to the stepfather, it
does not support the trial court’s finding that respondent-mother had chosen her
relationship with the stepfather over the chance to regain the ability to parent Rachel
“[t]hroughout the life of the underlying case.” For that reason, we will disregard the
relevant portion of Finding of Fact No. 18 in determining whether the trial court erred
in concluding that respondent-mother’s parental rights in Rachel were subject to
termination on the basis of neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). See In re
L.H., 378 N.C. 625, 2021-NCSC-110, ¶ 14 (disregarding factual findings not
supported by the record). IN RE R.L.R.
¶ 21 Similarly, respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred in making
Finding of Fact Nos. 12, 14, and 32 to the extent that these findings reflect a
determination that respondent-mother had failed to exhibit the behavioral changes
necessary to ensure Rachel’s safety and welfare. Although respondent-mother
acknowledges that she had failed to make progress toward satisfying the
requirements of her case plan for a substantial period of time, she asserts that she
“changed her situation substantially” in the months preceding the date upon which
the termination hearing was held by completing substance abuse group therapy and
a Parenting Lifeskills course and obtaining a comprehensive clinical assessment. For
that reason, respondent-mother contends that the trial court failed to adequately
account for the evidence relating to the changes that had occurred in her
circumstances as of the date of the termination hearing. We do not find this argument
persuasive.
¶ 22 As an initial matter, we note that the trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact
reflect that it did consider evidence concerning the progress that respondent-mother
had made in satisfying the requirements of her case plan between the filing of the
termination motion on 11 December 2020 and the holding of the termination hearing
on 25 March 2021. The trial court stated in the unchallenged portion of Finding of
Fact No. 14 that respondent-mother had “waited until after the [termination motion]
was filed to start working on any of her services” and that, “[p]rior to that, . . . [she] IN RE R.L.R.
had not completed any tasks of her case plan in nineteen (19) months.” In addition,
the trial court stated in unchallenged Finding of Fact No. 15 that, although
respondent-mother “did attend some assessments in March 2019, she did not follow
through with recommendations and treatment, including life skills, parenting,
individual counseling and intensive outpatient substance abuse program until almost
two years later.” These unchallenged findings of fact, which are binding upon us for
purposes of appellate review, see In re R.G.L., 2021-NCSC-155, ¶ 12, demonstrate
that the trial court knew of and considered the portions of the record indicating that
respondent-mother had made some progress in satisfying the requirements of her
case plan during the period of time leading up to the holding of the termination
hearing.
¶ 23 In addition, as the Court of Appeals had noted, a “case plan is not just a
checklist,” with parents being required to “demonstrate acknowledgement and
understanding of why the juvenile entered DSS custody as well as changed
behaviors.” In re Y.Y.E.T., 205 N.C. App. 120, 131(2010). In this case, both the record
evidence and the trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact show that, while
respondent-mother had engaged in substance abuse and parenting education services
in the months preceding the termination hearing, she had failed to demonstrate that
sustained behavioral change of the type necessary to ensure Rachel’s safety and
welfare had actually occurred. For example, the trial court found in Finding of Fact IN RE R.L.R.
No. 15 that, after testing positive for illegal substances during 2019, respondent-
mother had refused to submit to drug screens upon request during 2020 and did not
resume submitting to such testing until 2021, with her participation in the drug
screening process for a period of three months prior to the termination hearing
following nineteen months of non-compliance being insufficient to establish that
sustained behavioral change had occurred.
¶ 24 Similarly, while the record contains evidence tending to show that respondent-
mother completed a Parenting Lifeskills course in December 2020, the trial court
stated in Finding of Fact No. 16 that respondent-mother’s visits with Rachel had been
discontinued in June 2020 because of her inconsistent attendance and the negative
effect that her failure to attend scheduled visitation sessions had had on Rachel.
Although respondent-mother argues that she did not have a reasonable opportunity
to demonstrate that her methods of parenting Rachel had changed because the trial
court had conditioned the reinstatement of her visitation with Rachel in February
2021 upon the making of a recommendation that such visits be resumed by Rachel’s
therapist and because DHS had failed to find a new therapist for Rachel by the time
of the termination hearing and cites the decision of the Court of Appeals in In re
Shermer, 156 N.C. App. 281, 288 (2003), for the proposition that a parent’s failure to
comply with a case plan provision does not support a decision to terminate that
parent’s parental rights in the event that the parent has not had adequate time to IN RE R.L.R.
make the required amount of progress, respondent-mother overlooks the fact that, in
Shermer, the parent had only had two months within which to attempt to satisfy the
requirements of the case plan prior to the termination hearing, id., while, in this case,
respondent-mother had had almost two years to satisfy the requirements of her case
plan prior to the date of the termination hearing and had failed to fully comply with
any of the plan’s provisions during that time. In addition, unlike the situation at
issue in Shermer, respondent-mother had been allowed to visit with Rachel until June
2020, when visitation between the two of them had been discontinued because of
respondent-mother’s inconsistent attendance and the negative impact that
respondent-mother’s failures to visit with Rachel had had on the child, with
respondent-mother having failed to contact DHS for the purpose of requesting a
resumption of her visits with Rachel until November 2020. As a result, respondent-
mother’s inability to demonstrate that her methods of parenting Rachel had changed
resulted, in substantial part, from her own inaction rather than the lack of sufficient
time to make such a demonstration.
