In Re Psychiatric Hospitals of Florida Inc.

217 B.R. 645, 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 195, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2171, 1997 WL 828292
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedApril 28, 1997
DocketBankruptcy 95-2531-8P1
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 217 B.R. 645 (In Re Psychiatric Hospitals of Florida Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Psychiatric Hospitals of Florida Inc., 217 B.R. 645, 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 195, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2171, 1997 WL 828292 (Fla. 1997).

Opinion

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEBTOR’S MOTION TO DETERMINE TAX LIABILITY

ALEXANDER L. PASKAY, Chief Judge.

THIS IS a yet to be confirmed Chapter 11 case filed by Psychiatric Hospitals of Florida, Inc., d/b/a Horizon Hospital (Debtor). The immediate matter under consideration is the Debtor’s Motion to Determine Tax Liability pursuant to Section 505 of the Bankruptcy Code and Motions for Summary Judgment on the same filed by the Pinellas County Tax Collector and the Pinellas County Property Appraiser. The taxes under consideration are ad valorem and non-ad valorem taxes assessed by Pinellas County for the 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996 tax years. The Debtor, in its Motion, contends that the amount of taxes are incorrect because they are based on an incorrect valuation of the property, subject to the taxes. Based on the foregoing, the Debtor contends that it is entitled to a revaluation of the property and, in turn, a reduction of the Debtor’s tax liability.

In due course, the Pinellas County Tax Collector filed a Motion to Dismiss the Debt- or’s Motion to Determine Tax Liability. In his Motion, the Tax Collector contended that, pursuant to Florida Statute § 197.332, the Tax Collector is mandated to bill and collect the amount of taxes levied by the county based on the certified tax roll. Accordingly, the Tax Collector contended that he has no statutory authority to alter the assessments or, to change the tax rolls. Additionally, the Tax Collector contended that the real party of interest is the Property Appraiser, not the Tax Collector, and since the Debtor has failed to name the Property Appraiser, an indispensable party, this Court should deny the Debtor’s Motion. On January 30, 1997, however, the Debtor filed a response to the Tax Collector’s Motion to Dismiss contending *647 that the failure to serve the Property Appraiser was an oversight and that this defect has been cured, as the Property Appraiser has been served.

On January 29, 1997, the Pinellas County Property Appraiser filed his Motion to Dismiss. In his Motion, the Property Appraiser contended that the Motion filed by the Debt- or is, in effect, an action to determine the extent of the lien or other interest in property and, as such, it was procedurally improper because such an action could only be brought by instituting an adversary proceeding. Additionally, the Property Appraiser contended that the Debtor faded to join an indispensable party, the State of Florida, Department of Revenue. Moreover, according to the Property Appraiser, the Debtor’s Motion seeks to have this Court act in constitutional violation of the sovereign immunity of the State of Florida (sic), Pinellas County, and Jim Smith, Property Appraiser. Based on the foregoing, the Property Appraiser sought dismissal (sic) of the Debtor’s Motion to Determine Tax Liability, i.e. a denial of the Motion.

On February 4, 1997, the Tax Collector filed a renewed Motion to Dismiss the Debt- or’s Motion to Determine Tax Liability. The Tax Collector’s Motion merely repeated the grounds for dismissal set forth in the Property Appraiser’s Motion. On March 12, 1997, this Court held a pretrial conference in order to consider all pending Motions, particularly the Motions to Dismiss filed by the Tax Collector and the Property Appraiser. This Court heard arguments by the respective parties and denied the Motions filed by the Property Appraiser and the Tax Collector, without prejudice, and rescheduled the pretrial conference to hear arguments on any motions for summary judgment which may be filed by the parties on or before March 14, 1997.

On March 14, 1997, the Tax Collector and the Property Appraiser, separately filed respective Motions for Summary Judgment. Both parties contend in their respective motions that there are no genuine issues of material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In support of this proposition, both the Tax Collector and the Property Appraiser contend that the Motion filed by the Debtor is, in fact, a suit against the State of Florida which is barred by the 11th Amendment to the United States Constitution. Therefore, the Debtor’s Motion should be denied with prejudice.

Ordinarily, in light of the constitutional challenge to the Motion under consideration, the initial inquiry would be addressed to the impact of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), on the Debtor’s right to seek a determination of the Debtor’s tax liability. However, when one considers the Office of the Tax Collector and his duties, and the Office of the Property Appraiser, it is evident that it is unnecessary to consider the applicability of Seminole Tribe to the Motion based on 11 U.S.C. § 505 as it relates to the Tax Collector. This is so because of the well established constitutional doctrine that Federal courts should not pass on a constitutional question, if it is fairly possible to decide the matter under consideration without considering the constitutionality of the statute involved. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 7, 113 S.Ct. 2462, 2465-66, 125 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439, 445, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 1323, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988) (“A fundamental and long standing principle of judicial restraint requires that the courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.”); Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 2199, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981) (“Prior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision.”); Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105, 65 S.Ct. 152, 154, 89 L.Ed. 101 (1944) (“If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality ... unless such adjudication is unavoidable.”).

CLAIM AGAINST THE TAX COLLECTOR

Article VIII, Section 1(d) of the Florida Constitution establishes the Tax Collec *648 tor’s office and Florida Statute § 192.001(4) defines that office. Section 192.001(4), Florida Statutes provides that the Tax Collector is a county officer charged with the collection of ad valorem taxes levied by the County, the School Board, any Special Taxing District within the county, and any Municipality within the county. See Fla. Stat. § 192.001 (1995).

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Bluebook (online)
217 B.R. 645, 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 195, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2171, 1997 WL 828292, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-psychiatric-hospitals-of-florida-inc-flmb-1997.