In re R.D.

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: December 18, 2020
• Docket: 268A19
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 268A19

Filed 18 December 2020

IN THE MATTER OF: R.D.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on

6 March 2019 by Judge Elizabeth Trosch in District Court, Mecklenburg County.

Heard in the Supreme Court on 2 September 2020.

Thurman, Wilson, Boutwell & Galvin, P.A., by W. David Thurman and Thomas J. Thurman, for petitioner-appellant Bethany Christian Services.

Wendy C. Sotolongo, Parent Defender, by J. Lee Gilliam, Assistant Parent Defender, for respondent-appellee father.

DAVIS, Justice.

In this case, we address several issues relating to the manner in which

dispositional hearings in termination of parental rights cases are conducted and the

factors that a trial court may properly consider in making a determination as to

whether termination is in the best interests of the juvenile. For the reasons set out

below, we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part for the entry of a new

dispositional order.

Factual and Procedural Background

This case involves a private termination of parental rights proceeding initiated

by petitioner Bethany Christian Services (BCS), a private adoption agency, against IN RE R.D.

Opinion of the Court

the father (respondent) of the juvenile. The minor child “Ryan”1 was born in October

2017 to respondent and “Brittany.” Respondent and Brittany met at school in 2016

when they were 15 and 14 years of age, respectively. The two were family friends and

lived in the same neighborhood. In January 2017, respondent and Brittany began a

sexual relationship that lasted until March 2017.

Brittany discovered that she was pregnant in March 2017. Later that month,

respondent blocked Brittany from contacting him on social media—the primary

means that the two had used to communicate with each other. The two offered

differing accounts in their testimony as to why this occurred. Brittany testified that

respondent blocked her immediately after she informed him of the pregnancy, but

respondent testified that he did so because “[s]he was becoming annoying.”

Brittany changed schools while she was pregnant, and respondent’s family

moved away from Brittany’s neighborhood. Respondent did not see Brittany over the

summer of 2017, and, according to respondent, no discussion took place between them

during that time as to whether she might be pregnant.

Brittany gave birth to Ryan in October 2017 in Mecklenburg County. The day

after Ryan’s birth, Brittany signed a document relinquishing her parental rights over

Ryan to BCS and also signed an affidavit naming respondent as the father of Ryan.

Brittany selected Jason and Demi Dowdy as the prospective adoptive parents for

Ryan, and Ryan was placed with the Dowdys on 1 November 2017. Ryan has lived

1 Pseudonyms are used throughout this opinion in order to protect the identity of the

minor child.

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exclusively with the Dowdys since that time. Following Ryan’s placement with the

Dowdys, BCS attempted to contact respondent by sending letters to the address listed

in Brittany’s affidavit. However, Brittany had mistakenly written down the wrong

house number when listing respondent’s address, and respondent never received the

letters.

Respondent testified that he was not aware of Brittany’s pregnancy or the birth

of Ryan until 2018. He stated that in January of 2018 he heard rumors at school that

Brittany had given birth, and respondent’s sister testified that she had seen a photo

of Brittany with Ryan on social media. Nevertheless, respondent did not take any

steps to investigate whether he might be the father of Brittany’s child and did not

make any attempt to contact Brittany until after he was served with BCS’s

termination petition several months later.

BCS filed its petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights on

21 November 2017, alleging that respondent had neglected Ryan under N.C.G.S.

§ 7B-1111(a)(1) and had failed to establish paternity under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5).

After several unsuccessful efforts to locate respondent both by mail and via the

internet, BCS finally served respondent at his new address on 6 March 2018. After

receiving the petition, respondent’s mother paid for a paternity test. Upon confirming

that respondent was, in fact, the father of Ryan, respondent’s mother began the

process of challenging BCS’s custody of Ryan.

At a pretrial hearing on 30 May 2018, the trial court appointed Rhonda

Hitchens—a local attorney—to serve as the guardian ad litem (GAL) for Ryan in the

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termination proceeding. The adjudication stage of the termination proceeding was

held on 24 August 2018. During the adjudication stage, the trial court dismissed the

ground of neglect but found the existence of a ground for termination under N.C.G.S.

§ 7B-1111(a)(5) due to respondent’s failure to establish paternity.

The dispositional stage of the termination proceeding was subsequently held

over the course of two dates—31 October 2018 and 9 January 2019. During the

dispositional hearing, the trial court directed Hitchens to take the witness stand in

order to testify about the GAL’s report she had prepared. The GAL’s report contained

summaries of interviews with twenty individuals connected with the case, an

assessment of Ryan’s needs and interests, and Hitchens’ ultimate recommendation

that respondent’s parental rights not be terminated.

Respondent objected to Hitchens being called as a witness on the ground that

allowing her to testify about her report would create a conflict of interest by requiring

her to act as both a lawyer and witness in violation of Rule 3.7 of the North Carolina

Rules of Professional Conduct.2 In response, BCS argued that it would not be

improper for Hitchens to testify and that BCS should have the right to cross-examine

Hitchens about the contents of her report.

2 Rule 3.7(a) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the

lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless: (1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; (2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or (3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.” N.C. Rev. R. Prof. Conduct 3.7(a).

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The trial court ultimately presented Hitchens with two options—either to

(1) testify as a witness and withdraw as Ryan’s attorney advocate; or (2) remain as

his attorney advocate and submit her written report to the trial court without

testifying. Hitchens chose the second option, and her report was admitted into

evidence without her testimony. BCS objected to the admission of Hitchens’ report on

the grounds that the report presented an improper expert opinion on the ultimate

issue of whether termination would be in Ryan’s best interests and that it had been

denied its right to cross-examine her. The trial court overruled this objection and also

denied BCS’s request to present an offer of proof regarding the testimony Hitchens

would have given had she testified.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined that termination

of respondent’s parental rights was not in Ryan’s best interests. The trial court

entered a written order dismissing BCS’s petition to terminate parental rights on

6 March 2019. BCS appealed to this Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1).

Analysis

Our Juvenile Code provides for a two-step process for the termination of

parental rights—an adjudication stage and a dispositional stage. N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-

1109, -1110 (2019). At the adjudication stage, the petitioner bears the burden of

proving by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that one or more grounds for

termination exist under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a). N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e), (f). If the trial

court finds the existence of one or more grounds to terminate the respondent’s

parental rights, the matter proceeds to the dispositional stage where the trial court

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must determine whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best

interests. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a).

