In re: Ramon Pabon Rodriguez, Elsa Iris Medina Landin v. Julio C. Cajigas, Norma Feliciano

• Court: United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Puerto Rico
• Decided: March 29, 2006
• Docket: 05-00246
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR 2 THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 3

4 IN RE:

5 RAMON PABON RODRIGUEZ CASE NO. 95-02831 ESL ELSA IRIS MEDINA LANDIN CHAPTER 7 6 Debtor(s) ADVERSARY NO. 05-0246 7 RAMON PABON RODRIGUEZ, HIS WIFE 8 ELSA I. MEDINA LANDIN AND THE 9 CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP CONSTITUED BY BOTH OF THEM 10 Plaintiff(s) 11 JULIO C. CAJIGAS, HIS WIFE NORMA FILED & ENTERED ON 3/29/2006 12 FELICIANO AND THE CONJUGAL 13 PARTNERSHIP CONSTITUED BY BOTH OF THEM 14 Defendant(s) 15 OPINION AND ORDER 16

17 This adversary proceeding is before the court upon defendant’s 18 motion for summary judgment and plaintiff’s opposition thereto. 19 Defendant alleges that the issue of the compensation paid to defendant 20 for his professional services as a surveyor in the bankruptcy case was 21 adjudicated by this court and may not be relitigated. Plaintiffs alleges 22 23 That there are issues in controversy regarding the reasonableness of the 24 fees paid to Mr. Julio C. Cajigas Morales. For the reasons set forth 25 below, the motion for summary judgment is granted as the relief requested

is barred on the grounds of res judicata. 1 The following facts appear from defendant’s motion and the record of 2 3 the bankruptcy case: 4 1. On January 7, 1997, the court entered an order approving the 5 trustee’s application to employ Mr. Julio Cajigas Morales as a surveyor. 6 2. On June 1, 1999, Ms. Ana D. Cajigas, in representation of Mr. 7 Julio C. Cajigas, filed a request for payment of administrative expenses 8 9 in the amount of $21,599.47. 10 3. On August 2, 1999, the court ordered Mr. Cajigas to give notice 11 of the application for compensation, and stated that if no opposition was 12 filed the same would be granted. 13 4. On September 13, 1999, Mr. Cajigas moved the court informing 14 compliance with this court’s order, and stating that no opposition had 15 16 been filed. 17 5. On November 18, 1999, the court entered an order approving the 18 professional fees in the amount of $21,599.47. 19 6. On March 2, 2002, the debtors and Mr. Cajigas filed a settlement 20 agreement for the payment of $19,075.00 to Mr. Cajigas to resolve 21 22 controversy on the amounts owed. The agreement was approved on August 6, 23 2002. 24 7. On October 4, 2002, Mr. Cajigas filed a motion requesting the 25 payment of the $19,075. The request was granted on October 12, 2002.

8. On November 8, 2002, the debtors moved the court to set aside the order dated October, 12, 2002. The request was denied On December 12, 2002. 1 9. On October 15, 2004, the debtors again moved the court 2 3 requesting a declaratory judgment that Mr. Cajigas has been overpaid. 4 The court denied the request on October 21, 2004, on the grounds that the 5 case had been closed on August 15, 2003, and that a request for 6 declaratory judgment must be initiated as an adversary proceeding. 7 10. The instant adversary proceeding was filed on November 4, 2005, 8 9 to recover the payment made to Mr. Cajigas. 10 The doctrine of res judicata bars parties from litigating or re- 11 litigating any issue or claim that has already been adjudicated in a 12 prior case. Suarez Cestero v. Pagan Rosa, 198 F.Supp.2d 73, 84 (D.P.R. 13 2002); Del Carmen Tirado v. Department of Education, 296 F.Supp.2d 127, 14 130 (D.P.R. 2003). Issues surrounding the application of the doctrine of 15 16 res judicata arise because of the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by 17 state and federal courts over similar claims based upon similar facts and 18 involving the same parties. Id. “The doctrine of res judicata, now 19 called claim preclusion, forecloses litigation of all matters which have 20 been litigated or might have been litigated in an earlier case. The rule 21 22 of collateral estoppel, now termed issue preclusion, precludes re- 23 litigation of issues actually adjudicated.” Id., citing 18 Charles Alan 24 Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and 25 Procedure: Jurisdiction, § 4402, 4404 (1981). The doctrines of res

