In Re Petit

291 B.R. 582, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 340, 2003 WL 1860267
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Maine
DecidedMarch 12, 2003
Docket15-20727
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 291 B.R. 582 (In Re Petit) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Petit, 291 B.R. 582, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 340, 2003 WL 1860267 (Me. 2003).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER SETTING COMPENSATION

ARTHUR N. VOTOLATO, Bankruptcy Judge. *

In this long and contentious bankruptcy case, some background is necessary to put the following discussion about fees in proper perspective. The origin of this legend, which precedes Catherine Petit’s involuntary bankruptcy in 1993, is most notable for Petit’s post-petition crime spree, 1 and the damage to the administration of this case by the attorney for the Debtor’s friend and main co-conspirator, Paul Richard. Ironically, in the early stages of her fall from substantial citizen to convicted felon, and long before she inflicted so much damage upon others, Catherine Petit was herself fleeced out of several millions of dollars by a gang of Petit groupies, where Bernstein Shur malpractice settlement proceeds of $3,900,000 were disbursed to her “friends, advisors, and attorneys,” leaving Petit with less than $190,000. It was the poor handling, early on, of this scenario which prompted then Chief District Judge Gene Carter’s scathing but accurate assessment of the substandard manner in which this case was being addressed by the professionals, and under-supervised by the Bankruptcy Court. See Petit v. New England Mortgage Servs. Inc. (In re Petit), 182 B.R. 64, 72 (D.Me.1995). Although Judge Carter’s comments and admonitions were directed only to the Bernstein Shur situation, he was also somewhat clairvoyant — i.e., even before the ink was dry on his order affirming the appointment of a Chapter 11 Trustee, many of the same actors were embarking on a scheme that would double the magnitude of the misconduct which incurred his wrath in the first place. What this is all leading up to is that this sorry tale was probably made as bad as it is by the apathy and inattention of Court-appointed professionals to the mischief that was ongoing, literally under our noses. I say our noses because this Court shares blame with those being admonished here, for not being more pro active in overseeing the professionals and in not formally ordering closer monitoring of a Debtor who absolutely needed closer monitoring. In classic Keystone Cop fashion (except that nothing here is funny), much of the work of the fiduciaries in this case has consisted largely of closing doors after the damage has been done.

In any event, here are some highlights which make this whole episode the disaster that it is: The case has seen three trustees and many professionals, had varied chapter status for nearly 20 months, and finally in October 1995 ended up in Chapter 7 for good. Things at first appeared to be proceeding normally, until Peter Fessenden, Esq., the original Trustee who was aggressively performing his statutory duties, abruptly quit the job after receiving threats by counsel for Paul Richard, one of Fessenden’s prime targeted defendants. Specifically, Joseph S.U. Bodoff, Esq., promised Fessenden that he would be sued and held personally and financially responsible (for what, we still don’t know) unless all legal action against his client was dropped, and unless Fessenden dismissed *585 his adversary proceeding brought against Petit 2 to deny her discharge. Getting really up close and personal, Bodoff told Fessenden “we’ll take your house” unless Fessenden backed off. That this comment was made in the presence of Mrs. Fessen-den eliminated any possibility that Mr. Fessenden might reconsider his decision to resign. It was also apparent that other things were said during the encounter, but Fessenden, admittedly and visibly intimidated, refused to go into detail, even when pressed by the Court at a hearing on April 30, 1996. Bodoff also did a masterful job avoiding any specifics when queried on this subject, again only by the Court. 3 That single confrontation which left the estate without a Trustee, halted all the momentum, removed all scrutiny from the Debtor by diverting the attention of professionals to obtaining new professionals, and otherwise seriously derailed the orderly progress of the case — a disruption from which the estate never recovered. 4 By any standard, Bodoff could not have scored higher on the accomplishment of his mission, which was totally out of bounds both morally and professionally.

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3057(a), I reported the incident to the United States Attorney for the District of Maine, to investigate whether a bankruptcy crime or other misconduct had been committed, and to report to the Court, in writing, the result of his inquiry. Time passed, and nothing happened. After my early polite requests, and later not so polite demands for a substantive answer were ignored, the Maine U.S. Attorney finally responded one day by telephone: “we’re not taking any action, and we’re not telling you why.” Add to this the fact that Mr. Bodoff was never interviewed by the U.S. Attorney, the matter takes on an odor all of its own. Besides reflecting unfairly on the many not so arrogant Department of Justice agents, this autocratic behavior also sends the unfortunate message DON’T BOTHER US, to anyone inclined to obey 18 U.S.C. § 3057(a), which requires:

Any judge, receiver, or trustee having reasonable grounds for believing that any violation under chapter 9 of this title or other laws of the United States relating to insolvent debtors, receiverships or reorganization plans has been committed, or that an investigation should be had in connection therewith, shall report to the appropriate United States attorney all the facts and circumstances of the case, the names of the witnesses and the offense or offenses believed to have been committed. Where one of such officers has made such report, the others need not do so.

18 .U.S.C.A. § 3057(a) (emphasis added). These vignettes partially explain the Court’s frustration and dissatisfaction with some of the performances in this case, and why this incident has been so benignly ignored.

Turning to more predictable sources of misconduct, i.e., the Debtor’s, the principal asset of this estate has always been a claim against Key Bank, which was pending in the Maine State Courts since 1986. Over *586 time, all counts of the Complaint were dismissed, except one alleging tortious interference with the Debtor’s contractual relationship with another bank. As this asset was being administered in the Bankruptcy Court, but while the professionals were ineptly trying to cure the Fessenden resignation and counsel conflict problems, the Debtor, with the help of Paul Richard and others, began, on a very large scale, illegally selling shares of the same cause of action to (mostly elderly) Maine residents. The ruse was that people were induced to advance money to finance “Petit’s litigation” against Key Bank, with promises of extravagant returns on their investments, plus really big bonuses for everybody when the matter was concluded.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
291 B.R. 582, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 340, 2003 WL 1860267, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-petit-meb-2003.