“We review a trial court’s adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 ‘to determine

whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the

findings support the conclusions of law.’ ” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 392 (2019)

(quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111 (1984)). With regard to the trial court’s

assessment of a juvenile’s best interests at the dispositional stage, however, we

review that decision “solely for abuse of discretion.” In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 6 (2019).

“[A]buse of discretion results where the court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by

reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.”

Id. at 6–7 (alteration in original) (quoting In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. 101, 107 (2015)).

BCS raises a number of arguments on appeal, which essentially raise two

primary issues. First, BCS contends that the trial court’s admission of the GAL’s

report during the dispositional stage of the termination proceeding without allowing

Hitchens to be cross-examined about the report constituted an abuse of discretion.

Second, BCS asserts that the trial court’s written order contained key findings of fact

that lacked evidentiary support in the record. We address each argument in turn.

I. Admission of the GAL’s Report Without the Opportunity for Cross- Examination

BCS initially argues that the trial court should not have admitted the GAL’s

report into evidence during the dispositional stage without affording its counsel the

opportunity to cross-examine Hitchens about the contents of the report. In order to

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fully analyze this issue, it is necessary to review the legal framework governing the

role of the GAL in termination of parental rights proceedings. Our Juvenile Code

provides for the appointment of a GAL in a termination proceeding as follows:

(b) If an answer or response denies any material allegation of the petition or motion, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for the juvenile to represent the best interests of the juvenile, unless the petition or motion was filed by the guardian ad litem pursuant to G.S. 7B-1103, or a guardian ad litem has already been appointed pursuant to G.S. 7B-601. A licensed attorney shall be appointed to assist those guardians ad litem who are not attorneys licensed to practice in North Carolina. . . .

(c) In proceedings under this Article, the appointment of a guardian ad litem shall not be required except, as provided above, in cases in which an answer or response is filed denying material allegations, or as required under G.S. 7B- 1101; but the court may, in its discretion, appoint a guardian ad litem for a juvenile, either before or after determining the existence of grounds for termination of parental rights, in order to assist the court in determining the best interests of the juvenile.

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1108(b)–(c) (2019).

Our Juvenile Code also states the following with respect to the GAL’s duties:

[t]he duties of the guardian ad litem program shall be to make an investigation to determine the facts, the needs of the juvenile, and the available resources within the family and community to meet those needs; to facilitate, when appropriate, the settlement of disputed issues; to offer evidence and examine witnesses at adjudication; to explore options with the court at the dispositional hearing; to conduct follow-up investigations to insure that the orders of the court are being properly executed; to report to the court when the needs of the juvenile are not being met; and to protect and promote the best interests of the juvenile until formally relieved of the responsibility by the court.

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N.C.G.S. § 7B-601(a) (2019).

This Court has recognized that in termination cases where a respondent-

parent files an answer denying material allegations in a termination petition, “the

trial court (1) must appoint a GAL for the juvenile, and (2) must appoint a licensed

attorney . . . if the appointed GAL is not an attorney.” In re C.J.C., 374 N.C. 42,

44 (2020). It is therefore clear that in some cases a GAL may be appointed to serve in

a dual role as both the juvenile’s GAL and attorney advocate. See In re J.H.K.,

365 N.C. 171, 175–76 (2011) (“Thus, if the GAL is an attorney, that person can

perform the duties of both the GAL and the attorney advocate. . . . [The Juvenile

Code] recognizes that in TPR proceedings the [GAL] attorney advocate is to perform

the traditional role of a lawyer . . . .”). Moreover, subsection (c) of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1108

provides that even when the trial court is not expressly required to appoint a GAL,

the trial court may still do so in its discretion “in order to assist the court in

determining the best interests of the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1108(c). This language

makes clear that one of the statutorily enumerated functions of a GAL is to assist the

trial court in making its best interests determination during the dispositional stage.

In light of the specific argument BCS asserts in this appeal, we must also

address the evidentiary distinctions between the adjudication and dispositional

stages of termination proceedings. The portion of the Juvenile Code governing the

adjudication stage of termination proceedings provides, in pertinent part, that

[t]he burden in such proceedings shall be upon the petitioner or movant and all findings of fact shall be based on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. The rules of

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evidence in civil cases shall apply. No husband-wife or physician-patient privilege shall be grounds for excluding any evidence regarding the existence or nonexistence of any circumstance authorizing the termination of parental rights.

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (emphasis added).

With regard to the dispositional stage, however, the General Assembly has

stated the following:

After an adjudication that one or more grounds for terminating a parent’s rights exist, the court shall determine whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interest. The court may consider any evidence, including hearsay evidence as defined in G.S. 8C- 1, Rule 801, that the court finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine the best interests of the juvenile.

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (emphasis added).

These statutes make clear that during the adjudication stage of a termination

proceeding, the trial court must apply the provisions of the North Carolina Rules of

Evidence that apply in all civil cases. During the dispositional stage, conversely, the

trial court retains significantly more discretion in its receipt of evidence and may

admit any evidence that it considers to be relevant, reliable, and necessary in its

inquiry into the child’s best interests—even if such evidence would be inadmissible

under the Rules of Evidence.

* * *

Applying these principles to the present case, we must first decide whether the

GAL’s report was admissible—that is, whether the trial court erred in its implicit

determination that the report was “relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine the

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best interests of the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). We agree with respondent that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the report provided by

Hitchens met each of these criteria. The report contained summaries of interviews

with twenty different persons having some connection with the case, an analysis of

the needs of Ryan, and Hitchens’ ultimate recommendation that the trial court not

terminate respondent’s parental rights. The report detailed the basis of Hitchens’

opinion and thoroughly set out both the pros and cons of terminating respondent’s

parental rights. This report was therefore directly related to the trial court’s task

during the dispositional stage. Thus, the trial court possessed the discretion to

determine that the report was, in fact, “relevant, reliable, and necessary” to

determine the best interests of Ryan.

