In re Powell

121 F. Supp. 33, 1954 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3362
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedMay 12, 1954
DocketNo. 1528
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 121 F. Supp. 33 (In re Powell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Powell, 121 F. Supp. 33, 1954 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3362 (D. Del. 1954).

Opinion

LEAHY, Chief Judge.

On January 27, 1953, Harper Feed Mills, Inc., petitioned to have Edwin R. Powell and Joshua E. Turaer and the partnership known as Powell & Turner, composed of the same individuals, adjudicated bankrupts. By answer the alleged bankrupts denied they were subject to an involuntary proceeding in bankruptcy because as individuals and as a partnership they were farmers engaged primarily in the raising of poultry in an unmanufactured state. The Referee, after hearing testimony, receiving evidence and considering counsel’s arguments, adjudged the individuals and the partnership bankrupts. The alleged bankrupts petition to review and set aside the Referee’s order of adjudication.

The record shows from 1937 until 1945, Powell & Turner, as individuals and partners, processed poultry in Sussex County, Delaware. From 1945 until July or August 1952, they engaged in raising broilers. In the operation of their business, they supplied all feed, medicine, and incidentals, bought the young chicks and placed them with various farmers for feeding and care in rented chicken houses; The partnership rented the farmers’ houses for raising the broilers under leases whose tenure was for the time necessary to raise a flock, usually about twelve weeks. Storage bins for feed were rented on a monthly basis. The all-important item of feed was ordred, billed, and shipped to the partnership, picked up by their trucks and either delivered on call to the various farmer-lessors or stored in the rented bins. Until mid-1952, the partners’ pattern of operation was to buy the baby chicks regularly and put them out for feeding and care until maturity, rather than to follow uniformly the twelve-week cycle of flocks. Thus, the partners generally had some broilers ready for market all the time. The capacity of their production at any one time was about 800,000 chickens. They owned in their own right a forty-five acre farm which had a chicken capacity of 72,000 and the necessary equipment, but the Referee found as a fact only a relatively few were raised on this farm by the partners themselves.

Each of the partners had assets including real estate held jointly with their wives; together they owned other realty at Bethany Beach, Delaware, from which they realized rents; they also owned five trucks, a tractor, a coal loader, some stoves, water troughs and feeders. Feed was bought on credit from several companies, and as of July 1952, the partners owed more than $250,000 to their feed suppliers. The partnership financial statement issued on September 12, 1950, showed a net worth of $175,475.74. The March 25, 1952, statement reflected a net worth of $213,426.46. Realty- — including property jointly owned by the partners and their wives but not identified as such in the assets — was included in both statements, in the first at a valuation of $172,-000 and in the second at $192,000. On May 17, 1952, a third partnership statement omitted about $140,000 of realty from the assets, representing the jointly-owned realty and showed a negative net worth of minus $139,528.15. After May 1952, the feed creditors and others refused the partners’ requests for further credit purchases and extensions of feed debts past due. From June to mid-August 1952, the partners raised only the [35]*35broilers on hand and marketed them as they matured, but put in no new flocks because of inability to obtain feed on credit. The last leases on chicken houses expired without renewal in mid-August, 1952. The storage bin leases were can-celled in July 1952, and the partners testified they then began to prepare for storage and office space on one of their own farms. Admittedly, no chickens were raised by the partnership or by the individuals after mid-August 1952 in either the rented houses or on the partnership farms. In July and September 1952, inconclusive meetings were attended by the partners and principal feed creditors, but no new credit came of them. During the period May-July 1952, cash or judgment notes aggregating more than $50,000 were paid or given by the partners to local creditors. On December 4, 1952, the partners committed the specified act of bankruptcy: while insolvent, they permitted Richards Milling Company, a feed creditor, to obtain a lien on their real estate by entry of a $125,444.93 judgment, which was not vacated or discharged within the following thirty days.

Petitioners claim they as individuals and as a partnership are farmers1 and are immune to an involuntary adjudication under the exception of § 4, sub. b of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 22, sub. b.2 The Referee found as a key fact they were not farmers on December 4, 1952, the date of the act of bankruptcy, since admittedly they raised no poultry from mid-August through December 1952 and none after that. Citing Judge Bradford’s comment on the farmer exception proviso in In re Mackey, D.C.Del., 110 F. 355, the Referee ruled the alleged bankrupts had not proved themselves within the exception by merely showing they had for some time in the past been farmers. Petitioning creditors have shown jurisdiction here since the bankrupts had not been engaged in farming for a reasonable time before the act of bankruptcy.

Petitioners advance five factual arguments to support their claim they were farmers on December 4, 1952:

1. Ownership of substantially the same property after the date of the act of bankruptcy as before when operations were at their peak level. The partnership property was not a controlling asset of the business as it was operated. The distinguishing feature of Powell & Turner’s method of operations was the use of property and facilities of others on a rental or profit-sharing basis to the practical exclusion of their own property. This was the core of their business. Retention of such incidental servicing property as the trucks, troughs, and coal loader is not indicative of a farmer’s status or even of an intent to be a farmer. It is as consistent with later use of these items in other non-farming employment, retention for purposes of their sale or rental to other farmers, or their use at some indefinite, future time when their former poultry business might be resumed. Use of the equipment in farming would have proved petitioners’ point; non-use is a contrary indication, and bare retention of such personal property is at best equivocal.

2. Adoption of no new occupation coupled with partners’ attempts to pacify feed creditors so poultry operations could be resumed. The negative evidence the partners have not chosen to follow a new occupation other than farming is weak. One who has once been a farmer but who ceases farming without [36]*36taking up a different work cannot accurately be termed a farmer by occupation. The most to be said is, his last occupation was farming or he formerly was a farmer. In any event, weighting this factor with such favorable significance as it might possibly have for the partners, it falls short of conviction. Further, it receives no support from the debtor-creditor meetings. The partners’ offer to resume operations was only on terms most favorable to them and without risk to them. They proposed the feed creditors would pay all business expenses, including increased salaries to the partners, profits would be shared by creditors and debtors, and partners would supervise operations as previously conducted. The proposition was summarily rejected by the creditors. All this is not evidence of such a bona fide attempt to settle with creditors that the cessation of business must be deemed an involuntary interruption and not an abandonment.

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Bluebook (online)
121 F. Supp. 33, 1954 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3362, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-powell-ded-1954.