¶ 25 Finally, the trial court’s determination that respondent-mother had failed to
demonstrate that she had made the behavioral changes needed to permit her to
properly parent Rachel had ample support in the testimony that the social worker
provided at the termination hearing. Among other things, the social worker testified
that “[DHS] has not seen any behavioral changes”; that, “[f]or the 23 months that IN RE R.L.R.
[Rachel] has been in foster care, [respondent-mother] only seemed to want to complete
the tasks — only complete the tasks of her case plan in the last four months from
November up until now” and “has not shown any type of behavioral change”; that
there had been “[m]inimal to no efforts to regain custody from [respondent-mother]”;
and that DHS remained concerned that the conditions that had led to Rachel’s
placement in DHS custody had not been adequately addressed. Thus, we hold that
the record evidence and the trial court’s undisputed findings of fact adequately
support the trial court’s determination that respondent-mother had not made the
behavioral changes necessary to ensure Rachel’s safety and welfare by the time of the
termination hearing.
¶ 26 After evaluating respondent-mother’s challenges to the trial court’s findings of
fact, we next examine the validity of respondent-mother’s challenge to the trial court’s
conclusion that it was likely that Rachel would be subject to further neglect in the
event that she was returned to respondent-mother’s care. Among other things,
respondent-mother argues that the progress that she had made in satisfying the
requirements of her case plan precluded the trial court from determining that there
was a likelihood that the neglect to which Rachel had been subjected would be
repeated if she was reunited with respondent-mother. We are not persuaded by this
argument. IN RE R.L.R.
¶ 27 As an initial matter, “a parent’s compliance with his or her case plan does not
preclude a finding of neglect,” In re J.J.H., 376 N.C. at 185, with this Court having
held that the neglect to which a child had been subjected was likely to be repeated
despite the fact that the parents had substantially complied with their case plans
given that the conditions that had led to the child’s removal from the parental home
continued to exist at the time of the termination hearing. See id. at 185–86; see also
In re D.W.P., 373 N.C. 327, 339–40 (2020). In addition, this Court has held that a
parent’s failure to visit with his or her child is indicative of a likelihood of future
neglect. In re M.Y.P., 378 N.C. 667, 2021-NCSC-113, ¶ 20. After carefully reviewing
the record, we hold that the trial court’s findings relating to respondent-mother’s lack
of success in complying with the requirements of her case plan until shortly before
the date upon which the termination hearing was held, her failure to show the
sustained behavioral changes necessary to eliminate the substance abuse and
parenting-related concerns that had led to Rachel’s removal from the family home,
her failure to consistently visit with Rachel, the cessation of her visits with Rachel in
June 2020, and her failure to maintain suitable housing, stable employment, and
consistent transportation provide ample support for the trial court’s determination
that there was a likelihood that Rachel would be subjected to further neglect in the
event that she was returned to respondent-mother’s care. As a result, the trial court IN RE R.L.R.
did not err by concluding that respondent-mother’s parental rights in Rachel were
subject to termination on the basis of neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1).
B. Dispositional Determination
¶ 28 Secondly, respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred by concluding
that the termination of her parental rights would be in Rachel’s best interests. “If a
trial court finds one or more grounds to terminate parental rights under N.C.G.S.
§ 7B-1111(a), it then proceeds to the dispositional stage, at which it determines
whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interest.” In re A.E.,
379 N.C. 177, 2021-NCSC-130, ¶ 13 (cleaned up); see also N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)
(2021). In making the required “best interests” determination,
[t]he court may consider any evidence . . . that the court finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine the best interests of the juvenile. In each case, the court shall consider the following criteria and make written findings regarding the following that are relevant:
(1) The age of the juvenile.
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile.
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement.
(6) Any relevant consideration. IN RE R.L.R.
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). “We review the trial court’s dispositional findings of fact to
determine whether they are supported by the evidence received during the
termination hearing, with a reviewing court being bound by all uncontested
dispositional findings.” In re S.C.C., 379 N.C. 303, 2021-NCSC-144, ¶ 22 (cleaned
up). “The trial court’s assessment of a juvenile’s best interests . . . is reviewed for
abuse of discretion.” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. at 392. “Abuse of discretion results where
the court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could
not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. 101, 107
(2015) (cleaned up).