We also observe that the admission of a GAL’s report at the best interests stage

of a termination proceeding is a commonplace occurrence and that such reports are

frequently introduced in order to aid the trial court in determining the juvenile’s best

interests. See, e.g., In re N.G., 374 N.C. 891, 905 (2020) (noting that the trial court

admitted a “detailed [GAL] report” during the dispositional stage and that “[n]o

objection was made and said report was received into evidence and considered by the

[trial court] on the issue of best interest”); In re A.L.L., 254 N.C. App. 252, 261 (2017)

(“In the dispositional phase, the trial court received the report of the guardian ad

litem . . . .”); In re M.A.I.B.K., 184 N.C. App. 218, 221 (2007) (noting that during the

best interests determination the trial court “considered a report on the child’s best

interests submitted by her guardian ad litem”).

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BCS argues, however, that the trial court was required to make explicit

findings setting out why it found the GAL’s report to be “relevant, reliable, and

necessary” pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) before admitting it into evidence. This

argument is unavailing. This Court has never interpreted N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) to

impose such a requirement, and nothing in the statutory text indicates that the

General Assembly intended that such express findings be required. By way of

contrast, we note that other portions of the Juvenile Code do require explicit factual

findings in certain contexts. See, e.g., N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101 (2019) (“[T]he court shall

find that it has jurisdiction to make a child-custody determination . . . .”) (emphasis

added)). The absence of any analogous language in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)

demonstrates that no explicit findings are necessary when a trial court deems it

appropriate to consider evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible under the

Rules of Evidence.

Having determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting

the GAL’s report, we must next determine whether the trial court committed

reversible error in declining to require that Hitchens be subject to cross-examination

after her report was admitted into evidence. During the dispositional stage of the

termination proceeding, the trial court initially asked Hitchens to take the witness

stand to testify regarding her report. Respondent, however, objected to Hitchens

being called as a witness, contending that her dual role as an attorney advocate and

as a factual witness would create an impermissible ethical conflict under Rule 3.7 of

the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct. After hearing arguments on this

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issue from both parties and consulting the North Carolina Rules of Professional

Conduct, the trial court ultimately ruled that Hitchens “being compelled to testify or

giving testimony as a witness would constitute a violation of Rule 3.7 and necessitate

her withdrawal.” The trial court then gave Hitchens the option either to testify and

withdraw as Ryan’s advocate or—alternatively—to introduce her written report

without giving any testimony at all. Hitchens chose the latter option.

BCS argues that it was improperly deprived of its right to cross-examine

Hitchens by the trial court’s ruling. BCS asserts that a party has the absolute right

to “an opportunity to fairly and fully cross-examine a witness who has testified for

the adverse party.” Citizens Bank & Tr. Co. v. Reid Motor Co., 216 N.C. 432,

434 (1939). Because the GAL’s report in this case contained relevant evidence—

including interviews with persons who did not appear in court and a recommendation

from Hitchens regarding Ryan’s best interests—BCS contends that it should have

been allowed to question her regarding the basis for her opinion and the methods she

used to conduct these interviews. Similarly, BCS challenges the trial court’s

characterization of the ethical conflict that would exist under Rule 3.7 if Hitchens

had been required to testify, contending that there is no legal authority in this state

preventing a party from compelling a material witness to testify. Finally, BCS argues

that the trial court committed prejudicial error by denying its offer of proof regarding

Hitchens’ anticipated testimony.

In response, respondent contends that BCS was not entitled to cross-examine

Hitchens as a matter of right because the dispositional stage of a termination

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proceeding is inherently non-adversarial in nature. Respondent further asserts that

the relaxed evidentiary standards applicable to dispositional hearings under

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) do not lend themselves to bright-line rules regarding the

manner in which evidence may be admitted by a trial court during this stage of a

termination proceeding.

As a preliminary matter, we first address BCS’s contention that the trial

court’s ruling amounted to a deprivation of its constitutional due process right to

cross-examine an opposing witness. Because BCS made no constitutional argument

before the trial court, this issue is not properly before us. See State v. Golphin, 352

N.C. 364, 411 (2000) (“Constitutional questions not raised and passed on by the trial

court will not ordinarily be considered on appeal.”). As a result, the only issue for our

determination is whether the trial court acted within its discretion by refusing to

allow cross-examination of Hitchens. On these facts, we cannot say that an abuse of

discretion occurred.

While it is axiomatic that cross-examination of an adverse witness is an

essential right in adversarial proceedings, see, e.g., Brewer v. Garner, 264 N.C. 384,

386 (1965), the dispositional stage of a termination proceeding is not adversarial. See

Stephens v. Stephens, 213 N.C. App. 495, 503 (2011) (quoting Ramirez-Barker v.

Barker, 107 N.C. App. 71, 78 (1992)) (“ ‘[T]he best interest’ question is thus more

inquisitorial in nature than adversarial . . . .”). Instead, the focus during the

dispositional stage is entirely on ascertaining the best interests of the child by

utilizing whatever evidence the trial court believes is most “relevant, reliable, and

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necessary.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). This statute gives the trial court broad discretion

regarding the receipt of evidence in its quest to determine the best interests of the

child under the particular circumstances of the case. Although this reservoir of

discretion is not limitless, we are satisfied that here the trial court’s ruling on this

issue was within its discretion.3

Our conclusion is supported by the language of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) itself,

which—as noted above—expressly allows the trial court to consider hearsay evidence.

See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (“The court may consider any evidence, including hearsay

evidence . . . .”). Hearsay, by definition, is an out-of-court statement that is not subject

to cross-examination. See State v. Baymon, 336 N.C. 748, 759 (1994) (quoting

N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 801(c)). Accordingly, because the statute expressly allows the

admission of evidence which inherently cannot be subject to cross-examination, our

legislature has made clear that no absolute right to cross-examination exists during

the dispositional stage.4

We deem instructive this Court’s decision in In re J.H.K. In that case, the trial

court appointed the juveniles a GAL and a separate attorney advocate shortly after

DSS obtained custody of them. J.H.K., 365 N.C. at 172. At the subsequent

3 For example, we are not confronted with a scenario in which the trial court allowed

the GAL to testify on direct examination for respondent but then refused to allow cross- examination by BCS. Instead, the trial court allowed the GAL’s report to speak for itself. 4 Although BCS contends that cross-examination was particularly warranted because

the GAL’s report contained Hitchens’ expert opinion regarding Ryan’s best interests, Hitchens made clear to the trial court that she was not holding herself out as an expert witness or purporting to offer an expert opinion.

