In Re Reid's Petition

349 P.2d 446, 76 Nev. 76, 1960 Nev. LEXIS 154
CourtNevada Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 23, 1960
Docket4174
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 349 P.2d 446 (In Re Reid's Petition) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nevada Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Reid's Petition, 349 P.2d 446, 76 Nev. 76, 1960 Nev. LEXIS 154 (Neb. 1960).

Opinion

*77 OPINION

By the Court,

Badt, J.:

The above-captioned matter is before us on a petition for review of the recommendation of the Board of Bar Examiners that Dallas Wendell Reid be denied admission to the State Bar of Nevada.

Mr. Reid was 27th in rank in a class of 29 that took the 1958 Nevada State Bar examinations. Twenty-two of the 29 passed the examination. The passing grade was *78 established many years ago as 75 percent and was in effect at the time. Mr.' Reid’s average grade on all of the examinations taken was 70.4 percent. This resulted from the following respective grades on all examinations: examination No. 1, 70 percent, examination No. 2, 73 percent, examination No. 3, 74.2 percent, examination No. 4, 64.8 percent, examination No. 5, 72.6 percent, and examination No. 6, 68 percent. It thus appears that petitioner did not receive a passing grade in any of the subjects covered by the six separate written examinations.

In his amended petition for review and in his oral presentation thereof in his own behalf petitioner alleged that he was prevented from passing the examination through fraud, imposition, and coercion, and was deprived of a fair opportunity to take the examination. Specifically, reliance was placed upon the following contentions :

(1) “Petitionér was required to answer questions in an academic examination identical with the questions propounded to law students recently graduated from the academic study of the law, which examination was not a fair test, standing alone, of petitioner’s learning, training, and ability as reflected by his background of more than twenty years in the active general practice of the law.”

Many years ago our rules did indeed provide for a different and limited examination of attorneys from other jurisdictions who sought admission to practice in this state. California and possibly other jurisdictions still so provide. However, it now is and has been for a great many years the rule and practice in this state that attorneys from other jurisdictions seeking admission here must take the same academic examinations as all other applicants.

(2) Attorneys from other jurisdictions seeking admission here are required to submit additional data: a certificate of the clerk of the court in the state in which *79 the applicant last practiced certifying to his good standing in that state, the non-pendency of any disbarment proceedings, a letter from the secretary of the local bar association of the applicant’s last place of residence certifying to his good moral character, a letter of recommendation from the judge of the court of record before which he last practiced, and other evidence of good moral character and fitness. Petitioner asserts that he not only submitted this required information but that the same showed definitely his successful practice in several jurisdictions for over 21 years. He asserts that he was fraudulently deprived of the benefit of this evidence by the refusal of the Board of Bar Examiners to give it any consideration. In reviewing the application of William L. Hughey for a license to practice law, 62 Nev. 498, 156 P.2d 733, this court noted that the petitioner questioned the rules of procedure which will not allow the board to weigh, with the academic examination, the personalities and backgrounds of the applicants. This it rejected as any ground for reversing the recommendation of the board, saying: “With respect to applicant’s contention that the personality and background of an applicant should be weighed along with the written examination, it is sufficient to say that the general qualifications of an applicant will not be substituted for the requisite knowledge of law which one must possess in order to be admitted into the legal profession.” Accord: In Re Loer, 68 Nev. 1, 226 P.2d 272. There, as here, the board’s recommendation that the applicant be denied a license was based entirely upon his failure to pass the written examination. Recourse to the information supplied by the National Conference of Bar Examiners as to the applicant’s ability and integrity would therefore, under the rules, have added nothing to the situation.

(3) During the oral presentation petitioner submitted to the court a transcript of all of his answers to all of the questions in the six separate written examinations and asserted that even a casual examination of his *80 answers to questions selected at random would convince the court that he was entitled to passing grades. Petitioner’s request would require the court to examine all of his answers to all of the questions in the six examinations. This, under the circumstances presented, we will not undertake. In Re Hughey, supra.

(4) Petitioner contends that because, in each examination, his paper was given a percentage grade as a whole without giving a percentage grade to each of his questions, he was in effect deprived of an opportunity to review the gradings, and therefore “coerced into accepting the abstract statement made by the Board of Bar Examiners that he failed to pass the written examination.” He argues in effect that the method used is contrary to all accepted methods of grading and was grossly improper and prejudicial. It was the method adopted by the Board of Bar Examiners for all 29 examinees at the 1958 examination and included the seven who failed. It is the method followed in prior examinations for many years. The point raised however is not entirely without merit. But while it does present to the unsuccessful applicant a measure of difficulty in determining just which of his answers in a given examination brought his average grade on that examination to a low level, the mere fact that the examiner used separate notes for the grading of the individual questions, from which he gave a grade to the paper as a whole, does not in itself cast any reflection on the fairness or the accuracy of the grade allotted. This precise objection was heretofore rejected by this court. In Re Myles, 64 Nev. 217, 180 P.2d 99.

(5) Petitioner asserts that the Board of Bar Examiners was biased and prejudiced against him because the law partner of a member of the Board of Bar Examiners had accused petitioner of practicing law in the State of Nevada without a license so to practice. No proof was offered in support of this assertion.

(6) Petitioner asserts further however that'an attorney practicing in Clark County had written a letter likewise accusing petitioner of practicing law in Nevada *81 without a license; that such letter had come to the attention of the Board of Bar Examiners and had influenced one or more of them in the recommendation of the board to this court that petitioner be denied a license to practice in this state.. Such original letter was introduced in evidence and did indeed make the accusation asserted. However, it was not shown that any member of the Board of Bar Examiners had knowledge of such letter at the time he graded applicant’s papers.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
349 P.2d 446, 76 Nev. 76, 1960 Nev. LEXIS 154, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-reids-petition-nev-1960.