¶ 29 The trial court addressed the required dispositional factors in Finding of Fact
No. 33 by stating that
[Rachel] is approximately 5 years old and doing well in her placement. Even though [Rachel] is not in a pre-adoptive home, the likelihood of adoption is very good. [Rachel] is a very loving little girl, that has no behavioral concerns or other barriers preventing her from being adopted. Her currently [sic] placement is maternal family, that has ultimately decided not to keep [Rachel] long term, but there are two other families already interested in adopting her. Terminating the parental rights of [respondent- mother] . . . would aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan of adoption for [Rachel]. There is no evidence of any bond between the child and [respondent- mother.]
In addition, the trial court stated in Finding of Fact No. 24 that, even though Rachel’s
current foster family had decided that it was not interested in keeping her long term, IN RE R.L.R.
DHS had identified two families that were interested in having Rachel placed with
them. Based upon these findings of fact, the trial court concluded that:
[i]t is in [Rachel’s] best interest that the parental rights of [respondent-mother] . . . be terminated based upon the juvenile’s age[]; likelihood of the juvenile being adopted; that termination will help achieve the permanent plan for the juvenile; the lack of bond between the juvenile [and respondent-mother] . . . ; and the quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the placements.
¶ 30 Respondent-mother begins her challenge to the trial court’s dispositional
decision by contending that the trial court’s finding that she had no bond with Rachel
lacked sufficient evidentiary support. In support of this argument, respondent-
mother directs our attention to the existence of evidence that, in her view,
demonstrates the erroneous nature of the relevant finding, including assertions
contained in the reports that the guardian ad litem had prepared for use at review
and permanency planning hearings dating back to 12 December 2019 that Rachel had
expressed the desire to return to respondent-mother’s home and that respondent-
mother “want[ed] to do everything she [could] to get Rachel back.” In addition,
respondent-mother points to the social worker’s testimony that she had witnessed
respondent-mother playing and otherwise engaging with Rachel during visits. In
light of this evidence, respondent-mother asserts that the trial court’s finding
concerning the absence of a bond between herself and Rachel was “inaccurate and IN RE R.L.R.
demonstrates a concerning lack of attention to a very important consideration[.]” We
are not convinced by respondent-mother’s argument.
¶ 31 Admittedly, the reports that the guardian ad litem prepared for use at various
permanency planning hearings and the social worker’s testimony do not suggest that
there had never been a bond between Rachel and respondent-mother. On the other
hand, however, neither the relevant reports nor the social worker’s testimony tend to
show that any such bond continued to exist at the time of the termination hearing.
In addition, the record reflects that respondent-mother had last visited with Rachel
in March 2020, which was approximately one year prior to the termination hearing;
and had not seen Rachel since that time. The report that the guardian ad litem
submitted in advance of the termination hearing stated that, while “a bond with
[respondent-mother] was observed prior to visitation ceasing[,] . . . given the issues
that caused visitations to cease[,] . . . the bond that remains in the [guardian ad
litem’s] opinion is more of a memory for [Rachel] than a continued bond.” In addition,
the guardian ad litem’s termination hearing report did not suggest that Rachel
wanted to return to respondent-mother’s home and stated, instead, that the child had
expressed excitement about being part of the family in her current placement. As a
result, we hold that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
finding that there was no bond between Rachel and respondent-mother and that,
even if the evidence did, in fact, tend to show the continued existence of such a bond, IN RE R.L.R.
there is no question but that, as respondent-mother concedes, that bond was
“arguably lessened,” with the strength of the remaining bond having been unlikely to
change the trial court’s “best interests” decision in light of the nature and extent of
the evidence concerning the remaining dispositional criteria. See In re Z.L.W., 372
N.C. 432, 437 (2019) (explaining that “the bond between parent and child is just one
of the factors to be considered under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a),” with “the trial court
[being] permitted to give greater weight to other factors”).
¶ 32 Similarly, respondent-mother contends that the trial court’s finding that “the
likelihood of adoption is very good” lacks sufficient record support. According to
respondent-mother, “[t]he only evidence presented tended to show that ‘two families
are interested,’ ” with “ ‘interested’ only indicat[ing] a mere possibility, not [a]
likelihood.” In addition, respondent-mother argues that the trial court failed to fully
consider how Rachel’s behavioral problems, the lack of a current adoptive placement,
and Rachel’s ability to connect with a potential placement would impact her
adoptability. Once again, we are unable to agree with this aspect of respondent-
mother’s challenge to the trial court’s dispositional decision.