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termination proceeding, the attorney advocate was present, but the juveniles’ GAL

was absent from the courtroom. Id. at 173. On appeal, the respondent-parent argued

that the trial court erred by conducting the termination proceeding without the

children’s GAL being physically present. Id. We disagreed, holding that a “nonlawyer

GAL volunteer is not required to be physically present at the TPR hearing.” Id. at

178. In explaining our ruling, we emphasized the “separate in-court and out-of-court

responsibilities” of the nonlawyer GAL—such as investigation and observation of the

needs of the children. Id. at 176. We noted that “[a]lthough the GAL’s presence at the

TPR hearing may be preferable,” nothing in the Juvenile Code explicitly requires the

GAL’s attendance. Id.

We further held that it was clear that the GAL had fulfilled her statutory

duties by “regularly fil[ing] reports describing the children’s needs . . . . and her

recommendations concerning the best interests of the children in light of her ongoing

investigation of their case.” Id. at 177. Meanwhile, the attorney advocate had, in turn,

complied with her respective duties by “appear[ing] at every hearing documented in

the record” and by examining witnesses and introducing the GAL’s report at the

termination proceeding. Id. Thus, we concluded that “[t]hrough the work of its team

members appointed to th[e] case, the GAL program satisfied its out-of-court

investigatory duties as well as its in-court representational duties.” Id. at 178.

Although In re J.H.K. did not involve the specific issue raised by BCS in the

present case, it is nevertheless consistent with our ruling today. If the GAL is not

even required to be present in the courtroom at the termination proceeding, then

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logically there is no absolute right to cross-examine the GAL in cases where she is

present but does not testify for the adverse party. In re J.H.K. further demonstrates

that a GAL can fulfill her “out-of-court investigatory duties” simply by submitting her

written report to the trial court—which is what ultimately happened here. Id.

Moreover, the existence of the potential for an ethical conflict pursuant to Rule

3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct makes the trial court’s refusal to require

Hitchens to testify even more reasonable. After becoming aware of the possible ethical

conflict, the trial court (1) heard arguments on this issue from both parties; (2)

reviewed Rule 3.7, the relevant portions of the Juvenile Code, and case law regarding

the duties of the GAL; and (3) made a phone call to the North Carolina State Bar

seeking guidance on this ethical issue. The trial court then offered Hitchens the

option to either testify as a witness and withdraw as Ryan’s advocate or submit her

written report without testifying and continue to serve as Ryan’s advocate. In so

doing, we are satisfied that the trial court acted within its authority in attempting to

resolve this issue. Accordingly, BCS’s argument is overruled.

II. Best Interests Determination

BCS next makes several arguments regarding the trial court’s dispositional

findings of fact in its written order. Specifically, BCS contends that the trial court

(1) improperly placed a burden of proof upon BCS during the dispositional stage;

(2) failed to properly consider the statutory factors relevant to the best interests

determination; and (3) made several material findings of fact that were unsupported

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by the evidence including, most notably, a finding about alleged harms associated

with adoption generally.

We first address BCS’s argument regarding the burden of proof during

disposition. BCS argues that the trial court’s order incorrectly (1) conflated the

applicable burden of proof with the statement of legislative purpose set out in the

Juvenile Code; and (2) suggested that BCS bore the burden of proving that

respondent was not a capable parent.

In its written order, the trial court looked to the stated legislative purpose

contained in the section of the Juvenile Code governing termination proceedings for

guidance in making its dispositional findings. The trial court’s order noted that

[t]he court, in making its [best interests] determination, has considered the general purpose of Article 11, which is to provide judicial procedures for terminating the legal relationship between a child and the child’s biological or legal parents when the parents have demonstrated that they will not provide the degree of care which promotes the healthy and orderly physical and emotional well-being of the child.

The trial court also framed several of its dispositional findings in terms of

whether or not respondent had “demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to

provide the degree of care which promotes the healthy and orderly physical and

emotional well-being of the child.”

As noted by BCS, this language in the trial court’s order is drawn directly from

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1100, which sets out the underlying legislative intent with regard to

the statutory scheme governing termination of parental rights proceedings. See

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N.C.G.S. § 7B-1100(1) (2019) (“The general purpose of this Article is to provide

judicial procedures for terminating the legal relationship between a juvenile and the

juvenile’s biological or legal parents when the parents have demonstrated that they

will not provide the degree of care which promotes the healthy and orderly physical

and emotional well-being of the juvenile.”).

However, we do not believe that it is improper for a trial court to look to the

General Assembly’s intent as set out in the Juvenile Code for guidance when making

its dispositional findings of fact. In fact, this Court has similarly examined

statements of legislative intent contained within the Juvenile Code in reviewing

orders involving the termination of a party’s parental rights. See, e.g., In re F.S.T.Y.,

374 N.C. 532, 540 (2020). Moreover, although it is true that the trial court’s order

does not recite all of the legislative policies contained in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1100, we are

unaware of any rule that required it to do so.

BCS further contends that the trial court improperly suggested that BCS bore

the burden of proof during the dispositional stage. BCS is correct that—unlike during

the adjudication stage—no burden of proof should be imposed upon either party at

the dispositional stage. Compare N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (“The burden in [adjudication]

proceedings shall be upon the petitioner or movant . . . .”), with N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110

(containing no burden of proof requirement). See also In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App.

94, 96 (2002) (“There is no burden of proof on the parties at disposition.”). However,

our reading of the trial court’s order does not reveal any indication that the trial court

actually imposed a burden of proof upon BCS.

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BCS also argues that the trial court erred by either minimizing or ignoring

altogether the five statutory factors required to be considered in the best interests

analysis under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). Most notably, BCS contends that the trial

court failed to sufficiently consider Ryan’s high likelihood of adoption, his lack of a

bond with respondent, and whether termination would aid in accomplishing Ryan’s

permanent plan of adoption. BCS also claims that the trial court placed too much

weight on the statutory “catchall” provision under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(6). Section

7B-1110 states, in pertinent part, as follows:

In each case, the court shall consider the following criteria and make written findings regarding the following that are relevant: (1) The age of the juvenile. (2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile. (3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile. (4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent. (5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement. (6) Any relevant consideration.