judicata and collateral estoppel serve important purposes; “they prevent the waste of judicial and party resources through vexatious and multiple lawsuits and encourage the rendering of consistent, reliable adjudications.” Esteves v. Ortiz Alvarez, 678 F.Supp. 963, 965 (D.P.R. 1 1988). 2 3 The preclusive effect of a state court judgment depends upon state 4 law. Kane v. Town of Harpswell (In re Kane), 254 F.3d 325, 328 (1st Cir. 5 2001), citing Cruz v. Melecio, 204 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2000); see also, 6 Suarez Cestero v. Pagan Rosa, 198 F.Supp.2d at 85 (“[I]f Puerto Rico 7 courts would give preclusive effect to the judgment of a state court, 8 9 then this Court must also give preclusive effect to said judgment.”). 10 Additionally, whether a state court judgment is final for preclusion 11 purposes (claim or issue) is a question of state law. Federación de 12 Maestros de Puerto Rico v; Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de Puerto 13 Rico, 410 F.3d 17, 22 fn. 8 (1st Cir. 2005), citing Roy v. City of 14 Augusta, 712 F.2d 1517, 1520 (1st Cir. 1983). “In Puerto Rico, judgments 15 16 can be given preclusive effect if they are final and on the merits.” 17 Suarez Cestero, 198 F.Supp.2d at 85. 18 “In Puerto Rico, the broader form of res judicata is applied. This 19 means that issues which could have been litigated and adjudicated in a 20 previous suit, as well as those actually litigated and adjudicated, 21 22 cannot be relitigated in a later suit. The broad form does not extend, 23 however, to collateral estoppel. Parties may be collaterally estopped 24 only from litigating issues actually litigated previously.” Esteves, 678 25 F.Supp. at 965, citing Mercado Riera v. Mercado Riera, 100 P.R.R. 939

(1972) and Schneider v. Colegio De Abogados De Puerto Rico, 670 F.Supp. 1098, 1104 (D.P.R. 1987). Under Puerto Rico law, “[i]n order that the presumption of the res adjudicata may be valid in another suit, it is necessary that, between the case decided by the sentence and that in 1 5 which the same is invoked, there be the most perfect identity between the 3 ||things, causes, and persons of the litigants, and their capacity as 4 |\such.” 31 P.R. Stat. Ann. ° § 3343 (2002). “While the statute refers only to res judicata and “the ° most perfect identity between ...causes” the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 7 3 has recognized the operation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel where 9 issues and parties are the same.” Esteves, 678 F.Supp. at 965, 10 ||citing Pereira v. Hernandez, 83 P.R.R. 156, 161 n. 7 (1961). 11 The phrase “perfect identity” is not interpreted literally by courts in Puerto Rico. Boateng v. InterAmerican University, Inc., 210 F.3d 56, 61 (1°° Cir. 2000), citing Cruz, 204 F.3d at 19; Futura Dev. Corp. v. 15 Centex Corp., 761 F.2d 33, 43-45 (1°* Gir. 1985). “Thing” refers to the 16 ||object or matter over which the action is exercised. Boateng, id., 17 ||citing Lausell Marzuach v. Diaz de Ya ez, 3 P.R. Offic. Trans. 742, 745 18 (1975). “The test for identity of ‘things’ is whether a decision in the second action may contradict the prior adjudication.” Boateng, id., 20 citing A & P Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Asociacién Cana, 10 P.R. Offic. 22 ||Trans. 987, 998 (1981). “Cause” refers to the principal basis, main 23 |}ground or origin of the action or exceptions raised and decided. Id.; 24 Esteves, 678 F.Supp. at 965, citing Lausell Marzuach. “Cause” should not 25 be confused with the means of proof or the legal grounds of the claims of the parties. Id. “The requirement of identity of causes does not prevent the res judicata doctrine from being applied to a second case simply because the plaintiff alleges a new legal theory in the new case.” Lugo Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Institute of Culture, 221 F.Supp.2d 229,

1 3 237 (D.P.R. 2002). “Identity of persons” may be found, even though there 3 some differences in the parties listed in the two actions, if the 4 ||parties on each side, in each action, have identical interests. Esteves, 5 678 F.Supp. at 965. 6 CONCLUS ION 7 3 In view of the foregoing, the court finds that there are no relevant 9 |)facts in controversy AND that the issue concerning the fees paid to Mr. 10 ||/Cajigas in the bankruptcy case was adjudicated and may not be 11 relitigated. Consequently, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is 12 hereby granted. 13 The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing the complaint. 14 15 SO ORDERED. 16 San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 29 day of March, 2006.

{ 19 ENRIQUE S. LAMOUTTE INCLAN U.S. Bankruptcy Judge 20 21 DEBTOR JOSE RAUL CANCIO BIGAS 22 ANTONIO FIOL-MATTA ANA D. CAJIGAS MORALES 23 SANTIAGO MARI ROCA 24 UST 25