In Re Propulsid Products Liability Litigation

261 F. Supp. 2d 603, 2003 WL 21108338
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Louisiana
DecidedApril 29, 2003
Docket1355
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 261 F. Supp. 2d 603 (In Re Propulsid Products Liability Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Propulsid Products Liability Litigation, 261 F. Supp. 2d 603, 2003 WL 21108338 (E.D. La. 2003).

Opinion

261 F.Supp.2d 603 (2003)

In re: PROPULSID PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION.
Dorita Black, et al.
v.
Johnson & Johnson, et al., and only regarding Plaintiff, Ernestine Brock, Civil Action No. 00-2497.

No. 1355.

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.

April 29, 2003.

*604 Russ M. Herma, Leoanrd A. Davis, Stephen J. Herman, Herman, Mathis, Casey Kitchens & Gerel, LLP, New Orleans, LA, liaison counsel for plaintiffs.

Roy F. Amedee, Jr., Law Office of Roy F. Amedee, Jr., LaPlace, LA, for Patricia L. Diez, Samantha Reed, plaintiffs.

Albert Joseph Rebennack, Jr., Caluda & Rebennack Law Firm, New Orleans, LA, for Ernestine J. Brock, plaintiff.

James B. Irwin, Quentin F. Urquhart, Jr., Irwin Fritchie Urquhart & Moore, LLC, New Orleans, LA, Thomas F. Campion, Susan M. Sharko, Drinker Biddle & Shanley LLP, Florham Park, NJ, Charles F. Preuss, Donald F. Zimmer, Jr., Drinker, Biddle & Reath, LLP, San Francisco, CA, Mary Catherine Roper, Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., Johnson & Johnson, defendants.

ORDER & REASONS

FALLON, District Judge.

Before the Court is the Defendants' Motion to Exclude Opinions of Dwain L. Eckberg, M.D. and William E. Shell, M.D. in the case of Ernestine Brock ("Brock"), a plaintiff in Civil Action No. 00-2497. The defendants challenge these experts' opinions as unreliable under the standards set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which in essence codified the Supreme Court's opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.

The defendants have also moved for summary judgment in Brock's case, arguing that if the only evidence relating to the causation of her injuries fails, then the plaintiff cannot carry her burden of proof as a matter of law. Since the Court grants the defendants' motion to exclude evidence, the motion for summary judgment will also be GRANTED. Defendants further move for partial summary judgment on the plaintiffs composition, express warranty, and design claims. Since the Court finds that the plaintiffs case fails because she cannot prove causation, it will DISMISS AS MOOT the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment.

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff Brock used Propulsid from January, 1996 to May, 1997 pursuant to the *605 instructions of her treating physician, Dr. George Howard. Dr. Howard prescribed Propulsid to treat Brock's severe esophagitis.[1] During the course of her treatment with Propulsid, Brock suffered no apparent cardiac incidents. In August, 2000, Brock was one of several plaintiffs who filed suit in the Eastern District of Louisiana alleging causes of action against Johnson & Johnson and Janssen Pharmaceutica for damages under the Louisiana Products Liability Act ("LPLA"), LA. REV. STAT, ann. § 9:2800.51-2800.60. The main basis of her complaint is that Propulsid was defective because it caused her to have a sustained prolonged QT interval,[2] which places her at risk for sudden death. Her case was consolidated with MDL-1355 for which this Court was designated the transferee court.[3] After several years of discovery, the Court exercised its role as the original trial court in the Brock case, and, after consulting with all parties, set the matter for trial. Defendants now move to exclude the opinions of Dr. Dwain Eckberg and Dr. William Shell, Brock's two expert physicians on the issue of Propulsid's sustained effects on Brock's QT interval.

II. Legal Standards

As noted above, the defendants challenge the experts' opinion as unreliable under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence; the rule provides:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

FED. R. EVID. 702.

The current version of Rule 702 was enacted in response to the Supreme Court's opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), which held that before an expert is allowed to testify the trial court must assess the reliability of the methodology used by the proposed expert and the relevance of the testimony to the facts at issue. According to the Advisory Committee Notes accompanying the rule, the amendment "affirms the trial court's role as gatekeeper and provides some general standards that the trial court must use to assess the reliability and helpfulness of proffered expert testimony." Advisory Committee Notes, FED. R. EVID. 702.

In Daubert, the Supreme Court identified a non-exclusive list of factors for a district court to consider in determining reliability: (1) whether the theory has been tested; (2) whether the theory has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error; and (4) the general acceptance of the methodology in the scientific community. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95, 113 S.Ct. *606 2786. A district court must focus on methodology, not conclusions. In Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), the Court cautioned that the district court must ensure "that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experiences, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field." Id. at 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167. The person seeking to admit the expert testimony bears the burden of proving reliability by a preponderance of the evidence. Moore v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir.1998) (en banc). After the proponent of the expert testimony has carried the burden of showing reliability, the party must also prove the expert opinions' relevance. That is, that the experts' opinions have "a valid ... connection to the pertinent inquiry." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592, 113 S.Ct. 2786. This Court heard the testimony of the experts and the arguments of the parties at a hearing set in advance of the trial date. After considering the testimony, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, the Court now rules on the motion.

III. Medical Background

Before analyzing the specific evidence presented in connection with the Daubert hearing, it is helpful to review the medical background surrounding cisapride (the generic name for Propulsid). This Court has had previous occasion to discuss this issue.

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