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a).

We have held that the five enumerated factors are not exclusive, as subsection

(a)(6) expressly authorizes a trial court to rely on any other “relevant consideration”

it deems pertinent to the best interests determination. See In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190,

200 (2019) (“In addition to the statutory factors set out in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(1)–

(5), the district court considered other relevant factors, as it was permitted to do

under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(6) . . . .”).

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We previously rejected an argument similar to that made by BCS in In re

A.U.D. There, the respondent-parent contended that “the trial court did not make

sufficient findings regarding the factors set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)” and that

the trial court improperly weighed these factors by relying too heavily on the

“catchall” provision under (a)(6). A.U.D., 373 N.C. at 10. We disagreed, explaining

that while “[i]t is clear that a trial court must consider all of the factors in section 7B-

1110(a),” a court need not make explicit “written findings as to each factor.” Id.

Because the transcript indicated that the trial court considered each of the five

statutory factors, we held that there was no violation of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). Id.

We further determined that it was permissible for the trial court to “consider[ ] other

relevant circumstances . . . under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(6)” in making its best

interests determination—such as the circumstances surrounding the children’s

adoption and the respondent’s recent “strides in self-improvement.” Id. at 12. As for

the respondent’s argument regarding the allegedly erroneous weighing of the

statutory factors, we noted that while some “evidence existed that would have

supported a contrary decision . . . . this Court lacks the authority to reweigh the

evidence that was before the trial court.” Id.

Here, as in In re A.U.D., we are satisfied that the trial court properly

considered each of the statutory factors. Indeed, the trial court’s order stated that

“[t]he court has considered each of the six criteria set out in subsection 1110, and

makes written findings on those factors that are relevant, placing significant weight

on the sixth criteria which addresses any relevant consideration.” Furthermore, to

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the extent that BCS is contending that the trial court improperly weighed and

balanced the six factors in reaching its conclusion, such balancing is uniquely

reserved to the trial court and will not be disturbed by this Court on appeal. See In re

A.U.D., 373 N.C. at 12 (“[T]his Court lacks the authority to reweigh the evidence that

was before the trial court.”).

Finally, we address BCS’s various challenges to the trial court’s factual

findings in its written order. During the dispositional stage, we review the trial

court’s factual findings to determine if they are supported by competent evidence.

In re K.N.K., 374 N.C. 50, 57 (2020) (“The trial court’s dispositional findings of fact

are reviewed under a ‘competent evidence’ standard.”). In making findings of fact, “it

is the trial judge’s duty to consider all the evidence, pass upon the credibility of the

witnesses, and determine the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the testimony.”

In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 411 (2019). Moreover, findings of fact are binding “where

there is some evidence to support those findings, even though the evidence might

sustain findings to the contrary.” In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 110–11.

BCS first challenges Finding of Fact 14, which discusses Brittany’s attendance

at a birthday party held by respondent’s sister. Finding of Fact 14 states as follows:

14. [Brittany] attended a birthday party in May, 2017 for Respondent-Father’s sister. This was a pool party to which [Brittany] wore a bikini. [Brittany] initially denied attending the party, but acknowledged her participation when confronted with photographic evidence of her presence. [Brittany] was not obviously pregnant and she did not disclose her pregnancy to any member of the father’s family. Respondent-Father did not attend the birthday party.

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BCS asserts that this finding is incorrect because the transcript demonstrates

that Brittany never denied attending the party—rather, she simply stated that she

did not recall whether she had attended the party.

The transcript reveals that, when Brittany was asked whether she had “any

contact or communication” with anyone in respondent’s family after becoming

pregnant in March 2017, Brittany responded “[n]o.” When initially asked about her

attendance at the May 2017 pool party, Brittany stated that she “[didn’t] recall”

whether or not she had attended. After being asked about the pool party again on

cross-examination and after being confronted with a photograph of her at the party,

Brittany admitted that she was “the person wearing a pink bikini” in the photograph.

To the extent that a portion of Finding of Fact 14 contained an inaccurate recitation

of the evidence, we do not deem any such inaccuracy prejudicial. Indeed, the

transcript reveals that Brittany initially denied having any contact with respondent’s

family after becoming pregnant but later admitted attending the party for

respondent’s sister while pregnant.

Second, BCS challenges Findings of Fact 42, 52, and 53, which discuss the

“barriers” that prevented respondent from visiting Ryan and forming a bond with him

after becoming aware of his birth. These findings state, in relevant part, as follows:

42. . . . . Additionally, in this case, the Respondent-Father was innocent in his ignorance of the pregnancy. . . .

....

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52. That the only reason this child does not have a strong reciprocal bond with Respondent-Father is because of barriers that were erected after his birth which the Father could not, despite his efforts, overcome.

53. Immediately after he became aware of the existence of this child, Respondent-Father expressed his desire to visit with and establish a bond with his son. He was prohibited from doing so, both by [BCS] and the Court.

BCS asserts that no “barriers” were erected to deny respondent access to Ryan

because it was respondent who (1) blocked Brittany on social media; (2) failed to ever

inquire about whether Brittany was pregnant (despite knowing where she lived); and

(3) heard rumors of her pregnancy in January 2018 but still did nothing to assert his

parental rights until March 2018. For these same reasons, BCS argues that

respondent was not “innocent in his ignorance of the pregnancy” and that he did not

express a desire to visit Ryan “immediately” after becoming aware of Ryan’s birth.

BCS asserts that respondent knew about the pregnancy two months before service of

the termination petition yet still took no action.

There was conflicting evidence in the record regarding respondent’s knowledge

of Brittany’s pregnancy. Brittany testified that she informed respondent that she was

pregnant in March 2017, but respondent denied this assertion and testified that he

did not learn about the pregnancy until 2018—having first heard rumors about her

pregnancy in January 2018 and receiving confirmation of her pregnancy when he was

served with BCS’s termination petition in March 2018. The trial court found

respondent’s account of these events to be credible and found Brittany’s testimony

“not believable”—as was its province as the trier of fact.

