In Re Report of Com'n on Family Courts

646 So. 2d 178, 19 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 542, 1994 Fla. LEXIS 1558, 1994 WL 583650
Supreme Court of Florida·Decided October 26, 1994·No. 77623·Published·Cited by 15 cases

Opinion

646 So.2d 178 (1994)

In re REPORT OF the COMMISSION ON FAMILY COURTS.

No. 77623.

Supreme Court of Florida.

October 26, 1994.

*179 OVERTON, Justice.

This cause is before the Court to clarify issues regarding the implementation and operation of family law divisions in the circuit courts of this State. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 7, Fla. Const.; ch. 90-273, § 10(3), Laws of Fla.

Through chapter 90-273, the legislature announced the policy that family law divisions were to be established within each of the circuit courts of this State. In that chapter law, the legislature established the Commission on Family Courts (Commission) for the purpose of making recommendations regarding the implementation of the family law divisions, and it stated that the family law divisions were to operate "with as much consistency as possible throughout the state." When the Commission submitted its report to this Court, it recommended in part that:

The jurisdiction of the family division should include dissolution of marriage, simplified dissolution of marriage, child custody and support, URESA, domestic violence, name changes, adoptions, paternity suits, [and] modification proceedings; and each circuit should consider inclusion of juvenile dependency and delinquency matters at least for administrative purposes.

(Emphasis added.) After we received the report, we directed that each judicial circuit was to incorporate the recommendations of the Commission by developing a local rule to establish a family law division in its circuit or by developing a means to coordinate family law matters that affected one family if the circuit or part of the circuit was too small to administratively justify a separate family law division. See In re Report of the Commission on Family Courts, 588 So.2d 586 (Fla. 1991) (Family Courts I). Subsequently, we received from the circuits proposed local *180 rules or administrative orders designed to implement family law divisions or to coordinate all family law matters.

In In re Report of the Commission on Family Courts, 633 So.2d 14 (Fla. 1994) (Family Courts II), we set forth additional criteria for organizing family law divisions and for coordinating family law cases. Additionally, we provisionally approved both the local rules and administrative orders that had been submitted by the circuits and directed that the circuits were to continue efforts to develop a more holistic response to family-related litigation. We directed that "[a]ny deviations from or amendments to local rules or administrative orders provisionally approved must be submitted to this Court for approval." Id. at 18. We also stated that all circuits were to submit an annual report regarding the status of their respective family divisions, along with any proposed revisions to the local rules and administrative orders, to this Court by December 1, 1994.

During the 1994 legislative session, the legislature passed chapter 94-134, Laws of Florida, making the violation of a domestic violence injunction a first-degree misdemeanor. In chapter 94-134, the legislature stated that "[i]t is the intent of the legislature that domestic violence be treated as an illegal act rather than a private matter, and for that reason, indirect criminal contempt may no longer be used to enforce compliance with injunctions for protection against domestic violence." Ch. 94-134, § 3, Laws of Fla. By its action in that chapter, the legislature clearly intended to remove the power of judges to use indirect criminal contempt to punish those who violate domestic violence injunctions.[1] This legislative action effectively placed domestic violence injunction violations within the jurisdiction of county court criminal judges and removed those violations from the jurisdiction of circuit court family division judges unless those circuit judges were specifically assigned to hear those matters as county court judges.

As noted above, the Commission on Family Courts had specifically recommended and this Court specifically directed that all domestic violence issues were to be handled by judges in family law divisions. The legislature may have had the best of intentions in criminalizing domestic violence injunction violations. By doing so, however, it created a number of administrative problems, given its chapter 90-273 directive that all family issues be handled by judges assigned to family law divisions because, unquestionably, domestic violence is a family law issue. All circuits have now implemented family law divisions or have coordinated all family law matters. As such, this legislative action obviously has created a great deal of confusion and uncertainty in the handling of domestic violence issues. We note that, in many instances, injunctions prohibiting domestic violence also contain numerous other provisions that do not directly relate to criminal acts of domestic violence but that do indirectly relate to the domestic violence at issue. For instance, domestic violence injunctions often direct when a person should be removed from the parties' residence; direct the delivery of a car or other personal property; provide for the payment of support; and set forth requirements for visitation. In essence, the new legislation has created an administrative Frankenstein because it has placed the violation of some provisions of domestic injunctions in the jurisdiction of the criminal divisions of county courts while the violations of other provisions in the injunction remain in the family law divisions of the circuit courts. Interestingly, it is possible that the circuit court family division judge who initially entered the injunction might have to testify as a witness in the county court criminal proceeding for the State to prove the domestic violence claim brought in county criminal court.

In addition to the confusion created by chapter 94-134, other problems have surfaced regarding the implementation of family law divisions and domestic violence matters. The Eleventh Circuit's situation is but one example. In an attempt to ensure that all domestic violence matters are to be heard by *181 a family law division judge, the Eleventh Circuit issued two administrative orders, which established domestic violence departments within both the family law and county court criminal divisions. Those administrative orders, however, were subsequently quashed by the Third District Court of Appeal in Garcia v. Rivkind, 639 So.2d 177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). In Garcia, the district court determined that the Eleventh Circuit had unconstitutionally created a new domestic violence "division" in violation of article V, section 7, of the Florida Constitution, and section 43.30, Florida Statutes (1993). Under somewhat similar circumstances, the Fourth District Court of Appeal recently granted a stay and order to show cause regarding the Seventeenth Circuit Court's administrative order establishing a similar domestic violence department. See Sapp v. Ross, No. 94-2839 (Fla. 4th DCA Oct. 7, 1994).

Article V, section 7, provides that "[a]ll courts except the supreme court may sit in divisions as may be established by general law." Section 43.30 states that "[a]ll courts except the supreme court may sit in divisions as may be established by local rule approved by the supreme court." In quashing the administrative orders, the district court held in Garcia that the Eleventh Circuit's new domestic violence "department" was, in fact, a "division" that had not been established

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In Re Report of Com'n on Family Courts, 646 So. 2d 178, 19 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 542, 1994 Fla. LEXIS 1558, 1994 WL 583650 (Fla. 1994).

646 So. 2d 178 (In Re Report of Com'n on Family Courts) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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