¶ 33 As an initial matter, we note that “the absence of an adoptive placement for a
juvenile at the time of the termination hearing is not a bar to terminating parental
rights.” In re A.J.T., 374 N.C. 504, 512 (2020) (citing In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190, 200
(2019), and In re D.H., 232 N.C. App. 217, 223 (2014)). In addition, the trial court IN RE R.L.R.
specifically addressed the considerations upon which respondent-mother’s argument
relies by finding that “[Rachel] is a very loving little girl, that has no behavioral
concerns or other barriers preventing her from being adopted.” A examination of the
record satisfies us that this finding and the trial court’s determination that “the
likelihood of adoption is very good” have ample record support. For example, the
social worker testified that “[t]here is a very high likelihood of adoption for [Rachel]”
in light of the fact that two families had been identified as being interested in having
Rachel live in their home and the fact that Rachel’s age would allow her to bond and
build a positive relationship with a family. In addition, the social worker asserted
that, while Rachel did appear sad and upset at times, the child did not exhibit any
extreme behaviors; that Rachel had done well in her current placement; and that
Rachel had a good relationship with the family with which she had been placed.
Similarly, the guardian ad litem testified that Rachel was “extremely adoptable”; that
Rachel was adorable, bright, warm, loving, and emotionally open; and that Rachel
connects with other people readily and is easy to talk to. In light of this testimony,
respondent-mother’s challenge to the sufficiency of the trial court’s finding that “the
likelihood of adoption was very good” constitutes little more than an impermissible
request that we reweigh the record evidence. See In re R.D., 376 N.C. 244, 258 (2020)
(explaining that “it is the trial judge’s duty to consider all the evidence, pass upon the
credibility of the witnesses, and determine the reasonable inferences to be drawn IN RE R.L.R.
from the testimony” and that the trial court’s findings of fact “are binding where there
is some evidence to support those findings, even though the evidence might sustain
findings to the contrary” (cleaned up)). As a result, the trial court did not err by
determining that Rachel’s “likelihood of adoption is very good.”
¶ 34 Finally, respondent-mother contends that dispositional criteria set out in
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) do not suffice to permit the trial court to make a valid “best
interests” determination. According to respondent-mother, we should require trial
courts to consider additional dispositional factors set out in the statutes that have
been adopted in other jurisdictions in determining whether the termination of a
parent’s parental rights in a child would be in that child’s best interests on the
grounds that N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) “does not directly address the progress of the
parents and how adoption could affect the child, positively or negatively, or even if
the child understands the concept of adoption.” Respondent-mother’s argument to
the contrary notwithstanding, however, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(6) allows the trial
court to consider “[a]ny relevant consideration,” with this “catch-all” provision serving
to afford the trial court a means to consider any additional relevant information aside
from the statutorily-enumerated criteria in the course of making its dispositional
decision. To the extent that respondent-mother is seeking to have additional factors
added to the list of dispositional criteria enumerated in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), any
such argument should be directed to the General Assembly rather than to this Court. IN RE R.L.R.
¶ 35 Moreover, we note that the trial court considered the progress that respondent-
mother had made in satisfying the requirements of her case plan and that the effect
that adoption would have upon Rachel was considered in the underlying juvenile
proceeding despite the fact that the trial court did not make any specific dispositional
findings relating to those subjects. As we have already noted, the trial court
considered respondent-mother’s progress toward satisfying the requirements of her
case plan in the course of determining that Rachel was likely to be neglected in the
event that she was returned to respondent-mother’s care. In addition, the decision
that Rachel’s primary permanent plan should be set as adoption and that such a
result would be consistent with Rachel’s health, safety, and best interests, see
N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.1(g) (2021) (requiring the trial court to “make specific findings as
to the best permanent plans to achieve a safe, permanent home for the juvenile within
a reasonable period of time”); N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(a) (2021) (requiring the trial court
to adopt a permanent plan that reflects the juvenile’s best interests), provides ample
basis for believing that the impact of adoption upon Rachel was clearly considered at
some point during the underlying juvenile proceeding. Finally, as we have previously
determined, the trial court is not required to consider non-termination-related
alternatives at the dispositional stage of a termination hearing, In re N.B., 379 N.C.
441, 2021-NCSCS-154 ¶ 26, and is, instead, simply required to determine whether
termination of the parent’s parental rights would be in the child’s best interests. IN RE R.L.R.
¶ 36 Thus, for all of these reasons, we hold that the trial court’s dispositional
findings have sufficient record support and adequately address the criteria
enumerated in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) and that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in the course of concluding that the termination of respondent-mother’s
parental rights would be in Rachel’s best interests. As a result, since the trial court
did not err in concluding that respondent-mother’s parental rights in Rachel were
subject to termination on the basis of neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)
and that the termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights would be in Rachel’s
best interests, we affirm the trial court’s termination order.
AFFIRMED.