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Moreover, the evidence of record permitted the trial court to conclude that

barriers were erected after Ryan’s birth that prevented respondent from bonding with

Ryan. It is undisputed that Brittany relinquished her parental rights to Ryan one

day after his birth and that Ryan was shortly thereafter placed with a prospective

adoptive family without respondent’s knowledge. Thus, the circumstances

surrounding Ryan’s adoption alone were enough to allow the trial court to infer that

barriers existed that made it difficult—if not impossible—for him to bond with Ryan.

BCS next challenges the portions of Findings of Fact 15, 30, and 38 that discuss

Brittany’s “active efforts to conceal” her pregnancy from respondent. These findings

provide as follows:

15. [Brittany’s] guardians engaged in active efforts to conceal [her] pregnancy in that they withdrew her from the school she attended with Respondent-Father and sent her to a school outside of their community of residence.

30. . . . . The Respondent-Father’s failure to provide an adequate standard of care for this minor child could not be willful because . . . [Brittany] and her guardians intentionally concealed her pregnancy from Respondent- Father [and] engaged in a process of planning for the child’s future at the exclusion of the minor father . . . .

38. A fourteen year old child, with the counsel and assistance of her legal guardians, made a decision to conceal this pregnancy from a fifteen year old father, his family and the world . . . . All of these decisions were carried out by a minor child who intentionally excluded the father of her unborn child from the process.

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BCS argues that none of the actions in which Brittany engaged were motivated

by an intent to conceal her pregnancy from respondent. BCS asserts that (1) her

family moved Brittany to a different school to prevent her from being bullied because

of her pregnancy; (2) she informed respondent of her pregnancy; (3) she posted a

picture of herself with Ryan on social media; and (4) she told BCS the correct name

of the baby’s father. BCS asserts that the lack of communication between the two was

respondent’s fault, as it was respondent who knew where Brittany lived at all times

but chose not to contact her.

We reject BCS’s argument as we believe that these findings were likewise

supported by competent evidence. Given that the trial court disbelieved Brittany’s

claim that she informed respondent of the pregnancy, the remaining evidence could

have led a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Brittany and her family were

intentionally concealing her pregnancy from respondent. First, Brittany changed

schools while pregnant. She testified that she changed schools in order to avoid being

bullied or harassed, but the trial court was free to reject her testimony and to infer

that her true motivation for changing schools was to avoid contact with respondent.

Second, Brittany listed the wrong address for respondent on her affidavit. While this

could have been a simple mistake, it also would have been permissible for the trial

court to infer that this inaccuracy was intentional given the trial court’s unchallenged

finding that Brittany gave “inconsistent, self-serving and untruthful testimony . . .

concerning a number of substantive matters.” Third, as noted above, there was

evidence that Brittany and her family never attempted to contact respondent after

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Ryan’s birth, and it is uncontested that respondent was not consulted regarding the

decision to relinquish Ryan for adoption.

Additionally, BCS challenges the portion of Finding of Fact 23 stating that

BCS did not “engage in meaningful efforts to ascertain the proper address of the

minor Respondent.” BCS asserts that it asked Brittany for respondent’s address and

that BCS had no reason to believe that the address provided by Brittany would be

inaccurate. BCS notes that it was unable to verify respondent’s address through

county property records because his family did not own the residence. BCS argues

that it never gave up the search for respondent, claiming that it was not until after

several months of undelivered letters as well as searches conducted through the

internet, social media, criminal records, and Division of Motor Vehicles records that

BCS could finally locate a current address for respondent’s mother, who lived in a

different county. Likewise, BCS also challenges the trial court’s refusal to admit into

evidence BCS’s affidavit of service—a record that BCS contends documented its

diligent efforts to search for respondent.

Although it is true that BCS took a number of steps to attempt to locate

respondent—such as sending letters to the address for respondent listed in Brittany’s

affidavit and searching for respondent on social media and on the internet—the trial

court noted that there were several other commonsense steps that BCS could have

taken to find respondent but that it did not do so. For example, BCS did not seek

additional information from Brittany or her family, who were known to be acquainted

-26- IN RE R.D.

with respondent’s family. Nor did BCS attempt to obtain an address for respondent

from the high school that he was known to attend.5

Finally, BCS challenges the portion of Finding of Fact 57 discussing the alleged

“harm” associated with adoption generally. In the trial court’s oral findings at

disposition, the trial court not only emphasized the “need to protect all children from

the unnecessary severance of relationship[s] with biological parents” but also went

on to discuss the “harm or the challenges that children who are adopted often face.”

This concern was also reflected in Finding of Fact 57 of the written order, which states

as follows:

57. There is insufficient evidence that changing primary care givers and homes at fourteen months of age would be traumatic and should be considered a primary or compelling factor on best interests to terminate parental rights. A change in caregivers, routine and home must be balanced against the harm that children who are adopted often face as they try to understand who they are, where they came from, and why they were not raised by their biological parents.

(Emphasis added). BCS argues that this finding is unsupported by the evidence and

that if the finding is allowed to stand, it will signal that adoptive families are deemed

5 We also reject BCS’s argument that the trial court committed reversible error by

refusing to admit the affidavit of service, which described BCS’s various efforts to contact respondent via mail, the internet, and through public records searches. The trial court received extensive testimony from BCS’s representative Robyn Johnson regarding BCS’s efforts to contact respondent. Given the broad amount of discretion that trial courts possess in making evidentiary rulings during the dispositional stage coupled with the fact that the majority of this information was described in Johnson’s testimony, we do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to admit the affidavit of service.

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by courts in this state to be inherently inferior to biological families for purposes of

conducting a best interests determination.

We agree with BCS that the italicized portion of Finding of Fact 57 and the

above-quoted oral findings by the trial court not only lack support in the record but

can also be read as reflecting an inappropriate bias against adoption. At oral

argument, counsel for respondent conceded that the trial court heard no evidence

from the GAL or any other witness regarding any “harm” associated with adoption as

a general proposition. Additionally, although it is true that our Juvenile Code states

a preference for avoiding the dissolution of the biological parent-child relationship

except when absolutely necessary, see, e.g., N.C.G.S. § 7B-1100(2) (recognizing “the

need to protect all juveniles from the unnecessary severance of a relationship with

biological or legal parents”), this does not mean that adoption is contrary to the public

policy of our state or that our law deems adoptive parental relationships to be any

less valuable than biological parental relationships.

As articulated elsewhere in our General Statutes, the legislature has stated

that “it is in the public interest to establish a clear judicial process for adoptions,

[and] to promote the integrity and finality of adoptions.” N.C.G.S. § 48-1-100(a)

(2019). The General Assembly has further declared “as a matter of legislative policy”

that it is desirable to “advance the welfare of minors by . . . facilitating the adoption

of minors in need of adoptive placement by persons who can give them love, care,

security, and support.” N.C.G.S. § 48-1-100(b). This Court recognized eighty years

ago that

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[t]he institution of adoption is a very worthy response of the law to social needs . . . . Instances of its beneficent effect may be found in the history of men and women who have been aided to become prominent in all lines of private and public service, and in the consolation it has given to hundreds of childless homes.

Ward v. Howard, 217 N.C. 201, 208 (1940).

In response, respondent argues that even if there was no evidence in the record

about harm suffered generally by adopted children, it was nevertheless permissible

for the trial court to make such an inference based on its own personal experience

pursuant to the doctrine of judicial notice. We disagree.

We have held that “[a] matter is the proper subject of judicial notice only if it

is ‘known,’ well established and authoritatively settled.” Hughes v. Vestal, 264 N.C.

500, 506 (1965). Conversely, “[a]ny subject . . . that is open to reasonable debate is

not appropriate for judicial notice.” Greer v. Greer, 175 N.C. App. 464, 472 (2006).

Here, it can hardly be said that it is “well established” or “authoritatively settled”

that children who are adopted often face “harm” while growing up and attempting to

understand their identity. Hughes, 264 N.C. at 506.

Accordingly, because no evidence existed in the record to support the trial

court’s finding on this issue and because the doctrine of judicial notice is inapplicable,

we hold that the challenged portion of Finding of Fact 57 was erroneous.

Furthermore, we deem this inappropriate finding to be prejudicial because of the

possibility that it influenced the trial court’s ultimate best interests determination.

Although there were factors in this case suggesting that Ryan’s interests were likely

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to be best served by the termination of respondent’s parental rights—such as Ryan’s

close bond with his prospective adoptive parents, the extremely high likelihood of

adoption, his lack of any bond with respondent, and the very young age of respondent

himself—the trial court ultimately found that these factors were outweighed not only

by the importance of maintaining the biological parental bond between respondent

and Ryan but also by the trial court’s perception of the “harm” that adopted children

face simply by virtue of the fact that they are adopted.

We are therefore unable to determine whether the trial court would have

reached the same result in its best interests analysis but for the consideration of this

improper finding. Thus, we remand this case to the trial court for the entry of a new

dispositional order. We express no opinion as to the ultimate result of the best

interests determination on remand, as that decision must be made by the trial court.

The trial court shall have the discretion on remand to determine whether a new

dispositional hearing is necessary.6

Conclusion

For the reasons set out above, we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part

for the entry of a new dispositional order.

6 BCS also argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the ground of neglect during

the adjudication stage. Because the trial court found that a separate ground for termination existed—i.e., respondent’s failure to establish paternity—we need not address the trial court’s determination regarding the ground of neglect. See In re D.W.P., 373 N.C. 327, 340 (2020) (“Because there is sufficient evidence to support one ground for termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights, the Court need not address the second ground for termination . . . .”); In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 395 (2019) (“[A]n adjudication of any single ground in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) is sufficient to support a termination of parental rights.”).

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AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.

-31- Justice EARLS concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I join the entirety of Part I of the majority opinion, which correctly resolves

BCS’s challenge to the trial court’s admission of the GAL report. I also join Part II,

except as to the majority’s disposition of this appeal. In contrast to the majority, I

believe there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s conclusion

that terminating respondent-father’s parental rights was not in the juvenile’s best

interests, even without the portion of the court’s finding that it must consider “the

harm that children who are adopted often face as they try to understand who they

are, where they came from, and why they were not raised by their biological parents.”1

Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s decision to remand to the trial court for the

entry of a new dispositional order and would instead affirm.

The trial court made specific findings of fact relating to all six enumerated

factors provided by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019). First, regarding “[t]he age of the

juvenile,” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(1), the trial court found that because Ryan “is only

1 The majority is correct that there was no expert witness testimony in this case documenting the impact of adoption on the adoptee, but I do not agree that its factual finding reflects “an inappropriate bias against adoption” on behalf of the trial court as asserted by the majority. There is a large body of academic research addressing this question. See, e.g., David M. Brodzinsky et al., Being Adopted: The Lifelong Search for Self (1993) (describing seminal research on the unique stages of adoptee development); Psychological Issues in Adoption (David M. Brodzinsky & Jesús Palacios eds., 2005) (collecting works from psychologists engaged in adoption research, including issues of adoptive adjustments). While the existence of this body of research does not justify the trial court taking judicial notice of an adjudicative fact in this regard, it does demonstrate some basis for the trial court’s concern. IN RE R.D.

Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

fourteen months old . . . the establishment of a new primary care giver would not

cause such a significant disruption in social and emotional well-being and

development[ ] that it should preclude preservation of the relationship between this

child and his father.” Second, regarding “[t]he likelihood of adoption of the juvenile,”

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(2), and “[w]hether the termination of parental rights will aid

in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile,” N.C.G.S. § 7B-

1110(a)(3), the trial court found that because “the likelihood of adoption of this

Juvenile is extremely high and the Dowdy’s are absolutely committed to providing a

permanent home through adoption, this is one of many counter-balancing

considerations made by the Court.” Third, regarding the “bond between the juvenile

and the parent,” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(4), the trial court determined that this factor

should be given “limited weight because the Mother’s act of placing the child in the

custody of Petitioner twenty-eight (28) days after birth combined with no clear

statutory right to visitation pending this action, resulted in a limited opportunity for

Respondent-Father [to] nurture and parent his son.” The trial court further found

that “the only reason this child does not have a strong reciprocal bond with

Respondent-Father is because of barriers that were erected after his birth which the

Father could not, despite his efforts, overcome.” Fourth, regarding “[t]he quality of

the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent[s],” N.C.G.S.

§ 7B-1110(a)(5), the trial court found that while “[t]his child has a very strong and

reciprocal bond and attachment with the proposed adoptive parents and the extended

family members, and their entire circle of friends[,] . . . [t]he quality of the

relationship with the prospective adoptive parents should not be the prevailing factor

resulting in the deprivation of a relationship with Respondent-Father.”

If the findings recounted above reflected the sum total of the trial court’s

dispositional findings, I might agree with the majority that a remand for further

factfinding is appropriate. However, the trial court also expressly stated that, in

reaching its ultimate conclusion at the dispositional stage, it was “placing significant

weight on the sixth criteria which addresses any relevant consideration,” referring to

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(6). Regarding this factor, the trial court made numerous

findings of fact relating to “[t]he circumstances surrounding the [mother’s] pregnancy

and [Ryan’s] birth,” which tended to show that despite “fac[ing] extraordinary

constraints to establishing his biological, legal[,] and personal relationship with his

son,” the respondent-father had “on service of the petition and learning of the

existence of his son, contacted petitioner to request custody and visitation,” and

immediately “purchased and collected items to provide care for his son and

unequivocally expressed his desire to exercise his parental rights and duties.” The

trial court found that the evidence presented “do[es] not also demonstrate that

Respondent-Father will not provide the degree of care which promotes the healthy

and orderly physical and emotional well-being of his child.” Thus, in light of “the

general purpose of Article 11, which is to provide judicial procedures for terminating

the legal relationship between a child and the child’s biological or legal parents when

the parents have demonstrated that they will not provide the degree of care which

promotes the healthy and orderly physical and emotional well-being of the child,” the

trial court weighed the evidence against the statutorily enumerated factors and

concluded that terminating respondent-father’s parental rights did not serve Ryan’s

best interests.

The trial court’s express statement that it was relying most heavily on findings

related to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(6) suggests that its consideration of the potential

harms of adoption was not a basis for its ultimate conclusion. Further, absent this

finding, the trial court’s order bears substantial similarities to the order at issue in a

recently decided case involving substantially similar facts, In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3,

832 S.E.2d 698 (2019). In that case, we concluded that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in concluding that termination of parental rights was not in the best

interests of the juveniles, reasoning that it was appropriate for the trial court to

emphasize the importance of preserving ties between the children and their biological

father and to consider the circumstances of the mother’s relinquishment of the

children which had deprived the respondent-father of an opportunity to develop a

parental bond:

Here, the trial court carefully weighed the competing goals of (1) preserving the ties between the children and their biological relatives; and (2) achieving permanence for the children as offered by their prospective adoptive family. In addition to the statutory factors set out in N.C.G.S. § 7B- 1110(a)(1)–(5), the trial court also considered other relevant circumstances—as it was permitted to do under

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(6)—such as the fact that (1) [the juveniles] were relinquished to BCS solely at the behest of their mother; (2) respondent was never afforded the opportunity to parent [the juveniles] or provide for their care prior to their relinquishment; (3) upon learning of [the juveniles’] birth, respondent “proactively” attempted to establish paternity.

Id. at 12, 832 S.E.2d at 703–04. For similar reasons, I believe that the trial court’s

appropriate findings in this case are adequate to support its conclusion that

termination of parental rights is unwarranted.

Our decision in In re A.U.D. reflected a recognition that “[o]ne of the stated

policies of the Juvenile Code is to prevent ‘the unnecessary or inappropriate

separation of juveniles from their parents.’ ” Id. at 11, 832 S.E.2d at 703 (quoting

N.C.G.S. § 7B-100(4) (2019)). Whatever the state of the evidence here regarding the

potential impact on this child from being adopted, the trial court was entitled to

conclude that because there was “substantial evidence that Respondent-Father is

willing and capable of providing the degree of care that is necessary to promote the

healthy and orderly physical and emotional well-being of his son,” terminating

respondent-father’s parental rights was “unnecessary” to achieving an outcome that

served the juvenile’s best interests. An unwarranted skepticism of adoption is

inconsistent with our Juvenile Code, but a belief that preserving the relationship

between a child and a fit parent serves that child’s best interests is perfectly

appropriate. Although the trial court had no specific evidence of the impact of

adoption generally, the trial court was well within its discretionary authority to

conclude that it served Ryan’s best interests to preserve his relationship with a

respondent-father who was ready and able to provide appropriate care.

Further, our decision in In re A.U.D. and other cases also reflect an appropriate

respect for and deference to the judgment of trial courts tasked with weighing the

often contradictory evidence presented during termination proceedings. As we

indicated in that case, our sole task on appeal is to review the trial court’s order and

the underlying record to determine whether the trial court’s conclusion that

termination of respondent’s parental rights was not in the children’s best interests

was either arbitrary or manifestly unsupported by reason. See id. at 12, 832 S.E.2d

at 704; see also In re I.N.C., 374 N.C. 542, 550, 843 S.E.2d 214, 220 (2020) (“[T]he

responsibility for weighing the relevant statutory criteria delineated in N.C.G.S. §

7B-1110(a) lies with the trial court, which ‘is permitted to give greater weight to other

factors,’ rather than with this Court.”) (quoting In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. 432, 437, 831

S.E.2d 62, 66 (2019)).

In the present case, it does not appear that the trial court’s conclusion that

termination of parental rights was not in Ryan’s best interests rested upon its

unsupported factual finding regarding the impact of adoption, nor was its ultimate

conclusion “arbitrary” or “manifestly unsupported by reason” given the trial court’s

other findings at the dispositional stage of the proceeding. Upon close review of the

trial court’s order and the record, I cannot agree with the majority that the trial

court’s finding regarding the harms of adoption was so central to its determination

that respondent-father’s parental rights should not be terminated as to permit us to

disturb the trial court’s reasoned judgment.

Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to remand to the

trial court for the entry of a new dispositional order.

Chief Justice BEASLEY and Justice HUDSON join in this opinion concurring

in part and dissenting in part.

-7-